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ABSTRACT
REVISIONIST ZIONISM IN AMERICA: THE CAMPAIGN TO WIN PUBLIC
SUPPORT 1939-1948
by
Joanna Maura Saidel 
University of New Hampshire, December, 1994
Shortly before the outbreak of World War II, followers of the 
Zionist Revisionists went to the United States at the urging of their 
leader, Vladimir Jabotinsky. They established two groups which 
initially attempted to gain public support for the creation of a Jewish 
Army.
The New Zionist Organization of America, headed by Benzion 
Netanyahu, followed the Revisionist political party. Its campaign 
exposed the anti-Jewish position of the British in Palestine. It was 
effective in placing the Palestine problem on the world (rather than 
regional) agenda of the State Department
The Irgun Delegation to the United States, headed by Hillel 
Kook (Peter Bergson), acted independently, in defiance of the 
Revisionist political party. While assisting in some rescue work for 
the underground Irgun Z’vai Leumi, the American delegation did 
work which was primarily political and educational.
Though independent of one another, the efforts of both groups
vi
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
heightened public awareness of the extermination of European 
Jewry. They created a nationwide advertisement campaign which 
pressured the United States government through growing public 
support They fought for a Jewish Army and later for statehood. They 
were the pioneers of the Jewish lobby in America.
The Irgun Delegation provided intelligence to the United States 
in World War II and aided in the rescue of American airmen. They 
also helped to forestall the pro-Arab policy of Franklin Roosevelt His 
allegiance and promises to Ibn Saud resulted from wartime national 
security concerns which necessitated Saudi oil concessions and 
guarantees for an American air base at Dharan.
The Irgun Delegation to the United States and the New Zionist 
Organization of America have generally been overlooked, or 
incorrectly described, in American Jewish historiography. Personal 
interviews, F.B.I. files, and government documents confirms that 
they were two distinct, independent organizations having different 
philosophies and goals. They remained neutral toward one another 
until Hillel Kook called for a democratic (rather than Jewish) state in 
Palestine. This resulted in charges that the Irgun Delegation was 
anti-Zionist and in an open attack by the NZO. The antagonism which 
existed between the two groups was never totally resolved.
vii
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1INTRODUCTION
This dissertation traces the development of the Revisionist 
Zionist movement in America from 1939 to 1948. It begins With a 
survey of the history of Zionism, its meaning, origins, leaders, and 
development Biblical, political, geopolitical, and socialist Zionism are 
discussed in this section, which provides background material for the 
second chapter, “Revisionist Zionism Comes to America.”
Leaders of the Revisionist movement decided, in 1939, that it 
would be beneficial to their cause to campaign in America. It was 
believed that only there could enough influence be exerted to force 
the British to change their position on Palestine. Revisionists thought 
that, as British power waned, America would become the world 
leader and could, thereby, help the Zionist cause.
The two most im portant groups within the Revisionist 
movement to undertake this mission were the New Zionist 
Organization of America, an affiliate of the Revisionist political party, 
and the Irgun Delegation to the United States, which was sent by the 
Revisionist m ilitary arm, the Irgun Z’vai Leumi, in Palestine. While 
the former organization was political, philosophical and activist, the 
latter was also activist but had no attachment to the political party,
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operating rather as a practical m ilitary organization, for the most 
part independently under various names. These included The 
Committee for a Jewish Army, The Hebrew Committee for National 
Liberation, and The American Friends for a Free Palestine. The leader 
of the New Zionist Organization was Benzion Netanyahu. The Irgun 
Delegation to the United States was headed by Hillel Kook, who was 
known in the United States as Peter Bergson.
Both groups came from the Jabotinsky school of thought which 
envisioned a Jewish national home in Palestine on both sides of the 
Jordan, with mass Jewish immigration and settlement. Jabotinsky 
was the head of the Revisionist party and also the head of the Irgun, 
although these were two independent organizations. While both 
groups came from the body of Revisionist Zionism neither believed 
that the Irgun Delegation to the United States was Revisionist in a 
political sense.
Jabotinsky visited America several times before 1939 but, 
despite his ever growing popularity in Eastern Europe, he failed to 
get support. American Jewry was firm ly under the control of Chaim 
Weizmann, president of the World Zionist Organization, and American 
Zionist leaders like Rabbi Steven Wise.
The first major campaign undertaken by both the New Zionist 
Organization and the Irgun Delegation was the drive to gain public
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support for the creation of a Jewish Army. Both groups utilized 
similar methods to gain this support. Particularly, they applied the 
innovative practice of running full page political advertisements in 
newspapers throughout the country. They also held mass rallies, and 
applied intense efforts to gain the support of public officials, 
congressmen, and members of the Roosevelt and Truman 
administrations. These were some of the first major Jewish lobbying 
efforts in the United States.
Chapter three, “The Campaign for a Jewish Army,” discusses 
the methods and tactics employed by the groups. It also emphasizes 
the reasons why such an army would be important to America and 
its Allies, as well as the reasons why Britain opposed such a force.
The Zionists believed that the defense of Palestine and the 
“World Island” was crucial to the Allied success of the war. The 
creation of a Jewish Army would have immediate benefits for the 
Allies and long term benefits for the Zionists. Palestine was at the 
center of the “World Island,” that is, at the crossroads to Asia, Africa, 
and Europe. It was the focal point of a major drive by the Axis 
powers. Not only could they win the war by taking this area (they 
were already in the Caucasus’, the Baltic, the Pacific, Europe and 
North Africa) but by obtaining this area would capture the Suez 
Canal and gain access to Middle East oil fields. By establishing a force
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of 200,000 dedicated Jewish opponents to Hitler who were familiar 
with the terrain, the British could afford to withdraw reinforcements, 
bring them home or station them elsewhere; and, by being in place 
(i.e. not needing to be transported to their destination) a Jewish army 
could play a vital part in the war effort
There were also long term benefits for the Zionists which the 
British were well aware of and which ultimately prohibited the 
creation of the force. The Jews of Palestine would become a strong, 
armed fighting force able to defend themselves and to force the 
British out of Palestine at the end of the war. The Jewish Army 
would, in effect, become the Army of Israel. Although the Jewish 
Army effort did not succeed, despite years of campaigning, it did 
result in the creation of the Jewish Brigade.
Chapter four focuses on the American political response to the 
Bermuda Conference on Refugees and to the ad campaign publicized 
by the Irgun Delegation in reaction to this Conference. The Irgun 
Delegation called the conference a mockery and a sham. Their 
response to the it, though accurate, caused their organization and 
reputation to suffer greatly because of the inept timing of their 
dynamic ad campaign. Had they been a bit more patient and careful 
it could have been extremely successful. As it turned out they 
released a shocking fu ll page ad before the official report on the
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Conference was issued. Because the names of many important 
officials and congressmen were attached to this ad without their 
consent, those persons were greatly angered and decried the Irgun 
Delegation publicly and on the Senate floor. The group lost many 
sponsors, including Harry Truman, because of this error in planning.
The fifth  chapter details the fight for a Jewish State. This 
section begins with the Hoskins Affair. Mr. Hoskins, aide to President 
Roosevelt, pressed for a joint Anglo-American declaration which 
would, in effect, stifle the Palestine question during the war and 
make a decision on Palestine depend upon Arab agreement. He 
advised that unless this was done there would be civil war which 
would endanger Allied war efforts. Only by a united Zionist lobbying 
effort was the Hoskins proposal overcome.
The ad campaign, letters to the President, rallies, and marches 
(such as the march of 400 Orthodox rabbis on Washington in October 
1943) of the Irgun Delegation brought pressure to bear on the 
administration. Simultaneously, the New Zionist Organization 
continued to expose British aspirations in Palestine, to criticize that 
government’s policy and to push for a nationwide boycott of British 
goods. At the same time it made important inroads into the U.S. 
government by its persistent well planned campaign.
Other Irgun Delegation efforts included the plan by Dr. Alex
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Raphaeli to establish an off shore radio station to broadcast news 
about the Holocaust to Europe. This is an interesting story which 
shows some of the problems faced by the Irgun in their contacts with 
the U.S. government. Other problems with the government are also 
discussed, particularly the efforts of Cordell Hull to have the F.B.I. 
investigate Hillel Kook and his group. The F.B.I. did conduct an 
investigation of the Hebrew Committee for National Liberation and 
looked into the status of Kook, his organizations, and their right to 
solicit funds in America. The findings of these queries are found in 
this chapter.1
This section also concentrates on the Irgun’s activities in 
Palestine, particularly the murder of Lord Moyne and the bombing of 
the King David Hotel, both of which had international repercussions. 
It was by the relentless, determined but unpopular action of the 
Irgun and Lechi that the British were forced to abandon the Mandate 
and turn the Palestine problem over to the United Nations. The Irgun 
Delegation to the United States was responsible for participating in 
some of these missions and for funding certain operations such as the 
purchase of the ship, Altalena , which was loaded with arms by the 
Irgun and brought to Palestine, only to face a grim end.
The negative effects of these actions are also stated, including 
charges by Abba Eban that the actions of the underground resulted
1 Chapter eight also contains material on the F.B.I. findings.
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in the postponement of statehood (i.e. of a partition plan scheduled 
for December 1944). It is unlikely that his scenario would have 
materialized.
The chapter moots the position taken by the United States 
government regarding the formation of the Jewish state, articulates 
the pros and cons of supporting the plan, discusses a plan for 
cantonization and the rejection of the Morrison-Grady Plan, and 
examines the role which the Revisionist Zionists in America played in 
shaping the final destiny of the Jewish state
Chapter six, “Rescue and Partition,” describes some of the 
practical work of the Irgun Delegation and the accomplishments it 
made in financing and purchasing rescue vessels. Menachem Begin 
became angry at the Irgun Delegation for this diversion of funds. He 
thought they should have been used at the front rather than for the 
purchase of a few vessels. The relations between the American and 
Palestinian branches of the Irgun deteriorated.
In January 1947 British Foreign Minister, Ernest Bevin, stated 
his position on Palestine in a cabinet paper which he sent to Prime
Minister Attlee. It said, “Without the Middle East and its oil [I see]
no hope of being able to achieve the standard of living at which we 
were aiming in Great Britain.”2 His plan was to have Palestine
2 Years of Wrath. Davs of Glory. Yitshak Ben Ami, New York: Shengold 
Publishers, Inc., 1983, p. 398.
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replace Egypt as the headquarters for the Imperial Forces in the 
region. Thereby, the communications, oil supplies and the strategic 
geopositioning of the British would be maintained and protected.
However, on February 18th the Palestine question was turned 
over to the United Nations. There is speculation on the reasons why 
Britain let the Mandate go to the U.N. These are presented in this 
chapter. The debate over partition continued within the government 
and in Jewish circles until the U.N. vote on Palestine in November 
1947.
The position of the U.S. State Department official, Loy 
Henderson, and his connection with Benzion Netanyahu are also 
discussed. Although Henderson was considered to be an opponent of 
Zionism, this chapter portrays a different picture of his position and 
of the changing views within the Department itself. While the State 
Department had been firm ly opposed to Jewish statehood, Benzion 
Netanyahu’s influence on Henderson may have paved the way to 
changes in State Department policy, particularly as the U.S. - Soviet 
conflict heated up.
Hillel Kook (Peter Bergson) continued to press for immediate 
action from the government to support a Jewish state (rather than 
partition) in Palestine. President Truman become increasingly 
irritated by the pressure which the Jews put upon him. “According
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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to the diaries of Henry Wallace, at a period of particular pressure he 
exclaimed at a cabinet meeting in mid-1946, “If Jesus Christ couldn’t 
satisfy them here on earth, how the hell am I supposed to?” He 
added later, “I have no use for them and I don’t care what happens 
to them.”3
Following the decision to partition Palestine, Hillel Kook (Peter 
Bergson) continued to petition President Truman to arm the Jews so 
that American forces would not have to be sent to Palestine to quell 
the fighting.
Chapter 7, “Begin’s Visit to the United States,” demonstrates 
the problem the U.S. government had in deciding whether to allow an 
alleged terrorist onto American soil. This political and diplomatic 
problem was also influenced by the public debate on the subject. 
Despite recommendations that Begin be banned from the United 
States, there was support for the visit. Mr. Begin was the head of 
the strongest opposition party in Israel. His party was also rightist 
and anti-communist. It was possible that the party would become 
the controlling power in Israel in which case, if the United States did 
not grant him the visa, they would be excluding the future Prime 
Minister of Israel.
This is followed by a chapter about the extent and range of the
3 Spiegel. The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict: Making America’s Middle East
Policy, from Truman tq Reagan, p. 20.
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workings and contacts of the Irgun Delegation to the United States,
and its connections with Reuben Hecht in Europe. The archives of Dr.
Reuben Hecht are important to the study of Revisionist Zionism in
America because they clearly show the place which the Irgun
Delegation to America held in the overall scheme of Jewish efforts to
save victims of the Holocaust Hecht’s papers
point to a major lacuna in the historiography of attempts 
made to rescue Jews from the Holocaust. The scholarly 
literature on the subject has been dominated by a tendency 
to emphasize the rescue efforts undertaken by the 
“establishment” Jewish and Zionist groups, such as the Jewish 
Agency, the Institute for Illegal Immigration, and the 
American Joint Distribution Committee, and not those of their 
rivals, the “dissident” organizations.4
Here the Irgun’s association with the American Consul General 
in Switzerland, Samuel Edison Woods, is established. He and Hecht 
collaborated to rescue Allied airmen and to coordinate efforts to 
rescue Jews. The primary advantage of this relationship for the Irgun 
Delegation in America was that it provided a direct contact between 
the underground and the White House, rather than through the 
official intelligence center in Bern headed by the Zionist opponent, 
Allen Dulles.
Hecht evaluated the work of the Irgun Delegation to America in 
a very positive light. When Hecht was asked, during a war trial in
4 Introduction, Archives o f the Holocaust . Hecht Archive-Universitv of 
Haifa, p .ix .
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1954, what he believed contributed to bring the most pressure on 
the United States to help the Jews he credited Hillel Kook’s group, 
saying, “I think that the great pressure was carried out by the large 
advertising campaign in the press and the mass meetings of the 
“Hebrew Committee.” 5
This chapter also demonstrates the continuing difficulties in 
trying to get help from the American government to bomb the 
railways and crematoria at Auschwitz. Hecht testified that 
Eisenhower and McClelland refused to take such action on the 
grounds that they were not flighting a Jewish war and that they did 
not want the Germans to think that the Americans perceived it as 
such.
Samuel Edison Woods helped to stop the British blockade of 
arms and immigration ships to Palestine. These contacts were also 
successful in getting intelligence concerning the planned Nazi 
invasion of England. Hecht and Woods helped to bring American 
pilots and captains of the Air Force, who were interned in 
Switzerland, to freedom and to prepare suggestions for psychological 
warfare against the Germans. Woods nominated Reuben Hecht for the 
American Medal of Freedom.
From evidence in this chapter it is possible to conceive that the 
long delayed charges against Hillel Kook (Peter Bergson) in the
8 Hecht Archive, p. 176.
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United States (i.e. regarding his alien status) and the casual attitude 
toward him taken by the F.B.I. (their reluctance to investigate his 
activities and status) were, in reality, because he was seen as an 
asset to the American war effort.
Kook’s fund raising work in America was essential to the rescue 
work of Reuben Hecht and William Perl. The Irgun Delegation 
partially funded the S.S. Sakarya, the S.S. Pencho, and other rescue 
missions. Kook and Hecht worked hand in hand.
The position of Reuben Hecht proved to be convenient for the 
Irgun Delegation in America in other ways. The Hebrew Committee 
for National Liberation needed, for their political work, money in 
France and other places. Reuben Hecht was essential to the 
movement of these funds. Hillel Kook arranged for him to be Consul 
in order to be able to bring gold from Switzerland to Paris, and to 
have a free travel possibility.
When asked, in 1982, what the major contribution of the Irgun 
and people like Hillel Kook made, and what deserved historical 
emphasis, Hecht replied, “I think that the battle of the Irgun, not I 
think, Churchill said it, that the Irgun was one of the reasons that the 
British left Palestine.”6 Hecht also stated his belief in the importance 
and effectiveness of the propaganda of the Hebrew Committee in 
America.
8 Hecht Archive, p. 467.'
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Chapter nine of this study calls into question the motives for 
President Roosevelt’s lack of efforts to help the Jewish victims of the 
Holocaust. It may be that Roosevelt was more interested in obtaining 
and retaining the loyalty of Ibn Saud, oil concessions and the rights 
to the Dharan air base than he was in assisting the abandoned Jews. 
His interests in Saudi Arabia were based on national security 
concerns. Oil was instrumental in fueling the war and the air base 
was a necessary stopover and fueling point for American war efforts 
in the Pacific. He may, therefore, have considered these to be 
overriding concerns. Ibn Saud was adamantly opposed to a Jewish 
state in Palestine. Agreements for oil and Dharan may have been 
contingent on Roosevelt’s isolation from the Jewish problem.
The simultaneous development of a dual U.S.-Israeli, U.S.-Saudi 
defense policy was directly affected by Revisionist Zionist efforts in 
America. Had these efforts failed and had the Revisionists not 
pressed the Jewish issue by drawing major public attention to it the 
United States may have adopted a purely pro-Arab policy, 
guaranteeing access to oil and to strategic military positions without 
the complications of support for the Jewish State. The public outcry 
however, which resulted in part from the activities of the Revisionist 
Zionists and the Irgun Delegation in America, called attention early 
on (1939-1942) to the plight of the European Jews, later (1942-
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1945) to the moral responsibility of the U.S. government to help save 
them, and, finally (1945-1948) urged the U.S. government to support 
and defend a Jewish State in the Near East. The defense of Israel by 
the U.S. government not only sustained the creation of a democracy 
in the region but in later years helped to balance the growing power 
of the Arab nations, to repulse Soviet aggression, and to maintain U.S. 
hegemony in the region.
The United States dual policy of support for both Jerusalem /  
Tel Aviv and Mecca /  Riyad would become the fulcrum of an 
ongoing balancing act to maintain peace in the region.
Chapter ten examines problems of terminology. Particularly, it 
faces the problem of who was a Revisionist and who was not. It 
presents the views of those involved and argues that, despite 
negation on both sides, the Irgun delegation were Revisionists, 
having come from the Revisionist Zionist school of thought. This does 
not, however, deny that they had no affiliation to the Revisionist 
political party, that they operated independently, and that they were 
essentially a m ilitary, not a political, organization. Each group sees 
itself as being the bearer of truth and as the most effective voice on 
the American scene, sometimes begrudgingly attributing credit to 
the other for unquestionable successes. They openly call each other 
liars and deceivers. The members of these two groups and those
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interviewed from Labor and Lechi are all powerful characters, 
intelligent, with strong opinions. They have dedicated their lives to 
their beliefs and are not afraid to express their views. While each 
holds his own viewpoint to be the truth it seems that there is some 
truth to all of their views. Each, with one exception, seems to be 
correct in their view. Their combined work, though criticized by 
each other, was effective on a broad scale, in ultimately bringing 
forth the creation of the State. They succeeded in applying enough 
public pressure, by drawing attention to the plight of the Jews, to 
demand worldwide support for the Jewish State.
The antagonism which existed between the two groups was 
never totally resolved. American Revisionists alleged that the Irgun 
Delegation deviated from the leadership of Jabotinsky, ( i.e. their 
decision to act independently in America, to act as a military rather 
than political entity, and to establish a democratic, rather than a 
Jewish State in Palestine.) The decision to support a democratic state 
was the determining factor in Benzion Netanyahu's decision to launch 
an attack on the Irgun Delegation. The democratic state idea 
belonged to Hillel Kook and was not supported by all members of the 
Irgun delegation. Dr. Alex Raphaeli and Yitshak Ben Ami opposed the 
idea. Because of Kook’s position as leader of the delegation the idea 
was presented publicly as that of the whole group. This proved to be
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a very contentious point
The final chapter of this dissertation discusses the effects of the 
Irgun Delegation to the United States and the New Zionist 
Organization of America on U.S. public opinion and on American 
foreign policy. It argues that their work stirred and challenged the 
American public, forcing additional pressure on the government to 
help the Jews of Europe and later to support a Jewish state in 
Palestine. It also argues that the work of the Irgun Delegation may 
have been effective in forestalling an outright pro-Arab policy, while 
the work of the New Zionist Organization (NZO) exposed the British 
intentions in Palestine.
The activist role of both groups forced mainstream Zionists, 
who had isolated themselves, to reexamine their position and 
eventually drove them out of their silence, forcing them to adopt 
some of the policies of the NZO and Irgun delegation. Emboldened by 
the successes of these groups in America, it has been contended that 
Wise and Silver pressed President Truman and David Niles to resist 
the State Department and to stand solidly for the creation of a Jewish 
State. Wise and Silver did not acknowledge the work of Kook and the 
Irgun until the late 1940’s. One may be certain however that the 
rabbis used to their advantage every opportunity which resulted 
from the work of this group.
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The Irgun Delegation and the New Zionist Organization may 
have been the main forces to originate and stimulate a powerful 
Jewish lobby in America. They positively affected the creation of the 
only democracy in the Near East. Had the Zionists been more passive 
it is possible that a Jewish State in Palestine would not have resulted. 
Palestine would have remained in British hands or become an Arab 
entity.
In the final analysis the disunity within the Zionist ranks in 
America was actually beneficial to some degree. Their independence 
from each other gave them the liberty to take actions which they 
would otherwise have been unable to have excuses for. The violence 
could be condemned while the effects of that violence could give 
credibility to the idea of a de facto government in place in Palestine. 
Certainly violence tarnished the relationship between Jewish leaders 
and U.S. Government officials. This was temporary, however.
While most American Jews were afraid to risk the security 
which they felt in the United States by exhibiting loyalty to an 
ancient homeland, the Irgun Delegation and the New Zionist 
Organization did not harbor this fear. Their leaders were not 
American citizens. They could afford to take chances. Only when it 
was clear that a Jewish State would become a reality did the 
mainstream feel safe enough to openly endorse the groups' activities.
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By then the War of Independence was being fought and support of 
American Jews was essential to press the government to aid the 
newborn State of Israel. Statehood gave added legitimacy to the 
Irgun. American leaders were suddenly faced with the possibility of 
an Irgun led government. Although this did not materialize 
immediately, the Revisionist factor has continued to play an 
important role in Israeli politics to the present day (i.e. the present 
Likud party). The Irgun was one of the only so-called terrorist 
groups that brought about a democracy rather than a leftist 
totalitarian regime. For this the world can be thankful.
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CHAPTER 1
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ZIONIST MOVEMENT
What is Zionism? How did it originate? Who were its leaders? 
What did it accomplish? The term Zionism comes from the root word 
Zion. Although the origin of the word is uncertain there is no doubt 
that Zion refers to a hill and fortress in Jerusalem. First used as the 
name of the Jebusite fortress on the southeast of Jerusalem, below 
the Ophel and the Temple Mount, Zion came to be known as the “City 
of David.” Sometimes Zion referred to the Temple Mount alone. 
During the time of the Macabees the Mount was called the 
“Mountain of Zion.” By the time of Josephus however, Zion included 
the upper city and the upper agora. The slight deviations in the exact 
definition of Zion were eclipsed by the generally accepted definition 
which has survived for centuries. This definition, which developed 
very early in Jewish history, made Zion synonymous with Jerusalem. 
It has, since the destruction of the First Temple, had a special 
meaning which reflected the yearning of the Jewish people for a 
homeland.
Some of the earliest references to the longing for Zion are cited 
in the Bible. “By the rivers of Babylon, there we sat down, yea, we
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wept, when we remembered Zion,” writes the psalmist.1
The Bible guaranteed the “Promised Land” to the children of 
Israel. This land was to extend from the River of Egypt to the 
Euphrates River.2 However, as time passed, the transgressions of 
Israel caused God to sever them from their land and to disperse 
them to the ends of the earth.3
Zionism was bom from the desire for, and the Biblical promise 
of, return to the land of Israel. Jerusalem was biblically designated as 
the eternal capital of Israel.4
The wanderings and persecutions of the Jewish people served 
to reinforce their desire for a homeland. s Only recently did this 
longing for Zion acquire the name, Zionism, which became an official 
political movement.
Some of the earliest precursors of the modern Zionist 
movement were found in Europe. Napoleon Bonaparte proposed a 
Jewish State in Palestine, ?lbeit for his own political reasons. He 
wanted the Jews to side with him against the Turks. The reward for 





5 See Appendix A for list of expulsions
8 Napoleon Bonaparte from his Headquarters in Jerusalem, April 20, 1799, 
from The Rise of Israel: A Documentary Record from the Nineteenth Century to 
1948. Hereafter referred to as R.O.I.. vol. 1, document 1.
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In nineteenth century Great Britain, there were also calls for a 
Jewish national homeland in Palestine by high ranking officials.7 This 
plan, in contrast to that of the French, envisioned cooperation with 
the Turks in the form of a Jewish protectorate of the Sultanate.8 The 
Ottoman government, however, failed to accept this proposal9 Feeling 
that the request had been misunderstood another proposal was sent 
with the approval of Qjueen Victoria.10
This also failing, appeals were made by British officials for 
European assistance in the establishment of a homeland in Palestine 
for the Jews.11 Jews throughout Europe were called upon by the 
Board of Deputies of British Jews to implement this proposal.12 This 
paved the way for the emergence of Zionism in Europe.
Due to Palestine’s strategic location at the crossroads of Asia 
and Africa, and its proximity to the Red Sea and the Suez Canal, 
British support for the Jews became more geopolitical than 
humanitarian in nature.13 Various schemes for Jewish settlement 
under British supervision emerged. One was that the world owed the
7 F.O. 78/368 - No. 2, British Foreign Office, R.O.I. vol. 1, document 9.
8 F.O. 78/390 - No. 134, British Foreign Office, R.O.I.. vo l.l, Document 11.
0 Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston -Enclosure No. 24, F.O. 195/185 
- No. 19, British Foreign Office. R.O.I.. document 13.
10 F.O. 78/427 -.No. 33, British Foreign Office, R.O.I.. vol. 1, document 15.
11 Letters from Col. Charles H. Churchill to Moses Montefiore, June 14, 1841 
and August 15,1842. R.O.I.. vol. 1, documents 17 & 18.
12 R.O.I.. document 19
13 Colonel Churchill, Mount Lebanon, a Ten Years Residence, from 1842- 
1852. London. 1853 (vol. i., pp. v-x), R.O.I., vol. 1, document 2.
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Jews retribution for the atrocities committed against their people.14 
Another advanced the idea that domination of Palestine would 
provide the shortest and safest lines of communication with British 
colonies in the Far East.15 A third proposed the development of the 
agriculture and natural resources of the region. While such schemes 
appeared throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
the pogroms of Eastern Europe and Russia added to the urgency of 
these appeals.
This period marked the dawning, in Europe, of Zionism as a 
political movement. The movement rapidly gained momentum and, 
by the twentieth century, spread to America. The European 
precursors of modem Zionism were instrumental in planting the idea, 
in the minds of the oppressed Jews of Eastern Europe, that a Jewish 
state in Palestine was realistic and feasible. They ignited an 
emotional spark which exploded with intensity.
Among the most influential of these leaders were two Germans, 
Moses Hess,16 known as the father of Zionist Socialism, and Max 
Bodenheimer,17 founder of the Zionist organization in Germany. They,
14 See Colonel George Gawler’s comments from a pamphlet entitled 
Tranauilisration of Syria and the East. London. 1845, pp.30-31. R.O.I.. vol. 1, 
document 22.
15 An address by Colonel George Gawler, January 25, 1853, Syria, and its near 
prospects.. .  p. 49, R.O.I.. vol. 1, document 23.
18 Hess’ philosophy is expounded in Rome and Jerusalem (Paris 1860), 
translated by M. Waxman, New York, 1918.
17 See The Memoirs of Max T. Bodepheimer: Prelude to Israel. New York, 
London, 1963.
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among others, laid the foundation for modern Zionism.
The term Zionism was coined by Nathan Bimbaum in the April 
1, 1890 edition of his journal Selbstem anzination. Birnbaum 
described Zionism in political and nationalistic terms as the 
“establishment of an organization of national - political Zionist party 
in juxtaposition to the practically oriented party that exists now.” He 
sought to replace the pure philanthropic approach which prevailed 
with a more vibrant nationalist movement. This definition of Zionism 
was generally accepted by the time of Theodore Herzl near the turn 
of the century.
By the early twentieth century (at the Eighth Zionist Congress 
in 1907) Chaim Weizmann coined the term “synthetic” Zionism, 
putting an end to the prolonged struggle between the two concepts 
within the Zionist movement (i.e. “political” and “practical” Zionism). 
Weizmann’s term defined Zionism as a symbiotic movement in which 
both approaches were necessary to insure success.
The religious, concept of Zionism differed from the practical and 
political approaches. This ingredient was both a stimulus and an 
obstacle to the movement. Zionism leaned heavily on Messianic hopes 
from which it derived much of its ideological and emotional appeal. 
While some religious leaders urged Jews to return to Zion in 
fulfillment of Biblical prophecy others believed that man could not
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bring about a Jewish messianic state but that only God could 
establish the true Israel. The Hibbat Zion (“Love of Zion”) movement, 
for example, which flourished in Jewish communities of Eastern 
Europe in the 19th century, contended that human endeavors to 
bring about a Messianic age would fail. Even today, a segment of the 
Israeli populace does not recognize the State of Israel.
Another problem that troubled and divided Zionists in the 
struggle between “practical” and “political” Zionists was the idea that 
Jewish nationalism could not be tolerated. However, the persecution, 
defamation, and the bloody pogroms in Eastern Europe 
overshadowed this concern. When, for example, in 1881, Czar 
Alexander II was assassinated, a wave of pogroms swept Russia and 
resulted in the belief among Jews that there was no future for Jews 
in Russia under the existing government. Some Jews turned to 
revolution, many to mass emigration, most became Zionists.
Jews such as Leon Pinsker believed that anti-Semitism was not 
limited to Russia but was an international phenomena. He called it 
Judophobia in an essay entitled Autoemancipation. Pinsker wrote 
that the nations of the earth feared the Jews because they were like 
a ghost which walked the earth without a habitation.18 He called 
Judeophobia an incurable, psychic aberration, a condition having the
18 Pinsker, Leon, Auto-Emancipation: An Appeal to his People bv a Russian 
Tew. 1882. English translation by D. S. Blondheim in B. Netanyhu (ed.), Road to 
Freedom. New York, 1944, p. 18.
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sole remedy of self - emancipation (i.e. by the creation of a national 
homeland).
Pinsker’s views were reiterated in the late 1800’s by a 
Viennese correspondent in Paris, Theodor Herzl. Unaware of 
Pinsker’s Autoemancipation. Herzl wrote Per Tudenstaat in which he 
expressed views nearly identical with those of the Russian, Pinsker. 
Herzl’s nationalist spirit was awakened as he covered the famous 
Dreyfus Affair in Paris. His growing awareness of anti-Semitism led 
him to take a bold political stand. He organized the first Zionist world 
congresses, established a Zionist newspaper, Die Welt, and ran the 
growing movement almost single - handedly. The official program of 
the movement was a plan to secure for the Jewish people a publicly 
recognized, legally secured home in Palestine, to encourage the 
settlement of Palestine by Jewish agricultural workers, laborers and 
those pursuing other trades. The plan also called for the unification 
and organization of all Jewry into local and wider groups in 
accordance with the laws of their respective countries, and the 
strengthening of Jewish self-awareness and national consciousness. It 
also planned for initial steps to obtain the consent of the various 
governments necessary for the fulfillment of the aims of Zionism.19
Herzl, who lived only forty four years, came to be known as the
'“Laqueur, A History of Zionism, p. 106.
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father of political Zionism. During his short life he founded the World 
Zionist Organization and began the work that resulted in the 
establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine.
By World War I Zionism had become a mass movement and a 
major political force. It has been argued, contrary to the belief that 
Zionism developed as a reaction to the inability of Jews to assimilate 
into the gentile world, that, conversely, it was a reaction to the fear 
of assimilation of Jewry within Gentile society whereby Jews could 
retain their unique existence through the creation of a political 
state.20
This nationalist sentiment was stimulated by the growth of 
racist nationalism within Christendom which objected to 
Jewish assimilation. Another important element destined to 
play a leading role in the Zionist movement was the religious 
sentiment of Orthodox Jewish groups which now saw in 
Jewish nationalism the only bulwark for the preservation of 
the Jewish fa ith .21
The first Jewish Supreme Court Justice, Louis D. Brandeis, 
became an ardent Zionist. He wrote, “Our task is to bring into 
Palestine, as rapidly as we can, as many persons as we can.”22 
Brandeis made Zionism credible by clearly declaring its compatibility 
with Americanism. Brandeis conceived of Zionism as essentially a
20 Stevens, Richard P., American Zionism and U.S. Foreign Policy 1942-1947. 
p. xv .
21 Ibid.
22 L. D. Brandeis. Brandeis on Zionism. Statement made on July 14,1920, to 
members of the American Delegation at the London Conference.
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democratic movement
The path of the Zionist in America, during this year of 
trial, has been relatively clear solely because the Zionist 
ideals, the highest Jewish ideals, are essentially the 
American ideals. Democracy is also a Zionist concept. Social 
justice is also a Zionist aim. Full and complete liberty is an 
essential of triumphant Zionism as it is the Jewish ideal of 
the twentieth century. As Americans, and as Jews battling 
for American ideals, we may look forward to the support 
of a great majority of the Jews of the United States.23
Brandeis did not envision the accomplishment of this goal in 
the same way as other Zionists did. Some of those, including Joseph 
Trumpeldor, Vladimir Jabotinsky, David Ben-Gurion and Izhak Ben- 
Zvi, were of a more m ilitant nature. During World War 1, they 
wanted to organize Jewish fighting units to assist the Allies. Their 
efforts resulted in the establishment of the Jewish Legion - the Zion 
Mule Corps, which fought at Gallipoli in 1915 and, in 1917, the 
Jewish battalions.
Between the first and second World Wars there was infighting 
within Zionist ranks. The spectrum of Zionism stretched from the far 
left Marxist, pro-communist, Ha-Shomer ha-Za’ir, to the Orthodox 
extremists of Agudat Yisrael which found Zionism to be too secular. 
The greatest problem during most of those years was the question of 
Jewish immigration, which was always strictly limited by the British
23 Brandeis, Remarks delivered by Louis D. Brandeis before the Convention 
of the Federation of American Zionists held in Boston and Chelsea in June, 
1915.
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in reaction to Arab opposition and violent outbursts. The World 
Zionist Organization controlled the distribution of entry permits 
for new immigrants, up to the number permitted in any one year by 
the British. How these permits were divided became a cause for a 
fiery struggle, both among the various Zionist factions which 
accepted the discipline of the world body and especially with the 
Zionist Revisionists, who regarded themselves as discriminated 
against
Who were the Revisionists and what did they do? Their full 
name was the Union of Zionists-Revisionists. They were later called 
the New Zionist Organization. Founded by Vladimir Jabotinsky the 
Revisionists maintained the maximalist Zionist political position. They 
were the strongest opposition group to the conciliatory policies of the 
mainstream Zionist movement led by Chaim Weizmann during the 
1920’s and 1930’s. Weizmann’s group accepted the British Mandate 
over Palestine and did not offer serious objection to their attempts to 
lim it Jewish immigration. To the contrary Jabotinsky believed that 
this policy would result in the creation of an Arab state since, under 
such circumstances, the Arab population would increase 
disproportionately to that of the lesser populous Jews. Jabotinsky’s 
plan to revise the Zionist policy came therefore to be known as 
Revisionism. His program called for active resistance to the British
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line.
Jabotinsky was a dynamic individual who seems to have highly 
affected everyone whom he came in contact with. For example, 
Former Prime Minister Yitshak Shamir, who was a leader of the most 
extreme underground movement, Lechi, was greatly inspired by his 
mentor.
And you cannot make, have, any distinction between 
Jabotinsky and the movement. The Revisionist movement 
is, we can say, is a creation of Jabotinsky. He was the 
founder of this movement, the inspirator (sic), and the 
ideologue, from the beginning and it continues to be after 
his disappearance. And you cannot make any distinction 
because it was his movement. . .  his movement. He was 
not only the leader, he was the, I wouid say, the 
incarnation of this movement. It ’s the Jabotinsky 
movement!24
The central tenets of the Revisionist plan for Palestine included the 
establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine on both sides of the 
Jordan, mass Jewish immigration and settlement, intensive 
agricultural cultivation of small plots, and mandatory arbitration of 
labor disputes, including the outlawing of strikes and lockouts during 
the initial period of statehood.2S
To combat Jabotinsky’s growing popularity, Chaim Weizmann 
made a deal with the leftist Labor party in Palestine. In exchange for
24 Interview with Yitshak Shamir by Joanna Saidel, Knessett, Jerusalem, 
Israel, June 2, 1993.
25 Encyclopedia Tudaiea. vol. 14, p. 129.
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their support in the World Zionist Congress he agreed to give them 
most of the funds from the World Zionist Organization as well as the 
majority of immigration certificates allocated by the British for entry 
into Palestine. This measure would allow the Labor party to increase 
their numbers and power in Palestine by assuring that the majority 
of new immigrants would support their party. This agreement 
enabled Weizmann to maintain his control of the World Zionist 
Organization.
Animosity between Weizmann’s supporters and those of 
Jabotinsky escalated and peaked in the famous Arlosoroff murder 
trial in which Revisionists were charged by the Laborites with the 
murder of the Socialist Zionist, Chaim Arlosoroff, who advocated a 
policy of peace and reconciliation with the Arab population in 
Palestine.26
Failure to reach an understanding with Arab leaders led
Arsoloroff to reconsider his previous contentions and to amend his
solution to the Palestine problem.
After 1929, while still maintaining the need for a political 
agreement with the Arabs, he asserted that the Arab 
national movement was dominated by the forces of social 
reaction and political tyrannyand blamed it for not having 
produced leaders like Sun Yat-sen or Gandhi. Arlosoroff 
favored cooperation on the municipal level, economic 
collaboration, the dispatch of Jewish students to A1 Azhar 
and other Arab universities, and Zionist support for
28 Walter Laqueur, A History of Zionism. New York: Schocken Books, 1989, p. 
242.
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Egyptian and Iraqi independence. But he was pessimistic 
with regard to the chances of an understanding with the 
Palestinian Arabs, for the simple reason that the Arabs 
were still convinced that they could defeat Zionism with 
violence.27
This pessimism led to ArlosorofPs adoption of partition or 
cantonization as the only viable solution to the problem short of a 
Jewish seizure of power.
Arlosoroff became the head of the political department of the 
Jewish Agency. While walking along the Tel Aviv coast on June 16, 
1933 he was shot. Revisionist leaders and others in Israel claim that 
he was murdered by two Arabs. This was supported by the legal 
confession of one Arab.— Revisionists contend that the blame was 
transferred to their party by Labor and the British in an attempt to 
discredit and vilify the Revisionist Party and to liquidate them 
politically, as public opinion would certainly mount against them, 
especially since Labor controlled the press. Because of this, 
Revisionists believed that no accurate reports of the trial were 
forthcoming. They decided to start their own daily newspaper. The 
editor of this paper was Benzion Netanyahu, whose father, Rabbi 
Nathan Mileikowsky, had been involved in helping to organize the 
public defense of the accused. He was instrumental in influencing
27 Ibid, p. 258.
“ Telephone conversation with Benzion Netanyahu, January 1995, from  
New York.
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Rabbi Kook to come out openly in defense of the accused. The 
circumstances of the murder were never formally resolved.29
Following this incident, a b itter propaganda campaign 
developed on both sides to discredit each other. The Rabbi, Hillel 
Kook (whose nephew later came to the United States as the leader of 
a delegation sent by the underground Irgun), sought reconciliation 
between the two groups by bringing Jabotinsky and Ben Gurion 
together in an attempt to reach an agreement and to focus their 
attention on a campaign against the British rather than against each 
other. An agreement was reached which had to be ratified by both 
parties. The Revisionists voted in favor of ratification. The Labor 
party however voted against it. Unable to made peace with Labor, 
Jabotinsky decided that the only alternative was to leave the World 
Zionist Organization.
In 1935 the Revisionists seceded from the World Zionist 
Organization and formed a new party called the New Zionist 
Organization (NZO). Vladimir Jabotinsky was elected president. The 
aim of the NZO was the same as the earlier Revisionist plan with an 
added emphasis on the “redemption of the Jewish people and its 
land, the revival of its state and language, and the implanting of the 
sacred treasures of Jewish tradition in Jewish life” through the 
creation of a Jewish majority on both sides of the Jordan and
29 Conversation with Benzion Netanyahu, October 1993, Jerusalem.
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liquidation of the Diaspora (i.e. emigration of all Jews to Palestine).
Shortly after Jabotinsky formed the New Zionist Organization 
new Arab riots broke out in Palestine. The Jews had to decide how to 
react to them. The leftists continued to rely on the British for their 
protection, but within the Revisionist movement a revolutionary 
section formed which demanded active resistance to the Arabs and 
to the British.30 These activists formed two groups, the Irgun Z’vai 
Leumi (National M ilitary Organization), and the group formed by 
Avraham Stern, which was known within the British camp as the 
“Stern Gang,” and which came to be called Lechi (acronym for 
Fighters for the Freedom of Israel).
According to Benzion Netanyahu, who was later to become the 
head of the political department of the New Zionist Organization in 
America, the British issuance of the 1939 White Paper marked the 
climax of the anti-Zionist British drive which aimed at the formal 
liquidation of Zionism.31 Under the terms of the White Paper only 
75,000 Jews would be allowed to enter Palestine (with a small 
additional number, annually), the Jews would be allowed to buy only 
a few more pieces of land, and that would be the end of it.32 This 
decision caused the revolutionary Revisionists to decide to attack the
30 Conversation with Benzion Netanyahu, October 29, 1993, Jerusalem, Israel.
31 Telephone conversation with Benzion Netanyahu, January 23, 1995, from 
New York.
“ Conversation with Benzion Netanyahu, October 29, 1993, Jerusalem,
Israel.
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British rather than the Arabs.
By the late 1930’s the New Zionist Organization became
alarmed at the situation in Europe and created a ten - year plan to
absorb a million and a half Jews in Palestine through clandestine
shipments of Jews prim arily from Eastern Europe.33 There was
impressive support for Jabotinsky there, “not just among the simple
unsophisticated people willing to give their blessing to anyone
promising them salvation; it was especially marked among the young
generation and the intelligentsia. For, as the world situation
deteriorated, there was growing impatience among all sections of the
Jewish communities.”34
Though at odds with the British government Jabotinsky urged
the Revisionists to abstain from their struggle against the British
during World War II so that efforts could be concentrated on
defeating the Nazis and on the formation of a Jewish Army to fight
with the Allies. While most Revisionists accepted this idea the
minority group, headed by Abraham Stem, rejected it. In September,
1938, his m ilitant stand was endorsed in Warsaw at the world
conference of Betar (an activist Zionist youth movement). Betar’s
leader, Menachem Begin, called for increased militancy.
We are standing on the threshold of the third phase of 
Zionism,” Begin declared. “After ‘Practical Zionism’ and
33 The Ten Year Plan for Palpstinp. T nnrinn 1938.
34 Laqueur, A History of Zionism, p. 369.
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‘Political Zionism’ the time has come for ‘M ilitary Zionism.’ 
Eventually, military and political concepts will merge, bu t. .
. if  we create our m ilitary strength, the salvation of the 
diaspora w ill come. The world is indifferent . . .  its 
conscience ignores what is happening to our people. The 
League of Nations is impotent. We cannot continue on this 
road. We want to fight! To win or die!35
This rejection of a wartime truce with the British led to a split 
in the Irgun, in 1940, when the group led by Avraham Stern seceded 
from the Irgun following the death of Jabotinsky. The name of 
Stem’s group was changed in 1942, following the murder of Stern, 
to Lohamei Herut Israel (i.e. Lechi).
While the Irgun suspended its aggression against the British 
until Menachem Begin took command in 1944, Stem continued his 
armed struggle during the war. He pursued the ideological principles 
which Jabotinsky had formulated. Those principles were articulated 
in Lechi’s outline for national revival.36
Those joining the Stem group are generally considered to have
been a minority. That contention has been challenged by a member
of the Irgun, Hillel Kook ( Peter Bergson).
When the Irgun split in 1940 and Avraham Stern formed 
the Stern group of Lechi - (Lohamei Herut Yisrael - Israel 
Freedom Fighters) people think he took a minority of the 
people and that the Irgun got the majority. What really 
happened was that between two and five percent - nobody 
compiled statistics - went with Stern; between ten and
3S Yitshak Ben Ami, Years of Wrath. Davs of Glorv. p. 193.
38 See Appendix I for full text of Jabotinsky’s National Revival Principles.
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fifteen percent went with Raziel37 in varying degrees of 
activity; and the rest went home just didn’t do anything. Of 
the members of the command of the Irgun who were with 
me . . . nearly everybody except Raziel went with Stern. 
They lasted between a month or two then they went home. 
They ceased being active because Stern’s beliefs were too 
extreme for some and Raziel’s were too mild for the others.
In a practical sense people did not feel like joining.38
During this period of decision within the Zionist ranks Hillel
Kook chose to remain with the Irgun.
The Irgun agreed in 1939 to cease preparations for conflict 
with the British and instead to collaborate with the British, 
to work with the British, except for Jabotinsky’s followers.
And I’m not mocking it. I was one of those who agreed and I 
still believe it was correct up till a certain time. Jabotinsky’s 
proclamation was to the Jewish people to join, first of all and 
above all in the war against Nazi Germany; to join with the 
allies in the war, as a belligerent in the w ar.39
Hillel Kook was to become the leader of the Irgun Delegation to 
the United States. His group, which was comprised of only a handful 
of individuals, came to America from Palestine to try to influence 
public opinion to favor the creation of a Jewish army, to help save 
the Jewish victims of the Holocaust, and to establish a Hebrew 
democratic state in Palestine. The role of this group in America 
during the 1940’s is highly controversial. Their opponents have
"Raziel lead the Irgun before Menachem Begin.
“ Interview of Hillel Kook by M. Kaufman, October 27, 1981, Hebrew 
University of Jerusalem, Institute of Contemporary Jewry, Oral History 
Division, Tape Nos. 194, A, B, C. Interview page 8.
“ Ibid, p. 7.
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stated that their work accomplished nothing while supporters say 
that “this was the most significant Zionist voice that was present on 
the American scene at these times.”40
40 Interview with Yitshak Shamir by Joanna Saidel, Knessett. Jerusalem, 
Israel, June 2,1993.
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CHAPTER 2 
REVISIONIST ZIONISM COMES TO AMERICA
The year, 1939, marked the entrance of both the New Zionist 
Organization and the Irgun Delegation to the United States onto the 
political scene in America. They came to gain public support for the 
fight for the creation of a Jewish Army in Palestine. It was believed 
that only the U.S. could exert the necessary pressure on Britain to 
make this plan a reality. Early attempts of the two organizations to 
merge proved a failure due to differences in philosophical and 
political ideals, as well as personality conflicts among the leadership 
of the two groups. Lack of support from the Roosevelt administration 
as well as opposition from mainstream Jewish organizations and their 
leaders (particularly the ardent Roosevelt follower, Rabbi Steven 
Wise) also hampered the efforts of the N. Z. O. and the Irgun 
Delegation in America.
By May of 1939 the fear of war was in the air. The leader of 
the New Zionist Organization of America, Benzion Netanyahu, left 
Palestine, where he had been editing a daily newspaper called The 
Iordan, and went to London to meet with Jabotinsky and his 
executive. Mr. Netanyahu presented his views, suggesting a major
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campaign in the United States to gain public support there. Because 
of the poor reception which Jabotinsky had received earlier in 
America, the founder of the Revisionist party was reluctant to accept 
Netanyahu’s ideas, but was so impressed by Netanyahu’s literary 
work and optimistic confidence that he agreed to go along with 
Benzion. Both knew the enormous value of gaining American public 
support.1
When Jabotinsky asked how Netanyahu proposed to finance 
the expenses of the delegation, he said that he did not know but that 
he would devise a plan by the following day. This he did. The next 
day Netanyahu gave Jabotinsky the names of ten wealthy individuals 
whom he had met in Israel and Egypt. Though not Revisionists, 
Netanyahu knew that they were not enemies of Revisionism. He 
asked Jabotinsky to write individual letters to each of these people. 
Netanyahu then planned to deliver the letters personally and ask 
each for a donation of one hundred British pounds. He told 
Jabotinsky that if these ten requests were successful he would then 
go to another ten, and another. Jabotinsky wrote the letters, 
Netanyahu delivered them and presented the purpose and case of 
the delegation. There was not one individual who refused to give him
’ Personal conversations with Benzion Netanyahu, October 29, 1993, in 
Jerusalem, and telephone conversation January 23, 1995 from New York.
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the money.2
It was agreed that Jabotinsky would not go immediately to 
America but that Netanyahu and a delegation chosen by him would 
precede their leader and prepare the groundwork. Netanyahu 
returned to Palestine to prepare for the mission.
In the meantime, on September 1, 1939, Germany invaded 
Poland and World War II began. The following day Jabotinsky 
declared Germany the number one enemy of the Jewish people and 
proposed the formation of a Jewish Army which would mobilize Jews 
worldwide, “not just a few units or battalions of Jewish soldiers, but 
the nucleus of a true national army which would fight along side the 
allies.”3 This body would number between one quarter and one half 
million men according to Jabotinsky’s calculations. In December of 
1939 a different proposal for the formation of a single Jewish 
Division of the British forces was put forth by Dr. Weizmann. Neither 
plan received much support in Britain. While little headway was 
made in London, it was decided to campaign in America for a Jewish 
Army.
Jabotinsky cabled Netanyahu and asked him to come to 
America. Netanyahu agreed but had problems leaving Palestine. 
The British there wanted to know why he was going to America.
2 Ibid.
3Yitshak Ben Ami, Years of Wrath. Davs of Glorv. p. 237.
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Netanyahu procured a visa with the help of Dr. Magnes, the head of 
Hebrew University, who was opposed to him politically, but who 
nevertheless gave his assistance. Netanyahu told him that the trip to 
America was to complete his doctoral dissertation, which was in fact 
his secondary motive. He did not tell Magnes about his political 
interests in the United States. After an examination by the police, 
Netanyahu, who was on a British list of suspicious persons, was 
finally allowed to go.4
Netanyahu arrived at Ellis Island at the beginning of April 
where he was met by the Zionist leader, Emanuel Neumann. He 
immediately met with Jabotinsky and formulated plans for their 
campaign.
The new approach which they chose to follow was 
masterminded by Mr. Netanyahu who vehemently believed their 
efforts should focus on exposing the Jewish struggle against the 
British and their intentions in Palestine. While he wanted the British 
to win the war, he was against their policy in Palestine. The 
campaign was to be totally anti - British. Although some of the 
delegation agreed with Netanyahu’s reasoning they felt that the 
timing was impractical because of the war. They thought such a 
campaign would be premature and that it would encumber their
‘ Personal interview with Benzion Netanyahu, October 29, 1993, Jerusalem.
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work. Netanyahu was deeply dissatisfied.5 Jabotinsky considered 
both views carefully and finally agreed to begin the campaign.6
In 1940, Jabotinsky addressed small gatherings, lecturing on 
Russian literature and other topics which, although he was an expert 
in these fields, had little to do with the Jewish struggle. Disappointed 
by the poor attendance he received in the States (he was used to a 
full to overflowing house when he spoke in Europe) Jabotinsky 
became disillusioned. Meanwhile Netanyahu continued to press 
Jabotinsky and his delegation to campaign for a Jewish army. Finally 
Jabotinsky agreed. Again the problem of financing the project arose. 
Having no money available, an innovative advertisement campaign 
was conceived and embarked upon, on credit, and succeeded in fully 
funding the operations of the organization.
The focus of the Jabotinsky - Netanyahu campaign was initially 
to gain support for a Jewish Army. The overall plan however was to 
combat the British with a nationwide campaign which would expose 
their anti - Zionist policy and would turn public opinion against them. 
They arranged for speakers to address mass meetings. One of their 
main supporters was the famous Colonel John Henry Patterson who 
commanded the Jewish Legion during the first world war. Jabotinsky
5 Ibid.
“Telephone conversation with Benzion Netanyahu, January 23, 1995, from 
New York.
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spoke at some of these meetings. One of the most effective was a 
mass rally at the Manhattan Center on June 19, 1940. This success, 
which had a big press following, seemed to bring Jabotinsky back to 
life. Their campaign gained momentum across the country during the 
late spring. It slowed down briefly during the hot summer months 
and was scheduled to resume at the end of summer.
The Irgun Delegation to the United States also began its
activities during this period. Though an offshoot of the Revisionist
movement this group was not part of the Revisionist party. The
delegation was composed of Hillel Kook (known as Peter Bergson in
America), Dr. Alex Raphaeli, Yitshak Ben Ami, Shmuel Merlin, and
Aryeh Ben-Eliezer.
You cannot say that this was a Revisionist movement. It was 
a very special movement, I would say, that was created by 
Hillel Kook and his friends . There have been others, they 
have been sent to the United States by the Irgun. And the 
Irgun was, we can say, a certain affiliation of the 
Revisionist movement. They have been sent to America, 
Hillel Kook and his friends as delegates of shlihim, that you 
call in Hebrew, it means envoys, by the Irgun. And in this 
framework of the Irgun, Hillel Kook and his friends have 
founded the group that was very active . . .  in the public 
world, in the media.7
They too met with Jabotinsky and made plans to work with 
him to gain support in America. Although both the New Zionist
7 Telephone interview with Yitshak Shamir from Tel Aviv, by Joanna 
Saidel, June 2,1993.
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Organization and the Irgun delegation had the same leader, 
Jabotinsky, they were not united in their work. Each had a different 
focus and a different philosophy.
In August, 1940, Jabotinsky died in New York. This event 
affected both groups. Seven days later Benzion Netanyahu, because 
of the division of opinion with regard to the campaign for a Jewish 
Army, disagreement on matters of policy, and other matters, and 
seeing the growing pessimism which developed among the remaining 
delegation, resigned.8
Shortly thereafter, Hillel Kook (Bergson) met with Netanyahu to 
see if they might merge in a common effort. Mr. Netanyahu was 
asked to join the executive of the Committee for a Jewish Army.9 He 
agreed to assist the delegation in every conceivable form provided 
they concentrate on the campaign for a Jewish Army which they 
hesitated to undertake, but agreed to when Van Passen joined and 
became the President of the Committee. Netanyahu then joined the 
Committee for a Jewish Army (not the Irgun Delegation).10 This 
unification was short - lived, however. Netanyahu stayed with Kook 
for only six months. He was disappointed that the delegation refused 
to focus their attack primarily on the British in the manner which he
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had envisioned.11
There was a conflict of interests, philosophies and
personalities, particularly between Hillel Kook and Mr. Netanyahu. A
member of the Irgun Delegation, Dr. Alex Raphaeli, understood this
personality conflict
He (Benzion Netanyahu) was very much admired by me in 
any case. And with Benzion we worked, he even worked in 
our office for a little  while. But he was a Revisionist and 
(this was) his mentality, He’s a veiy gifted man, a professor, 
but we didn’t feel that he has m ilitary spirit, m ilitary 
reaction in a situation where you need immediate action and 
where you have sometimes the courage to take a weapon 
and, etcetera, etcetera.12
When asked if there was much antagonism between the two men Dr.
Raphaeli replied,
Very much. Listen. Listen. There are many, many jealousies. 
Compared with us he was a bit older. He was a professor. We 
were just youngsters relatively. . . I was at that time (a) 
Doctor. . . But most of the other colleagues were a bit 
younger than I and didn’t have any education. He considered 
himself important. Suddenly he comes in a group which 
really behaved . . .  in a m ilitary w ay.. .  and he couldn’t live 
with that. Number two, he considered himself intellectually, 
maybe, that’s right, much more important than Hillel or any 
of the other colleagues.. .  So I would say, the Revis(ionists)..
. and I speak about people who are my friends.. .were.. .  a 
relatively.. . small, very unimportant group . . . they did 
not do much, they were not successful. This was not the field 
of action suddenly to come and speak on television and on
11 Personal interview with Benzion Netanyahu, October 29, 1993, Jerusalem.
12 Telephone interview with Dr. Alex Raphaeli from Jerusalem by Joanna 
Saidel, June 15,1993.
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the radio or appear at a university facing, as we had, 
British ministers and discuss with them. They couldn’t do 
that. So suddenly comes an unknown group of Israelis who, 
young, who don’t even appear under their real names, who 
have their m ilitary names, were entirely different. And 
suddenly get that attention and people speak (with you) and 
you’re invited (to important affairs) and you’re busy and 
you’re going to go around, and you’re just saying what you 
feel. Naturally the people who worked here maybe wanted 
the same thing, don’t feel comfortable. So there are 
psychological things which one can not discard.13
Yitshak Ben Ami also admits that there were problems between the 
New Zionist Organization and the Irgun Delegation, stating that 
despite their coordination of overt and covert activities there was 
constant infighting due to personality clashes, and debates over 
political and ideological questions.14 He believed that one of the main 
points of contention was the N.Z.O.’s platform (1938 Prague 
Convention) which called for the transfer of one million Jews to 
Palestine over the course of ten years. “We Irgun men knew that we 
did not have ten years to spare,” writes Ben Ami.ls
Mr. Netanyahu decided to leave the Irgun Delegation. He 
continued with his own campaign which proved to be highly 
effective in penetrating Congress and the administration.
These Zionists, (i.e. the Revisionist and the Irgun delegation),
13 ibid.
14 Ben Ami, p. 199.
15 Ibid, p. 228.
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had two primary reasons for focusing on America in their quest for 
support. First, it was believed that if American opposition to the 
British White Paper of 1939 (which proposed turning all of Palestine 
over to the Arabs and nullification of the Balfour Declaration) could 
be developed then pressure could be exerted upon Britain to rescind 
it. During the initial stages of the war this was especially important 
as, at that stage, the United States was only a potential ally and the 
British were eager to maintain cordial relations with America. The 
second reason for increased Zionist interest in America was to 
supplant Great Britain with the U. S. as the main component of 
gentile support. It was correctly believed that the British Empire was 
on the decline and that America would fill the vacuum as British 
power diminished. Zionists felt that it was essential to have a good 
rapport with American leadership in case that power shift occurred.16
Hillel Kook (Bergson) had come to America for this
undertaking with only with a handful of Palestinian Jews.
These Palestinians were not associated with the New Zionist 
Movement of America, which was the Revisionist Zionist 
body in the United States. Most of them, in fact, were 
secretly members of the Irgun (Irgun Zvai Leumi), a Jewish 
armed underground in Palestine. While these men 
constituted a tiny, American-based wing of the Irgun, they 
did not conduct underground activities in the United States. 
During the war they were almost completely isolated from
18 Alan R. Taylor. Prehide to Israel: An Analysis of Zionist Diplomacy 1897- 
1947. Darton. Longman & Todd, London, 1959 p.74-75.
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the Irgun in Palestine.17
While some, who have known the Irgun Delegation, say that this
small group of individuals accomplished little, others contend that
they had remarkable results.
They made a great work in America asking for the American 
support for the Israeli independence, for the creation of 
Israeli State in the land of Israel, for, they fought for the 
right of the Jewish people from all over the world to (come 
to) the land of Israel. . .  they (the Irgun delegation) played a 
great role in the years of the second World W ar. . .  this was 
the most significant Zionist voice that was present on the 
American scene at these times.18
Hillel Kook was descended from a notable rabbinical line. In the 
United States he adopted the name Peter Bergson in order to keep 
his political activities from reflecting on the name of his uncle, the 
former chief rabbi of Palestine, Abraham Isaac Kook,19 who believed 
that the return of Jews to the land of Israel “marked the beginning 
of divine redemption and that the Balfour Declaration of 1917 had 
ushered in a new era in the renewal of the Jewish people.”20 He also 
believed, however, that the Zionist movements of his day (1865- 
1935) were too secular and needed spiritual infusion. This idea was
17 Wyman, David. Abandonment of the Jews: America and the Holocaust. 
1941-1945. New York: Pantheon Books, 1984, p. 85.
18 Telephone interview with Yitshak Shamir from Tel Aviv by Joanna Saidel, 
June 2,1993.
18 Wyman, p. 85.
20 Encyclopedia Tudaica. vol. 10, p. 1183.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
49
markedly in contrast with Hillel Kook’s philosophy which was not 
religious.
A 1944 F.B.I. summary of H illel Kook (Peter Bergson)
portrayed him as follows.
Bergson is described as being single and thirty-four years of 
age. He is related to have been bom in Lithuania, the son of 
Rabbi Dov Kook. It is related that he studied typography, at 
the Hebrew University, although he claims to be a journalist.
He is said to be a British citizen. In 1929 he allegedly 
became involved in riots between Jews and Arabs in 
Palestine, and at that time was also alleged to have been 
engaged in an organization to advance the Jews against the 
Arabs in Palestine. He subsequently is reported to have 
become affilia ted  w ith a group advocating “Free 
Immigration to Palestine.” With regard to this group, it has 
been alleged that its real purpose was to smuggle into 
Palestine people outside of the immigration quota. In the 
year 1936 Bergson reportedly left Palestine for London 
where headquarters for his group were established. Later 
the remark, “We have been responsible for 40,000 Jewish 
refugees having entered Palestine illegally from Europe 
during the past seven years” was attributed to Bergson. It is 
alleged that Bergson is not looked upon with favor by the 
British Government.21
The mainstream Zionists detested the Irgun and the 
Bergsonites, and were not fond of the New Zionist Organization, for a 
number of reasons. It was generally believed that the Irgun was too 
militant and that they bordered on being fascist; that their violent 
activities were detrimental to the Zionist cause and could “damage
21 Summary F.B.I. file on Peter Bergson, December IS , 1944 - from file #100- 
309132-1; 100-257656-4.
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the moral stature of Zionism.” Jabotinsky’s break with the World 
Zionist discipline was both feared and resented.22 The New Zionist 
Organization was considered too anti-British, too aggressive, and a 
breaker of discipline. After two and a half years of campaigning 
however, the Zionist Organization found itself forced to adopt the 
ideas of the Revisionists whose outspoken behavior had changed the 
mood of public opinion in America.
Bergson’s group operated first as the American Friends for a
Jewish Palestine. Their initial goal was to raise funds to relocate
European refugees in Palestine and to buy arms for the Irgun.
However, by 1940, the war had expanded, communications between
American and Palestinian groups were cut off. The focus then shifted
to the idea of a Jewish Army .23
When the war broke out Jabotinsky decided to go to 
America to conduct a public campaign for the creation of a 
Jewish Army to join the war against Germany, and generally 
also in a sense to make propaganda for America to come a 
little closer, because there were many American volunteers 
in the Jewish Legion in World War I and he wanted to 
repeat the same thing on a bigger scale. Instead of the legion 
this time however, he spoke of a Jewish army representing 
the Jewish nation in the war.24
To accomplish their goals the Revisionist Zionists and the Irgun
22 Ibid
23 Ibid.
24 Interview of Hillel Kook by M. Kaufman, Oct. 27, 1981, Hebrew University 
of Jerusalem, Institute of Contemporary Jewry, Oral History Division, Tape. Nos. 
194, A, B, C. Interview page 11.
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Delegation attempted to win the support of the American public, 
Congress, and the Administration. They also sought the support of 
journalists, clergymen, public servants, and persons of standing and 
importance. The Zionist propaganda campaign was an ultimate 
success. As a result of it thirty-three state legislatures, the Congress 
of Industrial Organizations and the American Federation of Labor 
passed resolutions favoring Zionism. Later, both houses of Congress 
introduced similar resolutions, and in the 1944 election campaign the 
two major political parties adopted pro Zionist planks.25
In 1939 the two strongest Jewish groups in America were the 
American Jewish Committee and the Jewish Labor Committee. These 
groups were traditionally, sometimes fiercely, anti-Zionist. Zionists 
decided to attempt to make inroads into the American Jewish 
community. Some of their members and supporters included Haim 
Lubinsky, who was the ranking Irgun officer of the mission to the 
U.S., Robert Brisco, a member of the Irish Parliament, and John 
Patterson, former commander of the Zion Mule Corps and of the 
Jewish Legion during the first World War.
In 1939, the Kook (Bergson) group, Patterson, and Chaim 
Lubinsky, had founded “The American Friends for a Jewish Palestine” 
to raise funds to support the “illegal immigration” to Palestine. They
25 Ibid, p. 76.
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began with an effort to establish contacts. With the help of Rabbi 
Louis I. Newman, the Irgun delegation held meetings in several 
synagogues and private homes, espousing free immigration to 
Palestine for the Jews of Europe. Listening to Briscoe, Patterson, and 
Lubinsky, some individuals were moved to action. They contacted 
their rabbis and other leaders, asking about Kook’s group. “Who are 
these people? they asked. Who is Jabotinsky? What is the Irgun? 
And the answer (of mainstream Jewish organizations) was always
the same: “Don’t touch them.’’ 26
An extremely important contact was established with the help 
of Benzion Netanyahu. He suggested that Pierre Van Passen meet 
with the Kook group.27 Netanyahu influenced him in this direction in 
the early days, before the rift developed between the two 
organizations.
Many mainstream Zionist leaders greatly admired Benzion 
Netanyahu’s father, whose name was Rabbi Nathan Mileikowsky (he 
later changed it to Netanyahu). He was a very influential man and a 
great authoritative Yiddish speaker who was, for five years, one of 
the leading spokesman in America for Zionism. When Benzion came 
to America many leading American Zionist leaders wanted to meet
M Ben Ami, p. 215.
N J COnveKaUon With Netanyahu, January 23, 1995, from
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with Mileikowsky’s son, despite the fact that he had become a 
Revisionist. This opened doors for Netanyahu, who would years later 
become Professor of Judaic Studies at Cornell University. At one 
social gathering in the home of a man named Weisgal (who later 
founded the Weizmann Institute) Netanyahu met Joe Brainin, the son 
of the famous Hebrew author Reuben Brainin. Brainin turned out to 
be the agent of the celebrated Dutch author, Pierre Van Paassen. 
Netanyahu suggested that Brainin arrange a meeting between Van 
Paassen and Hillel Kook. This meeting was fixed and Van Paassen’s 
affiliation with the Irgun Delegation proved to become one of the 
main assets of the Irgun campaign.
It was ironic that Brainin was rumored to be a Communist 
agent who was supporting the Zionist cause in order to encourage 
the Jews to campaign and fight against H itler and the Nazis.28 
Netanyahu was unaware of these allegations at the time.29
Van Passen was one of the most effective speakers for the 
Irgun Delegation. He spoke not only in favor of a Jewish Army but, 
under Netanyahu’s influence, against the British policy and against 
Weizmann’s Zionist policy which was characterized by compromise
28 Conversation with Benzion Netanyahu, November 1, 1993, Jerusalem.
-  Ibid.
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and submission.30
The New Zionist Organization’s campaign for a Jewish Army 
and against British policy extended to an active campaign to secure 
political opinion in America. This was a very difficult task in those 
days. While the President of the United States had made favorable 
pronouncements toward the Jews, his policy, in fact, was anti-Zionist.
While Jabotinsky was still alive he had asked an influential 
supporter, Robert Briscoe (who later became mayor of Dublin, 
Ireland), to try to interest President Roosevelt in an emergency plan 
which proposed the removal of 2,000,000 Jews from central and 
eastern Europe. Briscoe was unable to obtain a hearing in the White 
House. It was believed within Zionist circles that “the key for helping 
the Jews of Europe lay in the hands of Franklin D. Roosevelt because 
the Allies would follow any forthright action the United States 
initiated.” 31
Franklin Roosevelt had endeared the Jewish population to 
himself for a number of reasons. These included his advocacy of old 
age pensions, the New Deal, and the appointment of an 
unprecedented number of Jews to high positions within his 
administration. The latter action caused Roosevelt to be labeled with
30 For his entire speech see, “Israel, You Are Being Betrayed!” Zionews.
October 1, 1942, p. 14 -17 .
31 Ben Ami, p. 281.
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the pejorative term, “Jew Deal,” by anti-Semetic elements.32
In fact, Roosevelt did not prove to be faithful to his Jewish 
following. He gave in to British requests not to discuss Palestine at 
the Evian and the Bermuda conferences. He feared alienating either 
the British or the Arab leaders. Although he issued a number of pro- 
Zionist statements, particularly before the elections of 1944, 
Roosevelt promised Arab leaders that they would be consulted 
before any decision was reached concerning Palestine. The New 
Zionist Organization vigorously attacked the administration, turning 
to the Republican party for support.
Concerning rescue efforts to save Jewish victims of the 
Holocaust, Roosevelt has been severely criticized. The author, David 
Wyman, accused the President of abandoning the Jews. Wyman 
believes that there were a number of options available to Roosevelt 
which may have assisted the victims. Wyman made a twelve point 
list of things that Roosevelt might have done to help them.33
These policies and suggestions, however, were never enacted 
for a number of reasons. The Roosevelt administration refused to 
acknowledge the severity of the situation which the Jews faced. “One 
reason for this was to avoid responsibility for taking special steps to 
save them. Such steps, if successful, would have confronted the
32 Encyclopedia ludaica. vol. 14, p. 257.
33 See Appendix K for list of Wyman’s twelve points.
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Allies with the difficult problem of finding places to put the rescued 
Jews.” 34
While the Roosevelt administration procrastinated, the New 
Zionist Organization and the Irgun Delegation continued their 
campaign to win American support. In December of 1942 the Irgun 
Delegation issued a “Proclamation of the Moral Rights of Stateless 
and Palestinian Jews” which stated that the Irgun would no longer 
passively witness the calculated extermination of the Jewish people 
by the Nazis.3S
This “Proclamation” was placed in a two page ad in The New 
York Times in December 1942. It was supposedly signed by more 
than 3,000 prominent Americans, and European exiles, including 
Herbert Hoover, and Senator Hariy S. Truman. This advertisement 
took the Zionist campaign out of a strictly Jewish milieu and made 
the cause universal. The statement was also formulated “to 
counteract the inhibitions of Jewish leaders like Stephen S. Wise” 
who, Ben Ami writes, “was writing his “Dear Boss” notes to his idol, 
President Roosevelt” while, “ironically, we, the Zionist “extremists,” 
were the ones now calling for broad humanitarian rescue above all. 
Helping the Jews to survive was all that mattered now.” 36
34 Wyman, p. 337.
35 Ben Ami, p. 282.
38 Ibid, p. 283.
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Stephen Wise began his Zionist career in the late 1890’s. In 
1897 he was a founder of the New York Federation of Zionist 
Societies. In the following year he was instrumental in the 
foundation of the national Federation of American Zionists, serving as 
honorary secretary of that organization until 1904. From 1898 Wise 
served as American secretary of the world Zionist movement. He 
collaborated with Theodor Herzl, creating the Provisional Executive 
Committee for General Zionist Affairs in 1914 and later administering 
it.37 Rabbi Wise assisted in framing the text of the Balfour 
Declaration of 1917, spoke in favor of Zionism at the 1918-19 
Versailles Peace Conference, was vice-president of the Zionist 
Organization of America from 1918 to 1920 and its president from 
1936 to 1938. Wise worked closely with David Ben-Gurion, Chaim 
Weizmann, and Abba Hillel Silver. Often he disagreed with them but 
sought unity in the movement38 As editor of Opinion. Rabbi Wise 
wrote about the reasons for his dedication to Zionism.39
From 1921 until 1925 Wise was the vice president of the 
American Jewish Congress. After 1925 he served as honorary 
president until his death. He believed that the American Jewish 
Congress was called into being for two purposes.
37 E ncvrlo n ed ia  ftidaicq. vo l. 16, p . 566.
“ Ibid
“ Wise, Stephen S., As I  See It. Jewish Opinion Publishing Corporation, 
Marstin Press, Inc., New York, 1944.
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. . .  To bring about the establishment of the Jewish National 
Home in fulfillment of the ancient and unrenounced ideal of 
our fathers. This means a Jewish majority on both sides of 
the Jordan . . .  in conformity with the vision and the 
program of Theodor Herzl. The second purpose was and is to 
safeguard rights of Jews in all lands in which they dwell.40
Dr. Wise recognized and warned both Jews and non-Jews that 
these rights were seriously threatened by Nazism. He was one of the 
first to make such predictions in the 1930’s and to organize for the 
defense of Hitler’s victims. He established the World Jewish Congress 
in 1936 and administered it until 1949 when he died. It has been 
claimed that he was responsible for making President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt, the U.S. State Department, and the general public aware of 
the circumstances which the Jews faced.41 This general belief is 
contestable in the light of the little known accomplishments of the 
Irgun Delegation and the New Zionist Organization which were the 
real motivating forces for the change in government policy and 
public opinion.
Wise contended that diplomacy should be the first route to 
liberation but did not discount “deeds of despair” when all else 
failed.42 However, he opposed the actions of the Revisionists and 
Irgun Delegation. According to the founder of The American Friends
40 Ibid, “World Jewish Conference,” p. 21.
41 Encyclopedia ludaica. vol. 16, p. 567.
42 Wise, S. , As I See It, Address to the American Jewish Conference, “ The
Jewish Fate and Faith,” 1943, p. 76.
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for a Jewish Palestine, co-organizer for the Committee for a Jewish 
Army, and the Emergency Committee to save the Jewish people of 
Europe, Rabbi Wise was the chief opponent of Ze’ev Jabotinsky in 
America.
In New York, Stephen Wise, the most politically prominent 
rabbi in the United States, called Jabotinsky a “traitor” for 
preaching “evacuation” from the ghettos of Europe. Davar, 
the Socialist-Zionist daily in Palestine, said that by working 
with the Polish government on annual emigration quotas, 
Jabotinsky was “joining hands with the Endeks, the 
pogromizers of the Jews of Poland.43
When Jabotinsky died in 1940 Stephen Wise said,
He was not only one of the most eloquent men of his tim e..
.but he was one of the bravest. . .  His limitation was that he 
could not bear to be a Grand Vizier, second in command. 
Feeling born to lead, and indeed, possessed of an undeniable 
flair for leadership, he was ill at ease in enduring a mere 
Lieutenancy. He was ill favored, too, in his following, which 
was pitiably unequal to its Commander.. .44
Members of the Kook group contend that a delegation headed 
by Rabbi Stephen Wise formally requested the British Ambassador 
not to make any gestures of sympathy to Jabotinsky’s campaign and 
issued instructions to the Jews of the United States not to contribute 
funds to the Irgun Delegation. When they ran an ad in major U.S. 
newspapers appealing for funds to “purchase” the Jews which
“ Ben Ami, p. 211.
“Wise, p. 228
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Rumania was selling for fifty dollars a piece the State Department 
and the Jewish establishment denied that such an offer existed. 
Stephen Wise called the appeal “a hoax on the part of the Hecht
group By the fall of 1943, when the United States Government and
Stephen Wise finally admitted that such an offer had even existed, it 
no longer did.” 45
David Wyman wrote about this issue. According to him 
the Rumanian government had offered to help relocate 70,000 Jews 
from Transnistria to any place chosen by the Allies in exchange for 
approximately $130 per refugee. When the administration was 
approached with the matter it was referred to the State Department. 
They stated that the story was without foundation. Wyman charges 
that the State Department’s investigation was “superficial.” He 
believes that
the Rumanian proposal might not have been workable. Quite 
likely it would have involved an element of bribery in 
addition to the actual costs of removing the imperiled Jews.
But it most certainly was not a story “without foundation. .w46
It is believed by some political analysts that the plight of the Jews 
was used by the Revisionists and by the Irgun to promote public 
sympathy for a Jewish state. For example, political analyst Alan R. 
Taylor writes that Zionists, while emphasizing the need for asylum
45 Ben Ami. p. 288 
48 Wyman, p. 84 - 85.
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for the displaced Jews of Europe to draw support to their cause,
employed the general sympathy of all people of good will in 
selling the idea of Jewish statehood. To the Zionists, asylum 
was not the real issue - rather it was the current need of 
Jews for asylum that they employed to justify the 
establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine.47
Certainly the noiTendous events which occurred in Nazi Europe 
provided a legitimate reason to bargain for a Jewish State in 
Palestine. However, it is wrong to assume that Zionist aims were 
focussed on exploiting the circumstances of their Jewish brethren to 
ensure statehood. This is simply not the case. Zionists were the most 
dynamic segment of the Jewish population. They were deeply 
concerned with the plight of Jewish refugees. The fact that the use of 
that plight served to capitalize on the statehood question should in 
no way diminish the attention and concern that Zionists had for 
victims of the Holocaust. Zionists, it should be remembered, were the 
most active elements worldwide to initiate or to campaign for rescue 
attempts for concentration camp victims. David Wyman adequately 
described the various attempts by Zionist groups to affect the war. 
Revisionist branches of Zionism were at the forefront in the list of 
risk-takers. The majority of rescue attempts were initiated by 
Revisionist groups or with Revisionist support. (In this context the
’ Alan Taylor, p. 77.
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term Revisionist applies to both the Revisionist party and to the 
Irgun and Lechi.) These attempts include at least sixty two rescue 
missions attem pted between 1937 and 1944, involving 
approximately 33,598 individuals.48 Such rescue attempts were 
typical of the dedication of Revisionists to the rescue of Holocaust 
victims. Similarly, they were intensely dedicated to the idea of 
creating a Jewish Army.
The early efforts of the New Zionist Organization and the Irgun 
Delegation were successful in setting up the mechanisms for the 
promotion of organized efforts to rally a nationwide campaign to gain 
American public support. Financial needs were successfully planned 
for. These plans became fully operative. Plans to publicize the 
campaign were enacted through the use of rallies and mass meetings. 
An effective nationwide ad campaign was initiated. Although 
resistance confronted them from the w ithin the Roosevelt 
administration and from mainstream Jewish organizations the 
operations of the two organizations were successfully set in motion. 
The campaign for a Jewish Army became the primary initial focus of 
these efforts.
".The chart in Appendix J illustrates this point.
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CHAPTER 3 
THE BATTLE FOR A JEWISH ARMY
The campaign for a Jewish Army appealed to Americans 
because it was believed that such a force would benefit the War 
effort Zionists contented that the defense of Palestine and the “World 
Island” was crucial to the Allied success in the War because of the 
extremely important geopositioning of this area at the crossroads of 
Asia, Africa and Europe. The Zionists based their case for a Jewish 
fighting force in Palestine on these premises while harboring an 
underlying goal of establishing a strong armed fighting force which 
would be able to evict the British from Palestine at the end of the 
war.
In 1941, following the initial efforts by Ze’ev Jabotinsky and 
Benzion Netanyahu to campaign in America for the creation of a 
Jewish Army, the Committee for a Jewish Army was formed. This 
group was headed by Irgun representative, H illel Kook (Peter 
Bergson). The president of the Carnegie Institute, Dr. Samuel Harden 
Church, and Colonel John Henry Patterson were the honorary 
chairmen and Pierre van Paassen was National Chairman of the 
committee. The name of the organization was amended to the
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Committee for a Jewish Army of Stateless and Palestinian Jews
shortly after Pearl Harbor was attacked. “This dissident group”
which was later called the Hebrew Committee for National Liberation,
“agitated in the U.S., mainly through newspaper advertisements, by
expounding and supporting the ideas and acts of the Irgun Zeva’i
Le’ummi (I.Z.L) in Palestine.. .The style and tactics of the “Bergson
Group” were the subject of sharp controversies in Zionist circles,
particularly among Revisionists and their sympathizers.”1
Irgun agents had contacted both Zionist and non-Zionist Jewish
leaders even before the formation of the Committee in America,
asking for their support. They refused and actively attempted to
hinder its work. They believed that the Irgun emissaries had
exaggerated the Nazi threat to Jewish survival and that they were
too militant. Mainstream Jews feared that such militancy would stir
up anti-Semitism in America.
These views were largely a reflection of the official position 
of the U.S. Government. The indifference of the allied 
governments and of the Jewish community’s silent 
acceptance of the position of the allies on the fate of the 
Jews under the Nazis became known as “the abandonment 
of the Jews.2
The Committee for a Jewish Army proceeded with its plan despite
1 Encyclopedia Judaica. voL 16, p. 1144.
2 Hiahu Lankin, To Win the Promised land: Story of a Freedom Fighter. 
Shengold Publishers, Inc., New York, 1992.
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Jewish and non-Jewish resistance.
Jews who considered themselves assimilated, patriotic 
Americans were outraged and uneasy. When members of the Kook 
group visited conservative synagogues they were faced with 
traditional pacifist Zionist reactions. People questioned the necessity 
of a Jewish Army and of a Jewish State. They were not yet aware of 
the extent of the Holocaust and felt threatened by the push for a 
Hebrew nationalistic movement. They considered themselves fully 
assimilated American Jews (i.e. Americans who practiced Judaism) 
and felt that the movement might threaten their security in the 
United States.
Orthodox congregations were more sympathetic, but were in 
no hurry to assist the Kook group. They felt that redemption would 
come in its own time and that it did not require the hand of man 
intervening in heavenly matters. While they resisted the national 
liberation movement they often supported and collaborated with the 
group in rescue and relief missions.
On January 5,1942, the Irgun Delegation published its first full
page advertisement in The New York Times which was headlined
“Jews Fight for the Right to Fight”3
Our first public statement, stunned Jews and non-Jews alike, 
made Washington uneasy, outraged the British and irritated
3 This slogan had been coined prior to this time by Benzion Netanyahu in
an article which he wrote.
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the Zionist establishment.4
It bore the signatures of a variety of notables including Louis 
Bromfield, Ben Hecht, Melvyn Douglas, Lion Feuchtwanger, Bruno and 
Waldo Frank, Frances Gunther, Max Lerner, Reinhold Niebuhr, 
Abraham L. Sachar, Paul Tillich and Lowell Thomas. Many 
congressmen also signed. The ad was repeated in other papers across 
the nation.
We continued using this technique of full - page ads until we 
ended our activities in the United States. It was without 
precedent among Jews to campaign on such a large scale of 
public agitation.5
The motives behind the Zionist proposal for a Jewish Army 
were, self-defense for the Jewish community in Palestine, “which 
was threatened by the possibility of Axis invasion, British 
evacuation, and Arab insurrection; and second, the desire for national 
revenge against Adolf Hitler, who had declared war on Jews the 
world over.”6
Those favoring a Jewish Army had political motivations as well. 
They hoped that a strong military showing during the war might lead 
to statehood after the war. This was the primary reason why the 
British continually opposed a Jewish Army.
4 Ben Ami, p. 250.
6 Ibid.
8 Michael J. Cohen, The Rise of Israel: The Jewish M ilitary Effort. 1939 - 
1944. vol. 29, Introduction.
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Chaim Weizmann, president of the World Zionist Organization, 
first offered Jewish m ilitary aid in the war effort to Prime Minister 
Neville Chamberlain on August 29, 1939. The British Cabinet 
bickered over the proposal throughout much of the war.
From New York, in May, 1940, Jabotinsky cabled Winston
Churchill, offering military assistance from a Jewish Army.
I offer to raise Jewish Army for all Allied fronts . . . 
provided MacDonald policy stopped, leaving Palestine 
destiny officially unprejudiced till peace conference.7
While Churchill favored utilizing Jewish troops in Palestine to 
relieve British troops and allow them to return to Britain, he was 
unable to convince his government that such a trade o ff was 
worthwhile. Their response was to advise him to decline 
Jabotinsky’s offer “in view of the insuperable objections to which any 
such scheme would be open.”8
The reason for opposing the creation of a Jewish Army was
even more exactly expressed by Colonial Secretary Lloyd in
correspondence to Churchill in a suggestion as to how the Prime
Minister should respond to American Zionist Leaders.
. . .  I need hardly emphasize the objections to this Zionist 
plan for arming the Jews of Palestine.. .  I am convinced that
7 Western Union Cablegram from Jabotinsky to Churchill, May 12,1940, 
Foreign Office 371/24566, The Rise of Israel: The Jewish M ilitary Effort 1939- 
1944. Doc., 10.
e “Secret” letter from Colonial Secretary George Lloyd - after consultation 
with Halifax and Eden - to Prime Minister Church ill, May 22,. 1940, Colonial 
Office, London, R.O.I.. vol. 29, Doc. 11).
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the step should not be taken. The political and m ilitary 
consequences would be so grave that any advantages would 
count as nothing in the scale.9
Colonel Secretary Lloyd emphasized the trouble that such a policy
would cause to British - Arab relations.
. .  .This apart from the dire consequences that would ensue 
in Palestine, would make shipwreck of our relations with 
Egypt and the neighboring Arab countries, which lie athwart 
of a vital line in our communications, thus greatly 
aggravating our m ilitary problem in the event of an enemy 
offensive. .10
Secretary Lloyd urged Churchill to tell the American Zionist leaders 
that he could not endorse the formation of a Jewish military force in 
Palestine.
Although George Lloyd had the agreement of Lords Halifax and 
Eden he could not persuade Winston Churchill, who continued to 
support the creation of a Jewish Army. In response, Churchill 
stressed the very large numbers of troops needed in Palestine (6 
battalions of Infantry, 9 regiments of Yeomanry, 8 battalions of 
Australian Infantry, totaling more than 20,000 men). Churchill 
contended that this was a heavy price to pay for Britain’s anti-Jewish 
policy. If  the war were to go heavily into Egypt the troops would 
have to be withdrawn leaving the Jewish Colonists in a precarious
8 Colonial Secretary Lloyd to Prime Minister Churchill, June 27, 1940. R.O.I..
Doc. 16.
10 Ibid.
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position. By arming them, Churchill believed, British forces could be
released to serve where needed.
. . .  I think it is little less than a scandal that at a time when 
we are fighting for our lives, these veiy large forces should 
be immobilized in support of a policy which only commends 
itself to a section of the Conservative Party.11
Churchill also disagreed with Lloyd’s assumption that Arab feelings 
in the Near East and India would be prejudiced, especially since the 
British relationship with Turkey had vastly improved and because of 
a settlement Churchill made with the Arabs on the basis of the 
Zionist policy which “commanded the full assent of Lawrence.”12
Disillusioned and frustrated by the obstructions in Britain, 
Jewish leader, Chaim Weizmann planned to go to the United States to 
rally support for a Jewish Army. He went with two objectives in 
mind. These were to accelerate the process of recruitment and 
training of such a force and to use what influence he had within the 
Jewish community to help speed up production. He also believed 
that hundreds of Jewish commercial airline pilots could be recruited 
to fight for Britain.13 David Ben Gurion agreed with Weizmann, “We




13 Chaim Weizmann to Field Marshall Chetwode, of the War Office, July 6,
1940, R.OJ., vol. 29, Doc. 18.
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must bring our supporters in America into action.”14
This was not the full extent of Weizmann’s objectives however. 
In a secret meeting on August 29, 1940, Dr. Weizmann told the 
Zionist Executive that he had, the prior day, made his true intentions 
known to Lord Halifax.
Weizmann told Halifax that he would be proceeding to the 
United States in order to unite the Jews there on a single platform to 
ensure a solution to the Jewish problem at the war’s end. Weizmann 
believed that the Jews would have difficulty in finding a place to 
emigrate to at that time. “Therefore it was essential to establish a 
Jewish State in Palestine, within reasonable limits; that was his 
solution.”15
Plans for a Jewish Division of the British Army were weighed 
and disputed throughout 1941. No action was taken.
The position of the United States government regarding the 
creation of a Jewish Army changed during the following two years 
from aloofness and opposition to a position of support in the 
Congress. This support extended even to sections of the State 
Department and the administration itself. It was highly affected by
u Memorandum by David Ben Gurion, July 31, 1940, chairman of the 
Jewish Agency Executive, Central Zionist Archives, Jerusalem 24/14.632,
R.O.L, voL 29, Doc 22.
16 “Secret” -minutes of Zionist Executive meeting in London, August 29,
1940, War Office, London, R.O.I., voL 29. Doc. 25.
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the zealous efforts of the Revisionist Zionists in America and the 
Irgun Delegation. They continued their effective ad campaign and 
lobbied for support where ever possible.
From the U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Coinage, 
Weights, and Measures, Andrew L Somers wrote to Senator Harry S. 
Truman requesting his support for the Jews and asking him to 
support “a Resolution asking the President to direct the Secretary of 
State to prevail upon the British Government to authorize such an 
Army” 16 (i.e. a Jewish Army in Palestine).
Truman responded to the call for a Jewish Army in Palestine 
with little enthusiasm. It is questionable whether he understood the 
complete plan at that time as, in his response, he pressed for 
American Jews to remain in the U.S. Army. These Jews were not the 
focus of a Jewish Army but rather stateless and Palestinian Jews. 
America was merely a staging area to rally support for the 
movement. However Truman’s reply did not reflect this thinking. He 
wrote,
. . .  so far as the United States is concerned I think the best 
thing for the Jews to do is to go right into our Army as they 
did in the last war and make the same sort of good soldiers 
as they did before. It is an honorable undertaking to 
organize an Army for Palestine but I think American citizens 
ought to serve in the American Army.17
18 Senatorial Files, Papers of Harry S. Truman, Truman Library, January 26, 
1942.
17 Papers of H any S. Truman, January 28, 1942, Senatorial Files, Truman 
Library.
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The campaign for a Jewish Army lasted nearly three years and 
reached the highest levels in the United States government. There it 
was not always received well. In April of 1942 Samuel Edelman, a 
Jewish public relations man from Philadelphia wrote to Secretary of 
State, Cordell Hull. Edelman emphasized his belief that the demand 
for the creation of a Jewish Army “does not even have the support 
of the Zionist organization and certainly not of the educated classes of 
Jews in America. Nevertheless, this movement is gaining support 
from the masses, and it is a flareback against the British 
government” 18
Yitshak Ben Ami was cited as the leader of the movement . 
Edelman requested that proceedings be initiated against Ben Ami as 
“an undesirable alien.” This caused investigative correspondence to 
begin between Ben Ami and the Department of State to determine 
whether the campaign for a Jewish Army was being conducted on 
behalf of a foreign principal. Despite these allegations Jewish Army 
leaders continued their attempts to make inroads at high levels and 
to stir up public awareness.
In February, 1942, a shock method was employed in the 
advertisement entitled “FOR SALE to Humanity 70,000 Jews- 
Guaranteed Human Beings at $50 a Piece.” This New York
18 Ben Ami, p. 323.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
73
Times ad stemmed from the offer by the Roumanian government to
the “Four Freedoms” to deliver 70,000 Jews to Palestine for a price.
The ad, which was antagonistic and sarcastic toward the so-called
Four Freedoms, included a note from the famous writer, Ben Hecht.
To the Four Freedoms
Care United Nations Leaders.
My Dear Noble State of Mind:
I know you are very busy, too busy 
perhaps to read this story on the left 
hand side of this page.
For that reason I am writing an ad. Ads 




Beneath this note, which was on official Committee for a Jewish 
Army stationery, was more sarcasm.
Attention Four Freedoms ! ! !
NO SPIES WERE FOUND AMONG THE 300,000 JEWS WHO CAME TO 
PALESTINE SINCE HITLER ASSUMED POWER IN GERMANY.
THERE WILL BE NO SPIES SMUGGLED IN AMONG THESE JEWS. (IF 
THERE ARE YOU CAN SHOOT THEM.)
Attention Humanity ! ! !
PALESTINE’S ARABS WILL NOT BE ANNOYED BY THE ARRIVAL 
OF 70,000 JEWS. THE ONLY ARABS WHO WILL BE ANNOYED ARE 
THE ARAB LEADERS WHO ARE IN BERLIN AND THEIR SPIES IN 
PALESTINE.
Attention America ! ! !
THE GREAT ROUMANIAN BARGAIN IS FOR THIS MONTH ONLY!
IT IS AN UNPRECEDENTED OFFER !
SEVENTY THOUSAND SOULS AT $50 A PIECE !
The Doors o f Roumania Are Open ! Act Now ! 19
19 The New York Times. Feb. 16,1943, p. 11.
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The ad then described the plight of the European Jews and urged 
immediate help to save them. It said, in part, that the principal 
demand of the Committee was that the United Nations immediately 
“appoint an intergovernmental committee to formulate ways and 
means of stopping the wholesale slaughter of human beings ..
Ben Hecht, who wrote this and many other ads for the 
Committee, and who wrote the script for a famous pageant which 
they held at Madison Square Garden called “We Shall Never Die,” 
proved to be a tremendous asset to the Committee for a Jewish 
Army.
Hecht’s mind was as sharp as his tongue. He said that he 
“wrote with a whip as much as with a pencil,” but the whip 
seemed more to me like a scalpel; sometimes it drew 
another’s blood, sometimes his own.20
Sunday, May 3,1942 marked a milestone on that road to the 
creation of the Jewish Army. Detailed plans were expounded at a 
national conference and testimonial dinner for Pierre Van Paassen 
which rallied 800 supporters.21
At this meeting, which was held at the Waldorf-Astoria, plans 
were made to accelerate and expand the movement for the 
formation of a Jewish Army “to defend the lifelines of the United
“Ben Ami, p. 284.
21 From the newsletter called MEMO from the National Headquarters of the 
Committee for a Jewish Army. 535 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y., May 15, 1942
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Nations in the Middle East.” 22 At this meeting Dr. Emil Lengyel, 
Committee member, author and authority on Middle East affairs gave 
a speech entitled “The Jewish Army, and the Middle East.” It 
reinforced the idea that the Middle East was one of the most 
important strongholds of the Allied defense.
In this speech Dr. Lengyel emphasized the importance of the 
strategic location of Palestine in the “World Island,” a term by which 
the Germans had referred to Europe, Asia and Africa. Lengyel 
contented that if Palestine were to fall to the Nazis the entire World 
Island would be swept along with it, thereby determining the fate of 
the rest of the world. He believed that no one was better equipped to 
defend Palestine than the Jews residing there who knew the terrain 
and believed in what they were fighting for.23
Other members of the Irgun delegation also spoke at the 
Conference. They stressed the value of a Middle East force, giving 
facts and figures of m ilitaiy strength of various elements there and 
analyzed their value in the world struggle.24
In the ensuing discussion a number of speakers raised the 
question of the relationship of the Committee to the Zionist 
Organization. They urged cooperation and understanding despite the 
continuing independent activities of the Revisionists and the Irgun
“ Ibid
23 Ibid. MEMO, p. 3 ,4 , 6
24 Ibid, p. 7
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Delegation.
The Conference received considerable attention in the press 
both in America and abroad.25 Most notably the articles covered the 
comments of two American Senators, James M. Mead, a Democrat 
from New York, and James E. Murray, a Democrat from Montana. 
These speeches were entered in The Congressional Record. Both 
Senators urged the immediate organization of a Jewish Army in 
Palestine to oppose the Axis thrust toward the Middle East and the 
Suez Canal26 Mead warned that Suez was “virtually the last bastion 
we command between Malta and Australia.”27 Senator Murray 
stressed the importance of oil fields in Iran and Iraq which were 
vital to the war effort.
Irgun delegation members who spoke believed that a Jewish 
Army would differ greatly from the non-committal (and later pro- 
Axis) attitude taken by the Arabs in the war. The speakers compared 
this attitude to the whole-hearted support given by the Jewish 
population of the Middle East, and particularly of Palestine, to the 
defense of the Middle East.
Alfred A. Strelsin, chairman of the executive board of the 
Committee for a Jewish Army, speaking at the same dinner, outlined
26 See the New York M irror. May 3, 1942, The Rochester Times. May 3, 1942, 
The Buffalo N.Y.News. May 4 ,1942.
29 For the complete text of the speeches of Senators Mead and Murray see 
Appendices B and C.
27 The Washington. D.C. Post. May, 3,1942.
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the plan for the creation of the Jewish Army.28 He said that the
testimonial dinner marked the closing of the formative stage of the
campaign. The second stage would be devoted to making the Jewish
Army idea a reality through the use of the press, radio, and rallies.
We hope to impress Great Britain with the American public 
desire to give concrete expression to Churchill’s recent 
statement that this is not a war for territorial controls, nor 
subordination of people, but for the freedom of the world, 
the dignity of man, and equality of all races, colors, and 
creeds.. . 29
Hillel Kook also addressed the group at the Waldorf Astoria.30 
He reiterated many of the essential points made by the other 
speakers but, in doing so, emphasized the Palestinian side of the 
argument. That is, that Jews not only wanted to fight the Nazis but 
were being treated as “protected people,” unable to defend 
themselves and their families. He also stressed the rebirth of their 
fighting spirit.
We will fight because out there has grown a generation that 
has again learned something that Jews have long forgotten, 
and that is to kill. For generations we have learned to die a 
multitude of deaths, the fighting Jews of Palestine have 
learned to kill a ruthless enemy... give us the tools, and we
26 For the complete text of Alfred Strelsin’s speech in the Congressional
Record see Appendix D.
28 Congressional Record. Comments of Alfred A. Strelsin, from The Tewish 
Arm Extension of Remark of Hon. James A. Shanley of Connecticut In the
House of Representatives Tuesday, May 12,1942.
30 For the complete text of Hillel Kook’s speech in the Congressional Record 
see Appendix E.
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will do our job.31
The testimonial dinner for Pierre Van Paassen and convention 
for the creation of a Jewish Army brought the work to a decisive 
stage. The Convention authorized the Executive Board 1) to create a 
nation-wide net of affiliates all over the United States, 2) to establish 
offices in London, Buenos Aires, and Montreal , and 3) to make a 
survey of the Jewish manpower available for the Jewish Arm y.32
Messages of encouragement were received from around the 
world. Eleanor Roosevelt, Frank Knox (Secretary of the Navy), as well 
as a number of British M.P.’s sent supporting messages.33
The pressure generated by the Irgun Delegation and the New
Zionist Organization forced the appearance of a resolution on the
Senate floor regarding the formation of a Jewish army.
Resolved by the House of Representatives (The Senate 
concurring),that the President of the United States is hereby 
requested to direct the Secretary of State to petition the 
Government of Britain to take such action as may be 
necessary to permit the organization of all-Jewish military 
units in Palestine.34
The efforts of these activist Zionists to draw attention to the
31 Congressional Record. Comments of H illel Kook from Extension of 
Remarks of Hon. Andrew L  Somers of New York In the House of 
Representatives, Thursday, May 7, 1942.
32 MEMO from the National Headquarters of the Committee for a Jewish 
Armv. May 15,1942, p. 9.
33 For their comments see MEMO from the National Headcmartprs fnr the 
Committee for a Jewish Armv. Vol. 1. No 13, May, 1942.
34 Zionews. May 1, 1942, vol. 5, no. 8, p. 1.
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plight of European Jews were effective in giving additional credence 
to the activities of the Jewish agency and other mainstream Jewish 
organizations. The perception that the Revisionists and the Irgun 
delegation were radicals actually benefited the mainstream Jewish 
activities in some ways. While somewhat suspicious of the linkage 
between the Revisionists and mainstream Zionists, the President and 
Government officials were, perhaps, more willing to listen to and talk 
with men like Wise, Silver, Weizmann, and Ben Gurion whom they 
considered to be more moderate. Whether planned or not, the 
presence of “radical” groups in the arena of struggle of any national 
liberation group gives to the “more rational” members of that 
struggle a seemingly tolerable voice. This has proven true, for 
example, in the current struggle of the Palestinian Arabs for a 
homeland. In the 1960’s and 1970’s the Palestine Liberation 
Organization was perceived as the most extreme faction of the 
Palestinian population. Its leader, Yasser Arafat, was then the most 
obvious of the radicals. He received some credibility after 
addressing the United Nations. As time passed and other extremist 
groups such as Hamas and Hizbollah, appeared on the scene. The P. 
L. O. began to appear less radical and slowly gained credibility. It 
used this change in perception to its advantage by making 
statements that sounded more diplomatic and acceptable to the
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world at large.
It is evident from the example of the P.L.O. and from the 
example of the Zionist Revisionists, that there is a necessity for 
extremism in any national liberation movement. Acts of violence are 
often used by these groups to draw world attention to their causes. 
The cycle of events in a national liberation movement therefore often 
begins with the efforts of a few extreme activists who may represent 
a dissatisfied constituency who yearn for something that they dare 
not attempt to achieve. It is often the most idealistic of that 
population, the freedom fighters or terrorists, who sacrifice their 
blood to move the rest into action. Conditions affect that movement. 
Usually, the greater the oppression the quicker and more intense the 
action. Legitimacy and diplomacy often follow in a cycle which begins 
with terrorism and shock tactics. These may eventually lead to 
national liberation.
So it was with the Irgun and Lechi in Palestine. The Revisionist 
and Irgun representatives in America employed more subtle shock 
tactics by use of the written and spoken word, rather than by the 
gun.
Following the convention and testimonial dinner for Pierre 
Van Paassen at the Waldorf Astoria, these two groups renewed 
their efforts to gain the support of American leaders such as Senator
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Truman. He was approached by Dr. A. Hadani, a representative of the 
Committee for a Jewish Army (in reality Dr. Alex Raphaeli, member 
of the Irgun). Van Paassen requested that Truman “grant an 
interview to Dr. A. Hadani,. . .  a brilliant scholar and authority on 
Middle Eastern affairs,” in a letter dated May 19, 1942 which was 
also sent to acquaint Truman with the new Committee headquarters 
in Washington at 2317-15th Street, N. W .35
Truman reluctantly agreed to Van Paassen’s request for the 
meeting.
I will be glad to talk with Dr. A. Hadani some time at his 
convenience, but I am not very strong for a Jewish Army. I 
am enclosing you a copy of a letter which I wrote to 
Congressman Somers on the same subject some time in 
January. Sincerely, Harry S. Truman, U.S.S.36
This comment indicates that Truman was still presuming that 
the Jewish Army would include many American Jews. A meeting 
with Dr. Hadani may have reeducated Senator Truman for, by the 
following week, Truman had suddenly changed his mind.
An F.B.I. file entitled “Background Information Concerning 
Members of the Hebrew Committee of National Liberation and Other 
Individuals Associated with the Committee” says
. .  . another member of the original Palestinian delegation 
(i.e. the “Bergson group”) was Dr. Alexander Rafaeli, alias
35 Letter from  Pierre Van Passen to Harry Truman, May 19, 1942, Senatorial 
File, Papers of Harry S. Truman, Truman Library.
36 Undated Copy, Senatorial Files, Papers of Harry S. Truman.
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Alexander B. Hadani. . .  Dr. Alexander Rafaeli, who uses the 
pen name Hadani, is an economist, an expert on Near East 
affairs. He was editor of the Economic Post in Tel Aviv. Since 
1938 he visited more than forty countries in Europe, Asia, 
and Africa, conferring on Jewish problems.. .”37
Two memoirs of the Irgun also mention the name, Alexander
Rafaeli. (Though neither mentions the alias, Dr. Hadani.) Yitshaq Ben
Ami stated that Rafaeli’s job in the United States was to take “charge
of mobilizing local activists to manage our spreading network of
organizations.”38 Ben Ami also stated that, in 1948, “Rafaeli would
concentrate on his specialty of aircraft acquisition.”39 This is
corroborated by the captain of the Altalena, Eliahu Lankin, who, in
his memoirs, wrote that Rafaeli was one of the six original “Irgun
emissaries”40 sent, in 1939, to the United States to set up The
American Friends of Jewish Palestine.41
(Yaakov) Meridor conceived the idea of organizing a flying 
squadron to accompany and protect the Altalena on her 
way to Eretz Israel and later to become part of the future 
Israeli air force. We succeeded in mobilizing a dozen 
volunteer pilots who had served in the various Allied forces 
during World War II and were competent and experienced. 
Among them were fighter pilots, heavy and medium bomber 
pilots, and reconnaissance pilots. We began to buy planes.
Our experts, Yehiel Ratushnik, Alexander Rafaeli and Meir
37 F.B.I. Confidential File, “Background Inform ation Concerning Members 
of the HCNL” taken from The Answer, June 15,1944.
38 Ben Ami, p. 299.
39 Ibid, p. 400.
40 The sixth member being Eri Jabotinsky, son of Vladim ir Jabotinsky.
41 Eliahu Lankin, To Win die Promised land; Story of a Freedom Fighter, p.
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Zilberstein, were sent to various destinations, and the 
airplanes began to arrive only after the A lta le n a ’s 
departure. They were eventually turned over to the 
representatives of Israeli government.42
Besides procuring airplanes for the Irgun, Rafaeli was a 
spokesman for the group. It was in this capacity that he approached 
Harry Truman, and gained support in the United States for the 
Irgun.
Alex Rafaeli pointed out the friendship and understanding 
we had found among Chinese, Indians, Koreans, Yugoslavs, 
Czechs and other exiles in the United States, and said that we 
needed to attend international gatherings to present the 
cause of Hebrew independence in a militant style, without 
the self-deprecating restraint of traditional Zionism. When 
the war was over, and the nations of the free world met to 
decide the future, we had to make sure that the reborn 
Hebrew nation was represented forcefully and with 
dignity.43
About himself Dr. Raphaeli said:
I was a publisher for Economic Newspaper in Israel. I 
volunteered in 1937 for a full time job with the Irgun. I did, 
from ' 37 to '39, underground work in Europe organizing the 
Jews for . . . underground immigration. I was purchasing 
arms. I was carrying (on) political negotiations with other 
national minorities like Maronites in Lebanon, like Kurds, 
etcetera, etcetera. Then I was in charge of Irgun’s western 
office in Paris. . .Then I was trying to get into England. 
England pushed me outside. I returned for a month or two 
to Israel, again Eastern Europe, and then the commander of 
the Irgun decided to send me with the other friends whom 
you know, Kook, Merlin, Ben Ami, Ben Eliezer to the United 
States. In the United States I was on the last boat from Italy,
42 Ibid, p. 273.
43 Ben Ami, p. 296.
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Rex. After that Italy declared war on the Allies and I was 
taken to the press conference of Jabotinsky in the hotel at 
Times Square. . .  And there I couldn’t be introduced under 
my real name and I wasn’t used to the name of Hadani. 
Since then the work in America til ' 44 or ' 45 was done 
under the name Hadani.44
Dr. Raphaeli was one of the main publicity men for the Irgun
Delegation to the United States. He was sent to Hollywood to gain the
support of stars.
I was asked to go to Hollywood via (the) West Coast. Lots of 
lectures, in Texas, Oklahoma. No one ever heard about such 
strange things like Irgun. And then I started a more 
continuous work, established our office in Chicago, and then 
I was in Hollywood where I worked with quite a number of 
people - among them Ben Hecht and Georgie Gessel and Billy 
Wilder and Garfield, etcetera. I think most of them are 
published in a number of books. I was in Hollywood doing 
public relations and mobilizing public opinion of the 
community there which is not American community, not 
specifically Jewish, there were many British there, etcetera, 
establishing the American Friends of the Jewish Palestine.
And then, from that work, I was sent to Washington and 
Philadelphia. I had a radio station in Philadelphia - WPHIL - 
once a week on Near Eastern subjects. And I worked in 
Washington. Hillel Kook got, at that time, sick and I had, for 
a while, to take over completely. At this occasion Truman 
was just one of quite a number of matters. Truman at that 
time was chairman of the, of the W ar. . .  not the War Supply 
Board but Senate’s Committee of War Production Board - 
something like that, I don’t remember the exact name. And 
what happened was that General Rommel, the Nazi 
General, was at that time already coming close to the 
Egyptian borders and we were afraid he w ill move into 
Palestine. Montgomery wasn’t strong enough to stop him.
44 Telephone interview w ith D r. Alex Raphaeli from  Jerusalem by Joanna
Saidel, June 15,1993.
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Rommel captured the whole coast up to Egypt and we 
expected them in Palestine. There was (a) plan of us 
withdrawing into the mountains and we needed weapons.
And I was charged with a job.45
Dr. Raphaeli said that while President Roosevelt did nothing to help
the Jews, his Secretary of the Treasuiy, Henry Morgenthau, was very
helpful, as was the Secretary of the Interior, Ickes.
Morgenthau took an unequivocal stand against the State 
Department’s policy to conceal from the public all 
information regarding the murder of the Jews, which had 
been available since September 1942. Together with some of 
his colleagues at the Treasury, he tried to convince Roosevelt 
to publish this information and assist Jews who had 
managed to escape the Nazis. He supported our demand that 
the American government publicly state that the Nazis and 
their cohorts would be tried as war criminals at the end of 
the war. . . He never joined our board officially, but was 
always willing to help.46
Apparently, on May 27, 1942, the Irgun Delegation (perhaps 
also because of behind the scenes pressure which the New Zionist 
Organization had effectively exerted within the administration) 
succeeded in “enlightening” Senator Truman. It may have been the 
conversation with Dr. Raphaeli, followed by one with Hillel Kook 
(Peter Bergson) which finally convinced Truman to join the effort. 
This is evident from correspondence of that day in which Bergson 
wrote:
Ib id .
48 Dr. Alexe Raphaeli, Dream and Action, p. 105-106.
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Following our conversation of this morning in which you 
expressed your sympathy and approval of our plan and 
consented to become a member of the Committee for a 
Jewish Army, I am writing to express our deep appreciation 
for your kindness and assure you that the Jewish people will 
never forget that you were among the leading personalities 
in this country to take a positive and friendly stand towards 
their most vital problem in the most critical moment of their 
history.. .47
Truman’s response to this letter was " . . .  I really think you give me 
too much credit. I will be glad to do what I can.”48
On June 22,1942 one, Baruch E. Rabinowitz, submitted a short 
memorandum to President Truman highlighting the main points of a 
plan to create a Jewish Army in the Near East. Rommel’s 
breakthrough in Libya necessitated a Jewish Army in the region, 
argued Rabinowitz. The benefit of such an army was that shipping 
transport forces would not be necessary since 100,000 men could be 
immediately mobilized in Palestine, plus an additional 100,000 
stateless Jews from elsewhere. While many Arabs had joined the 
Axis ranks, Jews could be counted on to remain firmly within the 
Allied camp. Reiterating some of the points addressed at the Waldorf 
Astoria meeting the prior month he wrote, “Palestine is the gateway 
to the Persian Gulf, the back-door to Russia. It is also where Hitler
47 Letter from  Bergson to Truman, May 27, 1942, Senatorial Files, Hgrry S. 
Truman, Truman lib rary .
48 Letter from  Truman to Bergson, June 1, 1942, Senatorial Files, Harry S. 
Truman, Truman Library.
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and Hirohito hope to join hands and thus have complete access to the 
oil and minerals of the heart of the World Island, which is the Middle
East” 49
Rabinowitz remarked that the crisis of lack of manpower had 
already destroyed Singapore, Malaya, Burma, Crete, Hong Kong and 
other areas, and would similarly threaten the Middle East. The 
Jewish Army would solve this problem; “100,000 men on the spot 
are worth 3,000,000 men yet to be drafted and transported,” he 
wrote.50 These available men would fight fiercely and “provide the 
unbreakable morale that is the absolute condition of victory . . .  If 
the Jews of the Middle East are slaughtered unarmed, it w ill be the 
greatest blow to Allied morale in this war because the aims of the 
Atlantic Charter w ill then be suspect wherever free men still 
breathe.” S1 Rabinowitz closed by proposing the immediate formation 
of a Jewish Army to be placed under Supreme Allied Command and 
by expressing a moral point of view written by Lord Davies in a 
letter to the Manchester Guardian.
Davies stressed that a determined stand needed to be taken 
either for or against the Jews. The attitude taken would reflect the 
sincerity of British war aims. Abandonment of the Jews would be
49 "Highlights on the Jewish Army Plan,” attached to a letter from  Baruch 
E. Rabinowitz to Senator Harry S. Truman, June 22, 1942, Papers of Harry S. 
Truman, Senatorial Files, Harry S. Truman Library.
" Ib id .
61 Ibid.
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construed as the abandonment of ethical principles, since Hitler had 
chosen them for his personal target. By this action the Jews had 
become central to a choice between good and evil. Desertion of the 
Jews would imply the betrayal of British war aims and the 
repudiation of British principles. The Jews and Palestine needed to be 
defended.
Assumptions by supporters of the Committee for a Jewish
Army concerning Hitler’s plans to attain the World Island with the
assistance of Arab collaborators proved to be true. “Haj Amin al
Husaini, the most influential leader of Palestine Arabs, lived in
Germany during the Second World War. He met Hitler, Ribbentrop
and other Nazi leaders on various occasions and attempted to
coordinate Nazi and Arab policies in the Middle East.”52 It was
claimed that al Husaini had connections with Adolf Eichmann.
Hannah Arendt, who covered the Eichmann trial in Jerusalem,
believed however that this charge was incorrect. She nevertheless
confirmed the union of Husseini with the Nazis.
The Grand Mufti’s connections with the Nazis during the war 
were no secret; he had hoped they would help him in the 
implementation of some “final solution” in the Near East.. .
That Arab nationalists have been in sympathy with Nazism 
is notorious, their reasons are obvious . . .  they never were 
in hiding. . . The Mufti had been in close contact with the 
German Foreign Office and with Himmler, but this was
“ W alter Laqueur and Barry Rubin. The Israel-Arab Reader. New York,
1984, p.79.
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nothing new.53
The outbreak of the war had caused the Germans to reevaluate
their position on the Arabs because of the importance of Middle East
oil and supply routes.
The Axis began giving generous subsidies to the Mufti in 
Baghdad, and the Germans modified their racial theory of 
the Arabs, who were upgraded from a prim itive people 
belonging to the lower races (though above Jews, gypsies, 
and blacks) to those possessing Nordic influences. The 
M ufti’s fair hair and blue eyes convinced H itler that the 
Arab leader “has more than one Aryan among his ancestors 
and one who may be descended from the best Roman 
stock”54
On November 30, 1941 the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem had
actually met with Hitler in Berlin. In a record of the conversation
between them, which was held in the presence of the Reich Foreign
Minister and Minister Grobba, the Grand Mufti affirmed that
“the Arabs were Germany’s natural friends because they 
had the same enemies as had Germany, namely the English, 
the Jews, and the Communists. They were therefore 
prepared to cooperate with Germany with all their hearts 
and stood ready to participate in the war, not only 
negatively by the commission of acts of sabotage and the 
instigation of revolutions, but also positively by the 
formation of an Arab Legion.”55
53 Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in  Jerusalem, p. 13.
64 Philip M attar, Ihe_M ufti o f Jerusalem; Al-Haii Amin al-Husavoi and the 
Palestinian National Movement, p. 100.
55 Laqueur and Rubin, p. 80.
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The Grand Mufti expressed his desire to enter into an agreement 
with Hitler. He promised the Mufti that once the gateway to the 
Middle East was opened by way of the Caucasus that the Mufti could 
make a public declaration telling the Arab population of Axis 
support Hitler assured the Mufti of the following, “enjoining him to 
lock it in the uttermost depths of his heart:”
1. Hitler would continue his efforts to destroy “the Judeo- 
Communist empire in Europe.”
2. German armies would reach the southern exit of the 
Caucasus.
3. When this happened “Germany’s objective would then be 
solely the destruction of the Jewish element residing in the 
Arab sphere under the protection of British power. In that 
hour the Mufti would be the most authoritative spokesman 
for the Arab world. It would then be his task to set off the 
Arab operations which he had secretly prepared.” S6
Meanwhile, Hitler continued to butcher the Jews. As the fact of 
the extermination of the Jews became known to the world, a rising 
sense of moral outrage grew.
In New York, forty thousand people attended a pageant, called 
“We Shall Never Die,” in Madison Square Garden to watch a 
theatrical presentation of the extermination on the Jews. This 
performance, which took place on March 9, 1943, was conceived by 
Ben Hecht and the Irgun Delegation in America, and directed by Moss
50 Ibid, p. 83, Prof. Laqueur took this information from Documents on  
German Foreign Policy 1918-1945, Series D, Vol. Xm, London, 1964, pp. 881 f l  .
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Hart. It was staged before a backdrop of two huge tablets three
stories high bearing the Ten Commandments. In the production
there was a roll call of the greatest Jewish figures throughout time
emerging from the tablets individually, each carrying a candle which
symbolized the Jewish contribution to humanity. The pageant ended
with these words,
The corpse of a people lies on the steps of civilization. And 
no voice is heard to cry halt to the slaughter, no government 
speaks to bid that the murder of millions end. Those of us 
here tonight have a voice. Let us raise it. Perhaps the dead 
will hear it and find hope. Perhaps the four freedoms will 
hear it and find their tongue.57
The presentation was repeated in Washington, at Constitution Hall, 
where it was attended by seven members of the Supreme Court, two 
Cabinet members, hundreds of Congressmen and high ranking 
government officials. Eleanor Roosevelt was in the the audience. She 
wrote movingly about the event in her weekly syndicated column.
Others were also writing about Bergson’s production in less 
favorable tones. The F.B.I. received mail from an individual who 
wrote a number of “personal and confidential” letters to J. Edgar 
Hoover concerning Peter Bergson’s (H illel Kook) activity in the 
Theatre Authority of New York. The writer believed that the Theatre 
Authority should be investigated for doing business with a non­
57 Ben Ami, p. 286.
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citizen of the United States, Peter Bergson, and allowing him to collect
funds thereby. The writer stated,
The question is? Why didn’t Alan Corelli (of the Theatre 
Authority) write your department about Mr. Bergson and 
make some inquiry regarding Bergson’s status in this 
country or what right had Mr. Bergson in this country?.. .  (to 
organize) the ‘Gigantic Pageant “We W ill Never Die” at the 
Madison Square Garden and gather in Thousands of Dollars 
from the Pageant when Alan Corelli knew right well that 
Bergson was not a citizen of the United States. To my mind 
the Theatre Authority is an organization of “Parasites.” that 
have no right to exist. .S8
The use of this underlined term, so often employed by Hitler to 
describe the Jews, may suggest that the source of this letter was an 
anti-Semite, writing for that purpose rather than the purpose stated 
(i.e. to investigate the theatre company and the alien status of 
Bergson).
The same writer (apparent from handwriting) wrote to Hoover 
regarding a play called “The Gate” put on by the Theatre Company 
which was supposed to benefit the children of India. The writer asks, 
“Will India’s children get the money Paid for the benefit?” and then 
implies that it might go to “European and other suspects” who were 
making “in roads on the American Pocketbook .”59
An F.B.I. investigation into the activities of Peter Bergson and
“ Letter to J. Edgar Hoover, from  F.B.I. file on Peter Bergson.
60 F.B.I. file  on Peter Bergson.
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his group was undertaken. The Committee for a Jewish Army 
continued to attem pt to put pressure on the United States 
government and to influence American public opinion.
While the New Zionist Organization and the Irgun Delegation 
worked in an all out effort to gain acceptance for the creation of a 
Jewish Army in Palestine they were not successful Despite American 
support for the idea, the British, completely aware of the underlying 
motives for such a force, feared the consequences and were 
determined to oppose the creation of such an Army. The work of the 
Irgun and the N.Z.O. did, however, result in the creation of the Jewish 
Brigade and continued to be the major agent of public exposure to 
the plight the Jews of Europe, to the anti-Jewish policy of the British 
in Palestine, and of the ineffectiveness of the United States 
government in assisting the Jews.




The ineffectiveness of the United States government in dealing 
with the “Jewish problem” in Europe was clearly visible in America’s 
response to the Bermuda Conference on Refugees in 1943. The Irgun 
Delegation made this response the focus of an ad campaign which 
characterized the Conference as a sham and a mockery. Though this 
analysis was substantially correct, its appearance in the nationwide 
press was prem ature. The inappropriate tim ing of the 
advertisements proved to be extremely costly for the organization 
primarily due to the attachment of a list of names of congressmen, 
without their expressed consent, prior to the release of the official 
report of the Conference. The Irgun Delegation was angrily decried in 
public and on the Senate floor. The group lost many supporters 
including Senator Truman because of their error in planning.
On April 19, 1943 the Irgun Delegation to the United States 
shifted their attention from the creation of a Jewish Army to the 
Bermuda Conference on the Refugee Problem which lasted until the 
end of the month. This Anglo-American Conference sponsored by 
Roosevelt and Churchill was the result of pressure from Jews, and 
from the general public in the U.S. and in Britain. Their demands for
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action could no longer be stifled, particularly after the issuance of the
United Nations Declaration on Jewish Massacres in December, 1942.
This declaration stated that the governments of Belgium,
Czechoslovakia, Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway,
Poland, the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
and Yugoslavia, and the French National Committee had been drawn
to numerous reports from Europe that the German authorities were
carrying into effect Hitler’s intention to exterminate the Jewish
people in Europe.
From all the occupied countries Jews are being transported, 
in conditions of appalling horror and brutality, to Eastern 
Europe. In Poland, which has been made the principal Nazi 
slaughterhouse, the ghettos established by the German 
invaders are being systematically emptied of all Jews except 
for a few highly skilled workers required for war industries. 
None of those taken away are ever heard of again. The able 
bodied are slowly worked to death in labor camps. The 
infirm  are left to die of exposure and starvation or are 
deliberately massacred in mass executions. The number of 
victims in these bloody cruelties is reckoned in many 
hundreds of thousands of entirely innocent men, women and 
children.1
By the declaration the above mentioned governments and the French 
National Committee condemned, in the strongest possible terms, the 
“bestial policy of cold-blooded extermination.” They warned that
1 Monty N. Penkower, The Tews were Expendable: Free World Diplomacy and 
the Holocaust, p. 91.
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those responsible for the crimes would not escape retribution and 
expressed their determination to press on until this enemy was 
vanquished.
While Jews submitted various rescue plans, the members of 
the Bermuda Conference, headed by the president of Princeton 
University, Willis Dodds, anxiously avoided referring to the Jews as 
the Nazis’ major victims. The Conference attained little except to 
revive the Evian Committee (Intergovernmental Committee of 
Refugees) and to decide to extend the British mandate over Palestine 
to deal with problems that would occur after the war ended. British 
plans to open up wartime refugee camps in North Africa did not 
materialize. The decisions of the Bermuda Conference came too late 
to save Jews from the Nazi Holocaust.2
The revival of the Inter-Governmental Committee on Refugees 
would secure visas for refugees wherever it could. However, this 
body did not facilitate Jewish immigration into Palestine since it 
regarded its activities as purely humanitarian and wished to avoid 
being drawn into political controversies.3
The Conference proved to be a sham. Despite public demand for 
action, the British and American governments “hid behind 
questionable immigration figures . . . Ships were found to bring
2 Encyclopedia Judaica, vol. 4, p. 669.
3 Richard Stevens, American Zionism and U.S. Foreign Policy 1942-1947. p.
70.
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400,000 German prisoners of war to internment in the United States
outside current visa regulations, but not for Jews facing death . .  .
Indeed, the word “Jews” could not be found in the final communique’
from the conference.”4
The failure of the Conference to assist the Jews of Europe
brought Zionists who had been inactive to their feet. Rallies and
protests increased. Restrictive immigration policies gave credence to
the Zionist contention that only a Jewish state would relieve the
suffering of European Jews.
This was especially true after the Bermuda Conference of 
1943 demonstrated that Washington was not prepared to 
modify existing American immigration laws. Not until 1947 
was a belated, and ultimately futile, effort made to relax 
American immigration policy with a view to aiding growing 
numbers of Europeans of all faiths, displaced from their 
homes by the w ar.s
Although the United Nations Declaration on Jewish Massacres
had stirred public sympathy it had failed to call the Allied powers
into action. It was the only international document of its nature
produced during the war period.
“Deeds commensurate with the gravity of the hour,” called 
for in a last cable from the doomed fighters of the Warsaw 
ghetto uprising while the conference’s delegates basked in 
the Bermuda sun, had not followed. The pleas and reasoned 
proposals of a concerned public could not move London and
4 Penkower, p. 119.
6 Dan Tschirgi, The Politics of Indecision: Origins and Implications of 
American Involvement with the Palestine Problem, p. 129.
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Washington to meaningful action. Chaim Weizmann’s bitter 
observation, included in a memorandum to the conference 
which the Jewish Agency could not deliver in person, that 
“the world is divided into countries in which the Jew cannot 
live and countries which they must not enter” had proved 
only too true during the Holocaust6
Dr. Yehuda Bauer, Professor of Holocaust Studies and former 
head of the Institute of Contemporary Jewry at Hebrew University in 
Jerusalem analyzed the reaction of mainstream American Jews to 
the Holocaust. He believes that while Jewish organizations in America 
were well informed about the failure of the Bermuda Conference, 
“they did not respond with plans of their own. In addition to the 
formidable psychological hindrances to action hinted at already, 
there were certain objective circumstances that militated against 
“radical” demonstrations, hunger strikes, and the like.” Such actions, 
Bauer contends, would have hurt President Roosevelt and his 
administration, which, Bauer states, “for all its shortcomings, had 
stood between the Jews and American antisemitism. Any 
demonstrations against the government would be perceived as a 
demonstration against the war. Jews in 1943 simply could not 
demonstrate against Roosevelt” 7
Bauer states however that if groups like the American Jewish 
Joint Distribution Committee, which was the chief representative of
* Penkower, p. 121.
7 Yehuda Bauer, American Jewry and the Holocaust, p. 195.
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mainstream Jews in Europe during the War, had backed the activist
Zionists in America, rescue actions would probably have been much
more successful.
Some action was attempted, and might have been more 
successful if  more representative groups had joined: the 
mission in the United States of the extremist underground 
Revisionist Irgun organized an Emergency Rescue Committee 
which roped in senators and congressmen and demanded 
action, such as sending funds to Nazi-controlled territory and 
creating a special governmental agency to deal with rescue 
plans. But their activity, aimed at maximum publicity and 
lobbying, went far beyond what the JDC (Joint Distribution 
Committee) considered its proper line of approach.8
This presumed “proper line of approach” did not deter the 
Irgun Delegation who were outraged by the Bermuda Conference. 
They again used shock tactics to bring attention to the Conference. On 
May 4, 1943 they placed another ad in The New York Times . The 
caption atop it read, To 5,000,000 Jews in the Nazi Death-Trap 
Bermuda Was a “Cruel Mockery”9 . It was subtitled “When Will 
The United Nations Establish An Agency To Deal With The Problem of 
Hitler’s Extermination of a Whole People?” The ad criticized the 
Bermuda Conference, calling it a “mockery and a cruel jest.” It drew 
public attention to the problem but alienated many important 
individuals because it was published before the final reports of the
8 Ib id.
9 For fu ll text of this ad see Appendix L.
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Conference were published. Although the accusations of the Irgun 
Delegation proved to be true, many officials resented having their 
names attached to the ad without consent and prior to the disclosure 
of the official findings. The overriding result of the ad however was, 
to some extent, positive. It helped increase pressure resulting in the 
formation of the War Refugee Board.
This powerful advertisement did not go unnoticed. A legal
adviser of the Visa Division named Mr. Alexander pointed out the
article to an F.B.I. agent who noted it in his file on Hillel Kook (Peter
Bergson). The F.B.I. file on the Bermuda Conference ad said
The entire article which followed the headline was cast in a 
tone of vituperation. . . Along the margin of this ad, 
separated in a black-lined box, was a large number of names 
of people prominent in public life, including Sidney Heilman, 
Donald Nelson, Herbert Hoover and thirty-three United 
States Senators. The implication was offered that these 
persons endorsed the statements appearing in the ad.10
This list, which was composed of many m ilitary officers, 
senators, ambassadors, governors, and distinguished American 
leader, included their names under the subtitle “The Voice of 
America.”11
Senator Edwin Johnson immediately complained to Mr. Bergson 
because he felt it was unfair to condemn the Conference before an
10F.B.I. Memorandum to M r. Ladd from S. S. Alden - Re: Committee for a 
Jewish Army of Stateless and Palestinian Jews, May 12, 1943.
11 See Appendix G for entire list o f names included in this ad.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
101
official report was issued regarding Bermuda. He also believed that
one of the U.S. representatives to the Conference “who had no
background in refugee matters,”12 Senator Scott W. Lucas, had been
maligned by the ad.
. . .  My colleagues and I have great respect for Senator Lucas 
and we do not deem it fair to him to prejudge or condemn 
the work of the committee until it has had sufficient 
opportunity to make a report. None of the work of the 
Conference has been disclosed to me in confidence or 
otherwise, and in all fairness I must therefore withhold my 
judgment until such time as I know what actually took place 
in the Conference.. .13
Johnson also objected to the use of his name, which appeared 
as National Chairman of the organization, and to the publication of 
other names, saying, “While there is nothing to indicate that this 
group of distinguished citizens endorses the specific advertisement, 
the inference might be made that they do.”
The Congressional Record for May 6, 1943 set forth a protest 
by Senator Lucas in which he defended the conference at Bermuda. 
He also read Senator Johnson's letter to Peter Bergson into the 
Record. During that session of Congress four other senators 
disclaimed knowledge of the ad. These included E. H. Koore of 
Oklahoma, A. B. Chandler of Kentucky, Alexander Wiley of
12 Penkower, p. 108.
13 Letter from Senator Edwin C. Johnson to Peter Bergson, May 6, 1943; 
Senatorial File, Papers of Harry S. Truman.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
102
Wisconsin, and Harry S. Truman of Missouri.
Senator Truman was outraged. He withdrew his support for the 
Committee for a Jewish Army. In a letter to Peter Bergson Truman 
stated his case.
Dear Mr. Bergson,
Senator Lucas yesterday called my attention to an 
advertisement in the New York Times to which was signed 
the names of some dozen or so Senators and to which the 
name of Senator Edwin C. Johnson was signed as Chairman.
Senator Johnson informs me this advertisement was never 
submitted to him for approval, and I have the same 
information from a number of other Senators.
I am withdrawing my name from your Committee, and you 
are not authorized under any circumstances to make use of 
it for any purpose in the future.
This does not mean my sympathies are not with the down­
trodden Jews of Europe, but when you take it on yourself 
without consultation to attack members of the Senate and 
House of Representatives who are working in your interest I 
cannot approve of that procedure.
Sincerely yours,
Harry S. Truman, U.S.S.14
On May 10, 1943 Senator Maybank of South Carolina pointed 
out that his name had also been used without his approval and “that 
the man responsible was one Peter Bergson, a citizen of Palestine, 
who, with four or five other Palestinian citizens, is presently in the
14 Papers of Harry S. Truman, Senatorial File, dated May 7, 1943, Harry S. 
Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.
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United States preparing full page ads of the same general tenor.”15 
In the Congressional Record for this date Senators Lucas and 
Chandler expressed their resentment that “an individual not an 
American citizen should, without authority, use the names of other 
Senators to condemn a colleague in the United States Senate.”16
Mr. Lucas made the following comments in the Congressional 
Record.
The time may come for a showdown with respect to the 
alien groups, regardless of who they may be, who are here 
under temporary sufferance at the hands of a benevolent 
government which accords them better treatment than they 
can get at any other place under God’s shining sun, and 
while they are here they take advantage of the courtesy and 
kindness extended to them.17
Bergson sent letters of apology to both Senator Lucas and 
Senator Truman on May 13, 1943 for what Bergson considered a 
misinterpretation of intent by the senators. But the damage had been 
done. Truman’s reply to the apology was curt " . . .  I still feel that you 
abused your privilege when you subjected the members of the 
United States Senate to the embarrassment of your advertisement 
which was not authorized by any member of that committee.”18
15 F.B.I. Memorandum to M r. Ladd from S. S. Alden - Re: Committee for a 
Jewish Army of Stateless and Palestinian Jews, May 12, 1943.
18 Ib id
17 Congressional Record, May 10,1943.
1* Letter to Peter Bergson from  H any Truman, May 24, 1943 ; Senatorial File, 
Papers of Harry S. Truman.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
104
Irgun delegation member, Yitshak Ben Ami, commented on the 
reaction to advertisement in his memoirs.
As we hoped we would, we touched a nerve, and a storm 
of protest against us broke loose, whipped up by Senator 
Scott Lucas, who had just returned from the conference. The 
debate which then broke out on the Senate floor revolved 
mostly around Senator Lucas’ hurt feelings. Lucas declared 
before the Senate that no one could accuse him of not caring 
for the Jews of Europe, since “some of my best friends are 
members of the Jewish faith.” In May, 1943, this was 
considered a forthright and courageous statement. Without 
knowing the facts or understanding the historic issues, 
Lucas’ colleagues rose up on the floor and several, including 
Harry S. Truman, announced their withdrawal from the 
Committee for a Jewish Army. How could our ad have dared 
to state “It was almost improper to mention the word Jew?” 
Lucas called this a “diabolical untruth,” and wanted to know 
how we knew what had been said or not said at the 
Conference. (We did have friends who had attended.)
While Eichmann’s Germany herded thousands into the 
shuttle trains to the extermination camps, while David 
Wdowinski and his comrades were retreating from bunker 
to bunker in the Warsaw ghetto, the members of the United 
States Senate were patting each other on the back in a show 
of support for each other’s fine efforts.19
While the Senate continued to debate the issue, Kook (Bergson) 
wrote to Senator Edwin C. Johnson, “President Roosevelt called this a 
war...  for the survival of human liberties; for the survival of human 
freedom; for the survival of world civilization and the dignity of the 
human race.. .  Let not the day of victory come and find seven million
,B Ben Ami, p. 290.
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Jewish corpses in Europe.”20 During 1943 Truman had been urged by
more moderate elements of the Zionist movement to support a
Jewish State in Palestine. On January 28, Rabbi Stephen Wise sent
him a copy of a volume called “Why a Jewish State” written by Rabbi
Leon Feuer of Toledo.21 On February 4,1943 Truman replied, “I shall
read it with much interest.” 22 Truman’s amicable relationship with
Wise prompted further correspondence in the wake of the Senator’s
resignation from the Committee for a Jewish Army. On May 20,1943
Rabbi Wise, representing the American Emergency Committee for
Zionist Affairs, wrote to Truman about Peter Bergson and the Irgun
Delegation in America.
The activities of Mr. Bergson have been a source of 
considerable embarrassment to the organized Zionist 
movement in this country, whose leadership has viewed 
with concern the manner in which he and his associates 
have been conducting their campaign.23
Senator Truman’s June 1,1943 reply to this letter is both interesting 
and revealing. In it he openly criticizes Bergson and states why.
Dear Rabbi Wise,
I appreciate your letter of the twentieth very much, and it 
is fellows like Mr. Bergson who go off half cocked in matters
20 Ibid, p. 290-291.
21 Letter from Steven Wise to Senator Truman, Jan. 28, 1943, Truman 
Senatorial Files, Truman Library.
22 Reply from Truman to Wise, Feb. 4, 1943, Senatorial Files, Papers of Harry 
S. Truman, Truman Library.
23 Letter from Rabbi Steven Wise to Senator Harry Truman, May 20, 1943, 
Truman Library.
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that affect strategy of the whole world that causes all the 
trouble. No one feels more sympathetic toward the Jews 
than the members of the United States Senate who signed 
that Committee petition, but when an ad such as Bergson 
put in the New York Tomes can be used to stir up trouble 
where our troops are fighting it is certainly outside my 
policy to be mixed up in such an organization.
That ad was used by all the Arabs in North Africa in an 
endeavor to create dissension among them and to stab our 
fellows in the back.
We want to help the Jews and we are going to help them but 
we cannot do it at the expense of our military maneuvers.
Sincerely yours,
Harry S. Truman, U.S.S.24
The failure of the Irgun Delegation to properly time the release 
of its advertisement attack on the Bermuda Conference was 
regrettable. The plan could have been highly successful had proper 
endorsement been attained. It is probable that such support could 
have been mustered. Over - zealousness and a desire to make the 
public aware of the hypocrisy of the event seemingly overshadowed 
the systematic approach of affirmation and consent which should 
have been followed. This failure, however, did not stop the Irgun 
Delegation from continuing with its mission.
Other important events were simultaneously taking place. 
Despite the animosity between the Irgun Delegation, the Senate, and
24 Letter from Harry Truman to Steven Wise, June 1, 1943, Truman Library.
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the mainstream Jews in America, in 1943, over the Bermuda
Conference, there was cooperation elsewhere.
The establishment Zionists, important anti-Zionist figures, 
and a group of young Palestinians in the United States led 
by Peter Bergson managed to torpedo a joint U.S.-British 
declaration that would have disavowed commitment to a 
Jewish state in Palestine, and denied freedom of expression 
to a minority (i.e. the Revisionists) in the United States.25
The affair began in January with the appointment of Lt. Col. Harold 
B. Hoskins, “an Arabist in the Office of Strategic Services,” to the 
position of Near East envoy to Franklin Roosevelt.26
25 “The Hoskins Affair,” by Louis Rapoport, The Terusalem Post. November
23,1984, p. 5.
20 Ibid.
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CHAPTER 5
THE FIGHT FOR A JEWISH STATE
The Hoskins Affair threatened to stifle the Palestine question 
during the war and to make a decision on Palestine dependent upon 
Arab agreement. This incident, which was averted by the united 
effort of a broad spectrum of Jews, was only one incident in the large 
number that constituted the fight for a Jewish State by supporters in 
both America and Palestine. While the methods were controversial, 
the results of those efforts was increased pressure and publicity for 
the creation of a Jewish State.
Harold B. Hoskins, the son of missionaries from the United 
States, was bom in Beirut and educated at American University, and, 
in the United States, at Princeton. His first job in the Roosevelt 
administration was to establish friendly contacts (i.e. to create an 
intelligence network) in the Arab world.1 In a report which he 
wrote, he pressed for a joint Anglo-American declaration which 
would, in effect, stifle the Palestine question during the war and 
making a decision on Palestine depend upon Arab agreement.2 He 
advised that unless this was done there would be civil war there
1 “The Hoskins Affair,” by Louis Rapoport, The Jerusalem Post. November
23,1984, p. 5.
2 Summary of lieutenant Colonel Harold B. Hoskins’ Report on the Near 
East, Foreign Relations of the United States. (Palestine section) 1943, volume 
IV, p. 784.
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which would endanger Allied war efforts.3
He also cited the controversy between mainstream and 
Revisionist Zionists (particularly the campaign of Rabbi Wise against 
the Irgun Delegation) as contributing to “domestic disunity.” Hoskins’ 
appraisal stated that 10 additional divisions would be needed in 
Palestine unless Zionist agitation, especially the campaign for a 
Jewish Army, was silenced immediately.4 British reports and State 
Department assessments confirmed Hoskins’ assumptions. There 
Wallace Murray headed the Near East desk and “was considered the 
most intransigent foe of Zionism in the government.” 5 General 
Patrick Hurley (Army Intelligence) made similar recommendations. 
Had Roosevelt and Churchill jointly disavowed any commitment to a 
Jewish homeland in Palestine it would have been a terrible blow to 
Zionism.
However, Churchill’s strong support for an allied Jewish force
overcame the major forces of opposition.
Without the Prime Minister’s support, evident at every 
crucial stage since September, 1939, the Jewish Brigade 
would never have gotten by the careerists in London and 
the Middle East. The U.S. War and State departments also 
rejected the idea, and a report in m id-1943 from  
Roosevelt’s personal emissary to the Middle East (Hoskins),
3 Hoskins to Under Secretary Sumner Welles, from Cairo, January 23, 1943, 
Foceign_Relations of the United States. Palestine Section, 1943, volume IV, p.
748.
4 “The Hoskins Affair,” by Louis Rapoport, The Jerusalem Post. November
23,1984, p. 5.
6 Ibid.
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which did much to shape government opinion, omitted any 
mention of the Yishuv’s war record...  Churchill justified the 
Jewish Brigade on military grounds, on the basis of his firm  
views supporting a large Jewish state in Palestine . .  .6
By the end of July 1943, Roosevelt used a Jewish aide, Judge 
Samuel Rosenman, to convince Jewish leaders to accept the Hoskins 
report. Rabbi Stephen Wise and Chaim Weizmann were two of the 
Jewish leaders to whom appeals were made to stop the activities 
supporting the formation of a Jewish Army. “Wise pointed out, quite 
justly, that he had no control over the Jewish Army people, but that 
he would see what could be done.” Similarly there was a request 
made of Chaim Weizmann in Great Britain “to stop the Jewish Army 
campaign, and the Zionist leader’s reply to Lord Halifax (was) that 
the Bergson group would not listen to him. The Zionist establishment 
tried, nevertheless, to frustrate the movement for a Jewish Army.”7 
In 1984 Hillel Kook (Peter Bergson) said that Rabbi Wise, after 
talking with Rosenman, had telephoned and asked Bergson to attend 
a meeting in New York of about 10 Zionist leaders. At the meeting, 
Wise stated that Roosevelt told him personally that unless the Jewish 
Army Committee’s ads were stopped, he would alter the tax 
exemption status of sill Zionist organizations in the United States.8
* Penkower, p. 26.
7 “The Hoskins Affair,” by Louis Rapoport, The lerusalem Post. November
23,1984, p. 6.
"Ibid.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
111
Controversy continued over both Kook’s (Bergson’s) activities 
and the Hoskins report. Kook’s friend, Senator Edwin Johnson 
(national chairman for the Committee for a Jewish Army and 
chairman of the Senate M ilitary Affairs Committee) demanded an 
inquiry into the Hoskins affair. After Johnson was finally able to 
obtained the Hoskins report, he told Kook that “the recommendations 
in it were based purely on opinion, that there was no substantiation 
for his assessments of a possible Arab revolt”9
I. F. Stone, Washington correspondent, editor of The Nation. 
and PM newspaper, called Hoskins “politically a Syrian nationalist 
who had given alarmist accounts to Franklin Roosevelt.” 10 By July 
1943 the War Department stated that Lt. Col. Hoskins’ activities 
were unauthorized. In the Treasury Department Secretary Henry 
Morgenthau was dismayed by Hoskins’ activities. Morgen thau 
defended the rights of the Irgun delegation.
A cross spectrum of Jewry united, for it was feared that if 
Hoskins’ efforts succeeded there would be an increase in anti- 
Semitism nationwide. “The president realized that he was facing, for 
the first time, united Jewish and Zionist opposition representing the 
entire spectrum: the clamorous Bergson group in the same company 
as Baruch, Frankfurter, Wise, Morgenthau and Roseman. All would
MblcF
10 The Nation. March 18.1944.
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be in one open revolt if the joint declaration were forced through.”11 
Despite efforts to halt Hoskins in this matter, he remained friendly 
with F.D.R., who sent him on other missions to the Middle East to talk 
with Ibn Saud.12
The Hoskins affair showed the strength of the Jewish lobby.
No similar effort was made-except by the Bergson group-to 
lobby intensely for the rescue of Jews from Nazi satellite 
states. It was a question of priorities: the Beigsonites, after 
November 1942, put rescue first, Palestine second. The 
mainstream Zionists openly admitted - even at the height of 
the Holocaust- that Palestine should be “first and foremost” 
on the agenda, as Zionist leader Dr. Israel Goldstein said in a 
statement at the establishment’s American Jewish 
Conference in June 1943. Rescue was a poor second.13
Following the Hoskins Affair, Colonel Hoskins became less 
conspicuous. He left the secret service and returned to the State 
Department, becoming director of the Foreign Service Institute from 
1955-1961. Later, he became a Middle East consultant to Standard 
Oil of New Jersey. His 1977 New York Times obituary never 
mentioned the Hoskins Report, which nearly became Allied policy.14 
It was only because of the united Jewish lobbying effort that this 
was prevented.
It was believed that the underlying motive of the Irgun
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Delegation and the Revisionist Zionists in America was to arm the 
Jewish population in Palestine in preparation for a revolt against the 
British. This belief was especially held by the British themselves and 
was the principle cause for the demise of the Jewish Army plan. The 
British War Office produced a seventeen page report on the subject 
in December of 1942, which stated that “the Committee for a Jewish 
Arm y. . .  is closely connected with the [aim of] creation of a Jewish 
State in Palestine.. The British, however, were not too concerned 
about American support for such an Army. The report commented 
that Lord Halifax believed that officials in the State Department were 
aware of the real objectives of the Jewish agitation, but due to 
benevolence, and a desire, in an election year, to avoid the risk of 
offending voters or being called anti-Semites, did not publicly 
confront the matter. 15
In Washington the British approached this matter more 
diplomatically. Members of their embassy requested the Prime 
Minister to tell the Irgun Delegation that the arming of the Jews in 
Palestine was being actively implemented with the help of the 
Jewish Agency. Nonetheless, after three years only 12,000 of the 
130,000 men and women registered in Palestine for service had been 
admitted to various British units in the Middle East.16
16 Report from the British War Office, Dec. 10,1942, quoted by Ben Ami, p.
332.
ie Ben Ami, p. 333.
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In June of 1943 Irgun delegation member, Yitshak Ben Ami’s, 
army furlough was ending. He believed that his work in the Irgun 
Delegation in the United States had been beneficial
Even though we had met opposition every step of the way 
from our fellow Jews in the establishment, if nothing else, 
we had at least served as a stimulus, pointing to new 
approaches, and shaming Jews and non-Jews alike to look 
up, to take notice, and sometimes to act. Whether or not we 
succeeded, we had done our best17
While hopes for an Army of Stateless and Palestinian Jews 
were dashed, the effort was not a failure. In England Chaim 
Weizmann, though not a Revisionist, had also been pushing for 
independent units of stateless and Palestinian Jews within the 
British forces to serve with the Allied armies.
Although this effort was criticized by more extreme elements 
who wished to see an independent Jewish fighting force, Weizmann 
believed that such a force, even under British control, would help to 
form the nucleus of a Jewish army which could contend with Arab 
opposition when Jewish statehood was proclaimed. He also hoped 
that the creation of such a unit would have political ramifications. 
Jewish units representing the Jewish people, fighting under a Jewish 
flag, would draw further attention to the goal and recognition of 
Jewish statehood. It would also affect non-Zionist Jews by creating 
the impression that Jews were fighting in the war as members of the
17 Ibid, p. 334.
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Jewish nation, not as subjects of other nations, which was the real 
situation.18
Continuing Revisionist and Irgun agitation for a Jewish Army 
in the United States impacted on the situation in Great Britain. In 
September, 1944, the combined efforts in America and in Great 
Britain succeeded. The British War Office created the Jewish Brigade 
which fought in Italy under the flag of present day Israel. In this 
respect these Zionist activists achieved some of their goals. “The 
veterans of the Jewish Brigade became, exactly as the [Mandate] 
Administration had foreseen, the nucleus of the future Israeli Army 
and the decisive factor in the Arab defeat, which, as things were, 
amounted to a defeat of British policy.”19
Weizmann had secured the assurance of Churchill that Great 
Britain would recognize statehood. If the Conservatives had remained 
in power, the British probably would have recognized Zionist claims 
to statehood, at least a restricted part of Palestine. However, it was 
Zionist operations in America during the war that initiated the final 
showdown before Israel’s b irth .20
The Irgun delegation fervently turned their sights toward the 
statehood question. While Senator Truman had resigned from the
18 Alan R. Taylor, Prelude to Israel: An analysis of Zionist Diplomacy 1897- 
1947. p. 67.
1t Taylor, p. 69, (quoting Arthur Koestler, Promise and Fulfillment.
Palestine. 1917-1949. Macmillan, New York, 1949).
20 Taylor, p. 70.
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Committee for a Jewish Army he had not deserted the idea of a 
Jewish State. Undated and untitled correspondence, possibly in 
response to a May 2, 1944 request from the American Zionist 
Emergency Council for a statement of support for a Jewish 
Homeland,21 contained a statement which suggested and urged 
Truman to say, in part, that, as a member of the Sub-Committee of 
the Resolutions Committee of the Democratic National Convention, he 
would give his earnest support to the plank in the platform which 
favored the opening of Palestine to unrestricted Jewish immigration 
and colonization, resulting in the establishment there of a free and 
democratic Jewish commonwealth at the earliest possible moment.22
Truman, though sympathetic, was hesitant to issue the 
statement. He wrote in other correspondence, “My sympathy is with 
the Jewish people and I am of the opinion that a Resolution such as 
this should be very circumspectly handled until we know just exactly 
where we are going and why. With the difficulties looming up 
between Russia and Poland, and the Baltic States and Russia, and 
with Great Britain and Russia, it is absolutely necessary to us in 
financing the war. I don’t want to throw any bricks to upset the 
applecart, although when the right time comes I am willing to help 
make the fight for a Jewish Homeland in Palestine.”23
21 Letter from Rabbi Leon I. Feuer to Truman, May 2, 1944, Truman Library.
22 Senatorial File, Harry S. Truman
23 Undated Senatorial file, Papers of Harry S. Truman.
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Messages of support such as this one were continually being 
sought by Jewish Agencies, Revisionist and otherwise, to give 
additional credence to the movement for a Jewish State. On 
September 15, 1944 the Zionist Organization of America requested 
such a statement for its forty-seventh Annual Convention. In the 
request to Harry Truman the responsibility of America to keep past 
promises to the Jews was recalled and emphasized.
The Senator was reminded that, after World War I, 52 nations,
including the United States, had guaranteed a Jewish Homeland in
Palestine, and that it was the obligation of the United Nations to
declare Palestine open to unrestricted Jewish immigration so that it
could become a Jewish Commonwealth, in which all the inhabitants
would be guaranteed full equality and cultural autonomy.
The establishment of Palestine as a Jewish Commonwealth is 
in harmony with the policies of our Government as set forth 
in the Joint Resolution of Congress in 1922, reiterated by 
every president from Woodrow Wilson to President 
Roosevelt, and reconfirmed in the Palestine planks in the 
platforms of the two major Party Conventions this year.. . 24
Meanwhile other things had been happening within the Irgun 
Delegation in America. In 1943 the Gillette-Rogers resolution calling 
for a Presidential Commission to Save the Jewish People of Europe
24 Letter of Israel Goldstein, President of the ZOA, to Truman,September 15, 
1944, Senatorial Files, Truman Papers.
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had been introduced to Congress. The Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee approved it by a unanimous vote. This led, in January 
1944, to the creation of the War Refugee Board, which eventually 
proved to be the only United States Government entity to help save 
substantial numbers of Jews from extermination, although the total 
of those saved was actually very small compared to the number 
that could have been saved had the Board been created earlier. 
Nevertheless, it was a success for the Irgun Delegation to the United 
States, which had been directly responsible for promoting the plan as 
a result of ads in The New York Times and throughout the country on 
August 30, 1943. These ads were captioned, “WE ALL STAND 
BEFORE THE BAR OF HUMANITY, HISTORY AND GOD! WE 
WILL ALL BE JUDGED IF WE DO NOT CREATE THE 
MACHINERY TO SAVE THE JEWISH PEOPLE OF EUROPE.” The 
response from President Roosevelt had been that the rescue of the 
Jewish people of Europe was under constant examination by the 
State Department.
Outraged by Roosevelt’s failure to effect any rescue efforts, 
400 Orthodox rabbis had marched on Washington in October, 1943, 
demanding a special governmental agency be established to rescue 
Jews from the Holocaust. While Roosevelt’s policy had been “rescue 
through victory,” critics pointed out that by the end of the war there
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might be no Jews left to rescue. They marched from Capitol Hill to 
the White House hoping for an audience with the President. This was 
not forthcoming. They were told by the Presidential secretary that he 
could not meet them “because of the pressure of other business.” This 
was not true. The President had few meetings that day but had 
refrained on the recommendation of Dr. Steven Wise, president of the 
American Congress and Judge Samuel Rosenman, of the American 
Jewish Committee. Before the rabbis arrived President Roosevelt 
“slipped out a rear White House exit to attend a ceremony marking 
the induction of 40 Yugoslavs into the American army. Then he left 
for a long weekend in the country.”25 Roosevelt was severely 
criticized in the press for his treatment of the rabbis.
This march had been planned by Hillel Kook. During the 
summer of 1943 he had sponsored an Emergency Conference to Save 
the Jewish People in Europe. This conference had rallied forces from 
many walks of life to unite and to put additional pressure on the 
administration.
President Roosevelt had been uncooperative with the Irgun 
Delegation in another important pursuit. Dr. Alex Raphael! had 
attempted to establish an off shore radio station to publish news 
about the Holocaust to the Jews of Europe. Though fully funded, and
25 “The Day the Rabbis Marched,” by Dr. Rafael MedofF, Jewish Journal of 
Greater Los Angeles. October 22-28,1993, p. 17.
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supported by the head of the Office of War Information (O.W.I.), 
Elmer Davis, Raphaeli’s plan was thwarted by the President.
Dr. Alex Raphaeli, after a few initial meetings, was able to
convince Elmer Davis that it was the duty of the Irgun Delegation,
and of the American people, to establish, outside territorial waters of
the United States, a radio station which would broadcast to Europe in
Yiddish, Russian, and Polish, via London.
I had to provide the budget for it, which was a very big 
budget, and I got the money and obligation from a very 
famous m an.. .  This was Samuel Zammuray, the King of the 
White Fleet...  This was a poor Georgia boy who came to New 
Orleans at age of eight; started dealing with bananas and, 
after forty, fifty  years controlled all the banana fields of 
Central America. And controlled the White Fleet - all the 
boats bringing bananas from Central America, to America, 
to Europe, all over the world. . .  we became very friendly. . .  
and for us he undertook the obligation for three million 
dollars to finance this radio station. So I was absolutely 
covered and I had this radio station and then Elmer Davis 
comes and says, Alexe - but the President has to confirm it. I 
cannot go ahead. Pm for it. I passed it in all committees of 
O.S.S. and British objected. I told them this has nothing to do 
with Britain it’s outside the territory, (in) international 
waters. And he (Roosevelt) vetoed it. And we couldn’t do it.26
Dr. Raphaeli turned to Eleanor Roosevelt for help. She had
previously helped him but could not in this situation.
And I went to see his wife who was very helpful.. .  Eleanor.
.. who was very helpful when our boats when our boats got 
stuck in (the) Danube. She was very helpful contrary to the
29 Telephone interview from Jerusalem with Dr. Alexe Raphaeli by Joanna 
Saidel, June 15,1993.
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President. But when it came to this she said, Excuse me 
please, this is a political matter. . .  I can not get involved.27
The question remains, Why did Roosevelt refuse permission for 
this station? Perhaps it had to do with an internal battle that was 
taking place regarding control of propaganda and psychological 
warfare. On June 13, 1942 the President consolidated the Foreign 
Information Service, the Office of Government Reports, the Office of 
Facts and Figures, and the Division of Information of the Office of 
Emergency Management into a single agency. This agency was the 
Office of War Information (O.W.I.) which was given the duty of 
conducting foreign and domestic informational programs through 
radio, the press, movies and related sources. Elmer Davis was chosen 
by the President to head the O.W.I.; Dwight Eisenhower’s brother, 
Milton, became the associate director.
On June 13, 1942 the President also created the Office of 
Strategic Services, placing it under the Joint Chiefs of Staff. A quarrel 
arose about who had jurisdiction over clandestine broadcasting. It 
was argued that the O.W.I. should have control over informational 
broadcasting but that the O.S.S. should control psychological 
broadcasting. The O.W.I controlled most of the available broadcasting 
transmitters in America.
On December 23, 1942, the Joint Chiefs gave the O.S.S.
27 Ibid.
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responsibility for “propaganda and warfare phases of psychological 
warfare.” On January 3,1943, William Donovan, O.S.S. head, created 
the Morale Operations branch of the O.S.S. which would use 
propaganda to incite and spread dissension in enemy countries.
Elmer Davis was angered by Donovan’s attempt to take control 
of U.S. government propaganda. On January 5, Davis met with the 
President to object to plan. F.D.R. assured Davis that the O.W.I. would 
retain control of government propaganda and that he would discuss 
it further with the Joint Chiefs of Staff (J.C.S.). The controversy 
expanded into the public arena. Donovan gained the backing of the 
Joint Chiefs who advised the President of their decision. “Before 
receiving the statement of the Joint Chiefs, F.D.R. had sided 
completely with Davis and planned to remove O.S.S. from under the 
J.C.S. and place it under the War Department. The J.C.S. statement, 
however, changed his mind.”28 The result of this decision was that 
the O.W.I. would control propaganda while the Joint Chiefs would 
control psychological warfare.
On October 27, the Joint Chiefs gave the O.S.S. control of all 
forms of morale subversion, including “false rumors, ‘freedom 
stations,’ false leaflets and false documents. . . for the purpose of 
creating confusion, division and undermining the morale of the
“ Lawrence C. Soley, Radio Warfare: OSS and  CIA Subversive Pranaganria p.
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enemy.”29
Further problems developed in this arena. “O.W.I. was always 
plagued with internal disagreements and conflicts, over which Elmer 
Davis was able to exercise some control,” however when, in 
September 1943, additional power was given to the Overseas 
Editorial Board in New York, it was at the expense of Elmer Davis. 
Members of this Board submitted proposals that “in effect, stripped 
Davis of authority over foreign propaganda.”30 Another dispute 
followed which Davis won resulting in the firing of the heads of the 
Overseas Editorial Board.
It is possible that, because of this struggle for power and the 
complexities evolving as a result of these problems, the request by 
Raphaeli for his radio station was somehow hindered during the 
commotion which took place during 1942 and 1943, the years in 
which he attempted to get the broadcasting base. There may have 
been other reasons as well. It is not clear.
During this time, Dr. Raphaeli was inducted into the U.S. Army. 
He was selected to be an agent for the Counter Intelligence Corps. He 
was responsible for the arrest and interrogation of the powerful 
German industrialist, munitions manufacturer, and S.S, official, Alfred 
Krupp. This interrogation led to the arrest of Erich Mueller, who had
“ Ibid.
30 Ibid, p. 101.
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designed the infamous German guns, known as Kanonnen Mueller, 
and of Houdremont, “another builder of German cannons which, at 
that time, were the best in the world. The Americans were very 
anxious to get Houdremont, and he was actually delivered to us with 
Krupp’s help, after found hiding in a forest around Essen.”31
In March, 1944, the Hebrew Committee of National Liberation 
(HCNL) was founded. Its chairman was Hillel Kook (Peter Bergson). 
Again the members of the Irgun delegation found themselves at odds 
with the Zionist establishment in America. “Paralleling the 
declaration of revolt by the Irgun in Palestine, it (the Irgun 
Delegation in America) served notice on the Zionist establishment, on 
the British, and on the State Department that once the war was over, 
Hebrew freedom and Statehood could not be stopped.”32
Preparations for this move began in 1943 when victory over 
the Germans began to look possible and the Irgun delegation’s 
campaign to save European Jewry was in full swing. In November, 
ads were placed in newspapers throughout the United States 
featuring a piece by Ben Hecht called “My Uncle Abraham Reports.” 
Uncle Abraham was a ghost chosen by the millions of murdered Jews 
to represent all their ghosts at worldwide conferences “to make the 
world a better place to live.” Uncle Abraham would take notes while
31 Dr. Raphaeli, Dream and Action, p. 128.
32 Ben Ami, p. 328-329.
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sitting on the windowsill. He would then report back to his departed 
friends. He told them that for some unknown reason, their names 
were never mentioned - not in Moscow, not at 10 Downing Street, not 
at the White House, ‘When we were killed, we were changed from 
Nobodies to Nobodies. Today, on our Jewish tomb, there is not the 
star of David but an asterisk.’ ‘ Uncle Abraham has gone to the 
White House, is sitting on the windowsill two feet away from Mr. 
Roosevelt. But he has left his notebook behind.’ Roosevelt did not like 
the ad; neither did Secretary of State Cordell Hull”33
Hull not only disliked Hecht but tried to undermine Peter 
Bergson. The F.B.I. reported that “this man has been in the hair of 
Cordell Hull and they would like to have him inducted with the least 
possible trouble.”34 An article which appeared in the Washington 
Post on May 23,1944 was captioned, “Bergson Faces Inquiry by F.B.I. 
as Alien Agent.” This article, written by Ann Cottrell, stated that the 
F.B.I. was investigating the status of Bergson. The official reasons 
given were the expiration of his temporary visitor’s visa on July 7, 
1941, and his not registering with the Justice Department’s foreign 
agents’ registration section. The article stated that the President of 
the United Hatters, Cap and Millinery Workers of America, Max 
Zaritsky, accused the American League for a Free Palestine of being
33 Ibid, p. 327-328.
34 F.B.I. Internal Security Memorandum from J. F. Buckley to D. M. Ladd, May 
23,1944.
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an offshoot of Bergson’s Hebrew Committee for National Liberation. 
Zaritsky forbade the use of his name on any documents issued by 
the league.
Linking the league and the Liberation committee, Mr. 
Zaritsky said members of the two groups are members of 
the Palestinian Irgun, which he said has been “denounced as 
Fascist by the Palestinian Labor Federation.35
The article reported that the open letter from Mr. Zaritsky had 
been endorsed by Mr. William Green, president of the American 
Federation of Labor, (who also asked in a separate letter, addressed 
to Representative Andrew L. Somers, that his name no longer be 
used); R. J. Thomas, president of United Automobile Workers of the 
Congress of Industrial Organizations; Samuel Wolchok, international 
president of the United Retail, Wholesale and Department Store 
Employees of America; James Maloney, president of the American 
Glass and Bottle Blowers Association; and Leo E George, president of 
the National Federation of Post Office Clerks.36
The article stirred up an internal discussion within the F.B.I.
itself. Interdepartmental memorandums suggest that the F.B.I. was
not conducting an investigation of Peter Bergson (Hillel Kook) at that
time. An agent reported:
I called Mr. (blacked out) of the Department to find out
about a newspaper article which appeared in the
36 New York Herald Tribune. May 22,1944.
36 The Washington Post. May 23,1944.
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Washington Post today to the effect that the Justice 
Department was investigating Peter Bergson and the Hebrew 
Committee of National Liberation, and whether the 
Department had requested that we conduct an investigation 
inasmuch as our records did not show that such a request
was made._______ (blacked out) said they had not requested
us to conduct any investigation.37
This correspondence went on to explain the circumstances.
Bergson had been in contact with an agent of the F.B.I. and had kept
the bureau informed about his plans to organize the Hebrew
Committee of National Liberation. The point of registration as an
alien group was discussed. The agent told Bergson
that it was one of those cases where he could not say it is 
definitely out or he could not say it is definitely in, it is just
a question of interpretation._______ (blacked out) told
Bergson it was one of the cases in which he would not tell 
him that he thinks they are exempt and at the same time he 
would not insist that they were absolutely subject to the 
Act. Bergson finally said from the standpoint of public 
relations and general things just to prove they have a place 
to show their records and show they are not hiding 
anything, they would comply with the Statute in spite of the 
difficulties and just show the Jewish people throughout the 
world is their foreign principal.38
The correspondence also stated that while the F.B.I. had not 
been specifically requested to investigate Bergson, the Justice 
Department had asked the F.B.I. to “secure information from the 
British as to the background of the organization (the H.C.N.L) because
37 F.B.I. Office Memorandum from D.M. Ladd to J.K. Mumford, May 23,1944.
38 Ibid.
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the Department was positive that there is some tie with Palestine 
and this group which they have not been able to find.”39
Other F.B.I. correspondence corroborated the fact that Bergson 
was not being investigated for failure to register as a foreign agent. 
It said, “. . .  Bergson has not been investigated by the Bureau nor has 
an investigation been requested by the Department relative to him. 
Information has been supplied to the Criminal Division of the 
Department concerning the Committee for a Jewish Army of Stateless 
and Palestinian Jews of which Bergson was the National Director.”40 
The correspondence reviewed Bergson’s case. On November 6, 
1942 Peter Bergson had sent a letter to Assistant Secretary of State, 
A. A. Berle, Jr. In it he explained that he and his five colleagues, who 
were visiting in the United States, were in danger of being drafted 
for service in the U. S. Army. He said that he would willingly fight for 
the United States except that he and his associates were responsible 
for a much more important issue, that is, raising a Jewish Army of 
two hundred thousand. Bergson appealed to Berle to consider the 
value of this mission, stating, “But surely some way could be found 
which would enable us to impress upon members of our local draft
39 Ibid.
40 F.B.I. Office Memorandum from E. A. Tamm to D. M. Ladd, Subject* Hillel 
Kook, alias Peter Bergson, May 23,1944.
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boards the character of our work in order to permit them to 
reconsider the matter of our classification in the light of the proper 
facts.” Mr. Berle expressed his regrets that he could not be helpful in 
the matter in a letter to Bergson dated November 21,1941.41
Following the Bermuda Conference incident the angry Senator 
Lucas indicated to a State Department official, Mr. Alexander, that he 
intended to call upon the director, J. Edgar Hoover, to suggest an 
investigation of the Mr. Bergson’s draft status (i.e. if Bergson was 
trying to avoid, or assist others in avoiding, the draft), and to 
determine the source of the funds for the full-page ads which the 
Irgun delegation had purchased.42
Mr. Alexander then advised an F.B.I. agent that Bergson had 
come to the United States in 1940 and that his status, as of May 23, 
1944, was that his visitor’s visa was “overstayed.” He said that there 
was a warrant outstanding for the deportation of Bergson, but that it 
has not been served, “possibly because it might make a martyr out of 
Bergson. . . He also said that Bergson had requested diplomatic 
immunity from the State Department, presumably to avoid the draft, 
but the State Department had not considered it at all.”43
Bergson (Kook) asked the Board of Immigration Appeals to
41 F.B.I. file on Peter Bergson, Memo, S.S. Alden to Mr. Ladd, May 12, 1943.
42 Ibid.
43 F.B.I. Office Memorandum from E.A. Tamm to D.M. Ladd, Subject: Hillel 
Kook, May 23,1944, p. 3.
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rescind the warrant. He disclaimed the possibility that he could be
deported, stating that there was no transportation for civilians from
America to the Near East. He said that he had also applied to the
State Department for a permanent visa so that he could continue his
work in behalf of the Hebrew people.44
The F.B.I. did investigate the Committee for a Jewish Army.
They reported that
while there were allegations that there were Communists 
in filtrating the Committee, there were no concrete 
indications of this. None of its officers were known 
Communists. It was reported in April, 1943, that the 
majority of the Jewish people in the United States were not 
supporting it, although at that time its following was 
increasing.45
The report said that while there had been no indications of 
widespread activity since that time and that “British authorities had 
taken no notice, thinking the group would die a natural death.”46
The reports of Communists in the Committee for a Jewish Army 
were further discredited by the F.B.I. on March 16,1945 in a report 
which discussed, in part, the reaction of the press to the Irgun 
Delegation in America. The report stated that Bergson and his 
activities had been publicly attacked in the press for more than a
44 “Hebrew Leader Asks Board to Recall Warrant,” The Washington Post. 
July 6,1944, p. 9.
45 F.B.I. Office Memorandum from E.A. Tamm to D.M. Ladd, Subject: Hillel 
Kook, May 23,1944, p. 3.
48 Ibid.
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year. The Communist Daily Worker had been most vociferous in its 
attacks, while other news agencies stated that Bergson (Kook) was a 
representative of the Irgun. It was claimed that he collected over one 
million dollars from the American people, although he “became 
vague,” according to one news article, when it was insisted that he 
tell what use had been made of this money.47
On October 4, 1944. The Washington Post reported, “Bergson 
Admits His Committee Has No Right to Collect Funds.” The article 
reported a press conference in which Peter Bergson (Kook) charged 
The Post of “deliberate misrepresentation and insinuation to present 
him in the worst possible light.” He admitted, when questioned, that 
the Hebrew Committee of National Liberation “is not American; has 
no right to collect funds; is taking no action toward direct relief to 
“Hebrews;” and does not, to their knowledge, represent either 
Europeans or Palestinian “Hebrews.”48 A compatriot of Bergson 
called The Washington Post the tool of “British imperialists and 
defeatist Zionist leaders.”49 When asked who provided the capital for 
the Hebrew National Liberation Fund, Inc., Bergson replied that part 
of the funding was provided by night club impresario, Billy Rose. 
Rose denied any connection with Bergson, saying, “Let him show one
47 F.B.I. file on Peter Bergson, March 16, 1945, p. 2 of summary statement 
regarding file #!00-316012-8.
48 The Washington Post. October 4,1944.
40 Ibid.
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single check I ever signed. It is true that I did stage the pageant, “We 
W ill Never Die,” both in New York and at Constitution Hall in 
Washington for Ben Hecht, who wrote it. I did it because it was a 
good show. That was my only connection with the pageant.” 50
Representative Sol Bloom (Democrat from New York) also 
decried Bergson. He said, “No authorized Jewish agency approves of 
the methods adopted by Bergson and his groups,”51 which Bloom said 
were purely lobbying and high pressure.
Other inquiries were made concerning the right of the “Bergson 
groups” to solicit or collect funds in the United States. Assistant 
Attorney General, Herbert Wechsler, of the War Division wrote to 
F.B.I. Director, J. Edgar Hoover asking if  Bergson had a license from 
the Treasury Department to collect funds for foreign relief, and if 
they did not whether Bergson should be investigated for that 
reason.52
Meanwhile, on October 15, 1944, President Roosevelt gave his 
support to the Democratic Party plank on Palestine. However, he did 
little  to alleviate the plight of H itler’s Jewish victims in the 
concentration camps.
The Jews of Europe may have been going unnoticed but those
60 Ibid.
51 Ibid.
“ Letter from Herbert Wechsler to J. Edgar Hoover, F.B.I. file # 100-310922, 
October 18,1944.
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in Palestine were not. At the beginning of the 1944 Menachem Begin 
led the Irgun there in a series of armed attacks on government and 
police installations in order to exert pressure upon the government 
to change its policy. This resulted in the deportation of 251 men to 
Eritrea.
Relations between the British and the Jews further 
deteriorated when the British minister of state in the Middle East, 
Lord Moyne, was assassinated on November 6, 1944 by Lechi 
(Lohamei Herut Israel, also known as the Stern Gang), the 
underground group which had seceded from the Irgun in 1940. This 
group, led, after the 1942 death of Stern, by Nathan Yalin Mor, 
considered the action to be appropriate. The decision to liquidate 
Moyne was defended by supporters of the underground. When Irgun 
member, Yitshak Ben Ami, asked Nathan Yalin Mor if the 
assassination of Moyne had been a positive act in the War of 
Liberation, the answer was “Absolutely.” Mor felt that Moyne was 
the personification of British imperialism in the Middle East. Moyne 
had acted in opposition to the Jews throughout his career as Colonial 
Secretary earlier in the war, as a member of the House of Lords and 
as Resident Minister in Cairo. Moyne believed that the European Jews 
were mixed with Slavic blood. Therefore only the Arabs were pure 
Semites, having a historic rights in Palestine. Moyne was responsible
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for having the authorities in Turkey send the vessel, Sturma, back 
to the Black Sea, where 770 passengers drowned. He also defended 
the murder of Avraham Stem by the Palestine British police in 
1942.53
Former Israeli Prime Minister, Yitshak Shamir, and Lechi 
theoretician, Israel Eldad, supported and participated in the Moyne 
assassination.
Lord Moyne was the highest British official in the Middle 
East. And because we fought against the British in this area 
we took him for a target. This was the main reason for the, 
his assassination. Certainly we had known about his hostile 
attitude towards Zionism, towards the idea of ingathering 
the Jewish people here. He was against any Jewish aliyah, 
any Jewish immigration. He didn’t believe that there exists 
such a thing like a Jewish nation or a Jewish people, and 
therefore we decided to make this operation.54
Abba Eban accused Shamir with sending the assassins of Moyne on a
suicide mission.S5
. . .  in sending these people to kill Moyne those who sent 
them, that includes Shamir of course, were quite consciously 
murdering these two young Jews because there was no 
possibility whatever that they could carry out that mission 
and escape. Where could they escape to? So, in other words, 
on the negative side it was a death sentence for these two 
youngsters.. .“
93 Ben Ami, p. 362.
64 Interview with Yitshak Shamir by Joanna Saidel, October 25, 1993, 
Knessett, Jerusalem.
55 Telephone interview with Abba Eban from New York by Joanna Saidel, 
September 6,1993.
“ Ibid.
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Shamir denied this charge.
It’s not a suicide mission. They wanted to escape but have 
not succeeded. It was very risky of course. But there was a 
plan how to, after killing, after the assassination, they had a 
plan to escape!. . .  They’d been like soldiers and they had all 
the documents of soldier, British soldiers. And they could 
reach the railway and by the railway come here. It was 
possible! But it was bad luck because there was a policeman, 
an Egyptian policemen in the area. . .  when they killed Lord 
Moyne. There was in the area a policeman on a motorcycle.
And they had bicycles to escape. He was faster. And he shot 
them then. He shot. And Bet-Zouri was wounded, slightly, 
but he was wounded. He couldn’t continue to run. And so in 
such a way it happens. But the plan was, before, the plan 
was to, to, to, for their escape. It was planned to get an 
ambulance, an ambulance, a British ambulance, but it did 
not succeed to bring this ambulance. . .  they didn’t want to 
wait longer. It had been determined to do it and then they 
have been caught in that escape.57
A similar mission was carried out against Count Bernadotte four 
years later. He was appointed by the U.N. Security Council to 
mediate in the Arab - Israeli conflict in 1948. On September 17, 
1948 he was assassinated in Jerusalem. The Encyclopedia ludaica 
states, “His assailants have not been identified, but are believed to 
have been connected with Lohamei Herut Israel (Lechi).”58
Dr. Israel Eldad, scholar, writer and Zionist revolutionary was a 
member of Lechi. When asked who was responsible for the Count
57 Interview with Yitshak Shamir by Joanna Saidel, October 25, 1993, 
Knessett, Jerusalem.
68 Encyclopedia Tudaica. vol. 4, p. 670. Also see Middle East Tournal. 42, #2 
(summer 1988), “A Haunting Legacy: The Assassination of Count Bernadotte.”
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Bernadotte assassination he said, “Lechi. Me personally. . . I was
responsible only for the idea, not for the . . .  Yitshak Shamir . . .  was
responsible for the organizational (operations).”59
Abba Eban believes that the practices of the Irgun and Lechi,
particularly the murder of Lord Moyne cost Israel early statehood.
He believes that partition would have resulted from a plan scheduled
for vote on December 21, 1944. British Foreign Office documents
confirm that a British plan for partition was set for proposal at that
time. It is questionable whether or not the plan would have been
accepted. According to Mr. Eban, the motives for this plan were pro-
Arab, but would nonetheless have served the Jewish cause.
According to Winston Churchill’s November 4,1944 memorandum to
Chaim Weizmann, Moyne had come over to the Zionist cause, albeit
for pro-Arab motives. The murder of Moyne put a strangle hold on
the partition plan. Churchill became despondent and alienated as a
result of the attack and did not pursue the plan with his former
vigor. It was dropped until 1947. Mr. Eban spoke about the murder.
The murder of Lord Moyne carried out in 1944 without any 
knowledge by the people who carried it out of the general 
context was a shattering tragedy because without it the 
cabinet committee that Churchill had appointed was about to 
reach a decision on the partition scheme. I myself in fact 
being in the, in Cairo myself, got wind of this and conveyed 
it to Sharett and to Weizmann. The decision was, in order to 
abolish the White Paper, to put a plan of partition which
“ Interview w ith Dr. Israel Eldad by Joanna Saidel, Jerusalem, November 3, 
1993.
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was to be announced on December the twenty-first nineteen 
hundred and forty four, and what happened was that Lord 
Moyne, the Minister of State there had become, I would not 
say converted to Zionism, that was not the case, but he had 
become converted to the idea of partition with a Jewish 
state as the only solution. He did this for Arab reasons. In 
other words he said that unless the British were able to stop 
immigration, which they were not able to do, then the only 
way to save anything for the Arabs was by seeing that some 
part of Palestine was reserved to them. So he reached what 
I would call a Jewish state solution for anti-Jewish reasons, 
namely that otherwise the Jews would take over the whole 
of the country, and therefore partition was a sort of defense 
of the Arab position. That was also the view that was put 
forward then by Harold MacMichael, the High Commissioner 
at that time. In other words, he was saying that the game is 
up, as it were. There was no way of preventing the Zionist 
thing from developing because the immigration pressure is 
so strong therefore the question is how to protect the Arabs 
to some extent. Therefore, there should be at least a part of 
the country which was reserved, and that was one of the 
reasons why Lord Moyne went over to support partition. In 
November, 1944, Churchill invited Weizmann to Checkers 
and told him triumphantly, We now . . . Moyne is now on 
our Zionist side. You’ve got to go to Jerusalem and see what 
happens. And Weizmann was going to Jerusalem. Then one 
day about two days later Lord Moyne was assassinated and 
Churchill went into a sulk which lasted for, oh I would think, 
about four or five years,60 a refusal to deal with the 
problem at all until the Potsdam Conference which was in 
1945. Therefore, it’s no doubt that the murder of Moyne had 
a negative effect.61
The opinion of Abba Eban has been hotly contested by his 
political opponents. Yitshak Shamir said, “It’s nonsense. It’s nonsense.
80 M r. Eban probably meant four or five months.
81 Telephone interview with Abba Eban from New York by Joanna Saidel, 
September 6,1993.
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In 44, '45 (laughs) the British, the British after all, have still been
here, very strong, and they didn’t think about leaving the country.”62
Menachem Begin’s advisor on Foreign affairs, author, journalist
and member of the Irgun command, Shmuel Katz, agrees with
Shamir. He said that Eban’s contentions were,
Absolutely untruth. Neither, neither the facts of the incident 
itself nor the situation, nothing was going to be done until 
after the war. In ' 44 the war was not over. That the murder 
of Lord Moyne, which was completely justified, caused 
Churchill to be very angry, that we know. And lots of other 
people in England were very angry. But Mr. Abba Eban 
should have explained to them why Lord Moyne was killed 
instead of jumping at the idea that Lechi was to blame. I 
never heard that Abba Eban ever explained to them that 
Lord Moyne was the man who said, among other things, 
when they talked of getting a million Jews out of Europe, he 
said, What will we do with a million Jews? He was an anti- 
Semite, Lord Moyne. And he had a hand in the White Paper, 
in carrying out the White Paper policy. I don’t say that I 
would have, if I had to decide, that I would decide that he 
ought to be shot but once he was shot there were good 
reasons for him being shot. And (it was) because we had 
people like Abba Eban on the other side that we had so 
much trouble, and our acts of resistance, which were 
justified, which were much less than any other people would 
have carried out, were undermined by people like Abba 
Eban, not that he had very much authority in those days.63
Author David Wyman agrees with Shamir and Katz. He stated, 
concerning the supposed British decision for partition, “the British
“ Interview with Yitshak Shamir by Joanna Saidel, October 25, 1993, the 
Knessett, Jerusalem.
” Interview with Shmuel Katz by Joanna Saidel, November 2, 1993, Tel Aviv.
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were not ready to move out Palestine.. .  They were not ready to be 
out until they were thrown out”64
While Lechi supported the Moyne assassination, the Zionist 
Establishment, headed by David Ben Gurion, was outraged. It 
initiated repressive measures known as the “Saison,” or (Hunting) 
Season, on the Irgun and Lechi, going as far as to arrest some of them 
and turn them over to the British thereby evoking extreme 
controversy within Zionist ranks. The campaign was directed against 
the Irgun rather than Lechi because the Irgun was a political threat 
to Ben-Gurion. He knew that his Labor party would have to join with 
Haganah in the battle for independence or the Irgun would assume 
control. The only alternative, if  Labor wished to keep control, was to 
eliminate the Irgun entirely. On May 12, 1945 the Irgun issued a 
warning:
WARNING!
1. The Government of oppression should WITHOUT 
ANY DELAY evacuate children, women, civilian  
persons and o ffic ia ls  from  a ll its offices, 
buildings, dwelling places, etc., throughout the 
country.
2. The civilian  population, Hebrews, Arabs and 
others are asked, for their own sake, to abstain 
from now until the w arning is recalled , from  
visiting or nearing Government offices etc.
YOU HAVE BEEN WARNED!65
84 Interview with David Wyman by Joanna Saidel, August 20, 1993, 
Cantebury, New Hampshire.
86 Ben Ami, p. 352.
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The following month Teddy Kollek, who later became mayor of 
Jerusalem, turned over a list of names of Irgun and Lechi men to the 
British resulting in the arrest of many. An extract in the Palestine 
Post. June 17th, 1945 said, “The Inspector General of the Police 
wishes to express his appreciation to the Arab Customs Officer and to 
the member of the Jewish community who gave the information 
which led to the finding of two batteries of mortars in Jerusalem on 
June 12th and 13th.”66
Mr. Kollek was responsible for providing this information.
I am the “member of the Jewish community” referred to by 
the Inspector General of Police. I received the information 
regarding these weapons in my capacity as liaison officer 
between the Jewish Agency.. .  and the Palestine authorities, 
and I passed it on in the usual way...
TEDDY KOLLEK67
Mayor Kollek, whose contributions to the Municipality of 
Jerusalem are profuse and whose lifetime dedication to the State of 
Israel is unquestioned, chose, during those tumultuous years, to 
follow the laws of Palestine under the British. Although he favored a 
Jewish state he preferred the more traditional diplomacy of the 
Jewish Agency which opposed the radical action of the Irgun.
In the spring of 1945 invading Allied troops in Europe made a
“ Ben Ami, p. 352.
87 Ib id .
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world-shaking discovery which confirmed the Jews worst beliefs and 
fears. This was the discovery of the death camps. Although these 
had been reported long before, the liberation of the camps drew 
world attention to atrocities too horrendous to be believed. Military 
leaders, government officials, members of Congress, and journalists 
were stunned despite their previous exposure to information about 
the camps.68
M ilitary men were appalled and astonished at what they 
saw. Hardened war correspondents found the horror “too 
great for the human mind too believe.” General Eisenhower 
called the “Barbarous treatment” inflicted on inmates 
“almost unbelievable.” To dispel any doubts about the 
accuracy of reporters’ accounts, Eisenhower requested that a 
dozen congressmen and a delegation of American editors fly 
to Germany to look at the camps. The legislators emerged 
from Buchenwald “shocked almost beyond belief.” Editors, 
expecting to find that correspondents had overstated the 
situation, came away convinced that “exaggeration, in fact, 
would be difficult”69
In July, the killing center at Majdanek was captured. American 
reporters were permitted to inspect the camp, which was still intact. 
They witnessed the crematoria, gas chambers, heaps of ashes, and 
more.70 The New York Times reported the reaction of one American 
whose comment reflected that of all who viewed Majdanek: “I am 
now prepared to believe any story of German atrocities, no matter
48 Wyman, p. 323-324.
"  Ibid, p. 325.
70 Ibid, p. 324.
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how savage, cruel or depraved.” 71
The news, which had been suppressed for so long, captured the 
headlines of newspapers across the countiy and around the world. 
Newsreels and magazines were filled with monstrous photos of 
unburied corpses, skeleton-like survivors, piles of glasses, human 
hair and garments. The scope of destruction was beyond imagination; 
the crimes against humanity beyond comprehension.
The reaction among viewers, and particularly among 
mainstream Zionists, was outrage. These reports confirmed the 
repeated statements issued by the Irgun Delegation and the 
Revisionists for at least three years prior to the 1945 disclosures.
As the war in Europe drew to a close, and these revelations 
were forthcoming, the activities of the Irgun Delegation to the United 
States began to focus with even greater determination on the 
establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine. Jews were greatly 
disillusioned when the expected radical change in British policy 
regarding large-scale immigration to Palestine did not materialize. 
The displaced Jews still alive in Europe were interred in Displaced 
Persons camps there. The Irgun Delegation in America tried to effect 
a change in the condition of the DP’s and appealed to the President. 
They also tried to get one of their long time leaders, Yitshaq Ben Ami, 
back to the United States to renew his activities there.
71 New York Times. August 30,1944, p. 9.
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Having completed his duty fighting in Europe, Ben Ami had 
been requested by the Irgun in New York to meet with Menachem 
Begin to coordinate the work in America more closely with that of 
the Irgun in Palestine. “We had to strengthen the bridge of 
communications. . .  between the homeland and the United States . . .  
if the revolution was going to have a chance.” 72
In America, Truman continued to push for the repatriation of 
100,000 displaced Jews. The writer, Jack London, chaired a meeting 
of the American League for a Free Palestine held on June 20,1945 at 
the City Center Auditorium in New York City. In a telegram to 
President Truman he requested that the President act immediately 
to implement the plan concerning the 100,000 and that the 
government of the United States support fully the program of the 
Hebrew Committee of National Liberation.73
Hillel Kook (Peter Bergson) also appealed to Truman on this 
matter. In a four page letter to the President dated September 7, 
1945, Kook reminded Truman that while the war in Europe had 
been over for four months. “Some 200,000 Hebrews in Germany and 
Austria still find themselves in the same position in which they were 
prior to V-E day. . .  the same notorious camps, the same bunks, the 
same German hideous prison clothes, the same barbed wire and
72 Ben Ami, p. 350.
73 Note to David Niles concerning a telegram from  Jack London to President 
Truman, June 24,1945, Truman Papers, General File.
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armed sentries watching outside, only it is an American, British or 
Russian soldier that stands guard now and this, if anything, makes it 
even more painful.”74 Kook reminded the President that, while 
“everywhere people are feverishly laboring for their rehabilitation 
and reconstruction and are returning to life and liberty,” the Jews 
again seemed to be forgotten. Kook also approached the Palestine 
question, affirming that Palestine was not a British territory but had 
been placed under the British mandate by international authority. 
He contended that the United States, as leader among the United 
Nations, bore direct responsibility for the Palestinian situation and 
should intervene to put a stop to the heartless and despotic action of 
the British Government which prevented Hebrews from returning to 
their own national home. Kook told Truman that, when America was 
actively participating in the supervision of elections in Greece and 
Bulgaria and in the establishment of a new Roumanian government, 
America should not hesitate to take an authoritative and dynamic 
stand on the crucial problems in Palestine.75
Anger and frustration increased w ithin Revisionist and 
mainstream Zionist ranks on September 18, 1945. That evening in
74 Letter to the President from Peter Bergson, September 7, 1945, Truman 
Library.
75 Peter Bergson - representing the Hebrew Committee of National 
Liberation- to President Truman, September 7, 1945, Papers of Harry S.
Truman, O fficial File.
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Jerusalem, a dispatch from Reuter’s news service reported the 
rejection of Jewish demands for Palestine by the British. A British 
cabinet sub-committee was appointed by Prime Minister Attlee to 
draft the Labor Government’s policy with regard to Palestine. The 
sub-committee recommended maintaining the British White Paper 
and said that the Jewish demands for a state in Palestine and for free 
immigration under Jewish control were unacceptable. Only 1500 
Jewish immigrants were to be admitted monthly and land 
acquisition was to be restricted. A Palestine Legislative Council 
should be established in which Jews could have representation as 
compensation for restricted immigration. This Council would have 
limited authority over internal affairs but “all questions concerning 
foreign policy, security and defense should continue to be under the 
control of the British Government.’’ 76
Representing the American Zionist Emergency Council, Rabbi 
Abba Hillel Silver and Dr. Stephen Wise made urgent requests to see 
the President.77 In a note in inter-departmental correspondence from 
Hon. Charles G. Ross to the President’s Secretary, Matthew J. Connelly, 
Ross stated his distaste for the Zionist activists and his respect for the 
Jewish establishment in America. He writes, “I can only testify that
78 JTA Dailv News Bulletin. The Jewish Telegraphic Agency, Vol. XII, No. 213, 
September 19,1945.
77 Letter of September 20, 1945, Silver to Truman, Truman Papers, Official 
File.
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Dr. Silver’s is a high-class organization unlike the ‘renegade’ outfit 
which appears to have put out a recent statement purporting to give 
the President’s views.”78
That “renegade outfit” continued to seek the support and 
assistance of the U. S. Government. It refused to cave into to 
pressures to moderate its stance. In October, 1945, Yltshaq Ben Ami 
met with Irgun leader, Menachem Begin.
My job was to help Begin and his associates understand the 
political scene in Washington, London and the United 
Nations, so we could best coordinate strategy between our 
delegation in the United States and the Irgun in Palestine... 
Most important was our agreement in principle that as the 
time neared for the final stage of the uprising against the 
Mandatory power, a provisional government would be 
formed, one part underground in Palestine, the other in the 
diaspora.” 79
It was also decided at meetings between Begin, Ben Ami and
Haim Landau (Begin’s chief of staff) that the Hebrew Committee for
National Liberation would need international recognition. The main
complaint of the central Irgun was that the Irgun Delegation was
not providing sufficient financial help to maintain the military
revolution in Palestine.
The chances for weapons acquisitions, for training and for 
large recruitments were there, if we in the United States 
provided the means. No matter what we accomplished in the 
United States, the center of battle was in Palestine- and if
76 Honorable Charles Ross to Secretary Connelly, The W hite House,
September 17,1945, Truman Papers, Official File.
78 Ben Ami, p. 355-256.
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our people lost the ability to fight with arms, no political 
campaign would secure our nation’s freedom.. .  It was true 
that without the political front the military one would fail, 
and we needed to achieve a synthesis, but we had to 
remember that everything we did was to support the 
military revolution.80
That revolution was different than any other revolution on 
earth. Zionist theoretician and Lechi member, Israel Eldad, wrote his 
own explanation of the underground’s perception of this revolution. 
He stated that, unlike the major revolutions which have taken place 
in the world to change economic, political or social structures, 
“Zionism is a revolution and neither a philanthropic institution nor a 
reform movement. It is concerned with the shift of an entire nation 
from an exposed position to a place of refuge.”81 Eldad gives both 
religious and secular motivation for the revolution, quoting the Bible- 
“and among these nations ye shall find no rest” - and citing “the 
endless repetition of historic events.” 82 In his analysis of the 
motivations for the revolution Eldad recalls a comment made by the 
founder of political Zionism; “Herzl once replied to one of the skeptics 
who doubted his vision: An orange needs a table in order not to fall 
to the ground; Zionism is like the globe - it is kept up by its own 
motion. The existential need for a Jewish revolution is the only
80 Ibid, p. 358.
81 Israel Eldad, The Jewish Revolution. Shengold Publishers, N.Y., 1971,
p. 46.
“ Ib id .
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motive force required.” 83
Eldad detailed the revolution as it was interpreted by his 
political and ideological faction - the FFI (i.e. Lechi). The FFI, or 
Freedom Fighters of Israel, were an offshoot of the Irgun and the 
Be tar youth movement. It was founded by Avraham Stem, whom the 
British murdered in 1942, and was the smallest, most radical and 
daring of the underground Zionist movements .84 The New York 
Times described the FFI in this way:
. . . the Fighters for the Freedom of Israel, or the Stern 
Group, is even more fanatical and sinister than Irgun Zvi 
Leumi. They plot individual political assassinations. They 
were responsible for the unsuccessful attempt on High 
Commissioner Mac Michael’s life in Jerusalem in August 
1944, and the murder of Lord Moyne in Cairo three months 
later. Their leader is Nathan Friedman Yellin, a studious type 
of man for whose capture a $4,000 reward is offered. Yellin, 
mild-mannered and with an inconspicuous face behind gold- 
rimmed glasses, is a former school-teacher. He wields 
tremendous influence over 200 to 300 followers, mostly of 
Polish origin. They are expert marksmen, pledged to the 
utmost self-sacrifice. They would shoot their way out of 
any police ambush not hesitating to turn their last bullet on 
themselves to escape arrest, if necessary.85
The Times article stated that the group had a vendetta against 
the British police whom they accuse of having unnecessarily shot 
and killed Avraham Stem, their first leader.
M Ibid, p. 50.
M Ibid, p. 79.
85 The New York Times. “Political Terrorist Groups Keep Palestine in  
Turmoil,” July 28,1946,p. 4E.
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Stem was captured in February 1942, by a surprise police 
swoop on his rooftop room in Tel Aviv. His followers later 
said that he wore only shorts and an undershirt. His wrists 
were handcuffed behind his back, they added, and he then 
was pushed a few paces and shots were fired into his back.66
The police authorities never announced the circumstances of the 
shooting except to say that he was killed while trying to escape.
The most distinctive feature of the FFI was its new political 
conception which was first publicized in the trials conducted against 
its members for acts against the British government. Members of 
Lechi (FFI) refused to participate in the trials on the grounds that the 
British courts had “no legal standing in the Land of Israel.” They 
claimed that the British were a “foreign, imperialist occupying power, 
and the British Mandate granted by the League of Nations. . .  cannot 
supersede the a-priori title of the Jewish nation to this land.. The 
FFI defendants declared in court that when their forefathers were 
living in the Lands of Israel, “with their kings and generals, their 
poets and prophets, the ancestors of the British were still living in 
the primeval forests of the savage British isles . . .  We, the freedom 
fighters of Israel, are the only ones entitled to bear arms, to fight for 
our rights . . .  This is the homeland of the Jewish people, this is where 
it first became a productive and creative nation. It was banished 
from here by force, and will therefore return by force. We are a
“ Ib id .
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Hebrew liberation movement.”
While the Irgun refrained from fighting against the British
during the war, they joined Lechi at the war’s conclusion and, under
the leadership of Menachem Begin, joined in m ilitary operations
against the Mandatory power in Palestine. They were supported in
the United States by the Irgun Delegation which continued its public
relations efforts to gain support for a Jewish state and to raise funds
for Irgun - Lechi related projects such as the purchase of the ship,
Altalena. Members of the Irgun Delegation worked closely with the
Paris headquarters in this and other missions. Dr. Alex Raphaeli was
involved in the Paris operations.
Our object was to organize an army in Europe, transport it to 
Palestine, and capture whatever territory we could hold. We 
would then proclaim ourselves as the temporary Jewish 
government of these areas and gain a right to be 
represented in the international political forums on an equal 
basis.87
Jabotinsky had approved of this idea in 1939 but the outbreak of the
war prevented its implementation.
My tasks were not too clearly defined, but I was generally 
required to establish political contacts and find and 
purchase weapons. . . Besides the tasks that had been 
assigned to me I was put in charge of a so far non-existent 
“Air Force.”88
8r Raphaeli, p. 154-155.
“ Ib id .
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Dr. Raphaeli recruited pilots who had served in the Allied 
forces and was able to purchase arms from many places. A f t e r  
Israel became a State, Dr. Raphaeli became Director of the Board of 
Israel Aircraft Industries. This company “was the only foreign firm  
listed in the top 100 companies on the Pentagon’s list of 500 
contractors dealt with in fiscal 1993.”89
Dr. Raphaeli was an asset to the State of Israel from pre­
statehood days to the present. He worked for the Irgun in the early 
years. After statehood Raphaeli became a great industrialist in Israel. 
He began by founding the Jerusalem Pencil Company (Israel had 
been importing most of its pencils from other countries). He later 
started a factory to produce corrugated cartons. All citrus products 
had previously been shipped in wooden crates. Raphaeli became the 
main supplier of corrugated cartons in Israel, establishing plants also 
in Turkey, Greece and Spain. He then developed Dura Plastics which 
he part-owned. He had toolmaking and molding facilities. Dura was 
renamed Vered, and later Dukal Graphite Industries. This was a 
division of Jerusalem Pencils specializing in colored leads which it 
sold to other pencil factories. Later, it began producing oil pastels and 
wax crayons. Vered introduced plastic containers, like buckets, to 
Israel. Raphaeli’s various products found markets world wide. He 
shipped pencils to a company in Argentina owned by the Perons. He
SB The Jerusalem Post July 2 ,1994, p. 4.
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had markets in Britain, France and Africa. His biggest success was in 
Germany where his company had the largest share of the imported 
pencil market in West Germany. Raphaeli became the president of 
the Israeli Manufacturers Association. He was a partner in Rotoplas, a 
rotational molding plant, the first of its kind in the Middle East. They 
manufactured large containers for storing liquids and exporting fruit 
juice.
After the 1973 Yom Kippur War, Raphaeli became Chairman of 
the Board of Economic Welfare. This group dealt with the Arab 
economic boycott. From 1978 to 1985, Raphaeli was director of the 
boards of Zim Shipping Company; the Israel Aircraft Industries; and 
the Jerusalem Economic Corporation. He was also chairman of the 
board of the government owned Beth Shemesh Aviation Motors; and 
Dagon silos in Haifa.
Besides being an asset to Israel, Raphaeli proved to be an asset 
to the United States government during the war years in the field of 
counter intelligence. His first task was to uncover a German spy 
network. He was commended for this work. His further efforts were 
equally as fruitful. He searched for and discovered Alfred Krupp, 
who was a personal friend of Borman and who operated a worldwide 
industrial - m ilitary complex for Hitler, and Leo Schlessman, 
governor of the Ruhr district, top Nazi official, and the recipient of
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the Nazi Goldabzeichen (golden Emblem), the highest Nazi award.90 
Raphaeli’s interrogation of Krupp resulted in other very important 
arrests.
He worked with the Irgun Delegation to try to affect the politics 
of the United States government. Despite their efforts, the Irgun 
Delegation found itself still at odds with the Roosevelt administration. 
Mainstream Jewish organizations did little better.
In October 1945, the American Zionist Emergency Council 
submitted a memorandum to the State Department. This lengthy 
material, was submitted to counter the effects of correspondence 
which President Roosevelt had with King Ibn Saud earlier in the 
year. On his way home from Yalta, President Roosevelt met with the 
King on an American cruiser in the Suez Canal. Roosevelt expected 
the Saudis to accept the American position on Palestine since Saudi 
Arabia had been the only non-combatant to receive lend-lease aid 
during the War. The President promised more aid in return for Saudi 
support. The King however was vehemently opposed to Zionism, 
suggesting, instead of a Jewish State in Palestine, that the Jews take 
defeated German lands as their homes. The President, in the face of 
this hostile response, agreed not to adopt an anti-Arab policy in
"Raphaeli, p. 127.
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Palestine.91 When Roosevelt died in early April, Truman was left 
with the dilemma concerning the Saudis. “The temptation to become 
more involved in the Arab world and to promote its alliance with the 
West competed with the practical problem of handling the Jewish 
refugees who had survived the Holocaust”92
In October, the American Zionist Emergency Council, having 
over the prior few years been highly influenced by the activist work 
of the Revisionists and the Irgun Delegation, reviewed the pro-Zionist 
positions which had been taken by the U. S. Government, for the new 
President, reminding him, and the State Department, of the following. 
On July 4,1945 a declaration was made by the Governors of 40 out 
of 48 states favoring the establishment of Palestine as a Jewish 
Commonwealth. The legislatures of 33 states, representing 85% of the 
population of the United States also went on record in favor of the 
Zionists. The prior summer, 1944, both major parties had endorsed 
unrestricted Jewish immigration to Palestine. The Democratic 
platform had stated that they favored “such a policy as to result in 
the establishment there of a free and democratic Jewish 
Commonwealth.” The American Zionist Emergency Council claimed 
that both Roosevelt and Truman were elected on that platform.
81 Steven L. Spiegel, The Other  Arab-Israeli Conflict: Making America’s 
Middl.e_East Policy. from Truman to, Reagan., p. 13.
82 Ibid, p. 14.
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They said that Roosevelt and Truman were not the only 
Presidents to favor a Jewish State in Palestine. In March 1919 
President Wilson, who had directly affected the issuance of the 
Balfour Declaration stated that: “The Allied Nations, with the fullest 
concurrence of our Government and people, are agreed that in 
Palestine shall be laid the foundation of a Jewish Commonwealth.” 
This objective was supported by every American President since 
then. The United States government’s support of the Jewish National 
Home was recorded legislatively in two Acts of Congress, namely, the 
Joint Resolution (No. 73) unanimously adopted in 1922 by the 67th 
Congress of the United States; and the United States-British 
Convention on Palestine, ratified by the Senate on February 20, 
1925.93
This correspondence to the State Department also stated the 
concern of the Zionists that President Roosevelt had failed to assure 
King Ibn Saud of Jewish intent to live in peace with the Arabs. Their 
concern was also apparent concerning Arab rights to sovereignty in 
Palestine.
. . . the Arabs have neither legal nor moral title to the 
sovereignty over Palestine. While they conquered the 
country over 1300 years ago, Arab rule ceased as early as 
1071. Throughout the centuries the role of the Arabs in
83 Memorandum submitted by the American Zionist Emergency Council to 
the State Department, October 23,1945, p. 1-2, Papers of Harry Truman, O fficial 
File.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
156
Palestine has not been creative but destructive. In the 
eroded, poverty-stricken and disease-ridden country which 
within the last few decades the Jewish people set out to 
reclaim, it was difficult to recognize the land of milk and 
honey described in the Bible.
The Emergency Council correspondence maintained that in the
twenty years between the two World Wars the Jews had done much
to repair the ravages of the previous 1300. “They have conquered
deserts and swamps, revived agriculture and industry and
established in Palestine a sturdy, self-reliant community.”
They accused the Pan-Arabist claim to Palestine of being “an
attempt to add yet another to the immense, but for the most part
thinly populated and undeveloped territories of the independent
Arab States,” stating,
this expansionist appetite has recently manifested itself also 
in the demands put forward by the Arabs for Eritrea, the 
Sudan and Cyrenaica. The great mass of the people in the 
various Arab states are kept down in ignorance and 
fanaticism, in dirt and wretchedness by a ruling class which 
shows little or no interest in the improvement of their 
miserable lo t94
The Council believed that Arab ethnic claims were distorted, 
arguing that about 75% of the Arabic-speaking people in Palestine 
were recent immigrants or the descendants of persons who 
emigrated to Palestine in comparatively recent times.
At no time was there a Palestine Arab State. It was the
84 Ibid, p. 4-5.
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Jewish people which produced in Palestine the civilization 
and religious culture which, along with that of Greece, 
molded the civilization and the spiritual life of the whole 
Western world.95
The Zionists stated their objection to a number of other points. 
These included the failure of the American Government to take 
action concerning the White Paper of 1939, to keep the doors of 
Palestine open to Jewish refugees during the War, to advise U.S. 
representatives abroad of U.S. determination to insure a Jewish 
homeland in Palestine, and to utilize conditions created by the war to 
advance the Zionist cause.
The Zionists also cited many pro-Arab positions which the U.S. 
Government had taken. These included the United States recognition 
of the independent governments of Syria and Lebanon soon after 
their formation. Also, the U.S. encouraged the Arab States to declare 
themselves to be against Germany toward the end of the war 
“assuring them of places of honor among the United Nations, 
irrespective of their war records.” The United States had not 
withheld its support from the Arab League even though the League 
declared its opposition to Jewish aspirations and proclaimed the 
liquidation of the Jewish National Home as one of its major 
objectives.96
85 Ib id .
"  Ibid, p. 6
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A separate memo from the American Zionist Emergency 
Council, called, “Some Facts on the Palestine Situation,” stressed the 
support of organized labor and educators for a Jewish Homeland, 
citing a petition by more than 2,000 university presidents and 
professors favoring the establishment of a Jewish State.
The Council refuted the common arguments against the Jewish 
National Home Policy. The first of these arguments claimed that 
Palestine was too small and incapable of economically sustaining a 
large population. In rebuttal the Zionists stressed the possibility of 
large scale absorption of Jewish immigrants.
It was estimated by Dr. Walter Lowdermilk, Assistant Chief of 
the U.S. Soil Conservation Department, and Mr. J. L Savage and Mr. J. 
B. Hayes ( two American irrigation specialists), that at least a million 
acres could be irrigated, as compared with less than 100,000 acres 
under irrigation at that time. Dr. Lowdermilk also estimated that 
with proper development Palestine could sustain an additional four 
million inhabitants.97
The second argument against a Jewish Homeland was that 
there were “too few Jews left” as a result of Nazi exterminations. The 
Zionists rebutted this argument by quoting a July 14, 1945 article in 
the London Economist, which was not pro-Zionist. This article stated
97 “Some Facts on the Palestine Situation,” American Zionist Emergency 
Council to the State Department, September 1945, p. 4, Truman Papers, Official 
File.
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that observers of all types, returning from Germany, confirmed that 
unexpected numbers of the Jews left in central Europe wanted to go 
to Palestine.98
The third argument against the Jewish Homeland was the fear 
of violent Arab opposition. The Council stated that the Arab countries 
could not offer any real resistance to a clearly defined policy on the 
part of the Great Powers since Arab dependence upon these Powers 
was greater than ever before. Although the Arabs successively 
opposed each stage of Palestine's development they “have 
consistently reconciled themselves to realities.. .  Today they accept 
as an accomplished fact the 600,000 Jews in Palestine. They will 
likewise accept the Jewish State.”99
The fourth argument against Statehood was that Palestine was 
promised to both the Jews and the Arabs. The rebuttal of this 
argument by the Emergency Council took the form of documentation. 
While the Balfour Declaration promised Palestine to the Jews, the 
McMahon-Hussein Correspondence of 1915 presented a conflicting 
promise to the Arabs. The Zionists explained that Mr. McMahon 
made it very clear to King Hussein that that pledge excluded 
Palestine and that this was understood by the King. They contend 
that this was confirmed by Winston Churchill in 1922 and that
88 Ibid, p. 5.
88 Ibid, p. 7.
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further proof is evident “from the fact that at Versailles in 1919 Emir 
Feisal in asking on behalf of his father, King Hussein, for 
independence for the Arab countries, expressly excluded Palestine.” 
The Emir and Dr. Chaim Weizmann had signed an accord in which 
“the Emir recognized the right of the Jews to immigrate into and to 
develop Palestine provided Arab independence was achieved in the 
Arab lands outside of Palestine. That independence is today a 
reality,” wrote the Zionists.100
The fifth  argument against statehood was the growing 
dependence of America on oil. The rebuttal to this argument was the 
dependence of the Arabs on oil revenue. “It is altogether unrealistic, 
however to believe that the Arab states w ill allow their opposition 
to a Jewish Palestine to interfere with the flow of oil and thus with 
the steady receipt of oil royalties which constitute a major part of 
their revenue.”101
The Council argued that the United States was the only major 
Power which was ready to exploit these oil resources and pay 
royalties without attempting to interfere with the policies of the local 
governments, making the U.S. the most desirable partner in the 
development of their oil resources.102
100 Ibid, p. 8.
101 Ib id .
102 Ib id .
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The sixth argument against Jewish statehood was the question, 
Will the Jewish State be a theocracy? To this the Zionists stresses 
their belief in the separation of church and state. The Zionist 
movement “does not, nor has it ever aimed to set up a theocratic 
state in Palestine.” The term Jewish State did not refer to a religious 
state but that the Jews would constitute the majority in a country 
where each community would be autonomous in religious, 
educational, cultural and social affairs and in which all citizens could 
vote and hold office.103
The last argument against Jewish statehood was that the Jews 
were divided against themselves. The Zionists believed that despite a 
small but wealthy Jewish group which campaigned against a Jewish 
State, the Jewish masses were wholeheartedly in favor of the Zionist 
program.104
The Irgun Delegation in America agreed in principle with all of 
the above arguments put forth by the American Zionist Emergency 
Council. The Council however had a continuing vendetta against the 
Hebrew Committee for National Liberation. The Council had claimed 
in a 14 page document to the Justice Department on August 10,1944 
that the HCNL planned to destroy the existing Zionist leadership and 
replace it with their own kind. The Emergency Council claimed that
,03 Ibid, p. 9.
104 Ib id.
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the HCNL represented no one except the Irgun in Palestine whose 
activities were condemned by all “legitimate” Jewish agencies.
The F.B.I. file on Hillel Kook (Peter Bergson) mentioned the 
antagonism between the two Jewish factions. " . . .  It is reported that 
the American Zionist Emergency Council commented in a fashion 
which had been referred to as typical of the statements made by the 
more “solid” Jewish organizations: ‘Bergson’s action is an attempt to 
perpetrate a colossal hoax on the Jewish people.’ The statement is 
said to have continued, warning the public, the press and officials not 
to be taken in by ‘the brazen fraud of a half dozen adventurers with 
no standing, credentials or mandate, except from pistol-packing 
Irgun.’”105
In November 1945, the Irgun’s Jewish Resistance Movement 
attacked railroads throughout Palestine. Bevin repudiated the pro- 
Zionist commitments of his party and dispatched an Anglo-American 
Commission to Palestine to inquire into the Jewish refugee problem.
The revolt of the Jews against the British in Palestine began to 
affect politics in the United States. There the Irgun had submitted a 
memorandum to the American members of the Anglo-American 
Commission of Inquiry (AACI) which listed, for six single-spaced 
pages, British crimes against the Jews. They maintained that it was
105 F.B.I. Summary on Peter Bergson, December 15, 1944, from  File # 62- 
60950-42..
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useless to talk to the British since twenty-five years of talking had
done no good. Appealing to the British conscience, justice, and
humanitarianism was in vain and had led only to the massacre of
their fathers, mothers, sisters, brothers, children, rabbis and sages;
the British are to be those who deprive us of our homeland 
and destroy our people . . .  we are determined, in our 
relations with them, to use no other words but “Fight!”106
Not only the Irgun delegation but mainstream Jews were finally 
favoring the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine and immediate 
mass immigration for the displaced Jewish refugees of Europe.
The Palestine Solution was the title of a memorandum which
had been submitted to Truman during a meeting held on June 14,
1946 with the Executive of the Jewish Agency for Palestine (which
included Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver, Rabbi Stephen Wise, Dr. Nahum
Goldstein, and Louis Iipsky). It was believed by them that in order
for the British to release the 100,000 there needed to be substantial
economic assistance from the United States and a clear statement of
responsibility by the United States.
The British desire the type of statement from the United 
States which would enable them to convince the Arabs that 
the United States forced the admission of the “100,000.” It is 
believed, however, that the British will, if  pressed, agree to 
assume joint responsibility for such action.107
1M Ben Ami, p. 369.
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It was also suggested that the United States propose a long 
term solution to the problem. The Committee proposed partition (Le. 
redrawing the boundaries of Palestine and Trans-Jordan), as well as 
other solutions such as Dominion status, U.N. Trusteeship, or a 
Canton State. It was suggested, in the section concerning the 
redefinition of Palestine's borders, that “the severance of Eastern 
Palestine and its annexation by Trans-Jordan might be the basis for 
gaining partial Arab support. It would also leave residual Palestine 
with a Jewish majority.”108
By mid June the Jews in Palestine and the British were on a 
collision course. Britain’s rejection of the request for permits for the 
“100,000” outraged the Resistance. In retaliation, on June 17 they 
blew up the bridges linking Palestine with the neighboring states. 
The British Government prepared for war in an effort called 
Operation “Agatha” and gave the High Commissioner authority to 
liquidate the ‘extreme elements’ now supposedly in control of the 
Haganah and the Jewish Agency. The United States Government was 
not to be informed, until the last moment, to prevent leaks to 
American Jewish groups. All Jews of any political importance were 
targeted in the operation of June 29, 1946 (“Black Saturday”) in 
which one hundred thousand British soldiers and ten thousand police
108 Ib id .
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participated.109
On July 2 1946, the White House issued a statement. It 
protested “the arrest and detention of members of the Jewish Agency 
and other prominent leaders of the Jewish Community in Palestine” 
and said that it was “a cause of deep anxiety to this government.” 
President Truman protested the fact that the action had been taken 
“without my having been consulted or informed by the British 
Government.” He stated that, since the Jewish Agency had been 
recognized by international law and international agreements to 
which the U. S. was a signatory, he was requesting an explanation 
from the British Government. President Truman then recommended 
the immediate admission of 100,000 Jewish refugees to Palestine and 
reiterated American co-responsibility in finding a solution to the 
Palestine question.110
Others also sought a solution to the Palestine problem. On 
Monday, July 22, 1946 a small article appeared on the front page of 
the Late City Edition of The New York Times bearing the title 
“Gandhi Counsels Jews.”
In this article Mohandas Gandhi advised the Jews of Palestine 
to abandon ‘naked force’ as a weapon against the British restriction 
of immigration and to adopt instead the “matchless weapon of non-
Ben Ami, p. 376.
110 Papers of David Niles, Truman Library.
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violence”. 111
If the Irgun read this article it had little effect. The following 
day the Late City Edition of the Times front page read, “Jerusalem 
Bomb Kills 41 in Attack on British Offices.” The article was 
subtitled “Zionist Terror Raiders Accused of Blast in King David 
Hotel.”112 In this raid six stories of the historic hotel were destroyed 
in an attempt to hit the British headquarters stationed in the hotel. 
There were many injuries and deaths.113
Next to this article appeared a notation that the King David 
Hotel was owned by Palestine Hotels, Ltd., a subsidiary of the 
Palestine Economic Corporation, 570 Lexington Avenue. The 
Corporation had been organized twenty years earlier so that 
“American Jews and others might give aid on a strictly business basis 
to productive Palestinian enterprises and to further the economic 
development of the Holy Land and the resettlement of an increasing 
number of Jews there.”114 This non-political group was headed by 
Robert Szold.
The following day tensions increased. It was reported from 
Jaffa that Arab tensions in that port city were rising “because of the 
Jerusalem bombing and the presence of the British cruiser Liverpool
111 The New York Times. July 22,1946, p. 1.
112 See Appendix H for the complete text of this article.
113 See The New York Times. July 23,1946, p. 1, 3.
114 The New York Times. “Bombed Hotel Property Of New York Corporation,” 
July 23,1946, p. 3.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
167
off the harbor. The Liverpool was said to have been sent to Jaffa
because extremists were mining the harbor.”115
Tension rose in the Jewish quarter of Jerusalem, where 
armed, British soldiers patrolled the streets. Shopkeepers 
stood nervously in their doorways, ready to ring down iron 
shutters at the slightest alarm. A telephone operator for the 
Palestine Railways received an anonymous call that the 
building was going to be blown up. Police reached the 
building without result.116
As could be expected, the reaction to the bombing of the King 
David Hotel was extremely negative. The New York Times editors 
expressed their repulsion openly in the opinion section of the paper. 
They claimed that the action was self-defeating and could not expect 
to modify the position of the Mandatory Power, but would, rather, 
stiffen British opinion. They felt that it would also deter the United 
States government from pressing for further immigration into 
Palestine and would cause further divisions within that country. It 
was believed that “in the long run, the victims of these tactics of 
terrorism seem likely to include many of the harassed refugees 
whose escape from Europe may be postponed still further.”117 While 
supporting the admission of 100,000 refugees to Palestine the 
editors condemned the actions of the underground. The Irgun 
immediately took responsibility for the bombing of the King David.
11S The New York Times. “Arab Tension Reported,” July 24,1946
1,8 Ibid.
117 The New York Times. “Violence in Palestine,” July 23, 1946, p. 24.
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Irgun Z'vai Leumi, an extremist Zionist organization, 
announced that it had been responsible for the bombing of 
the British headquarters here in a communique’ issued 
tonight in Tel Aviv but blamed the “British tyrants 
themselves” for the loss of life.118
The Irgun claimed to have warned the King David’s switch­
board operator of the impending disaster. This was explained in a 
communique.
The tragedy which occurred in the civilian offices of the 
occupying Government was not caused by Jewish soldiers 
but by the British tyrants themselves, who disregarded that 
warning and did not evacuate the building at the advice of 
m ilitary experts who undertook to dismantle the 
explosives.119.
No evidence was forthcoming to support this claim and the 
Palestine Government vigorously denied any advance warning, 
according to Reuter. In the United States and in Jerusalem the Jewish 
Agency called upon the world Jewish community to condemn the 
action. The Jewish press expressed their abhorrence of the incident, 
calling on the Jewish community “to rise up against these abominable 
outrages.” There was speculation that the formal action and full 
cooperation in this respect was contingent upon the release of men 
detained earlier by the British.120
The bombing was denounced by President Truman who
118 The New York Times. “Zionist Terrorists Say They Set Bomb; Denounce 
British,” July 24,1992, p. 1 .
,1B Ibid.
120 Ibid.
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declared that such terrorism “might well” damage the cause of
Zionism. In his official statement the President commented on the
effects of the bombing and its relation to ongoing U.S. talks in London
to implement recommendations to allow 100,000 Jewish immigrants
to enter Palestine.
Such acts of terrorism will not advance, but on the contrary 
might well retard, the efforts that are being made, and will 
continue to be made, to bring about a peaceful solution of 
this difficult problem.121
The Irgun Delegation in America remained loyal to the Irgun in 
Palestine despite the political repercussions. They held to the claim 
that “the heavy casualties were the end result of a series of tragic 
missed signals.” The Irgun had at that time united with Lechi and 
the Haganah in a United Resistance Movement. The plan to blow up 
the hotel had been approved by the Haganah Command on July 1, 
1946.122 It was personally approved by Ben Gurion.123 However, 
following the unexpected loss of life and devastation, the Haganah 
condemned the operation.124 The Irgun publicly took responsibility.
In America efforts had been made to try to reduce bloodshed. 
The Irgun Delegation had set up the American League for a Free 
Palestine which continued their publicity efforts to focus attention on
,21The New York Times. “Truman Condemns Palestine Blast; Sees Damage to 
Peaceful Solution,” July 24,1946, p. 4.
122 Menachem Begin, The Revolt, p. 213.
123 Ben Ami, p. 377.
124 Begin, p. 224.
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the Palestine problem.
In July, 1946, when the URM (United Resistance Movement) 
was entering its eighth month of operation, the destruction 
of British military headquarters in the south wing of the 
King David Hotel shook Jerusalem, and had wide spread 
repercussions. The heavy casualties were the end result of a 
series of tragic missed signals. Ironically, the President Of 
our American League for a Free Palestine (ALFP), former 
Senator Guy M.Gillette, and the co-chairmen, Harry L. 
Selden, had confirmed reservations for July 27th at the King 
David. The activists who gathered around our cause in the 
ALFP, had been ceaselessly searching for ways to avoid the 
ever-increasing bloodshed. .  .12S
There were particular reasons for deciding to bomb the King 
David. Despite attempts by Senator Gillette and others to negotiate 
with the British Government in favor of a Jewish state in Palestine, 
the British had decided to launch Operation “Agatha” on June 29, at 
1:45 A.M., the month prior to the bombing.
This Operation was an attempt to arrest “important” Jews in a 
dragnet of British soldiers and police. To justify the arrests, the 
British seized documents in the Jewish Agency building which they 
later admitted did not sufficiently incriminate either the official 
institution or the individual leadership. The Operation shook up the 
Agency’s leadership, but it failed to destroy the Haganah, and hardly 
touched the Irgun or Lechi. However, when “Agatha” was launched 
on June 29, the immediate impulse in the United Resistance
129 Ben Ami, p. 374.
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Movement was for armed actions against the British administration; 
and the go ahead was given, for the King David attack .126
The Irgun believed that damaging evidence had been found in 
the British attack on the Jewish Agency and that this material was 
being kept at the British headquarters. It was urgent that the 
evidence be destroyed.
Unknown to the Irgun, it had been decided by Dr. Weizmann to 
halt the armed struggle of the United Resistance Movement just as 
the planned attack against the King David was proceeding. A note 
was sent to Menachem Begin by Haganah leader Sneh on the 19th 
and on the 22nd of July urging Begin to delay the operation.
The attack on the King David had the effect of focusing the 
British public on the immediacy of the Palestine question. It also put 
that question on the front pages of American newspapers. It marked 
the end of the United Resistance Movement. In an interview in the 
Parisian paper France Soir. David Ben Gurion declared that the Irgun 
was “the enemy of the Jewish people.”127
The King David incident was a catalyst for the call for partition of 
Palestine. Within three days of the blast the Anglo-American Cabinet 
Committee recommended to the American and British Governments a 
so-called federalist constitution for Palestine. This constitution was to
128 Ben Ami, p. 375-377.
127 Ben Ami, p. 380.
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vest “strong central powers in a British controlled central 
government, leaving very little autonomy to the separate Arab and 
Zionist provinces” and would make the admission of the 100,000 
Jewish refugees to Palestine, which President Truman had urged ten 
months prior, conditional upon the adoption of the federalization 
program.128
The plan called for dividing Palestine into Zionist, Arab and
central-govemment districts. The central government would control
Jerusalem, Bethlehem and surrounding areas, and the Negev, south
of Beersheba. The Zionist district would include about 1500 square
miles (compared with the 2,600 recommended by the Peel report
proposing partition in 1936 and the 45,000 in the area constituting
Palestine when it was originally promised as a Jewish “national
home”). This area would include two thirds of the southern coastal
Plain of Sharon, except Jaffa, the Plain of Esdraelon, the Valley of Jez-
reel and eastern Galilee north of Beisan. The rest of Palestine would
be Arab.129 The British would retain substantial power.
The most striking aspect of the proposals is the degree of 
power to be left in the hands of the central government. . .  
Under the plan the British would control defense, foreign 
relations, the police, prisons, the courts, railway and court 
facilities in Haifa, the post office, the telephone and 
telegraph systems, customs, excise taxes, civil aviation, 
broadcasting and antiquities. They would also retain final
128 The New York Times. “Divided Palestine is Urged by Anglo-U.S. Cabinet 
Body, Delaying Entry of 100,000”-July, 26,1948, p. 1.
128 Ibid.
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authority over immigration, but the provincial governments 
would have the right of appeal to the United Nations’ 
Trusteeship Council130
The British position on the immigration question had been that 
they could not agree to the absorption of 100,000 without the 
agreement of the Arabs. The Anglo-American Cabinet Committee 
deliberations caused an elaboration of this position. “The British 
have now said, in effect, that they cannot agree to admit the new 
refugees until the whole question of Palestine’s future has been 
settled.”131 This immigration question had become the main point of 
contention between the American and British governments.
Although the immigration plan had been delayed, details of 
the plan had been agreed upon by the United States and Britain. The 
United States would finance the movement of refugees to Palestine 
and world Jewish organizations would take over the estimated 
$280,000,000 cost of resettling them after their arrival.
The attitude of President Truman and the policy of the United
States Government was regarded as being pivotal to the solution of
the Palestine problem.
If President Truman rejects the new plan for a federated 
Palestine that has been recommended to him by his Cabinet 
delegation and that the British favor strongly it is not only 
going to be a shock to British opinion but it is going to force
130 Ibid.
131 The New York Times. “Britain Tries Again on Palestine Solution,” July 28, 
1992.
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a whole new reconsideration of the Palestine problem, with 
that much more time lost. .  .What they do urgently desire is 
to get President Truman’s blessing to go ahead with the new 
plan for a federated Palestine.132
Meanwhile a close friend of President Truman was at work in 
Palestine for the Irgun delegation. Iowa’s Senator Guy Gillette 
focused on their cause the prior year when he resigned 
chairmanship of the Surplus Property Board and declined other 
executive government appointments “to devote himself to the 
solution of the Hebrew problem of Europe and Palestine.”133 In  
August of 1945 Guy Gillette became full-time President of the Irgun 
Delegation’s American League for a Free Palestine. Yitshaq Ben Ami 
was its Executive Director. They worked with Ben Hecht, Louis 
Bromfield, W ill Rogers, Jr., Paul O’Dwyer, William Ziff and other 
prominent Americans. In 1946 Guy Gillette campaigned to stop 
Britain from establishing the independent state of Trans-Jordan on 
three-quarters of the Mandate area. Gillette pointed out that “this 
unilateral action by Britain contravened its obligation under the 
Mandate and went against the policies set by the Anglo-American 
Convention of 1924.” When this attempt failed Gillette said on
132 The New York Times. “British link  Fate of Palestine to US,” July 28, 1946, 
p. 29.
133 Request from the White House to the White House News Photographers 
Association to cover a press conference at the headquarters of the Hebrew 
Committee for National liberation where Gillette would discuss his plans 
concerning these matters, July 31, 1945, Truman Papers, Official File.
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national radio, “It appears, from the study of Great Britain’s record 
on Palestine, that she supports the lofty ideals of democracy 
provided they happen to coincide with the interests of the British 
Empire.”134
In July 1946, Gillette went to Palestine in an attempt to modify 
the course of British action, to meet with Begin to coordinate future 
policies, and to establish a better relationship between the Irgun 
Delegation in America and the Jewish Agency. His attempts “failed 
on all fronts . . .  he came back a converted revolutionary . . .  From 
then on his opening statement at public appearances was: ‘It is 1946 
in America, but it is 1776 in Palestine.’”135
Attempts were also made within the ranks to strengthen the 
Hebrew Committee for National Liberation’s political campaign, and 
to tighten ties with the Irgun which had been strained because of the 
decision by the Irgun Delegation not to send all their funds to the 
front in Palestine, and because of Hillel Kook’s call for a democratic 
(rather than a Jewish) state in Palestine. On May 1, 1946 an 
agreement had been signed with the Irgun High Command which 
defined the Hebrew Nation as all Jews in the diaspora and in 
Palestine who desired Eretz-Israel (the land of Israel) as their home 
and wished to help in its liberation.
The HCNL is the political representative of the Irgun; the 
1S4Ben Ami, p. 380-381.
Ibid, p. 381-382.
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links between the Irgun and its delegates abroad are 
reestablished. The HCNL accepts the Irgun’s supreme 
authority. The Irgun’s covert activities in the diaspora are 
directed by the Irgun’s diaspora command. The Irgun 
delegates are autonomous in their political work and shall 
participate in formulating the Irgun’s m ilitary and political 
policies.136
Begin hesitated to ratify the agreement, leading to considerable
friction, but the Irgun and American delegation continued to work
together throughout the summer of 1946. The Morrison-Grady plan
(whereby Palestine would be split into four sections, two under
British rule, one under Jewish rule and one under Arab rule)
motivated Menachem Begin to write to the HCNL that summer. He
feared that the Jewish Agency might agree to the plan which would
result in internecine fighting in Palestine. “A civil war can break out
at any time within weeks or months,” wrote Begin.
I have no doubt that your campaign in the United States. . .  
is one of the factors inhibiting the plotters. How long this 
will restrain them is impossible to predict. .  .We did not give 
up our principles two years ago, after the Moyne incident, 
when Golomb (head of the Haganah) threatened us with 
annihilation. We did not stop our struggles then and we 
won’t now.137
Begin planned to establish a Provisional Government only if “the 
Agency people” agreed to the Morrison-Grady plan and “if there is no
’“ Ibid, p. 382-383.
137 Ibid.
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choice le ft” 138
At this time a rift was developing within mainstream world 
Zionism. While Chaim Weizmann wished to settle for partition under 
British rules, the Zionist movement in America, led by Abba Hillel 
Silver, began turning toward the more m ilitant stand of the 
Revisionists and the Irgun Delegation.
On August 5, 1946 the Executive of the Jewish Agency for 
Palestine adopted a resolution rejecting the Morrison plan and 
demanding the immediate grant of 100,000 certificates and the 
transportation of the 100,000 to Palestine. They also demanded 
immediate full autonomy in administrative appointments and in 
national economics “to that area of Palestine to be designated to 
become a Jewish State,” as well as the right to control immigration 
there.139 This resolution was accompanied by a ten page paper titled 
“Palestine: Trusteeship, Binational State, or Partition?” This report 
compared the proposed types of government, analyzed the affects of 
each upon the indigenous populations and made suggestions and 
recommendations. Among these it was believed that Partition would 
be the most acceptable solution as it would give “a full measure of 
satisfaction to the political aspirations of both groups. Its drawback is
,3B Ibid.
1M Resolution Adopted at Meeting of the Executive of the Jewish Agency for 
Palestine in Paris, Monday, August 5, 1946, Papers of David Niles, Truman 
Library.
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that it can offer that satisfaction only in a limited area of the 
country.” The Jewish State could work out its own destiny while the 
Arabs would not feel “swamped” by the Jews as had been the feeling 
reported by the Palestine Royal Commission. “It would also give the 
politically conscious class among the Arabs of Palestine the ardently 
desired opportunity to obtain political office and influence.” Trans­
jordan and Iraq would probably favor the plan.
It may also be viewed with favor (by) Iraq, which would 
obtain - through the friendly and allied state of Transjordan 
- close access to the Mediterranean - an aim which has long 
been a major objective of Iraqi policy.140
The report objected to the fact that “the Arabs are represented 
in every branch of U. N. activity” while “it is clearly an untenable 
condition that the Jewish people should have no voice and no direct 
representation in affairs of the most vital concern to it.”141 The report 
also suggested boundaries. “Both the Jewish State and Transjordan 
would have access to the waters of the Jordan and could exploit them 
for irrigation and the generation of electric power.”142 The plan would 
partition Jerusalem, placing it under the control of an international 
trusteeship which would allow “the Jewish part of New Jerusalem” to 
be part of the Jewish State and “the Arab part of New Jerusalem” to
140 “Palestine; Trusteeship, Binational State or Partition?” - page 7, August 
5, 1946, Papers of David Niles, Truman Library.
141 Ibid, p. 8.
142 Ibid, p. 10.
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be part of the Arab State. It was suggested that Jaffa would be part 
of the Arab State “though not contiguous with it” while the port of 
Haifa would remain in Jewish hands. Haifa, however, would be 
accessible to Transjordan through a free port area. There would also 
be a naval area under British sovereignty.143
While members of the Jewish Agency found Partition 
acceptable the Irgun did not. Begin said, “We shall oppose it! We 
shall never acquiesce in partitioning of our homeland!” The thing 
they wanted to avoid at all costs was a civil war.
The efforts of the Irgun Delegation and the Irgun High 
Command to fight for a Jewish state in Palestine were inextricably 
intertwined. Each bore the repercussions of the successes or failures 
of the other. While the Irgun Delegation worked under the guise of 
several organizations (e.g. the Hebrew Committee, the American 
Friends for a Free Palestine, etc.) their true affiliation to the Irgun 
became known. This knowledge caused fund raising problems due to 
their alien status. Their organization and its leaders were 
investigated by the F.B.I. The results of the investigations, however, 
were not incriminating. During the war years some of their plans, 
such as Dr. Raphaeli’s plan to establish an off shore radio station, 
were foiled by the Roosevelt administration. Their political position 
however remained unshakable as they continued to pressure the 
143 Ibid, p. 9.
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government directly and in the public arena.




For a long time he was a hero. No president had 
appointed so many Jews to public office. No president 
had surrounded himself with so many Jewish advisers.
No president had condemned anti-Semitism with such 
eloquence and persistence. Jews were mostly liberals 
in those faraway days, and a vast majority voted four 
times for FDR.1
This dissertation has raised a question which is difficult to
answer. Why did President Roosevelt fail to help the Jews of Europe
during World War II and why did he put off Jewish leaders in
America? There is no doubt that while the President supported the
Jews verbally he failed to take action that might have drastically
altered the outcome of the war for the Jewish victims of the
Holocaust2 Some historians believe that the President was afraid of
appearing too friendly to the Jews during a period when anti-
Semitism was supposedly increasing.
The individual in whom the Jews placed their greatest trust.
. . failed to seize the hour. Franklin D. Roosevelt had 
information on the Holocaust long before . . .  November 24, 
1942, but, as with the War Crimes Commission, he allowed 
the issue to come to a head before making a move of, in fact,
1 “Did FDR Betray the Jews? Or did he do more than anyone else to save 
them?” James Schlesinger Jr., Newsweek. April 18, 1994, p. 14.
2 Abandonment of the Tews, by David Wyman, carefully documents these 
events and the proposed various plans which Roosevelt might have enacted to 
save the Jews of Europe.
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no immediate consequence. . . The chief executive turned 
down Sikorski’s private appeal for large-scale bombing in 
retaliation for German savagery.. .  He also proved unwilling 
to ask Congress about admitting thousands of Polish women 
and children, currently released from Soviet camps, fearing 
“anti-semitic agitation” upon the inclusion of many Jews.3
The Irgun Delegation to the United States and the New Zionist 
Organization in America tried to influence the administration to help 
the Jews of Europe and to take a stand against the British policy in 
Palestine. They has little success. While the Irgun Delegation began to 
attack the President through their ad campaign, the New Zionist 
Organization responded differently. They turned to the Republican 
party and tried to develop support there. This was a new approach. 
The large majority of Jews in America were Democrats. Although 
some disagreed with the policies of Roosevelt they did not want to 
criticize the President during the war. The New Zionists’ decision to 
reach out to the Republicans for help proved to be effective. They did 
not, however, totally isolate themselves from the Democrats but tried 
to make inroads to affect policy at the highest levels.
The Irgun Delegation organized the march of the rabbis, 
formulated the campaign which exposed the Bermuda Conference as 
a “mockery,” pressed for the creation of the War Refugee Board, 
staged rallies and mass meetings. They were opposed by Roosevelt 
each step of the way. These actions, as well as David Wyman’s
3 Penkower, The Tews Were Expendable, p. 95.
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documentation of Roosevelt’s behavior, are the basis for seriously 
questioning the motivation of the President. Certain conclusions 
have come to light.
The President was deeply involved in establishing ties with 
the Saudi Arabian king, Ibn Saud. Washington’s contact with the 
King were generally formulated for military and political benefits. 
Regarding Palestine, Roosevelt initially wanted to get the Saudis to 
speak face to face, or at least by royal representative, with Chaim 
Weizmann. The President would not proceed to support a Jewish 
State in Palestine without the support of the King because of 
geopolitical concerns of the United States. These included the need 
for Saudi oil concessions and plans for United States control of an air 
base at Dharan.
Varying reactions have emerged from the proposal that 
Roosevelt’s Saudi concerns were the main reason for his 
abandonment of the Jews. Most responses have been hesitantly 
questionable, some fully discounted the idea, others mulled over it 
and considered it a possibility.
David Wyman commented about Roosevelt in the following
way.
He was very concerned not to get the Arabs upset. A part 
of this was he kept saying that he didn’t want to see 
massacre. He couldn’t put x - number of American divisions 
over there to protect the Jews. So that this is why he was so
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hesitant, but there’s no doubt about it, he was playing both 
sides against the middle. It was a very devious policy. He 
didn’t know what to do. I think he was concerned about the 
Jews, I think he favored a Jewish state, but not to the extent 
of alienating the Arabs which is the only way your going to 
have a Jewish state. And so he seemed without any concern.
He seemed just to lie . . . but at the same time he was 
assuring Wise and Silver that it was just a matter of time. He 
was also telling the Arab leaders that we won’t do anything 
without Arab consent which means they aren’t going to do 
anything. This came out, this correspondence whatever the 
communication was between him and Arab leaders was 
published in the press I think in late '45 . It made quite an 
uproar because it showed what a false position he had 
taken.4
The earliest communication between President Roosevelt and 
King Ibn Saud is dated 1939. In this correspondence the question of 
Jewish self rule in Palestine was confronted by the King. He advised 
the President that such a decision would be against the sentiments of 
the majority of residents of the area (Le. of the Arab population). The 
Under Secretary of State, Welles, advised the President that because 
this was “the first letter which we have had from an Arab Chief of 
State” an appropriate response should be forthcoming. Welles, 
therefore, drafted a reply to the King which he asked the President 
to sign. In it the King was assured that no action would be taken 
which departed from the position which had been maintained to that
4 Interview with David Wyman by Joanna Saidel, August 20, 1993, 
Cantebury, New Hampshire.
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time.5
In 1940 Chaim Weizmann, President of the World Zionist 
Organization, suggested to Mr. H. St. J. B. Philby, “the great Near 
Eastern authority and friend of King Ibn Saud. . . some basis of 
settlement which the King might be willing to support. Dr. Weizmann 
said that he had remarked to Philby that the only thing the Jews had 
to offer was money.” Weizmann stated that he was prepared to raise 
“three to four million pounds as the price of the King’s support of a 
scheme whereby the Arabs of Palestine would be voluntarily 
transferred to Trans-Jordan and Iraq.”6
The idea of transfer was one which Benzion Netanyahu and the 
New Zionist Organization promoted throughout their campaign 
against the British in Palestine. In 1938 Mr. Netanyahu expressed 
this idea in political literature. The idea of transfer was originated by 
Israel Zangwill. Netanyahu believed that it should be arranged 
politically and not by forced expulsion.7
With the war well underway by 1941, interest in Saudi Arabia 
increased. That year King Ibn Saud approached the administration to 
ask for financial assistance. This request was initially turned down
5 Under Secretary of State to the President, January 9,1939 and Draft letter 
from President Roosevelt to King Ibn Saud, Foreign Relations of the United 
States. 1939, vol. IV, p. 694-696.
6 Memorandum of Conversation by the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern 
Affairs (Murray), February 6 , 1940, Foreign Relations of the Unites States.
1940, Vol. m, p. 836-840.
7 Personal interview with Benzion Netanyahu, November 1993, Jerusalem .
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by the United States. The King preferred to ask the U.S. for a loan 
than the British because he felt that the U.S. would not try to meddle 
in Saudi Arabia’s internal affairs. When this request was turned 
down he asked instead for a loan of road engineers and for a mission 
of agricultural and irrigation experts from the United States 
Government. State Department officials advised that such an 
arrangement would be beneficial to the United States. Agriculture 
experts argued “that quite apart from the question of helping King 
Ibn Saud, the information and experience which an agricultural 
expert obtained in Saudi Arabia would be very valuable to the 
Department of Agriculture.”8
The year, 1942, was important in determining the outcome of 
the pressure campaign aimed at the President to assist the Jews of 
Europe. Hitler’s plan was fully underway. Zionist groups in the United 
States, particularly the Irgun Delegation and the New Zionist 
Organization, were demanding action. However, important 
negotiations were beginning in Saudi Arabia for American rights for 
air transit over certain parts of Saudi Arabia.
The question remains whether President Roosevelt made 
agreements with Ibn Saud to gain advantages in Saudi Arabia. The 
Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Parker T. Hart, does not think this was
8 For a discussion on the proposal to assist Saudi Arabia see Foreign 
Relations of the United States 1941, vol. HI, p. 624-659.
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the case. He believes that the friendship between the King and the
President was sincere and that no deals were made concerning the
Jews and Dharan air base.
No. No. No. I don’t, I don’t take stock in that one at all. I 
don’t think that’s true. I don’t believe there was any deal of 
that kind, in fact I don’t think there was any real deal 
between them except that they were going to try to be 
friends; that he made a pledge that, of his own accord, that 
he would not undertake a policy which would be harmful to, 
or that could be considered harmful to either side but he 
particularly mentioned the Arabs, of course to Ibn Saud. He 
said, I wouldn’t undertake a course of action without, that 
might be harmful to you certainly, without consulting with 
you before I do it. I’m paraphrasing what he said, but that is 
basically what he said.9
The request by Ibn Saud for an agricultural mission was 
approved, though not for purely friendly reasons. The War 
Department had become interested in acquiring air rights from the 
Saudis.
On learning of the War Department’s interest in establishing 
one or more airfields in Saudi Arabia, this Department, to 
ensure the most favorable possible reception of a request 
for air facilities, took certain steps and made certain plans, 
i.e. visit of Minister to present credentials and President’s 
letter to King Ibn Saud, organization and dispatch of 
Agricultural Mission, and opening of Legation at Jidda.. .10
The reasons for desiring these air bases were primarily
* Telephone interview with U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Parker T. Hart, 
by Joanna Saidel, October 4,1993.
10 The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Egypt (Kirk), April 15, 
1942, Foreign Relations of the United States. 1942, Vol. IV, p. 567-568.
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military. The War Department determined that if  it was possible to 
establish a route across Saudi Arabia it would be very beneficial.
Ferrying distance for short-range aircraft between 
Khartoum and Karachi w ill be m aterially reduced, also 
Arabian route more secure than present one via Cairo. 
Moreover areas near Jidda and Fort Duwadamie seem more 
suitable with respect to terrain and communications than 
further south.11
It was presumed that “there is probably no use in approaching 
Ibn Saud on this matter unless an adequate offer is made to him of 
financial or other economic assistance and unless the King is 
convinced that in some way his country w ill be made secure from 
Axis attack.” 12 It was decided that Lend -Lease aid (financial, not in 
the form of war material) would be the best way to persuade the 
King to cooperate. Ambassador Hart confirmed the King’s need for 
assistance.
We had a very strong proprietary feeling about getting that 
oil flowing. We also had a very strong feeling that the King 
absolutely had to have some income. He was absolutely flat 
when I got there in 1944.13
The British also wanted air rights over Saudi Arabia. 
Cooperating together the Americans and British were able to secure
11 Ibid, p. 568.
12 Secretary of State to the Minister in Egypt (Kirk), July 7, 1942, Foreign 
Relations of the United States. 1942, Vol. IV, p. 571.
13 Telephone interview with U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia , Parker T. 
Hart, by Joanna Saidel, October 4,1993.
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air rights from the Saudi King. It was reported:
The King is willing to grant to the British, routes for non­
stop flights from Khartoum to Bahrein passing north of 
direct line from Birkeh to Bahrein and from Khartoum to 
Basra passing north of direct line from Dheba to Basra, and 
he will not object if  American planes utilize the facilities so 
granted. He asked the matter to be treated with utmost 
secrecy.14
Also in 1942 the problem of protecting U.S. oil fields in Saudi
Arabia was considerable. Suggestions were made to send American
servicemen, anti-aircraft batteries and troops, to defend oil
installations at Dharan.
American plans to help the Jews remained on hold into 1943.
President Roosevelt made an agreement with Ibn Saud that he would
take no action in Palestine without the full consultation of both Arabs
and Jews, thus continuing his policy of appeasement. Ambassador
Hart, believes that Roosevelt was sympathetic to the Arabs.
Franklin Roosevelt was, I think, concerned that the Arabs 
would be totally neglected in the sweep of sympathy for the 
Jews.1S
Ambassador Richard Murphy thinks that the Zionism was not
an important concern for Roosevelt.
Roosevelt and Zionism, frankly I don’t think he put that 
much thought into it. It became much more of an issue in
14 The Minister in  Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State, July 31,1942, 
Foreign Relations of the United States. 1942, Vol. IV, p. 574.
15 Telephone interview with U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Parker T. Hart
from Washington, D.C., by Joanna Saidel, October 4,1993.
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The vigorous ad campaign promoted by Hillel Kook, Ben Hecht, 
Samuel Merlin, Yitshak Ben Ami, Alex Raphaeli and others in the 
United States may have been the most important single element in 
forestalling an outright pro-Arab policy in the United States in the 
early 1940’s. The effects of the campaign were that public awareness 
was aroused to a degree which forced the White House in both the 
Roosevelt and Truman administrations not to abandon the idea of a 
Jewish State in Palestine despite suggestions to the contrary in 1943.
Some of these suggestions included the recommendation by 
Colonel Harold Hoskins to ship up to a half million Jewish refugees to 
Cyrenaica. In Part IV of a proposed post-war solution Hoskins made 
specific suggestions concerning the Jews.
The existing population of one million Arabs and 
one-half million Jews in Palestine is not to be moved and is 
to form a bi-national state within a proposed Levant 
Federation. This independent Levant Federation would be 
formed by the reuniting of Lebanon, Syria, Palestine and 
Trans-Jordan that, prior to their dismemberment after the 
last war, had for years been one natural economic and 
political unit. The Holy Places, including Jerusalem, Jaffa, and 
Bethlehem, are to be an enclave under United Nations’ 
control. The cession of some specific territory other than 
Palestine for a Jewish State is proposed - possibly northern 
Cirenaica, which is now virtually uninhabited.
The Jewish refugee problem is met to the extent that, 
under the proposed plan, the Jews could put another half
18 Telephone interview with Ambassador Richard Murphy from the Council 
on Foreign Relations, by Joanna Saidel, October 4,1993.
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million in Palestine so as to reach parity with the Arabs and 
up to a half million Jews in northern Cirenaica.17
Other suggestions for situating the displaced Jews in countries 
other than Palestine included that of President Roosevelt as 
mentioned in a memorandum by Harold Hoskins in September 1943. 
Therein he writes that “the President mentioned the fact that he had 
been receiving an increasing amount of information that indicated 
that many European Jews after the war would not care to migrate to 
Palestine but would prefer to return to their countries of origin in 
Europe” based on assurances of security.18
Because of the magnitude of the massacre of Jews by the Nazis,
“the President felt that the number of Jews pressing to enter
Palestine after the war may be substantially less than was originally
anticipated.”19 Hoskins conveyed Roosevelt’s plan.
As to Jewish refugees who may wish to move out of Europe 
the President said that he was still working on the 
possibility of at least a certain number of them being settled 
in the trans - Andean portions of Colombia in South America 
. . .  As to a solution to the Palestine problem, the President 
stated that his own thinking leaned toward a wider use of 
the idea of trusteeship for Palestine - of making Palestine a 
real Holy Land for all three religions, with a Jew, a Christian,
17 Summary of lieutenant Colonel Harold B. Hoskins’ Report on the Near 
East, April 20, 1943, Foreign Relations of the United States. (Palestine 
Section), 1943, volume IV, p. 784-785.
18 Memorandum of Conversation, by Lieutenant Colonel Harold B. Hoskins, 
Washington, September 27, 1943, Foreign Relations of the United States. 
Palestine Section, 1943, volume IV, p. 812.
” Ibid.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
192
and a Moslem as the three trustees.. . 20
Roosevelt did not, however, act upon these ideas.
Meanwhile, Hillel Kook continued, with the Irgun delegation, to
formulate new tactics to draw attention to the plight of the Jews.
While failing to affect the President, this group, operating now under
the banner, “Emergence Conference to Save the Jews of Europe,”
submitted their plans to Secretary of State Hull, Assistant Secretary
Long, Attorney General Biddle, Eleanor Roosevelt, and Secretary of
the Treasury, Henry Morgenthau. There the Irgun Delegation found
at least some help. Henry Morgenthau assured Hillel Kook of his
continuing support.
I need not reiterate to you my interest in any intelligent 
plan which offers any reasonable hope of success for saving 
the Jewish population of Europe, which is rapidly being 
annihilated. You may rest assured that I am already doing 
everything in my power, consistent with my position in the 
Government, to facilitate the rescue of these oppressed 
people.21
President Roosevelt sent Colonel Hoskins to Saudi Arabia to 
confront the King regarding the future of Palestine and to discuss the 
possibility of a meeting between Ibn Saud and Chaim Weizmann. 
The King vehemently opposed any negotiations with Weizmann or 
the Jewish Agency.
20 Ibid, p. 812-813.
21 Letter from Henry Morgenthau, Jr. to Peter Bergson, September 3, 1943, 
Morgenthau Diary, Franklin D. Roosevelt library, Hyde Park , New York.
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Apparently President Roosevelt was concerned enough to send 
substantial gifts with Hoskins for the King. In an outline of Hoskins’ 
report to the President on the visit to Saudi Arabia, Hoskins wrote, “I 
also showed to the President photographs of the presentation of the 
Jeep and of the Walkie-Talkie to the King, as well as photographs of 
the irrigation project at el Kharj, 75 miles south of Riyadh.” 22
Despite the failure to arrange a meeting between Weizmann 
and the King, Hoskins believed that his talks with Ibn Saud had been 
successful diplomatically because of an intimacy which he was able 
to develop with the King. “The fact that he could talk to me directly 
in Arabic, often without anyone else present, allowed him, he said, to 
be more frank than would otherwise have been the case since his 
best interpreters are not Saudi Arabians by birth.”23
Hoskins claimed that, due to this intimacy, the King explained 
“for the first time to anyone, the reason for his personal hatred of Dr. 
Weizmann.” This was an attempt by the latter to bribe the King with 
20 million pounds sterling which was supposedly guaranteed by 
President Roosevelt through an intermediary, St. John Philby.24 
Hoskins claims that the President greeted this charge with “surprise 
and irritation.”25
“ Ibid, p. 811-812.
23 Memorandum by Hoskins, Cairo, August 31,1943, Ibid, p. 808.
*  Ibid, p. 809.
25 Ibid, p. 812.
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The King’s hatred for Weizmann and the Jews went far beyond 
this point. His position and his religion were the determining factors.
King Ibn Saud is first a devout Moslem and only 
secondarily an Arab. He is the head of the Wahhabi 
(fundamentalist) sect of Islam. The Wahhabis regard 
themselves not as a sect, but as the only true Moslems, while 
non-Wahhabi Moslems are considered to have lost the 
purity of their faith.
There is every reason to credit the sincerity of the 
King’s beliefs. Leader of the Moslems (Wahhabis anyway), 
guardian of the Holy Places of Mecca and Medina, and a 
Moslem sovereign who is independent in fact as well as in 
theory, he, with much justice, regards himself as the world’s 
foremost Moslem, and assumes the defense of the rights of 
the Moslem community. Hence, his preoccupation with 
Jewish immigration into Palestine, a problem in which 
Moslem religious considerations are supported by Arab 
nationalist sentiment.
Although the King is reasonable in his interpretation 
of Moslem religious law, he is scrupulous in observance of 
established principles. Any relaxation of his steadfast 
opposition to Zionist aims for Palestine (about the only 
question on which the Moslem world shows unanimity) 
would violate his principles; it would cause him to lose the 
respect which he now commands from his co-religionists; it 
might threaten his influence with his intolerant Wahhabi 
subjects; and it could even result in the overthrow of his 
dynasty. The possibility that the King can be persuaded to 
alter his position with regard to Palestine is, therefore, so 
remote as to be negligible.26
Besides the Palestine problem, oil and Dharan continued to be 
in the forefront of discussions between Saudi Arabia and the United 
States. The U.S. proposed to establish a consulate at Dharan in August
M King Ibn Saud - Summary, p. 3-4. Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Crimea 
Conference File, Map Room.
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1943.
It was pointed out that a Consulate in Dharan would be a 
great convenience both to the California Arabian Standard 
Oil Company and to individual Americans there, in the 
issuance and validation of passports, notarial services, 
services to shipping and seamen, documentation of 
merchandise in normal times.. . 27
The Saudis were reluctant to comply with this request fearing 
that “an American Consulate in Dharan would cause embarrassing 
demands for consulates of other nations in Saudi Arabia.” It was also 
believed that the same ends could be achieved in other ways.28
President Roosevelt continued to affirm his good faith to the 
monarch. In correspondence he again reassured King Ibn Saud, his 
“Great and Good Friend,” “. . . I am glad of this opportunity . . .to 
reiterate my assurance that it is the view of the Government of the 
United States that, in any case, no decision altering the basic situation 
of Palestine should be reached without full consultation with both 
Arabs and Jews.”29
The year, 1944, marked the beginning of proposals by the
United States for the construction of an airfield near Dharan. On July
29th the American Resident in Saudi Arabia presented the request.
As has already been explained to Your Excellency, the 
United States military air forces are responsible for heavy
27 The Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia (Moose) to the Secretary of State, 
October 25,1943. Foreign Relations of the United States. 1943, voL IV, p. 835-836.
28 Ibid, p. 838.
28 President Roosevelt to King Ibn Saud, Foreign Relations of the United 
States. 1943, vol. IV, p. 790.
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air traffic movements between points in North Africa and 
India, and the responsible authorities believe that a direct 
route between Cairo and a point near Dharan would 
materially facilitate the movement of this traffic, and aid in 
the prosecution of the war.30
The British opposed the American plan. They too had sent 
officials to Dharan “for the purpose of finding a site for a Royal Air 
Force landing field.”31
Most authentic confidential source confirms that 
British told Saudi Government to refuse aerodrome to US 
Army at Dharan. Royal Air Force Chief Cairo stated to same 
source that Air Ministry London would not concur in US 
Army request for Dharan aerodrome.
In view of British survey for Dharan airfield this 
appears to be an unfriendly act constituting (1) anti- 
American coercion of Saudi Government, (2) obstruction of 
Allied war effort. Perhaps it is test of equal opportunities 
for US and of British cooperation in Saudi Arabia.32
With the war in full swing, Dharan came to be considered a 
national security concern. The United States Air Corps had been 
flying to the Far Eastern war theater via Iraq and Bahrein. The 
airstrip at Bahrain was not considered suitable for heavy planes 
because of its soft soil. Dharan, on the other hand, was desirable. Its 
terrain was suitable and it would save each plane 220 miles of 
travel.
30 The American Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia (Moose) to the Saudi 
Arabian Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs (Yusuf Yassin), Foreign Relations 
of the United States. 1944, vol. V, p. 661.
31 Foreign Relations of the United States. 1944, vol. V, p. 663, note 13.
32 The Minister in Egypt (Tuck) to the Secretary of State, October 6, 1944, 
Foreign Relations of the United States. 1944, vol. v., p. 663.
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American military authorities consider that the construction 
of an airfield near Dharan at the earliest possible moment is 
necessary for the prosecution of the war in the Pacific.33
The Army Air Forces stated that “the acquisition of a military airfield
at Dharan is considered to be a m ilitary necessity.”34 It was
considered essential for fueling the war in the Pacific.
It was intended . . .  to save mileage or kilometerage on the 
route that went from Cairo to Karachi and then hooked into 
other carriers from there, to provision the Far Eastern 
lines of combat because at that particular time we didn’t 
have the . . . Pacific under our control. Later, when the 
Pacific passed under American control the war against the 
Japanese could be fought from the United States westward, 
rather than from Cairo eastward, and India eastward.35
In a memorandum from the Secretary of State to President 
Roosevelt, proposals for long range financial assistance to Saudi 
Arabia were presented. These proposals were based on American 
national interests and assumed that a strong and independent Saudi 
Arabian Government in the Near East was essential to these interests. 
It also argued that oil resources of Saudi Arabia, “now in American 
hands under a concession held by American nationals, should be 
safeguarded and developed in order to supplement Western 
Hemisphere oil reserves as a source of world supply,” and that “the
33 Informal Statement Prepared in the Division of Near Eastern Affairs, Nov. 
9,1944, Foreign Relations of the United States. 1944, vol. v., p. 668.
34 Memorandum by Colonel John W. Bowen of the War Department General 
Staff, Foreign Relations of the United States. 1944, vol. v., p. 669.
35 Interview with U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Parker T. Hart, October 4, 
1993.
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military authorities urgently desire certain facilities in Saudi Arabia
for the prosecution of the war, such as the right to construct military
airfields and flight privileges for military aircraft en route to the
Pacific war theater.”36
The Secretary of State urged the President to help implement
these matters by asking Congress to authorize aid to Saudi Arabia, by
asking the President of the Export-Import Bank to extend long term
loans for economic and social development in Saudi Arabia, and by
asking m ilitary authorities to give immediate attention to airfield
and related construction, with the dispatch of training missions and
equipment, and the construction of strategic roads and facilities.37
Irgun Delegation leader, Dr. Alex Raphaeli commented on the
importance of Dharan.
The interest of F.D.R and the American government in Saudi 
was because Saudi controlled the oil fields. The biggest oil 
fields. And because a great part of the world, including the 
enemy of United States, Japan, (Japan was still in the war 
when F.D.R. went to see Ibn Saud). . . was still in the war.
And Japan was getting its oil from Saudi Arabia. The idea.. .  
from the American point of view, not the Jewish, was. . .  to 
protect America against enemies and to . . . make (it) 
difficult for them to get supplies of oil from which the whole 
war machine moved.38
38 Memorandum from the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt, 
December 22,1944, Foreign Relations of the United States. 1944. vol. v., p. 757.
37 Ibid, p. 758.
33 Telephone interview with Dr. Alex Raphaeli from Jerusalem, by Joanna 
Saidel, June 15,1993.
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It wasn’t until the following year, 1945, that an agreement 
was finally reached for the construction of an airfield at Dharan. 
Early that year President met King Ibn Saud aboard the U.S.S. 
Quincy on February 14,1945, at Great Bitter Lake, Egypt.
The President spoke to the King about the Jewish problem. The 
King felt that the Jews should be returned to the lands from whence 
they were driven, stating that the Arabs and the Jews could never 
cooperate, neither in Palestine, nor in any other country and that the 
Arabs would chose to die rather than yield their lands to the Jews.39 
“The President replied that he wished to assure His Majesty that he 
would do nothing to assist the Jews against the Arabs and would 
make no move hostile to the Arab people.”40
Ambassador Richard Murphy does not believe that the 
relationship between the King and the President was that important 
to Roosevelt.
I don’t think that Ibn Saud figured, frankly, much at a ll.. .  
as an individual on Roosevelt’s personal screen. . .  No. No. I 
mean he was old, very near to death, President, when he 
met Ibn Saud.41
Historian Walter Laqueur agrees that one must be wary of the 
relationship because of the President’s personal condition.
38 Memorandum of Conversation Between the King of Saudi Arabia (Abdul 
Aziz A1 Saud) and President Roosevelt, February 14, 1945, Foreign Relations of
the United States. 1945, vol. vm , p. 2.
40 Ibid.
41 Interview with Ambassador Richard Murphy, October 4, 1993.
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Look. Don’t forget at this time Roosevelt was a very sick 
man and, in ‘44 - ‘45, and he, half the time he didn’t know 
what goes on. So one should be a little careful you know.42
The President did in fact feel a kinship with the King which
was especially strong, in part, because of their similar physical
ailments. Concurrently, the King spoke of being the “twin” brother of
the President, in years, in responsibility as Chief of State, and in
physical disability.
The President said, “but you are fortunate to still have the 
use of your legs to take you wherever you choose to go.” The 
King replied, “It is you, Mr. President, who are fortunate. My 
legs grow feebler every year; with your more reliable 
wheel-chair you are assured that you w ill arrive.” The 
President then said, “I have two of these chairs, which are 
also twins. Would you accept one as a personal gift from 
me?” The King said, “Gratefully. I shall use it daily and 
always recall affectionately the giver, my great and good 
friend.”43
The President also encouraged the King to take an interest in
agriculture and irrigation.
The President spoke of his great interest in farming, stating 
that he himself was a farmer. He emphasized the need for 
developing water resources, to increase land under 
cultivation as well as to turn the wheels which do the 
country’s work. He expressed special interest in irrigation, 
tree planting and water power which he hoped would be 
developed after the war in many countries, including the 
Arab lands. Stating that he liked Arabs, he reminded His 
Majesty that to increase land under cultivation would 
decrease the desert and provide living for a larger
42 Interview with Walter Laqueur, October 4, 1993.
43 Foreign Relations of the United States. 1945. vol., viii., p. 7.
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population of Arabs. His Majesty thanked the President for 
promoting agriculture so vigorously, but said that he himself 
could not engage with any enthusiasm in the development 
of his country’s agriculture and public works if this 
prosperity would be inherited by the Jews.44
The King did however grant to President Roosevelt the desired 
rights to the Dharan base construction soon after this meeting. The 
King’s agreement with the United States was made on the condition 
that the field and fixed installations would pass to the Saudi 
Government at the end of the war. The U.S. Forces would be allowed 
to use the base for three years following the war. American 
commercial airlines would receive most-favored-nation terms when 
the field was eventually opened to civil aviation.45
The death of President Roosevelt ushered in a new hope for a 
solution to the Palestine problem. President Truman was more 
determined to support the Zionist cause than had been his 
predecessor. He pushed for the entry of Jewish immigrants into 
Palestine. This decision brought the response of confusion and 
disbelief from Ibn Saud, who was of the impression that Truman 
would uphold Roosevelt’s Palestine policy. The King referred to the 
agreement reached on board the U.S.S. Quincy, the details of which
44 Memorandum of Conversation Between Saudi Ibn Saud and President 
Roosevelt aboard the S.S. Quincy, February 14, 1945. Franklin  D. Roosevelt 
library, Crimea Conference File, Map Room, p. 3-4.
45 The Minister of Saudi Arabia to the Secretary of State, May 13,1945, Ibid, 
p.894.
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were not released in totality.
What was said at that meeting is not completely known. Is it
possible that the President agreed, in return to rights to Dharan, not
to support a Jewish State in Palestine? This question was posed to a
number of people, including the former Israeli Prime Minister,
Yitshak Shamir who was also asked what he thought about the
possibility that President Roosevelt had been more concerned with
retaining oil concessions and the air base at Dharan than in saving
the Jews. His response was as follows.
Shamir: Maybe. It was not, it was not the only factor but it 
was a part of his hostile attitude towards the Zionism. Could 
well be understood, it was . . .  handy to have an American 
influence in the Middle East and he met once with Ibn Saud, 
the king of Saudi. And well, of course, it’s possible. I can say 
that most of the establishment officials of the United States 
have been anti-Zionist. Not after Roosevelt’s death. This 
changed, gradually this changed because Truman was 
different.
Saidel: Yes. Roosevelt needed Dharan to fuel the Pacific, to 
fuel the war in the Pacific, and the oil, so maybe that was a 
national security concern to him, more than the Jews.
Shamir: I’m not sure because. . .  Because there is, there was 
nothing in contradiction between these both interests, the 
Jewish interests and the American interests. There . . .  has 
not been any contradiction between them. But maybe 
Roosevelt gave, of course there is no doubt of it, he gave 
more importance to the American interests. Oil interests and 
all that, but I know one thing. For the Jews, for the Jewish 
people he had a dislike.
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Saidel: Do you know of any other reasons why?
Shamir: I don’t think so.
Saidel: Those were the only reasons that I could come up 
with, Dharan and the oil.
Shamir: He didn’t have a positive reason for supporting the 
Jewish state. And of course the Saudis, it may be that, 
nobody knows what was the content of his conversations 
with Ibn Saud. Nobody knows about it. But maybe that Ibn 
Saud told him, Let the Jewish, let the Jewish problem aside. 
Maybe. Maybe he talked with him and Roosevelt accepted it. 
Maybe. Maybe.46
It appears that something of this sort took place between Roosevelt
and Ibn Saud for the King makes mention of an agreement between
himself and the President aboard the ship in a letter to Truman.
. . .  we have been made aware lately, through the radio 
broadcasts, of a speech attributed to Your Excellency that 
you had searched through the papers of the late President, 
our dear friend, President Roosevelt, and that you were not 
successful in finding any confirmation of his talk with us 
regarding the Palestine question. We did not previously 
publish the subject discussed between us and the late 
President regarding this matter. However, in some 
particular cases, we did inform various heads of Arab 
States, concerning the conversation which took place on 
February 14,1945.. .47
This letter leaves room for speculation that President Roosevelt may 
have made a secret agreement with the King regarding the Palestine
<s Interview with Yitshak Shamir by Joanna Saidel, October 25, 1993, The 
Knessett, Jerusalem.
47 The King of Saudi Arabia (Abdul Aziz ibn Saud) to President Truman, 
October 2, 1945, Foreign Relations of the United States. 1945, Vol. vm , p. 755.
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In July 1946 Truman informed the King that the United States
wished to implement the admission of 100,000 Jewish refugees to
Palestine,48 despite urging from the King to the contrary.49 A polite
verbal battle ensued, through correspondence, between the King
and President Truman because of this demand for the admission of
the 100,000 Jews to Palestine.
The Government and people of the United States have given 
support to the concept of a Jewish National Home in 
Palestine ever since the termination of the first World War.
. .  It is only natural, therefore, that this Government should 
favor at this time the entry into Palestine of considerable 
numbers of displaced Jews in Europe. . .  It was my belief, to 
which I still adhere, and which is widely shared by the 
people of this country, that nothing would contribute more 
effectively to the alleviation of the plight of these Jewish 
survivors than the authorization of the immediate entry of 
at least 100,000 of them to Palestine.. .50
Prince Faisal, the son of Ibn Saud, was scheduled to see the 
President on December 13, 1946. The State Department sent a 
memorandum to the President advising him what to say to the 
Prince at this meeting. It was suggested that the President indicate 
his happiness over the continued harmonious relations between the 
United States and Saudi Arabia, and the development of Saudi oil
48 Letter from Truman to Ibn Saud, July 8, 1946, Official File, Truman Papers.
"Letter from Ibn Saud to Truman, May 24, 1946, Official File, Truman 
Papers.
“ Letter from President Truman to King Ibn Saud, October 28, 1946, Official 
File, Truman Papers.
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resources. It was also suggested that the President affirm  U.S. 
interests to modernize Saudi Arabia by the construction of harbors, 
roads, railroads, hospitals, and public utilities. Concerning Palestine, 
the President was advised to say “that the Jewish National Home in 
Palestine should be developed further”, and that he hoped and 
believed that this could be done “with the agreement of the Arabs 
and in a manner which will be satisfactory to all parties and which 
will safeguard existing rights and privileges.. . 51
While President Roosevelt may have felt compelled to accept 
the views of Ibn Saud regarding Palestine because of impending 
national security concerns which occupied him during the war, 
President Truman was not as restricted by these concerns. The war 
was over and, although oil and the Dahran base continued to be very 
important, he had more leeway to make his own decisions. Also 
political concerns on the part of the Saudis required them to be more 
pliable vis-'a-vis America. Principally, the King feared that the 
British were behind Transjordanian King Abdullah’s plan for a 
Greater Syria which might include Syria, Transjordan, Iraq, Lebanon 
and part of Palestine. The King wanted assurance that the American 
government would support him in the United Nations should the
51 Memorandum from the Department of State to the President, December 13, 
1946, President’s Secretary’s File, Truman Papers.
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events begin to materialize.52
On February 11 a ton secret message was received from  
Minister Childs in Jidda, transmitting a message just 
received from King Ibn Saud to the effect that the King had 
obtained definite information that the British Government 
was planning to have King Abdullah made ruler of Greater 
Syria. King Ibn Saud asked that the United States 
Government intervene in this matter immediately.. ,53
The Saudi Government became more dependent on the
support and security provided by the United States as time passed.
The same holds true for the State of Israel These two enemy states
found common ground in their mutual benefactor, America. A dual
policy emerged in which the United States made guarantees to both
nations, and simultaneously attempted to maintain a balance of
power in the region. During the Truman administration, due to Saudi
fears of possible aggression from the Hashemite Kingdoms of Jordan
and Iraq, the United States was allowed to upgrade its facilities at
Dharan, which it still commanded, into a very important strategic
ferrying base which became a part of a policy of containment against
the Soviet Union, and a defense for Saudi Arabia.
Harry Truman, who very publicly gave moral support to the 
creation of Israel, secretly made agreements for the first 
American military support to Saudi Arabia.
The strange path of U.S. policy in the Gulf had been 
set. American now supported two countries who openly 
opposed each other and followed often conflicting Mideast
“ Memorandum for the President from the Department of State, February 
18, 1947, President’s Secretary’s Files, Truman Papers.
63 Ibid, p. 1.
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positions.54
One may conclude therefore that the United States’ interest in 
Saudi Arabia, particularly in U.S. oil concessions and the Dharan 
base, could have been determining factors in the formation of 
President Roosevelt’s, and later President Truman’s, policy toward 
that country, and toward the Jewish and Palestine problems. For 
President Roosevelt the need for oil and air strip rights was a 
primary national security concern which overrode any consideration 
he may have had for the Jews. He thought that, to save the Jews, the 
United States needed to win the war through military power. Arthur 
Schlesinger Jr. believes that “FDR, more than any other person, 
deserves the credit for mobilizing the forces that destroyed Nazi 
barbarism.”55 Revisionist Zionists contend that the President could 
have done more to save the Jews while fighting the war in Europe.
“ The Secret Files: W ashington. Israel and the Onlf. WETA - TV Transcript 
#106, A ir Date: February 17,1992, p. 10.
65 Schlesinger, p. 14.




The practical work of the Irgun Delegation involved the 
financing and purchasing of vessels to transport fleeing Jewish 
refugees, and later D.P.’s, from Europe to Palestine. These purchases 
caused friction between Delegation members and the Irgun High 
Command, particularly Menachem Begin, who believed that such 
funds should be used at the m ilitary front rather than for the 
purchase of vessels. This controversy led to the deterioration of 
relations between the American and Palestinian branches of the 
Irgun.
During these days the Palestine question was turned over to 
the United Nations. It is possible that this was a deliberate move on 
the part of the British, who did not expect partition to be accepted by 
the international body. The Irgun Delegation and the Revisionists 
opposed partition. During the fight for a Jewish state Revisionist 
leader, Benzion Netanyahu, developed a relationship with State 
Department official, Loy Henderson. While Henderson has been 
portrayed as an opponent of Zionism, Netanyahu’s connection with 
him reveals another side to this storv.
By the fall of 1946 it was clear to the Irgun Delegation that
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their activities in America needed to intensify. Ben Hecht again took 
to his pen, writing play called A Flag is Born, which starred Marlon 
Brando on Broadway and which was sponsored in part by Eleanor 
Roosevelt. The play depicted the plight of the Jews of Europe, their 
desire for a homeland and the barriers of the British. It ended with 
Brando saying, “We promise to wrest our homeland out of British 
claws . . . the English have put a fence around the Holy Land. But 
there are three things they cannot keep out - the wind, the rain, and 
a Jew.”1 The London Evening Standard called it “the most virulent 
anti-British play ever staged in the United States.”2
The proceeds from Hecht’s play were used for two purposes. 
Part went to finance the work of the Irgun in Palestine. The rest was 
used to buy a ship, called the S’. S. Abril, for $38,000 at a 
government auction of surplus vessels. While the Irgun Delegation to 
the United States debated whether it was right to deprive the Irgun 
in Palestine of some of the funds, they decided that if the Irgun was 
not going to act to ship Jewish D.P.s to Palestine then the American 
League for a Free Palestine would. They formed the “Tyre Shipping 
Company” as a cover for the operation which was under FBI 
surveillance from the start.
Meanwhile, on October 31, 1946 the Jewish underground took
1 Ben Ami, p. 384.
2 Ibid.
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its first action against the British outside of Palestine. The bombing of 
the British Embassy in Rome made the point that the battle would 
no longer be limited to Palestine but that the Jewish underground 
would strike at British targets worldwide if necessary. This was 
followed by other operations against British bases in Austria and 
Germany where weapons and explosives were confiscated. The 
decision to carry the fight to Europe, and to attack the British on all 
fronts, was made and executed, for the most part by Lechi, with 
operations often under the direction of Yaacov Eliav.3
In November, 1946, Irgun Delegation leader, Peter Bergson 
(Hillel Kook), requested a meeting with President Truman. In 
correspondence from a Revisionist member, Fowler Harper, to the 
White House, Fowler reiterates the Bergson request. This letter to Mr. 
Charles Ross bears a hand written note beside Bergson’s name which 
says, “Bad actor, steer clear.”4
Bergson was unable to see the President, who, his secretary 
wrote, had been “so unusually busy” as “so many pressing problems 
have arisen.”5 Bergson did not give up. On December 24th he sent the 
President a case of Palestine wine in “the hope it might serve to
3 For a detailed account of the underground activities of Yaacov Eliav see, 
The Wanted.
4 Letter from Fowler Harper to Charles Ross, November 9, 1946, Truman 
Papers, Official File.
5 Letter of the President’s secretary, Matthew J. Connolly to Fowler Harper, 
Dec. 10, 1946, Truman Papers, Official File.
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assist the ushering in [of] the New Year.” Bergson said that having 
been “constrained” to approach the President in the past concerning 
the sordid aspects of Palestine it was now his pleasure to present the 
President with a “bit of Palestine and it not soaked with trouble.” He 
hoped that with pride and honor the Hebrew people would learn “of 
the President of the United States toasting the New Year with wine 
from the ancient hills of Judea.”6
Two days later, on December 26, 1946, there was an FBI raid 
of an Irgun ship. The raid yielded, not the arms that they had 
expected, but hundreds of lifebelts. The S. S. A b ril then left 
Brooklyn, New York for Marseilles.
In January 1947 British Foreign Minister, Ernest Bevin, stated 
his position on Palestine in a cabinet paper which he sent to Prime 
Minister Attlee. It said, “Without the Middle East and its o il... .[I see] 
no hope of being able to achieve the standard of living at which we 
were aiming in Great Britain.”7 His plan was to have Palestine replace 
Egypt as the headquarters for the Imperial Forces in the region. 
Thereby, the communications, oil supplies and the strategic 
geopositioning of the British would be maintained and protected.
On February 18th, the Palestine question was turned over to 
the United Nations. Britain, it was speculated, wanted to give the
6 Notes from a letter from Peter Bergson to President Truman, December 24, 
1946, Truman Papers, General File.
7 Ben Ami, p. 398.
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impression that it was tired of the situation and of the economic
burden that it entailed.
While supposedly giving up in despair, Bevin was actually 
trying to precipitate events that would permit Britain to 
create an Arab puppet state in Palestine. He guessed at the 
scenario: The Arab and communist block would oppose a 
partition resolution, while the United States stayed friendly 
to all concerned. Thus, partition would fail, and under 
British tutelage, the Arab majority of Palestine would be 
given control of the country and eventually rule it.8
Under Bevin’s plan the Jews would be relegated to small 
“cantons” in a plan similar to the Morrison-Grady Plan, which Bevin 
supported earlier. While Bevin publicly stated his support for the 
protection of Arab rights, he privately stressed British and American 
mutual geopolitical and economic reasons for backing the Pan- 
Arabists. “Bevin blamed American domestic politics for his troubles 
in Palestine.” 9
The Revisionists in America did not ease their pressure. 
American mainstream Zionist, Abba Hillel Silver, became more 
militant and demanding. In Britain, Weizmann vacillated and Ben 
Gurion agreed “to what amounted to an historic abdication from 
Zionism, and a retreat from his recent conversion to the goal of a 
Jewish Commonwealth.”10
6 Ibid.
9 Ibid, p. 398-399.
10 Ibid, p. 400.
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Although Loy Henderson has been perceived within Zionist 
circles to be anti - Zionist," the New Zionist Organization leader, 
Benzion Netanyahu, described an unknown side of the State 
Department official. After two years of campaigning the New Zionist 
Organization forced the mainstream Zionists to also take political 
action. Netanyahu, sometime during 1945 - 1946, joined the Zionist 
Organization. As a member he was forbidden to negotiate with 
governments. He, therefore, decided to negotiate informally and 
secretly. He had a connection, through a fellow associate named 
Kolitz, to the wife of an Under Secretary of War under President 
Wilson, a Mrs. Bolton, who was a very influential congresswoman. 
Netanyahu and Kolitz asked her to arrange for a gathering with Loy 
Henderson at her home. This was agreed upon and the dinner 
meeting took place. At that affair Professor Netanyahu was able to 
convince Henderson of the importance of the Zionist movement by 
presenting it in a global scenario. He was highly impressed and 
invited Netanyahu, who was a very eloquent and powerful speaker, 
to come to the State Department and repeat the story to Henderson’s 
associates. This was done.12
The intelligent and foresighted Revisionist spokesman had
11 See The Arabists bv Robert D. Kaplan and Truman Palestine and the Press 
by Bruce J. Evensen for more on this perception of Henderson.
12 Personal interview with Benzion Netanyahu, November 7, 1993, 
Jerusalem.
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envisioned a scenario which later proved to be true. Mr. Netanyahu 
predicted that the Middle East, after the war ended, would become 
an area of conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union. 
He believed that the Arabs would not be able to stop the Soviet 
advance and that the only true ally in the region would prove to be 
the Jewish state.13
Netanyahu and Henderson met numerous times after this. 
Their relationship opened many doors in the State Department, the 
Army and the Navy for Mr. Netanyahu. The congresswoman, Mrs. 
Bolton, was also able to open doors for him including arranging a 
meeting for him and Kolitz with General Eisenhower.14
Eisenhower was so impressed by Netanyahu that he asked him 
to speak directly to the General Wilson, head of the British Army, 
who was due to visit America. Eisenhower called Netanyahu 
personally to let him know the meeting had been scheduled. 
However, the day before the meeting Netanyahu received a call from 
Eisenhower’s office informing him that the Foreign Office had 
ordered Wilson not to attend the meeting. Eisenhower was very 
angry, believing that they were afraid to attend a meeting which 
would weaken and expose them.ls
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a meeting of the General Staff. This was very important to the 
Revisionist cause. It may have been the first time in Zionist history 
that Zionists had the opportunity to address a General Staff. 
Netanyahu had penetrated veiy far and deep to be able to reach 
Eisenhower and the inner circles of the administration.16
Loy Henderson also arranged for Netanyahu and Kolitz to meet 
with the Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, and later his replacement, 
Mr. Lovett. Later he arranged for Netanyahu to meet Mr. Bohlen, 
author of the Marshall Plan, and Arbor, the Under Secretary of 
State.17
Mr. Netanyahu may have been responsible for changing the 
view of the State Department. (When asked if in fact he did, Mr. 
Netanyahu replied, “Absolutely.”) Rather than seeing Palestine as a 
problem of the British, Jews and Arabs, Mr. Netanyahu was able to 
convince the State Department that it had much farther reaching 
importance. It was a global issue which needed to be dealt with at 
the highest levels. It was extremely important to the geopolitical and 
international political post war plans of America.18
The internal high level connections which Mr. Netanyahu 
developed may have been one of the most important parts of the 
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America. The results which he achieved working behind the scenes, 
as well as his public campaign against the British, were extremely 
important.
While Benzion Netanyahu worked behind the scenes, Hillel 
Kook tried to affect the American government in his own way. He 
cabled Truman from Paris to protest the British inaction concerning 
the transfer of Jews from German camps to Palestine. He urged the 
President to set up a commission which could carry out the policy. He 
also encouraged Truman to tell the British Government that unless 
they took action immediately the United States would no longer take 
part in any further discussion on Palestine.19
At the time Bergson sent this telegram he was in Paris. That 
city became the focal point for the activities of the HCNL. Kook 
(Bergson), Eri Jabotinsky and others worked out of the Lutetia Hotel. 
Yitshaq Ben Ami wrote that the Revisionists believed that France was 
“the best choice for a future government in exile.” The overwhelming 
view there “favored creating a Provisional Hebrew Government, with 
or without the Jewish Agency. The HCNL believed that such a de 
facto entity would put Britain on the political spot, elevating our 
“terrorism” to “National resistance,” and our battle would be given 
legitimacy in the eyes of the world.” 20
1B Papers of Harry S. Truman, General File, January 30, 1947.
20 Ben Ami, p. 395.
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Apparently the Irgun Delegation leader had contacted
Menachem Begin regarding this idea.
I know that Kook was urging Begin to agree to a provisional 
government. And the notion was they set a provisional 
government abroad . . .  And the notion was, of course, that 
if Begin couldn’t get out of the country then Kook would be 
the man to do it. Sure. And Begin would be here the head of 
the fighting force, you see. Now, this is really amusing 
because Begin was a political animal and I don’t think he 
knew one end of a revolver to the other, from the other 
(laughs).21
Irgun leader, Menachem Begin, however, rejected the plan by the
Irgun Delegation to the United States, particularly Kook (Bergson), to
set up a Provisional Government.
There will be the need for a government, and there will be 
the time to form it, and possibly even a constellation of 
events that w ill bring about declaring it - if  the Agency 
accepts a modified plan. Then events w ill bring together all 
opposing factions and create the entity that will lead the 
War for freedom and the integrity of the homeland . . .  To 
rush with such a decisive political step w ill be to destroy 
that edifice before it is bu ilt22
France was the country of choice for Zionist underground 
operations as the government there was quite sympathetic. Lechi 
leader, Yaacov Eliav said, “we were given a free hand on condition 
that our operations emanated not directly from France but from 
neighboring countries, in order not to implicate France in a
21 Interview with Shmuel Katz by Joanna Saidel, November 1993, Tel Aviv.
”  Letter from Menachem Begin to Yitshaq Ben Ami, Ben Ami, p. 424.
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diplomatic conflict with England.”23
In Paris plans were made to consolidate Irgun activities 
worldwide. Strategies were laid out for the formation of an aviation 
school, for the acquisition of explosives, weapons and bases for 
operations and supplies.
Kook and Ben Ami went to Paris. Perhaps they wanted to 
oversee the activities of their ship, the S. S. Abril, which had arrived 
in Marseilles. On February 28, 1947 it took 620 Jewish immigrants 
aboard. It was renamed the S. S. Ben Hecht. Sailing under the 
Honduran flag, with its announced destination Bolivia, it made its 
way toward Palestine. On March 8, 1947 it was intercepted by two 
British destroyers. The passengers of the “illegal” ship were arrested 
and brought to a detention camp on Cyprus.
The American League for a Free Palestine had manned the ship 
with an American crew. They used this point to repudiate the British 
actions, again launching an advertising campaign to arouse public 
emotions.
Britain waives the rules! British jail American seamen in 
Palestine. Who is breaking what law? These men fought 
alongside the British in W. W. II. Still fighting for freedom, 
they ran the Ben Hecht through the Royal Navy’s illegal 
Palestine blockade. They were seized. Their crime: “Aiding 
and abetting illegal immigration” - the British say. Did the 
Ben Hecht crew violate the international pact of fifty-two 
nations? Or did they effectively fulfill President Truman’s
23 Eliav, p. 239!
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repeated demand that Palestine’s gates be opened “at 
once”?24
Having Irgun ships fly under foreign flags was another of the
methods used by the Irgun Delegation to the United States. They also
bought consulates.
There was the question when the war was over how to get 
the people from the camps and train them m ilitarily how to 
get the boats, etcetera. And this was the field (in) which I 
was active too. It was a complicated matter because we 
had to go to various South American states and buy 
consulates; you know this kind of a trick business, buying 
consulates and issuing visas in order that the Jews from  
Hungary, Poland, Rumania should be able to come to France 
or Italy and take, from there, a boat - because France and 
Italy would not permit them to enter on a transit visa unless 
they had a final destination. So our job was to get to all those 
ten of thousands of Jews a final destination visa like for 
instance Honduras, Nicaragua, Guatemala, San Salvador, what 
have you. And then we had visas for which we had to 
guarantee that the Jews would never come there based on 
this visa. We were able to receive French or Italian transit 
visas and from there take them on the boat. And so there 
were things without end. There was not only airplanes there 
were these things too.25
In March, Congressmen Hugh D. Scott (Penn.) and John D. 
Dingell (Mich.) protested the British arrests of Americans on the ship 
operated by the Irgun Delegation. Amidst such agitation the British 
released the crew and flew them back to New York. The American 
League for a Free Palestine welcomed them home at a reception at
24 Ben Ami, p. 407.
25 Interview with Dr. Alex Raphaeli, by Joanna Saidel, June 1993.
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the Hotel Astor where Ben Hecht effectively stated the case of the
Irgun and the released Americans.
Today there are only two Jewish parties left in the field; the 
terrorists and the terrified. You can dismiss the second party 
as a political force.. .  These lads are Americans. . .  the same 
sort of Americans who kept the lifeline to the British Isles 
open . . .  It was an American boat, bought with American 
money. There is no Hebrew navy yet. There is no Hebrew 
nation in Palestine yet. There are no victories yet - there is 
only this: the air is clearing around a flag . . .  victory is in us 
- and there is light ahead.26
In Palestine the Irgun bombed the British officer’s club in 
Jerusalem and, on March 21, Lechi set the oil refineries at Haifa on 
fire.27 In May they attacked Acre prison, freeing 29 key Lechi and 
Irgun men. Nine others died. Five were arrested. The British 
government responded by hanging seven Irgun and Lechi men. The 
Irgun reciprocated, hanging two British sergeants.28
In America Ben Hecht was recovering from surgery. From his
hospital bed he wrote “A Letter to the Terrorists of Palestine.”
My brave friends - you may not believe what I write . .  .but 
on my word as an old reporter, what I write is true. The 
Jews of America are for you. You are their champion. . . 
Every time you blow up a British arsenal, or wreck a British 
jail, or send a British railroad train sky high, or rob a 
British bank, or let go with your guns or bombs at the 
British betrayers and invaders of your homeland, the Jews 
of America make a little holiday in their hearts.29
28 Ben Ami, p. 408.
27 Hiav, p. 221, 222.
28 Encyclopedia Judaica, vol. 9, p. 359.
29 Ben Ami, p. 414.
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Hecht contrasted this portrait of the Revisionists and Irgun 
supporters with that of mainstream Zionists, whom he characterizes 
as cowards.
Unfortunately, the heads of nearly all the Jewish 
organizations whom the American newspapers call “The 
Jewish leaders” are against you. Every time you throw a 
punch at the British betrayers of your homeland, nearly all 
these Jews have a collective conniption fit. They rush in 
waving white handkerchiefs and alibis. They didn’t do it - 
not they! Respectable people don’t fight They gabble..."
Hecht closed by stating his opinion on the United Nations proceedings
concerning the fate of Palestine.
Right now, all the responsibility of the Jews is handsomely 
engaged in cooing before the United Nations. The British put 
the matter . . .  up to the United Nations because they are 
frightened of you . . . [they] figured the sound of gabble 
before a world court would drown out the sound of Hebrew 
guns in Palestine. It has not and it won’t!31
This letter was run as an ad in newspapers across the United 
States, in Mexico, Canada, South America and France. “The British and 
the Jewish Establishment were apoplectic. In the United Kingdom, 
Hecht was blacklisted, while in Palestine, the Irgun distributed his 
message to the population at large.” 32
The opinion of Ben Hecht was shared by other Irgun members.
30 ibid, p. 414.
31 Ibid, p. 415.
32 Ibid.
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Eliahu Lankin, commander of the Irgun in the Diaspora and 
commander of the ship, Altalena, wrote, “. . .  constant references to 
the underground’s war with the British had captured the 
imagination of the American press.. .”33
As a commander of the Irgun in the Diaspora Lankin operated 
out of Paris. He was financed “mainly from the Hebrew Committee 
for National Liberation, which,” Lankin writes, “had developed a 
comprehensive propaganda operation in the United States and had 
raised substantial amounts of money for their work there.” 34
Menachem Begin was angry with the Irgun Delegation in 
America which he believed were diverting funds from the revolt in 
Palestine to less important aspects of the movement. To delegation 
member, Ben Ami, he stressed, “I’m not a fatalist. Only one thing will 
decide the fate of Eretz-Israel - the armed resistance. . .  which needs 
funds and which should have been forthcoming from you during the 
past year, but have not.” 35
He was further outraged by the American independent action 
concerning the purchasing of more ships and of the failure of Yitshaq 
Ben Ami to deliver $100,000 which he had promised to raise for the 
Irgun in Palestine. Begin bitterly attacked the activities of the Irgun
33 Eliahu Lankin, To Win the Promised land: Storv of a Freedom Fighter, p. 
303.
34 Ibid, p. 212.
35 Ben Ami, p. 425.
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Delegation.
Pm enraged to think that the Irgun delegates are not 
coming across with all possible help. . .  which we must have 
to widen our battle. . .we lost repeated opportunities to 
purchase weapons. . .  actions were canceled because of the 
lack of funds - and only because of that.. .
These miserable funds mean arms, safe havens for 
our men, printing our message.. .  $550,000 for two vessels! 
With such an amount in our hands, we could organize ‘a 
small revolution . . .’I must conclude with one simple 
statement - everything, but everything for the front line!36
Begin was not the only Irgun member who was angry at the
Irgun Delegation to the United States. Others resented the fact that
the first ship to be purchased with their funds was named after Ben
Hecht rather than after Ze’ev Jabotinsky. Eliahu Lankin, who
commandeered the Altalena wrote
The Ben Hecht had been named in honor of the American 
playwright who was a stalwart supporter of the Hebrew 
Committee in America and the Jewish underground in Eretz 
Israel. No doubt that he deserved to be honored in any 
project connected with illegal immigration. But the Hebrew 
Committee should have first acknowledged the debt of all 
Zionists and Jews the world over to the memory of 
Jabotinsky, who devoted his life to the struggle for the 
establishment of the Jewish State and who, during the last 
few years of his life, urged massive evacuation of the Jews 
from East Europe.37
May 15, 1947 marked the formation of the United Nations 
Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP). The General Assembly
“ ibid.
37 Lankin, p. 260-261.
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gave UNSCOP “the widest powers to ascertain and record facts, and to 
investigate all questions and issues relevant to the problem of 
Palestine.” On the day that UNSCOP diplomats arrived in Palestine 
the British sentenced five members of the Jewish underground to 
death. “The resentment and dismay of Jews in Palestine colored the 
committee’s entire tour.”38
Ralph Bunche, an influential committee member, met with 
Menachem Begin in his hideout near the Mediterranean. Bunche was 
moved by the plight of the Jews and told Begin, “I can understand 
you. I am also a member of a persecuted minority.” Bunche was an 
African-American. “A wise Negro can never be an anti-Semite,” he 
said.39
In July of 1947 another incident occurred which had a 
profound effect on world public opinion and which bolstered the 
image of the Irgun in America and worldwide. The famous ship 
Exodus 1947 , with 4,500 refugees aboard was forced, upon arrival at 
the port of Haifa in Palestine, to return to its French port of 
departure. When the refugees refused to disembark the British took 
the boat to Hamburg where the people on board were forced to get 
off and were returned to German soil.40 Hillel Kook immediately
38 Peter Grose, Israel in the Mind of America, p. 234.
39 Ibid, p. 235.
40 Encyclopedia Judaica, vol. 9, p. 359.
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cabled the President concerning the Exodus. He urged the President 
to take action against the British. Kook stated that he had been in 
Germany on the day the ship left, full of survivors, including 
hundreds of children. He wrote that the behavior of the British was 
contemptible, and appealed again to the United States for 
repatriation of the D.P.’s and cessation of direct negotiations with the 
British government.41
On August 12th the American Jewish Labor Council contacted 
the President regarding a story which appeared in the Cleveland 
Plain Dealer eight days earlier. The story asserted that the minister 
from Syria, Faiz el-Khouri, had stated that “President Truman told me 
recently that he was tired of the Jews with their Zionism.” Was it 
possible that the President would make such a statement? This was 
the question posed in the letters from Leo Sack of the American 
Zionist Emergency Council42
Charles Ross, secretary to the President, suggested that the 
State Department should handle the situation which had offended the 
Zionists. He wrote that “El-Khouri, after being quizzed by the 
reporter, Bryan, says that President Truman had not used those exact 
words he quoted. In other words, the President might have said that
41 Cable from Bergson to Truman dated July 23,1947, Truman Papers,
General File.
42 Memorandum from Charles G. Ross, Secretary to the President, to David 
Niles asking what should be done about the incident; Truman Papers, Official 
File, August 18, 1947.
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he was tired of this Palestine problem and hoped it could have been 
solved.. .  The President should not get in any controversy with El- 
Khouri. He could deny it, of course, if it came up at the Press 
conference.”43
President Truman had perhaps, become increasingly irritated 
by the pressure which the Jews put upon him. “According to the 
diaries of Henry Wallace, at a period of particular pressure he 
exclaimed at a cabinet meeting in mid-1946, “If Jesus Christ couldn’t 
satisfy them here on earth, how the hell am I supposed to?” He 
added later, “I have no use for them and I don’t care what happens 
to them.”44
The day after the release of the El-Khouri statement Abba 
Hillel Silver contacted the President’s secretary, Matthew Connolly in 
a cable in which Silver said, “. . .  Would be most happy to hear from 
you. I will be [at the] Commodore Hotel, New York City beginning 
Thursday noon, Sailing Saturday morning, Best Wishes.. . ”
Below this telegram was handwritten, apparently by Connolly, 
a big, double-underlined, word NO! 45 It appears that there was
continued hostility between Silver and Connolly, which was reflected
43 Memorandum: David Niles to Charles Ross, August 19,1947, Truman 
Papers, Official File.
44 Steven L. Spiegel, The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict: Making America’s
Middle East Policy, from Truman to Reagan, p. 20.
46 Telegram from Silver to Connolly, August 13,1947, Truman Papers,
Official File.
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in their correspondence.46
Silver was now taking a more militant stand than Ben-Gurion. 
An Irgun delegation member said, “Silver admitted to us that the 
Irgun was having ‘a more successful psychological effect’ on the 
British and world opinion than the Haganah.”47 Menachem Begin 
also stated that Silver told him, “The Irgun will go down in history 
as a factor without which the State of Israel would not have come 
into being.”48
Hillel Kook cabled the President again on August 23,1947 
when the British Government attempted to move 4400 Jews to 
Hamburg. Kook charged that such action violated the spirit of the 
Allied cause as well as the Potsdam Agreement.49
As the battle heated up over Palestinian Statehood President 
Truman found himself in a whirlwind of controversy. While 
espousing a global policy of “containment” he was also concerned 
with regional implications, particularly oil concerns, as well as with 
the actual situation in Palestine.
Those opposing Jewish Statehood were found particularly
48 Abba Hillel Silver to Matthew J. Connolly, Secretary to the President, 
August, 15,1947, Truman Papers Official File.
47 Ben Ami, p. 419.
48 Menachem Begin, The Revolt, p.316.
48 Cable from Bergson to Truman, August 23, 1947, Truman Papers, Official 
File.
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within the State Department. They feared that American relations 
with the Arabs and with the Moslem world would be irreparably 
damaged. They believed that such alienation was not affordable since 
Europe depended upon Arab oil which was essential to the Marshall 
Plan. American oil companies in the Near East would be hurt. The 
State Department also urged Truman to resist his desire to help the 
Jews because of the need for U.S. military access to the area and, 
particularly, to the base at Dharan in Saudi Arabia. It was feared by 
Truman’s Defense Secretary, James Forrestal, that an energy crises 
would result and create the need for four cylinder motor cars in 
America. It was also feared by the State Department that the 
Palestine problem would become a permanent irritant in 
international politics, to which the United States would continually 
have to contribute both financially and militarily. It was also 
believed by the opponents of Statehood that a Jewish State was 
contradictory to American ideals of concerning self determination as 
well as being in contradiction to the United Nations charter. It was 
felt that increased tensions between Jews and Gentiles would result 
in the United States. Further concerns emphasized the possibility of 
growing extremism in the Arab world and even Arab alliance with 
the Soviet Union.50
Pro-Zionists argued that partition was the fairest solution. Both
50 Spiegel, p. 26.
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the Arabs and the Jews would have a state, while the holy sites in 
Jerusalem would be protected by international law. The Jewish 
refugee problem would be solved as well.sl
Truman hoped that the United Nations would be able to resolve
the problem without his personal involvement. He waited for the
UNSCOP report before finally endorsing the plan for partition. When
he eventually decided to sign on the State Department was not
happy. Representatives of their department stated that
Probably no American President has ever disregarded 
expert advise so thoroughly and with such relish. In acting 
to establish and later to support the Jewish State in 
Palestine, Truman ignored the objections of his Secretary of 
Defense, James Forrestal, and three of his Secretaries of 
State: James Byrnes, General George Marshall, and Dean 
Acheson.52
The Irgun Delegation and the New Zionist Organization were 
firm ly opposed to partition. In October, 1947, the Irgun’s 
mouthpiece, “The Voice of Fighting Zion,” warned that if the U.N. 
decided to partition Palestine it would not provide an international 
force to implement the action, that the British would evacuate the 
area but retain a blockade by sea, leaving the Jews defenseless and 
unable to receive reinforcements or arms. On November 16, 1947, 
“The Voice” broadcasted another warning to Jews in Palestine. It
61 ibid.
“ Richard H. Curtis, A Chanping Tmagp; A m priran  Perceptions of the Arab- 
Israeli Dispute, p. 26.
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warned the public of harboring three false illusions. First, that the
partition would be implemented by peaceful means; second, that if
war broke out in Eretz Israel, the United Nations representatives in
Jerusalem would restore peace; and, third, that if the United Nations
representatives failed in their mission the Security Council would
intervene to stop the war.53
It is essential that the people be called upon to prepare 
themselves for war and not for repose . . .The creation of 
even this ghetto inside our Homeland will be carried out 
amid flames.. and rivers of blood.54
On Saturday, November 27 the United Nations voted thirty- 
three to thirteen in favor of partitioning Palestine into two states, an 
Arab State and a Jewish State. The State Department immediately 
called for a U.S. embargo on weapons to the Middle East. On 
November 30,1947, the “Voice of Fighting Zion” said, “The partition 
of the Homeland is illegal. .  .Jerusalem was and will be forever our 
capital. . .  In the war that is surely coming . . .  all the Jewish forces 
will be united.” 55
During the next two weeks members of the Zionist movement 
congratulated President Truman and thanked him for “the great 
support” which he had given to the cause. Abba Hillel Silver wrote,
53 Ben Ami, p. 429.
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid.
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“You have won a place of distinction in Jewish history.”56
Steven Wise congratulated David Niles. “. . .  Did you happen to 
see my telegram — one of thousands—that went to the “Boss”? It 
is his achievement and vou helped. With love and gratitude, Yours, 
Stephen.”57
While mainstream Zionists were congratulating the President, 
Hillel Kook (Bergson) was pressing him to take certain steps to 
prevent imminent tragedy regarding the Palestine situation.58 With 
the outbreak of fighting in Palestine, the State Department remained 
Britain’s steadfast supporter. The U.S. Consulate General in Jerusalem 
issued a warning to all American citizens that taking part in the 
fighting would cause them to lose their United States passports.59
Even mainstream Zionists were outraged by this measure. On 
January 24, 1948 Dr. Israel Goldstein, acting chairman of the 
American Zionist Emergency Council, sent a cable to the President in 
which he wrote, “Distressed and shocked by report of State 
Department instructions to the American Consul-General in 
Jerusalem to withdraw passports and threatening to withdraw the 
citizenship of Americans volunteering to help in the defense of the 
Jewish community against Arab attacks undertaken in defiance of
58 Cable from Abba Hillel Silver to Harry Truman, December 1,1947, Papers 
of Harry Truman, General File.
57 Wise to Niles, December 5, 1947, Papers of David Niles, Truman Library.
68 Bergson to Truman, December 5,1947, Truman Papers, Official File.
59 Ben Ami, p. 430.
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United Nations decision. It is incomprehensible that our government 
which took a leading part in bringing about the United Nations 
decision should now contemplate punitive measures against those 
who uphold the policy of the United Nations and of the United States. 
Such action by the State Department would be contrary to the best 
American traditions. . 60 Dr. Goldstein requested the President to 
intervene and rescind the State Department actions.
The State Department also ordered the Treasury to conduct 
another investigation of Jewish activities to see if  funds were being 
raised in the United States to “smuggle Jewish emigrants unlawfully 
into Palestine.” 61 The Hebrew Committee for National Liberation had 
in fact purchased another ship to smuggle Jewish refugees into 
Palestine. The 4500 ton U.S. Navy landing craft, classified as an LST, 
was designed for amphibious invasions to land tanks and men. It 
was decided to name the ship after Ze’ev Jabotinsky. It was given 
Jabotinsky’s pen name from his days in journalism, the Altalena . 
Members of the Hebrew Committee in the United States formed the 
Three Star Line shipping company as a cover for the Altalena. Funds 
were lacking however, and the Committee was unable to sail her to 
Europe. In the meantime the ship was used as a tramp freighter,
80 Dr. Israel Goldstein to President Truman, Truman Papers, General File, 
January 24,1948
81 Ben Ami, p. 430.
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flying the Panam anian flag.62 It hauled potatoes from New Brunswick 
to Virginia, then went from Virginia to Florida to haul lumber. During 
the winter of 1947-1948 the Altalena visited ports in Cuba, Italy, 
France and Casablanca before returning to the United States. Hillel 
Kook wanted to put the ship at the disposal of the Jewish Agency 
(Haganah) so that it could be used to transport 6000 refugees to 
Palestine and be anchored at Tel Aviv by the time of the British 
withdrawal from Palestine on February 1, 1948. Ben Ami would not 
agree with this plan. However, by February control of the Altalena 
was transferred to the Irgun while U.S. Revisionists remained 
responsible for the financial details. In March 1948, Eliahu Lankin 
assumed command and organized a 5000 man fighting force to bring 
arms to Palestine.
That month Kook petitioned President Truman to arm the Jews 
so that American forces would not have to be sent to Palestine to 
quell the fighting. The Irgun Delegation leader requested “100 small 
airplanes, 250 armored cars and light tanks, 120 small and medium 
pieces of anti-aircraft and field artillery, 10,000 light and heavy 
machine guns, 20,000 rifles, 2,000 jeeps, trucks and other transport, 
3 corvettes or similar coastal naval craft and ammunition for the 
above arms.”63 Kook offered to pay for the material on a cash - and -
62 Lankin, p. 260-263.
63 Summary of a letter from Bergson to the President, March 27, 1948, 
Truman Papers, General File
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carry basis.
The Irgun’s Altalena was loaded with arms on the French coast,
with the complicity of the French government. It was going to carry
one of the largest arms shipments ever to be shipped to Palestine.
Supposedly, an agreement had been reached between the Irgun and
Ben Gurion’s Haganah in which eighty per cent of the weapons would
be delivered to the Haganah and twenty per cent retained by the
Irgun. However, when the ship arrived on the coast of Palestine it
was blown up by the Haganah.
Altalena was also an operation organized by this group of 
Hillel Kook in France. And especially by a man who worked 
with this group by the name of Ariel, Shmuel A riel.. .  Ariel 
had excellent relations with the French government. And by 
his connections with the French Arm y,. . . especially with 
the French Foreign Minister, George Bideau.. .  he concluded 
on behalf of the Irgun, a treaty with the French government 
for cooperation, cooperation with the aim of supporting the 
establishment of a Jewish state in Israel. And the first 
operation in this direction was the organization of this ship, 
A lta lena . It was a ship, a rescue ship, with some few 
thousands of Jewish refugees, young refugees, who have 
been interested to come to Israel and serve in the Israeli 
army in this war with the Arabs. And the French army 
decided to give it a pretty large quantity of arms. This was 
Altalena.64
When asked if there was a deal made between the Irgun and 
Ben Gurion former Israeli Prime Minister, Shamir, replied
84 Interview with Yitshak Shamir by Joanna Saidel, October 25, 1993, the
Knessett, Jerusalem.
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ambiguously.
Yes. Yes. But the initiative was of this group. Ariel, Hillel Kook, all 
these people. But Begin, here in Israel, informed the government 
that we will bring such a ship to Tel Aviv in the next few weeks 
or months and.. .  they made a bargain about giving. . .  a part of 
the arms, for Jerusalem. . .  because Jerusalem was not yet a part 
of the State of Israel. According to the United Nations decisions 
Jerusalem was designed to be an international city. And 
therefore the Irgun proposed to the Israeli government, it was 
the provisional government at this time, to give the greater part 
of arms to the army, to the existing army, Zahal, as we call it. 
And the part of it, twenty per cent or so, for Jerusalem. The 
government agreed or not agreed? It’s not clear yet. It’s not 
clear. Because there have been talks with, not with Ben Gurion 
himself, the talks have been with various emissaries of Ben 
Gurion, that was Galali, and there were others. And before the 
ship arrived here, on the beach of Netanyah, Ben Gurion changed 
his mind and asked the Irgun to give up to the army, to give to 
the army, all the arms! The ship with all the arms, with all the 
contents of the ship! And well, the people (who) have been with 
Begin have not agreed and therefore came this confrontation. 
That’s i t . . .  Well, it was a tragedy. It was a tragedy. It could be 
avoided.65
Former Irgun commander and, later, foreign affairs advisor to
Menachem Begin, Shmuel Katz, stated that not only did Ben Gurion
know all about the agreement but that he attacked the ship
specifically to get rid of Menachem Begin.
Oh! No question. He knew all about it . . . Look. I have 
written in my book, Davs of Fire. . . I wrote deliberately 
that the Altalena was blown up not because we had so many 
ships, we could do with one ship less, but because Mr. Ben 
Gurion wanted to kill Begin who was on the ship. And so I 
expected to be sued or to be tried for libel. . . There were
66 Ibid.
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some secret meetings in which I was attacked but nobody 
came forth to say this is libel, this is slander. And the fact is 
that I explained why I thought so.. .  It wasn’t such a great 
ship. It was the best thing we had. It was offered to the 
government, it wasn’t to say that we were going to use it 
further. The idea was to bring i t . . .  this was part of the 
original agreement with them .. .  Once it was taken off (the 
eighty percent), the ship would be presented to the 
government. . .  I have no doubt about it, as I said I wrote 
about it. There was nobody else on board. The, all of the 
people except for a handful, and they were killed by the 
way, I think sixteen boys were killed on that ship, had been 
taken o ff.. .  Nobody knows whether we got all the arms off 
at Kfar Vitkin, because that is where we brought the arms. 
Why did Altalena come to Kfar Vitkin? It wasn’t an Irgun 
center. We wanted to bring the boat to Tel Aviv and get a 
whole lot of Irgun people to help unload it. But the agree­
ment with the Haganah said, No. Kfar Vitkin, which was a 
center of the Labor party.66
Shmuel Katz was in Paris when the Altalena was on its way to
Palestine. He was in charge of monitoring the progress of the vessel.
I’d remained responsible for the Altalena on its way to 
Palestine but we lost all contact because our radio didn’t 
work. . .  I was supposed to . . .  remain in Paris and be the 
contact man with the Altalena. But our radio transmitter 
didn’t work . . . (laughs) So we didn’t have contact with 
anybody!67
While the Irgun considered the loss of the Altalena to be a
tragedy some Labor leaders were quite pleased. Abba Eban believes
that the action taken by Ben Gurion consolidated power.
The international effects were certainly beneficial because 
the fight then was Israel had already been established as a 
” Interview with Shmuel Katz by Joanna Saidel, Nov. 1993, Tel Aviv.
87 Ibid.
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state but the problem of recognition was very sticky. And 
one of the arguments against was that there was no proof 
that the provisional government of Israel, as we then called 
it, really had authority, or full authority, and Ben Gurion ‘s 
action was really related to the need to secure a minimal 
degree of recognition with which to live in the international 
context. You cannot live as, simply as a state with no 
international connections, and he asserted really the 
sovereignty of Israel. And it was one of his most dramatic, 
one of his most courageous, but also one of his most, I would 
say, poignious actions and after that the provisional 
government of Israel became respected as the government 
of Israel because you can’t be a government unless you have 
a monopoly of violence. Once you have two armies in a 
country then that means that neither of them can be a 
government. It becomes a Lebanon with militias like now. 
And his logic was that unless you have the army under a 
single jurisdiction you couldn’t honestly say that you were a 
state. Now, he even applied that unto his own camp because 
he also went on and he liquidated the separate Palmach. In 
other words his obsession with a unified Israel defense force 
took him into combat both the left and the right. To the right 
against what he called the Porishim, the seceders, and to the 
left to the Palmach.68
Mr. Katz vehemently disagrees with Abba Eban’s analysis.
Ben Gurion’s authority in the State was not consolidated 
because the Altalena was blown up. He was a Prime Minister 
after all and nobody was attacking his authority. What Abba 
Eban may have been hinting at is his acceptance of the idea 
that we had . . . that the Altalena was an act of rebellion 
against the provisional government which was nonsense! We 
had an agreement with them. No. You see Abba Eban is a 
pathological liar. He always was. And if you were to bring 
Mr. Abba Eban here I would tell him, maybe he doesn’t 
know. He’s a liar. He’s dishonest and he’s a terrific blower to
88 Telephone interview with Abba Eban by Joanna Saidei, September 1993, 
from New York.
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his own trumpet.69
Menachem Begin survived the Altalena and was, heroically, 
one of the last people off the ship before it blew up. He refused to 
leave until his men had gone first. The commander of the vessel, 
Eliahu Lankin, described the incident. He said that amidst the 
unabating storm of bullets and mortar fire Begin refused to leave the 
wounded whom he had been tending on board. When Lankin 
commanded him to disembark, saying, “I am the commander of this 
ship and I demand that you go ashore at once,” Begin replied, “Eliahu 
. .  .What’s come over you? Very well, I’ll get off as soon as we attend 
to the wounded. Now calm down.”70
The decision of the Irgun Delegation to purchase vessels with 
money raised in the United States had caused animosity between 
them and the Irgun High Command in Palestine. Menachem Begin 
remained angry that such astronomical amounts were being spent 
for a few vessels, still believing that he could finance a small 
revolution with such a sum. Begin was also disturbed by plans of the 
Irgun Delegation to set up a provisional government in the diaspora. 
This appeared to be a challenge to his authority. Ironically, Begin 
ended up on one of the Irgun Delegation ships, the Altalena, and 
according to his personal advisor, became the primary target of Ben
SB Interview with Shmuel Katz by Joanna Saidel, November 1993, Tel Aviv.
70 Lankin, p. 340.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
239
Gurion in the Haganah action to blow up the ship at Kfar Vitkin.
While the Irgun Delegation focused on rescue, they were also 
highly involved in action to stop partition and to promote statehood. 
The Revisionist Zionists, particularly Benzion Netanyahu, were also 
relentless in this pursuit. Mr. Netanyahu was able to penetrate the 
highest offices of the land by his convincing scenario which took the 
Palestine problem out of the regional arena and placed it on the 
world agenda. This was extremely important to the change in 
thinking of certain State Department officials, particularly Loy 
Henderson. By pursuing this approach Netanyahu was able to 
address General Eisenhower, and thereby gain access to other sources 
which became available to him.
The steadfast work of a few individuals, the Revisionist, 
Netanyahu, and the Irgun Delegation leaders, Kook, Raphaeli, Ben 
Ami, Eliezer and Merlin, and those who supported these leaders, 
made remarkable progress in bringing the Jewish plight to the 
attention of the nation. Their contributions positively affected the 
final decision on statehood.
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CHAPTER 8
REUBEN HECHT: THE EUROPEAN CONTACT
The archives of Dr. Reuben Hecht (1909-1993) are important to 
the study of Revisionist Zionism in America because they show, 
clearly, the place which that group held in the overall scheme of 
Jewish efforts to save victims of the Holocaust Hecht’s papers point 
to a major lacuna in the historiography of attempts made to rescue 
Jews from the Holocaust. The scholarly literature on the subject has 
been dominated by a tendency to emphasize the rescue efforts 
undertaken by the “establishment” Jewish and Zionist groups, such as 
the Jewish Agency, the Institute for Illegal Immigration, and the 
American Joint Distribution Committee, and not those of their rivals, 
the “dissident” organizations.1
Reuben Hecht (not to be confused with Ben Hecht) was the 
European representative of the Irgun Delegation to the United States 
headed by Hillel Kook (Peter Bergson). Hecht was instrumental in 
organizing, with Dr. Willi Perl, the Sakarya refugee ship which 
brought more than 2,000 refugees to Palestine in 1940.
In 1944 Hecht came in contact with the American Consul 
General, Samuel Edison Woods, who introduced Hecht to Jitschak and
’ Introduction, Archives of the Holocaust . Hecht Arrhive-Universitv of 
Haifa, p. ix.
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Recha Stembuch. The Stembuch’s acted as the European executive of 
the Emergency Rescue Committee (Vaad ha-Hatzalah) which was an 
offshoot of the Union of Orthodox Rabbis of the United States and 
Canada (the Agudah). Reuben Hecht became the only Zionist, non- 
Orthodox member of the Sternbuch group. He worked intimately 
with them to effect rescue missions, acquire intelligence and 
establish contacts in Europe. This work had far reaching results, 
actually affecting the perceptions of Heinrich Himmler, Reichsfuhrer 
SS2.
A remarkable aspect of the activist Zionists was their ability, 
because of their intense convictions, to produce results with an 
exceptionally small number of individuals. What Ben Hecht was able 
to do in America through his ad campaign, Reuben Hecht 
complimented in Europe through his total dedication to the Zionist 
cause. He forsook his family fortune and business, enduring the 
wrath of his father (who later stated that Reuben had been correct), 
in order to further his convictions.
Hecht was born in Antwerp in 1909, the elder of two sons of 
the prosperous Jacob Hecht, founder of the second largest shipping 
company on the Rhine. Before the War (c. 1933-1934) Hecht worked 
in Paris as a volunteer in the office of the Revisionist World
2 The Kastner war trial revealed that Hecht and the Sternbuch group 
believed that Himmler would agree to a deal to trade Jews for easier post-war 
treatment of Himmler.
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Executive, under Jabotinsky. There Hecht proposed a World
Organization of State Academicians, “which means of students and
faculty members, and so on, all people who are in the academic life,
who are on the political line to create a State.”3 As an emblem for
this group Hecht proposed the Yellow Badge, which Herzl had
designated as “our highest order.” Jabotinsky approved of the
emblem, wore it, and named it “Yavneh VeTodefet” Hecht explained
the meaning, “Yavneh is then spirit. Yodefet was the last fortress of
Bar Kochba (leader of the Jewish revolt against Rome, 132-135 C.E.).
. .  The last fortress. That means a combination of the Yeshiva at that
time, of the intellectual Jewish spirit, and of the forces of defense.” 4
In the late 1930’s Hecht had played a direct role in the
propaganda efforts of the Irgun Delegation.
I was mainly involved in public relations, which means to 
make political propaganda and diplomacy. I was involved to 
help the ideas of our illegal radio station, I proposed such 
things, they were afterwards made, different kinds of 
putting the idea of the Irgun and of Jabotinsky’s movement 
and the Hebrew Committee as a Jewish national revival for a 
State clearly to the non-Jewish and also to the Jewish 
masses.s
Later, during the War years, Dr. Hecht came in contact with 
Samuel Edison Woods, “the most successful U.S. intelligence gatherer
3 Interview of Dr. Reuben Hecht by Prof. Penkover , January 7, 1982, Haifa, 
Israel, Archives of the Holocaust . Hecht Archive-Universitv of Haifa. Dor. 7, p . 
449.
4 Ibid, p. 449-450.
5 Ibid, p. 468-469.
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of World War II,” and developed a close personal relationship with 
him.6 Woods was the American Consul General, based in Berlin from 
1937 to 1941 and in Zurich from 1941 to 1945. There he and Hecht 
collaborated to rescue Allied airmen and to coordinate efforts to 
rescue Jews. The primary advantage of this relationship for the 
Revisionist Zionists in America was that it provided direct contact 
between the Revisionists and the White House. The general method 
of communication had been to transmit information through the 
official intelligence center in Bern. This office was headed by Allen 
Dulles who opposed the Zionists. Samuel Woods had a brother in the 
cabinet of Franklin D. Roosevelt. Woods was able to directly transmit 
reports to Roosevelt by a special code which the President personally 
enciphered. These transmissions included reports on the expulsion of 
Jews from Switzerland, on the conditions of Jews in concentration 
camps, and suggestions for the rescue of Jews from Hungary and 
Bulgaria.
Hecht’s work with the Stembuchs resulted in the recruitment 
of the former federal president of Switzerland, Jean-Marie Musy, to 
the Zionist cause. This “Swiss Catholic reactionary antisemite” and 
personal acquaintance of Himmler convinced him, toward the end of 
the war, to release Jews, against the command of Hitler. Himmler 
was led to believe that by doing so a favorable press campaign would
8 Ibid, p. xi.
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be generated in his favor.
The fact that Reuben Hecht provided sensitive information to 
the American government is attested to by the American Consul 
General in a letter to J. Klahr Huddle, Esquire, Counselor of the 
American Legation in Bern. Therein, Woods asks for confidentiality 
concerning Hecht’s transmissions. Woods writes, “he (Hecht) has 
given me interesting information on Hungary and Yugoslavia.. .  Dr. 
Hecht mentioned that it was forbidden by law for a Swiss citizen to 
furnish representatives of a foreign country with information such as 
that given in his report and that he would be grateful if his identity 
as author of the report not be revealed to Swiss officials.. .”7
That particular information dealt with the expulsion and
extermination of Jews from Switzerland. Hecht urged the United
States, in correspondence of August 8,1944, to uphold its support for
a Jewish National Home, writing
Is it not enough, that already on May 15, 1944, 260 railway 
cars crammed full of Jewish children of 2-8 years of age left 
Hungary for the extermination camps of Auschwitz? . . .  The 
Mandatory Power at present demonstrates to the 
persecutors that the Jews have no home, no right to live.. .
The Jewish people place their confidence in the Government 
of the United States which can bring them help.
While pleading with the U.S. for help, Hecht worked through
7 “Confidential” correspondence from American Consul General Woods to 
Mr. Huddle, March 13, 1944, Hecht Archive. Doc. 12.
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Muesy, for the release of Jews from the camps. When questioned 
about Muesy’s motivation for helping the Zionists Hecht stated,
Muesy’s activity was entirely political, the intention was to 
explain to those German circles, who already understood 
that the War was lost, that the persecutions of the Jews 
created a terrible impression abroad, and to tell this 
Himmler to his face. In addition, to make it clear to him that 
the catastrophic impression would be a bit less catastrophic 
if at least now the remaining 600,000-800,000 Jews would 
be released, who, according to the famous order of Himmler 
were to be destroyed as well. These figures are produced by 
the Germans.8
In exchange for the release the United States was to provide 
surety in the form of cash held in escrow and a promise that in 
exchange for not destroying the camps, as Hitler commanded, 
Himmler would be guaranteed by the American army “that the camp 
guards in the Wehrmacht uniform would receive treatment like the 
Wehrmacht soldiers, and be regarded as war prisoners and not be 
shot on the spot, but be put before a military court.”9 Hecht affirmed 
that this plan was approved by Roswell D. McClelland, special 
assistant to the American Minister at the American Legation, who 
said that Eisenhower had also approved of the plan. According to this 
plan 1200 to 1800 Jews were to be released every week. The first
8 Stenographic protocol of the Interrogation of Reuben Hecht at the 
Kastner trial, April 6, 1954, Hecht Archive. Doc. 18.
9 Ibid.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
246
train, transporting 1200 Jews, actually arrived in Kreuzningen on 
February 9, 1945. Due to sabotage of the plan no additional trains 
arrived after that.
The money promised to Himmler, 5 million francs, was 
acquired from the Joint Distribution Committee and the Rescue 
Committee in America. Hecht also received money from the Irgun 
Delegation.10 The money, however, was not the major temptation 
offered to Himmler. The Zionists believed that he would be more 
interested in political advantage. Hecht was questioned on this point 
by advocate Tamir at the Kastner war trial in 1954.
Q. You wanted to mislead Himmler?
A. It is difficult to answer the question.
Q. Did you tell Himmler the truth? Answer my question: Did 
you wish to mislead him or on the contrary, awake in him illusions 
and hopes.
A. We certainly had no intention to do Himmler any favor at
all.
Q, I did not ask you whether you wanted to do Himmler a 
favor, why do you evade answering every single question?
A. It is difficult to reply to those questions yes or no.
Q, It is definitely possible to answer yes or no. Answer the 
question.
A. We wanted to exploit the political situation in order to 
explain to Himmler that by releasing the Jews he was approaching
10 Ibid, p. 17.
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more his political intentions.
Q. What were his political intentions which he could have 
approached more?
A. He wanted to get in touch with the West, and for that he 
needed some point of connection. And proof for this is that the 
negotiations with the Jews served him in this.
Q. To approach the West, that means to divide between the 
Allies, between Russia and the West, is it not so?
A. In our opinion no, but in Himmler’s opinion, yes.
Q. So you mislead him at least on this point?
A. Yes. We knew from the Americans that this was out of the 
question, but they agreed that we should give him this answer.
Q. Did you think that you can deceive Himmler?
A. Yes.
Q. And this without expertness in the international political 
situation?
A. On the basis of the talks with Woods it was possible to 
assume this. He explained to us that if it is necessary to pay 
compliments to the devil in order to save Jews, it is allowed to do so. 
We shall do the reckoning with him later on.
Q. Instead of encouraging with the Nazis a hope of money, you 
wanted to awake a hope of political advantage?
A. Yes, because in this manner we wanted to solve the entire 
problem, whereas with money we would have convinced that there 
would be every time additional expulsions in order to make 
additional extortions.
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Q. And based on what did you believe that those Nazis, those 
criminals, after they murdered 6 million Jews- would fall into your 
trap?
A. Because part of the Nazi criminals were in a great panic and 
were convinced that the War was lost.
Q. Among them was Himmler?
A. Himmler, if I can believe Muesy, understood that the war 
was lost.
When Hecht was asked, during the same trial, what he believed 
contributed to bring the most pressure on the United States to help 
the Jews he credited the Revisionists and Irgun Delegation, saying, “I 
think that the great pressure was carried out by the large 
advertising campaign in the press and the mass meetings of the 
“Hebrew Committee.”
In 1982 Professor Monty Penkover interviewed Dr. Reuben 
Hecht at his office in Haifa. There Hecht reiterated the importance of 
Sam Woods in the relationship between the Revisionist Zionists in 
America and the American Administration.
Dr. Hecht: Sam Edison Woods. You know who he is?
Prof. Penkover: Well, I know the whole story.
Dr. Hecht: Officially he was only Consul-General, but in reality 
he was much more.
Prof. Penkover: Of course, American Intelligence. . . He was a 
counter against Dulles.”
11 Interview of Prof. Penkover with Dr. Reuben Hecht, Hecht Archive. Doc. 
7, p. 383-384.
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Hecht explained how and why he avoided Dulles.
Dr. Hecht: He gave a lot of information which he received from 
me directly to America, not through the channels of Dulles . . .  Dulles 
was I wouldn’t say an antisemite, I don’t know, but according to 
Woods, Dulles was not interested in the Jewish problem in Europe, 
because he thought that this is a nuisance for the Allied war effort.12
In other sections of the interview Hecht mentions the three primary 
American government officials with whom he was concerned.
Dr. Hecht: . . . Now, there were three Americans: McClelland, 
Dulles, who was an enemy, and Woods who was the strongest, I could 
even say, practically the only helping force.13
Hecht also discussed the attitude of General Eisenhower with 
Professor Penkover.
Dr. Hecht: . . And one day we (Hecht and Recha Sternbuch) 
discussed, at length . . .  that to bombard the railway crosspoints and 
the stations before Auschwitz and the crematoria, could save 
hundreds of thousands of Jews. Because till they would repair it 
especially if several times bombarded, we also brought, through 
McClelland, these recommendations to Eisenhower who was the Chief 
Commander of the Allies, our request to make bombardments against 
this and to make bombardment of the gas-ovens, of the crematoria. 
Because if a few hundred people would have been killed it is nothing 
against thousands who were murdered every day. But McClelland 
was not helpful and the answer of Eisenhower was: We are not 
fighting a Jewish war, this is not in the way of the war effort, and we 
do not want that the Germans to think we are fighting the war for 
the Jews. And Eisenhower was not in favor at all, and McClelland was 
a bureaucrat, and the Americans put it down!14
12 Ibid, p. 385, 387
13 Ibid, p. 387.
"Ibid, p. 426.
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When questioned about whom Hecht worked with in Europe he said, 
“I directly was responsible for the Irgun.”15 The American Consul 
General, Samuel Edison Woods, was aware of Hecht’s affiliation and 
was himself a fervent Zionist as a result of Hecht’s indoctrination. 
Hecht said of Woods, “He was more Zionist than all the Jews in 
Switzerland together.” 16 Hecht admired and trusted Woods, crediting 
him with stopping the British blockade of Palestine after Irgun 
intelligence informed him of the British plan.
Dr. Hecht: Woods believed everything, and he was a very clear 
Realpolitiker. And what I gave him was forwarded immediately, 
dispatched to Washington.
Prof. Penkover: Washington, meaning the Secretary of State?
Dr. Hecht: The Secretary of State and maybe also the White 
House, because later on a thing happened where he directly 
telephoned after the War to the White House, and he, Woods, 
achieved to avoid the British blockade of Palestine against arms and 
immigration ships.17
Professor Penkover asked Hecht why the the very religious 
Aguda joined with the New Zionist Organization.18 Hecht believed 
that the only possible explanation was that “the Aguda really wanted 
to save the lives of Jews,” religious or not.
The Revisionist Zionists were also successful in getting
15 Ibid, p. 395.
16 Ibid, p. 429.
17 Ibid, p. 405; See p. 406 for details of how this was accomplished.
10 Ibid, p. 415 (there seem to be some interchangeable terminology between 
the NZO and the Irgun Delegation in this interview which is left unexplained).
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intelligence concerning the planned Nazi invasion of England.19 Woods 
again dispatched the information to America. Hecht helped Woods in 
other ways. The Revisionist,20 through him, helped to bring 
American pilots and captains of the Air Force, who were interned in 
Switzerland, to freedom,21 and to prepare suggestions for psycho­
logical warfare against the Germans. 22 Woods nominated Reuben 
Hecht for the American Medal of Freedom.
Could it be possible that the long delayed charges against Hillel 
Kook in the United States (i.e. regarding his alien status) and the 
casual attitude toward him by the F.B.I. (their reluctance to 
investigate his activities and status) were, in reality, because he was 
seen as an asset to the American war effort? Certainly his European 
connections, Reuben Hecht and Samuel Edison Woods, were providing 
useful intelligence to the American government.
As of March 16, 1945 the Director of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, J. Edgar Hoover, acknowledged that “no active 
investigation has been conducted by this bureau concerning Peter 
Bergson (Hillel Kook) up to this time.” 2< Two years later still no 
action had been taken despite various efforts to do so. An official
19 Ibid, p. 421.
20 Hecht mentions both the New Zionist Organization and the Kook group in 
the interview and does not distinguish between them.
21 Ibid, p. 423.
22 Ibid, p. 424.
23 Secret F.B.I. document from Hoover to Frank J. Wilson, Chief, Secret 
Service Division, Treasury Dept..
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U.S. Government internal security memorandum attests to this fact; 
“It is to be observed that recent information received by the Bureau 
reflects that the Board of Immigration Appeals has taken no action 
with respect to the deportation proceedings against Bergson and the 
Department has advised that no action is contemplated.”*'' A Top 
Secret F.B.I. document, dated March 5, 1952 further clarifies the 
status of Bergson. It states, “In March 1947, records of the State 
Department reveal that Bergson was in New York City attached to the 
United Nations working on Palestine matters.”25 By August of 1953 
Bergson was still residing in the United States and operating a 
business which he formed in 1950, Middle East Industries, “for the 
purpose of interesting American industrialists in the development of 
an industrial Israel and the development of substantial and 
profitable commerce between the United States, Israel and the 
Middle East.” 26 This memorandum confirmed that “with regard to 
any connection he may have with the Israeli Government, Bergson 
advised that in 1948 he had been a member of the Knessett 
(Parliment) in Israel as a member of the Freedom Party.” 27 This 
memorandum was followed chronologically by an undated letter to 
the Director of the F.B.I. which read,
24 F.B.I. Office Memorandum from D.M. Ladd to Mr. Strickland, March 13,
1947.
25 Top Secret F.B.I. Document, March 5, 1952, SAC, New York; Director, FBI.
26 Memorandum to the Director, FBI from SAC, New York, August 24, 1953.
27 Ibid.
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Bergson expressed a desire to cooperate with the Bureau in 
any way possible and was most cordial during the 
interview. In as much as this interview with Bergson failed 
to disclose any activity on his past which would constitute a 
possible violation of the Registration Act of 1938, as 
amended, and since active investigation to date has been 
negative in this regard, this case be considered closed, UACB.
Kook’s fund raising work in America had been essential to the 
rescue work of Reuben Hecht and William Perl. Kook’s group partially 
funded the SS. Sakarya, the S.S. Pencho, and other rescue missions.'8 
Kook and Hecht worked hand in hand.
The position of Reuben Hecht proved to be convenient for the 
Irgun Delegation in America in other ways. The Hebrew Committee 
for National Liberation needed, for their political work, money in 
France and other places. Reuben Hecht was essential to the move­
ment of these funds. As he explained in the Penkover interview, one 
day Reuben Hecht was invited by the Ambassador of Santo Domingo 
to a dinner party. Uneager to attend, he was encouraged to do so by 
the American Consul General, Woods.
So I came there, and there was a big dinner- table with 
candle light and everything, and then the Ambassador 
introduced me and then they drank champagne on (to) the 
new Honorary Consul in Basel. And I also raised my glass in 
honour of the new Honorary Consul in Basel. And I looked 
round, and I didn’t find him. At the end, I understood, I 
even have a letter of Trujillo. . . It was very funny. I had no 
idea. Hillel Kook forgot to advise me that he arranged for me 
to be Consul in order to be able to bring gold from
28 Perl, The Four Front War, p.228. 263, 333.
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Switzerland to Paris, and to have a free travel possibility. 
But I didn’t know.29
Hecht told Penkover that this appointment was helpful for the 
Irgun Delegation in America also in the workings of their illegal 
transport ships, such as the Ben Hecht. Hecht’s Swiss passport 
became invaluable for his IZL (Irgun) - organized “illegal immigra­
tion” of Jews to Palestine.
He opened an office in Zurich and exploited his shipping 
contacts to smuggle Jews, including 2,400 of them in 1940 
on the S.S. Sakaria. Once in Romania he won the support of 
the German ambassador, who attempted to stop a ship with 
“illegals” from sailing.30
Reuben Hecht’s position as Consul was, however, challenged by a
certain Consul-General, Mr. Mueller.
Dr. Hecht: . . . And then it occurred to me that a certain 
Goyish businessman in Basel was the Consul-General. Mr. 
Mueller. And he complained to the Swiss authorities that 
now a second Consul is there. And that was very interesting.
And then I insisted, and he insisted, and thereafter - 1 have 
the photocopies - the Swiss Secret Political Police which 
officially does not exist (If you would have asked in 
Switzerland you would have thought it doesn’t exist.) made 
a detailed report about me. That I am a very dangerous 
political agent of the so-called Revisionist terrorist group 
Irgun; who once with force fought the British. And that it is 
dangerous to give me this Consulate because I will use it not 
in the interest of Swiss neutrality. And so on. I have the 
document. And then, of course, I didn’t receive it, and 
probably I am the only man in the world, in the civilized
29 Penkover interview with Reuben Hecht, Hecht Archive, p. 437.
30 Obituary of Reuben Hecht, The Terusalem Post Inter­
national Edition. April 24, 1993, p. 4.
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world, who receives an Honorary Consulate, but not the 
Exequatur of his government.31
When asked, in 1982, what the major contribution of the Irgun 
and people like Hillel Kook made, and what deserved historical 
emphasis, Hecht replied, “I think that the battle of the Irgun; not I 
think, Churchill said it, that the Irgun was one of the reasons that the 
British left Palestine.” Hecht also states his belief in the importance 
and effectiveness of “the propaganda of the Hebrew Committee in 
America.”32
This information about the Irgun Delegation to America’s links 
in Europe, Reuben Hecht and Samuel Edison Woods, is essential in 
understanding the far reaching connections and the importance of 
that group. They were not the ineffectual renegades described and 
feared by mainstream Jews in the 1940’s, but rather were one of the 
most important, if not the most important, Jewish groups, when 
judged in retrospect. They were responsible for some of the most 
effective rescue work, and for the some of the most effective public 
campaigning to draw attention to the plight of the Jews of Europe 
and to the lack of governmental initiative to save those Jews. Their 
European connections, particularly Woods and Hecht, provided vital 
information which confirmed the rumored atrocities committed by
31 Ibid, p. 438-439.
32 Penkover interview, p. 467-468.
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the Nazis and thereby attempted to condemn the Roosevelt and 
Truman administrations for their inability to affect the condition of 
those Jews.
There was important collaboration between the American 
Revisionists and Agudat Orthodox Jews of the United States. This was 
accomplished with the full knowledge of the United States 
government and shows quite clearly the division between Zionist and 
non-Zionist representatives in the government. While Dulles and 
most State Dept, officials were anti-Zionist, the American Consul 
General was, in Hecht’s words, “more Zionist than all the Jews in 
Switzerland together.”
The Hecht Archive also suggests that the idea of bombing the 
railways and crematorium at Auschwitz, as mentioned in David 
Wyman’s book, Abandonment of the Tews, originated with Hecht and 
the Sternbuch group. The plan was proposed to McClelland and 
recommended to Eisenhower but put down by both.
The joint work of Reuben Hecht and the Irgun Delegation in
rescuing Jews even affected the former Prime Minister of Israel,
Yitshak Shamir. When asked if he knew Hecht he replied,
Reuben Hecht. Yes!. . .  Yes! He. . .  had very good contacts.
And ties with this group in America and he cooperated with 
them in Europe. He was active in Europe, in Switzerland.. .
He was friends with Hillel Kook, a very good friend of him 
since they had been together maybe in Paris, in France, 
these years. And, you know . . . there have been some
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contacts between me and this group when I was in Djibouti, 
French colony, where I got the status of a refugee, a political 
refugee from the government of France because I escaped 
from a camp of prisoners in Africa where I was imprisoned 
by the British. Deported from Israel, from Palestine, to 
Eritrea. And this group helped me to get the . . . right of 
asylum, of the political refugee and as such refugee I was 
brought to France, I came to France, by the provision of the 
French government; and from France I went to Israel a few 
days after the establishing of the State of Israel. And this 
group, especially their bureau, their office in Paris, they 
helped me a lot in getting these facilities and the support of 
the French government. . .  Yes. Yes. And they helped a lot. 
They helped the Jewish underground.. ,33
Shmuel Katz, Irgun leader who later became a renowned
author and journalist, was also familiar with the work of Reuben
Hecht. He offered additional information about the reasons for
Samuel Edison Woods’ access to the White House. When asked if he
knew Reuben Hecht, Mr. Katz responded as follows.
Katz: I was very fam iliar with him. Sure. I knew him for fifty  
years.
Saidel: Did you know the American Consul General named 
Samuel Edison Woods?
Katz: I didn’t know him but he worked with Hecht. Now, do you 
know his story?
Saidel: I’ve read the Hecht archive. Samuel Edison Woods was 
supposedly an intelligence agent supporting the Zionist 
movement, I believe.
Katz: Well, I don’t know about his supporting the Zionist 
movement. Maybe he did, but Hecht worked with him. First 
of all, during the War, when American airmen, after 
bombing targets in Germany, sometimes had to land in 
Switzerland and one of Woods’ jobs, he was the consul in
33 Telephone interview with Yitshak Shamir from Tel Aviv, by Joanna 
Saidel, June 2,1993.
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Zurich at the time, was to try and get them out of 
Switzerland and back to America and Hecht helped him in 
this. Subsequently, my indirect contact with Wood was 
much later, was in 1 9 . . .  end of 4 7 or 48 when we 
had decided, you know after the Partition decision at the 
United Nations the British continued harassing our 
immigrants, the so called illegal immigrants. And in the 
Irgun we decided that we would warn the British that if 
they continued harassing our boats we would sink their 
boats. We didn’t have much chance of sinking many boats 
but we had a couple of plans. One, and this was something 
that I was supposed to be supervising, not that I’m a great 
boat sinker but (laughs) I was supposed to deal with 
the subject. We had one plan for Shanghai and we had one 
plan for South, Portsmouth or South Hampton, I don’t know 
which. But at any rate we decided that we would warn the 
British and because they knew that our warnings were 
usually serious, that we didn’t make warnings in vain 
because they’d found out in Palestine than when the Irgun 
warned them of something that it was carried out. And so 
we decided to send a message, first of all to the British, to 
warn them. And so I discussed this with Hecht and 
Hecht gave Wood the warning to pass on to the British. Wood 
passed it on to Washington because Wood had, Wood 
although he was only supposed to be a consul, he had direct 
access to the White House. And, I may think for a moment 
and remember why he had access. And so a few days later 
we had a reply. Hecht gave the reply that he had from  
Wood, that Wood had had from Washington that this 
warning had been passed on to the British and the British 
had notified the Americans that they were stopping the 
harassment. Now, Woods’ status with the White House came 
because he had established, when he was a consul in 
Munich, before he came to Zurich he was a consul in Munich, 
and he made contact with one of the German opponents of 
the Nazis. To get information from him they used. . .  to go to 
the cinema and get seats next to each other and this man 
would pass on the information to him there and he would 
pass it on to the States . . .  he was giving them some very
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important information, including, if I’m not mistaken, the 
information about the impending invasion of Russia! '4
The connection therefore, between the Irgun Delegation to the 
United States and their representative in Switzerland, Reuben Hecht, 
proved to be important, not only for the Zionist cause and for the 
Irgun, but for the American war effort. This contact provided 
important information to the United States government, helped in 
the rescue of American airmen, saved a train load of 1200 Jews, and 
provided a direct contact between the Jewish underground and the 
White House.
34 Telephone interview with Shmuel Katz from Tel Aviv, by Joanna Saidel, 
June 10, 1993.
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CHAPTER 9
BEGIN VISITS THE U.S.
In October 1948 the Irgun Delegation attempted to promote the 
leader of the Irgun High Command, Menachem Begin, in a new light. 
Instead of freedom fighter it was desirable to portray him as 
statesman, scholar and friend of the United States. This was done to 
gain support for Mr. Begin in the election for Prime Minister in 
Israel. Controversy developed over a plan for him to visit the 
United States. While the Irgun Delegation formed a reception 
committee for a dinner in Begin’s honor planned for November in 
New York, a storm of protest broke out among those who considered 
him a terrorist. This led to a controversy within the United States 
government whether to allow him into the Unites States or not.
Begin had the support of important American figures who were
affiliated with the Irgun Delegation, such as Louis Bromfield who
called Menachem Begin “one of the great and almost legendary
figures of our time.” Bromfield credited Begin with great successes.
As Commander- in- Chief of the Irgun Zvai Leumi he led 
one of the most glorious and successful resistance 
movements in history. A little  defenseless community, a 
people who, in the course of almost two thousand years of 
dispersion, had lost the art of m ilitary defense was 
transformed under his leadership into a fighting and heroic
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nation.1
Bromfield noted that Begin had been responsible for giving Jews
back their dignity and self-respect and the respect of the civilized
world. Bromfield told David Niles that the Irgun was responsible for
the collapse of the British regime in Palestine.2
Bromfield tried to persuade Mr. Niles that support for Begin
was politically the right choice for America.
Today, Mr. Begin heads a strong political movement in Israel 
dedicated to western concepts of democracy - Tenuat 
Hecherut (Freedom Movement) - and thus is the logical and 
natural candidate for Prime Minister in the coming elections 
in Palestine. He combines in his personality not only the 
qualities of a military commander and a political leader, but 
also of a scholar, a lawyer and a speaker of great repute.3
Bromfield stressed the importance of “establishing a mutual 
understanding and friendship between the United States and the 
strategically vital State of Israel” and by asking Niles to add his name 
to the list of Americans who would welcome Mr. Begin to the United 
States the following month.4
In secret State Department correspondence from Under 
Secretary Lovett to Clark Clifford for President Truman the 
controversy over admission of Menachem Begin to the United States
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was discussed. In this confidential file, dated November 12, 1948, 
Lovett presented Clifford with the pros and cons of granting U. S. 
visitors visas to Begin and five associates. Lovett wrote that since 
Begin was
formerly head of the terrorist Irgun Zwai Leumi and now 
chief of the Hebrew Freedom Movement . . . The Visa 
Division, Legal Adviser and the Division of Security agree 
that Begin and associates are mandatorily excluded from 
admission into the United States under Act of 1918 which 
lists specific restriction to admission. We have had this point 
carefully checked and the aforementioned experts agree 
that the Irgun Zwai Leumi group clearly falls under the 
provision of this law on several counts.5
Lovett advised Clifford that under the 9 th Proviso of this Act, 
however, the law could be waived by the Commissioner of 
Immigration, with the consent of the Attorney General, if it was “in 
the national interest” to do so. “The Department is under considerable 
pressure to recommend to the Attorney General that Mr. Begin and 
his associates be permitted to enter this country under the 9th 
Proviso clause,” wrote the Under Secretary. This was also the opinion 
of the United States representative in Tel Aviv, Mr. McDonald. In a 
telegram to the State Department, he urged the immediate approval 
of Begin’s visa application. He believed that, while Begin’s presence 
in the United States might offend Jewish organizations, refusal of the
5 Secret State Department correspondence from Under Secretary Lovett to 
Clark Clifford, November 12, 1948, Truman Library, White House Central Files- 
Confidential.
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visa application might embarrassingly involve the United States in 
Israeli politics.6
A national reception committee to welcome Begin had already 
been put in place. This committee included many well known 
American figures including nine governors, eleven Congressmen, 
including five Senators (Green, Awakener, Capper, Magnuson, and 
Thomas), many judges, educators, mayors, clergymen, and other 
notable persons.
Louis Bromfield issued invitations to a dinner which was to be 
held on November 23 rd at the Waldorf-Astoria in honor of 
Menachem Begin. Under Secretary Lovett mentioned this information 
to Clifford before stating the pros and cons concerning Begin’s 
admission.
Two main points were presented which favored Begin’s 
admission. First, “Mr. Begin is the head of the strongest opposition 
party in Israel which is also rightist and anti-communist. It is 
possible that this party may become the controlling one in Israel in 
which case if we did not grant visa we would be excluding the future 
Prime Minister of Israel.” 7 Second, many prominent people were 
urging admission, as well as the American League for a Free 
Palestine which was the main supporter of the Irgun in the United
"Ibid
7 Ibid
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States.
Five points were presented in opposition to Begin’s admission. 
The first of these was the fact that the Irgun was responsible for the 
bombing of the King David Hotel. One hundred mostly British 
government officials were killed in the attack. The Irgun had also 
taken responsibility for an incident that occurred on July 30, 1947 
in which two British Army sergeants were hanged. It was thought, 
therefore, that there would be a public outcry in Great Britain if 
Begin were admitted to the States.
The second point against admitting Begin, similarly, was the 
uneasiness of the British Embassy regarding admission. This fear, 
Lovett suggested, could be discounted, as the F. B. I. could be alerted 
in advance.
The third point was that some Americans, including important 
Zionist groups would feel bitter about the admission. The risk of 
alienating such groups needed to be considered.
Also, the admission would increase the strain on U. S. - Arab 
relations. This could be expected because the Irgun called for the 
inclusion of Transjordan, as well as all of Palestine, within the 
borders of Israel.
Finally, allowing Begin to enter the United States could serve as 
an “unfortunate precedent in future visa cases involving terrorist
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
265
organizations such as the Stern Gang.” 8
On November 29, 1948 correspondence appeared in the 
Letters to the Editor of The New York Times regarding the visit of 
Menachem Begin to the United States. This piece reminded the 
editor, whose name had appeared on the list of reception committee 
members planning the welcoming dinner for Begin at the Waldorf- 
Astoria, of the terrorist background of the Irgun leader. It recounted 
what the signers of the letter considered to be the most negative 
aspects of the controversial leader. It expressed the complaints and 
urged withdrawal of support for Begin. It posed a number of 
questions to the editor. The questions confronted the editor with the 
most infamous acts of the Irgun including the bombing of the King 
David Hotel, the kidnapping and garroting of two British sergeants 
and booby trapping their bodies, the alleged massacre of 250 
inhabitants of the village of Deir Yassin, and charged that the Irgun 
Delegation, masquerading under the front of “democracy,” was a 
totalitarian group, “as reactionary as the fanatical Muslim 
Brotherhood” which used the funds it acquired in America to buy 
arms from Soviet Russia. The letter was signed by Rev. Dr. Henry 
Sloane Coffin, former president of Union Theological Seminary and 
former moderator of the Presbyterian Church in the United States, 
Father John La Farge of New York, well known Catholic editor, and
“Ibid
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Rabbi Morris Lazaron of Baltimore, member of the Central Conference
of American Rabbis, and a director of the American Association for
the United Nations
The events which took place in the village of Deir Yassin cast
the most ignominious light upon the workings of the Irgun in
Palestine of possibly any action taken by them. On April 11, 1948
The New York Times headlines read, “Jews Attack Village of Deir
Yassin. Massacre of civilians reported.”
Yitshak Ben Ami, Irgun member and activist in America for the
Kook group, claimed that the American press portrayed an incorrect
image of the events in the Arab village. He claimed that the village
had been, since the late 1800’s, a hotbed of Arab extremism and was
far from the “peaceful little village” described in the Times. Ben Ami
also claimed that the Irgun had the support of other Zionist groups,
specifically the Haganah, but that they denounced the incident in
the heat which followed. Ben Ami had been faced with “attempted
forays into our homes from Deir Yassin” when he was in charge of
defending Givet Shaul, a Jerusalem suburb, as early as 1936.
We dug out our “illegal” weapons every night and waited, 
while the Jewish supplementary police repulsed the 
infiltrators again and again. Months later, we had a defense 
position in nearby Motza commanded by Hillel Kook, and he 
often asked my help to transport men to their night duties 
in Motza. Driving back and forth to Motza from Jerusalem, I 
spent many hours lying in roadside ditches after ambushes
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Ben Ami asserted that, together with the Arab village of Lifta, the
“civilian population” of Deir Yassin “tried to choke off traffic to and
from Jewish Jerusalem whenever trouble was brewing.” 10
Ben Ami stated that the incident was far more involved than
described in the Times. Supposedly, in the beginning of April, Iraqi,
Jordanian and some European troops had stationed themselves in
Arab villages near Jerusalem.
The night of April 2nd, Deir Yassin opened intense fire on 
the Jewish suburbs of Beit Hakerem and Bait Vegan. The 
firing lasted all night. For the next several nights running, 
Haganah and Irgun troops reconnoitered Deir Yassin; by the 
seventh of April, the Irgun and Lehi commanders had 
decided to attack and occupy the village. This would 
discourage further night attacks, help secure the highway to 
Tel-Aviv and consolidate Hebrew control of the western area 
of Jerusalem.11
The attackers, lacking the necessary weapons, advanced under
instruction not to fire unless necessary, not to pillage or destroy
property but only to secure the village. The attack was
. . .  preceded by an armored car atop which a loudspeaker 
began repeating warnings in Arabic to the inhabitants: ‘The 
forces of the Irgun and Lehi are attacking you. Run toward 
Ein Karem or seek shelter below the village. We come to 
chase the foreign forces in your villages.’ The element of 
surprise had been sacrificed in an attempt to save civilian
9 Ben Ami, p. 440.
10 Ibid
11 Ibid.
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This was followed by a vicious, bloody battle.
Begin’s visit to the United States had come before the 
hemorrhaging within the underground body, which resulted from 
this incident, could be stopped. The Jewish establishment opposed 
Begin’s visit and the aims of his political movement. Their objections 
focused on the Deir Yassin issue. On December 4, 1848 their letter 
was published in a section to the editor of The New York Times.13 11 
was signed by such prominent individuals as Albert Einstein and 
Hannah Arendt. This general condemnation of Irgun activities 
specifically focussed on Deir Yassin.
On April 9 (The New York Times), terrorist bands attacked this 
peaceful village, which was not a m ilitary objective in the 
fighting, killed most of its inhabitants - 240 men, women and 
children - and kept a few of them alive to parade as captives 
through the streets of Jerusalem. Most of the Jewish community 
was horrified at the deed, and the Jewish Agency sent a telegram 
of apology to King Abdullah of Trans -Jordan. But the terrorists, 
far from being ashamed of their act, were proud of this 
massacre, publicized it, widely, and invited all the foreign 
correspondents present in the country to view the heaped 
corpses and the general havoc at Deir Yassin.
One of signers of this protest, Hannah Arendt, was a mover 
and shaker among American Jewish intellectuals. In March 1942 she 
had worked with a contemporary, Joseph Maier, to form a group
12 Ibid, p. 441.
13 For complete text of this letter see Appendix M.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
269
called Die Jungjudische Gruppe (“the Young Jewish Group”). This 
group, like Kook’s, called for the creation of a Jewish Army. However, 
“while the group members considered themselves Zionists, they were 
very critical of Zionism.” 14 Arendt attacked the Irgun Delegation in 
her publication, Aufbau. in which, on March 6, 1942, she “called the 
Revisionists ‘Jewish Fascists’ and asserted that their effort to raise a 
Jewish Army was only a part of their larger effort to gain control of 
the Zionist organization for their own ends.”ls
Arendt favored “the establishment of Palestine as part of a 
postwar British Commonwealth rather than as an autonomous 
state.”16 She rejected Revisionist calls for relocating Arab populations, 
which she considered would require “fascist organization.” 17 By 1944 
however, when the atrocities of Europe were fully verified, Arendt 
said, “The only difference between the Revisionists and the General 
Zionists today lies in their attitude toward England, and this is not a 
fundamental political issue.”18 By 1948 Arendt supported Count 
Bernadotte’s proposal for a U.N. trusteeship. It was during this period 
when she opposed Irgun Delegation efforts to bring Menachem Begin 
to America to gain support for his Herut political party.
14 Elizabeth Young-Bruehl, Hannah Arendt: For Love of the World, p. 178.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid, p. 180.
17 Ibid, p. 183.
18 Ibid, p. 224.
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The attack on Deir Yassin evoked deep emotional feelings on
both sides. In his memoirs, Menachem Begin indicated that there was
more behind the attack on Deir Yassin than the defense of the
Jerusalem road, and that the portrayal of the incident in the press
was distorted. Begin explained that the village was located at a
strategic position.
Dir Yassin, lying some two thousand feet above sea-level, 
was an important link in the chain of Arab positions 
enclosing Jerusalem from the West. Through Dir Yassin Arab 
forces from Ein Kerem and Bethlehem crossed to the Kastel 
front, whence they attacked Jewish convoys along the only 
road from Jerusalem to the coast
Begin refuted the charge that Deir Yassin was not a m ilitary
objective. He stated that, to the contrary, it was a vital security
interest in the War of Independence. The plan, agreed upon by the
Haganah, called for the creation of an airstrip in that location.
After the capture of Dir Yassin . . . the Haganah 
commander in Jerusalem announced that its capture was of 
no m ilitary value and was, indeed, contrary to the general 
plan for the defense of Jerusalem. We had, to our regret, to 
refute Mr. Shaltiel with the aid of a letter from - Mr. 
Shaltiel. Raanan, the Irgun commander in Jerusalem, radioed 
to us the following letter he had received from the Haganah 
Regional Commander:
‘I learn that you plan an attack on Dir Yassin. I wish 
to point out that the capture of Dir Yassin and holding it is 
one stage in our general plan. I have no objection to your 
carrying out the operation provided you are able to hold the 
village. If  you are unable to do so I warn you against 
blowing up the village which will result in its inhabitants 
abandoning it and its ruin and deserted houses being
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occupied by foreign forces. This situation will increase our 
difficulties in the general struggle. A second conquest of the 
place will involve us in heavy sacrifices. Furthermore, if 
foreign forces enter the place this will upset the plan . . . ’
When we published this letter we ended with those 
three points after the word ‘plan.’ The national interest 
required that we should not reveal what that plan was. 
Today those three points are superfluous. It can be revealed 
that in their place in the original letter there came the 
highly significant words: ‘for establishing an airfield.’ That 
airfield was established at Dir Yassin and, for a time, served 
as the only means of communicating between besieged 
Jerusalem and the coast19
Menachem Begin stated that the village had been warned, as 
Ben Ami described. Many inhabitants had fled and been unharmed. 
Once the battle began there were heavy casualties on both sides. 
Begin contends that the results of the battle were exaggerated by the 
enemy.
To counteract the loss of Dir Yassin, a village of strategic 
importance, Arab headquarters at Ramallah broadcast a 
crude atrocity story, alleging a massacre by Irgun troops of 
women and children in the village. Certain Jewish officials, 
fearing the Irgun as political rivals, seized upon this Arab 
greuel propaganda to smear the Irgun. An eminent Rabbi 
was induced to reprimand the Irgun before he had time to 
sift the truth. Out of evil, however, good came. This Arab 
propaganda spread a legend of terror amongst Arabs and 
Arab troops, who were seized with panic at the mention of 
Irgun soldiers. The legend was worth half a dozen battalions 
to the forces of Israel. The “Dir Yassin Massacre” lie is still 
propagated by Jew-haters all over the world.20
18 Begin, p. 162-163.
80 Ibid, p. 164, note.
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Whatever the truth of the matter, one thing is certain, the 
descriptions of the incident in the world press destroyed any 
remaining credibility the Irgun might have had.
Menachem Begin was allowed into the United States despite the
outcry against him. On November 30, 1948 The New York World
Telegram commented on an announcement which was made at the
dinner for Begin at the Waldorf-Astoria. It chronicled the dissolution
of the American League for a Free Palestine, the group which
Yitshak Ben Ami had directed from 1946 to 1948.
Announcement of the American League, which has been 
bitterly opposed by leading Zionist groups and condemned 
by the British government, came last night. Ben Hecht, co- 
chairman, told 1200 guests at a dinner in the Waldorf- 
Astoria Hotel, at which Mr. Begin was guest of honor, that 
the league’s job was done, adding its story “ends at least as 
nicely as a Jewish story can end.. .  Against the calumny of 
its own people, against the pitiless skulduggeries of British 
propaganda and against thousand-to-one power of the 
British army, Irgun fought for the right of Jews to strike 
back at their destroyers and oppressors.”
The year, 1948, marked the end of the separatist action by the 
Irgun. The effect of that action upon the foundation of the Jewish 
State is controversial. While some detested the actions of this 
underground group others considered it the essential ingredient in 
the Jewish national liberation movement.
The visit of Irgun High Command leader, Menachem Begin, to
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the United States came as a fitting close to the activities of the Irgun 
Delegation in America. They had worked for almost a decade to gain 
public support for the creation of a Jewish Army, for the rescue of 
Jewish Holocaust victims, and for the creation of a Jewish State in 
Palestine. Although their efforts had, at times, been in direct 
confrontation with Begin, the aims of both branches of the Irgun had 
remained basically the same. With the dissolution of the Irgun 
Delegation a new united effort was birthing in which the focus of 
activity was Israel. There the Irgun was transformed into the a 
legitimate political party, Herut, which became the heart of the right 
wing political faction and eventually was voted into power. As party 
leader, Menachem Begin became the Prime Minister of Israel. 
Today’s Likud party was created as a direct result of Begin’s work in 
the Irgun. It is now led by Benjamin Netanyahu, the son of the 
Revisionist’s New Zionist Organization leader, Benzion.
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CHAPTER 10
A QUESTION OF TERMINOLOGY
The term “Revisionist” has, in the course of this investigation, 
been highly controversial. Persons interviewed were perhaps most 
emotional, of all topics discussed, over this term and over whom it 
was applied to. While the term “Revisionist” had been used by 
numerous literary sources to describe the Irgun Delegation to the 
United States this definition is questionable. The term itself seems to 
be ambiguous. Both the application and the denial of this term, as it 
applied to the Irgun Delegation to the United States, can be defended 
under varying circumstances. Certainly both the Irgun and the New 
Zionist Organization derived from the Revisionist movement created 
by Jabotinsky. However, after the initial break with the World Zionist 
Organization, these “Revisionist” groups separated, one forming a 
political party, the other a military arm.
There has also been considerable controversy and error in 
separating the work of the Irgun Delegation to the United States from 
the New Zionist Organization of America. The names of these groups 
have been used interchangeably and incorrectly in source books, 
encyclopedias, and even intelligence files.
David Wyman is one of the few writers who has correctly
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stated that the Irgun Delegation was “not associated with the New 
Zionist Organization of America, which was the Revisionist Zionist 
body in the United States.”1 The Hebrew Committee and its affiliate 
organizations were, in fact, secretly members of the Irgun, which was 
the Jewish armed underground in Palestine. Mr. Wyman stated that 
“while these men constituted a tiny, American - based wing of the 
Irgun, they did not conduct underground activities in the United 
States. During the war, they were almost completely isolated from 
the Irgun in Palestine.”2 That is, they did not conduct aggressively 
militant activities on American soil. They did, however, operate 
covert activities such as purchasing arms, undertaking rescue 
missions, buying visas and consulates.
The dilemma of differentiation appears in a letter from Wallace 
Murray, Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs, to 
the Acting Secretary of State regarding the assassination of Lord 
Moyne.
. .  . the Stern Gang . . .  is one of the two principal secret, 
illegal Jewish military organizations in Palestine, the other 
being the Irgun Z’vai Leumi. . . Both of these groups are 
made up of fanatical young Jews who are completely 
unscrupulous . .  .These groups are offshoots of the extreme 
right-wing of the Zionist movement, the Revisionists or New 
Zionists.. . 3
’Wyman, p. 85.
2 Wyman, p. 85.
3 Memorandum from Wallace Murray to the Assistant Secretary of State, 
Washington, Nov. 8, 1944- Foreign Relations of the United States- 1944. vol.5. p.
634-635.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
276
While Murray was able to identify the various groups, he was
unable to differentiate the distinctions between them.
. . .  It is difficult to say today wherein the difference 
between the two groups he, and, in fact, we have reason to 
believe that they are no longer distinct organizations, but 
rather are two parts of one secret terrorist organization 
which seeks the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine 
through the overthrow by violent means of the present 
administration there.4
While members of the Kook group attest to being delegates of 
the Irgun they deny being Revisionists. Although they were closely 
tied to the Irgun, they deviated from the Irgun and became, 
somewhat, an organization unto themselves. Lechi leader, former 
Israeli Prime Minister Yitshak Shamir, said, “You cannot say that this 
was a Revisionist movement. It was a very special movement, I 
would say, that was created by Hillel Kook and his friends.”5 The 
confusion over terminology is apparent even here, as Mr. Shamir 
explains. Although he denies, in the previous statement, that they 
are Revisionists, he states that they are affiliated with the Revisionist 
movement.
There have been others, they have been sent to the United 
States by the Irgun. And the Irgun was, we can say, a 
certain affiliation of the Revisionist movement. They have 
been sent to America, H illel Kook and his friends as 
delegates of shlihim, that you call in Hebrew, it means
4. Ibid.
6 Telephone interview with Yitshak Shamir from Tel Aviv, by Joanna Saidel, 
June 2,1993.
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envoys, by the Irgun. And in this framework of the Irgun, 
Hillel Kook and his friends have founded the group that was 
very active in the public world, in the media.”6
Dr. Alex Raphaeli, a member of the Irgun delegation to the
United States reiterated this view.
Although we considered Jabotinsky our leader and mentor 
and consulted him as well as other party leaders, we drew a 
distinction between the party’s view and our own military 
activities. The public image of the IZL was that it was the 
military arm of the Revisionist movement, but the truth is 
that we followed our own independent ways and even came 
into sharp conflict with Jabotinsky when we failed to accept 
his suggestions.7
Further questions regarding who were Revisionists, and who
were not, arose from other sources. When asked whether or not
Kook’s group were Revisionists or, rather, a movement unto
themselves, author and Foreign Affairs advisor to Menachem Begin,
Shmuel Katz stated,
Well, I suppose they became a movement unto themselves, 
but when we talk of Revisionism, after all you might say 
that Shamir’s group was also not Revisionist in that sense. 
Shamir belonged to Lechi and . . .  Lechi’s leader, Stern, was 
in conflict with Jabotinsky. So I don’t know. I wouldn’t say 
that they were not Revisionists. They were also . . .  an 
offshoot, at least, of Revisionism, very definitely^ After all.. .  
their principle was that there should be a Jewish State in 
Palestine. Their principle was to save Jews. Their principle 
was to bring Jews here. At that time what more could
8 Ibid.
7 Dr. Alexe Raphaeli, Dream and Action, p. 65-66.
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anybody, would anybody need in order to be a Revisionist?8
Irgun Delegation member, Dr. Alexe Raphaeli, thinks that the
issue of terminology is important and very sensitive. He flatly stated,
“We did not consider ourselves Revisionists. Now, that’s a very
sensitive question.” 9 He had long conversations with Jabotinsky
over the issue of control. Jabotinsky often urged the Delegation to
work with his political organization.
And there was the answer, and this was the cardinal answer 
which we in the Irgun felt all these years . . .  We felt that 
Jabotinsky was our spiritual head. He was our logical head.
He was.. .  Field Marshall of whatever modest forces we had, 
but we did not consider the military work a political work.
We did not want to accept any party or political 
consideration, right or left.10
Dr. Raphaeli explained that his group felt, as young people, that they
should fight for their independence and protect Jews.
We were very, very small but we were very, very active; 
and you don’t need so many people if you have certain 
courage and you have certain possibilities and some ideas to 
do things. And the Irgun did very, very big things. These 
things they did from (a) m ilitary point of view . . . not 
because we belong to this or other party.11
Jabotinsky was not happy with this approach and continued to
•Telephone interview with Shmuel Katz from Tel Aviv, by Joanna Saidel, 
June 10,1993.




Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
279
try to influence Raphaeli in frequent meetings between them in 
Paris. While Raphaeli completely understood the thinking of the 
Revisionist party (having been a party member and founder of the 
Betar movement in the thirties) he, and the rest of the Irgun 
Delegation, felt that the military work should be separate from the 
political work.
This was the big discussion and the Revisionists took 
offense, were very, very aggressive and instead (of 
participating and helping) they were very critical and felt 
that we were breaking up the movement, etcetera, but we 
thought that we were doing military work and not political 
work. 12
Dr. Raphaeli stated that, besides the m ilitary differences,
there were some jealousies and rivalries between the Irgun
Delegation leader, Hillel Kook, and the New Zionist Organization
leader, Benzion Netanyahu. Raphaeli thought highly of Netanyahu
despite their differences.
He was very much admired by me in any case. And with 
Benzion we worked, he even worked in our office for a little 
while. But he was a Revisionist, and his mentality, he’s a 
very gifted man, a professor, but we didn’t feel that he has 
military sp irit.. ,13
Why then was Netanyahu so antagonistic toward the Kook 
group? Raphaeli explains.
Listen. Listen. There are many, many jealousies. Compared
12 Ibid.
13 Ib id.
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with us he was a bit older. He was a professor. We were just 
youngsters relatively. I mean I was at that time Doctor. I 
got my doctor(ate) in Heidelberg. But most of the other 
colleagues were a bit younger than I and didn’t have any 
education. He considered himself important...  intellectually, 
maybe that’s right, much more important than Hillel or any 
of the other colleagues.. . 14
When asked if  Hillel Kook would consider himself a Revisionist 
Raphaeli replied, “if  he w ill hear that you called (his group) 
Revisionists he will explode! (Laughs.) He will explode but he is, he is 
exactly, as Netanyahu, emotionally involved. I’m not emotionally 
involved . . .  We are not Revisionists. We were not Revisionists.”15
Dr. Raphaeli agrees that there is a lot of confusion over 
terminology, and in understanding the differences between these 
Zionist groups.
Ninety percent of the population in Palestine and abroad,
Jews involved in Zionism, considered the Irgun a part of the 
Revisionist party. . .  But this is not the inside truth. This is 
not the inside truth . . .  we’re politically not Revisionists. We 
are a m ilitary group acting according to principle (to) 
liberate the country against the British, protect the Jews 
wherever they needed physical protection and . . .  bring . . .  
them to Palestine. Period. That’s all.16
Dr. Raphaeli believed that “Revisionists were very good, very 
loyal, very nice people but this was not their approach. We. . . 
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international agenda.”17
The Revisionist New Zionist Organization also aimed at putting 
the Jewish problem, particularly the British problem, on the agenda, 
as well as, in the early years, campaigning for a Jewish Army. Their 
methods included mass campaigning, nationwide advertising, 
presentation of their views in publications, such as Zionews. and 
infiltration into the Congress, Army, Navy, and the administration.
Hillel Kook spoke about the Irgun and the Revisionist party. He
stated that the Irgun operated independently from the party.
I knew the Revisionist hierarchy because we had to be in 
touch with them. They were the only party who supported 
us on an organized basis. This doesn’t contradict what I said 
to you. We were independent. You can receive support from 
somebody and not be controlled by them. Begin, when he 
came out of the underground and formed the Herut Party, 
did not want to include the Revisionists. He did not want to 
meet the delegation of the Revisionist leadership.18
Despite the fact that the Revisionists and the Irgun worked 
separately it should be remembered that their mutual leader, 
Jabotinsky, personally called both the New Zionist Organization 
leader, Benzion Netanyahu,19 and the Irgun Delegation leader, Hillel 
Kook, to campaign for support in America. Kook testified to the fact 
that Jabotinsky had personally requested his assistance.
17 Ibid.
18 Interview of Hillel Kook by M. Kaufman, Oct. 27, 1981, Institute of 
Contemporary Jewry, Oral History Division, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, p.6.
10 Jabotinsky’s request for Netanyahu to come to the States is documented in  
chapter two, “Revisionist Zionism Comes to America.”
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In ‘39 the war broke out. Jabotinsky decided to go to London 
. . .  I wanted to go back to Palestine. Jabotinsky told me not 
to go. He said. .  .The only place to do something is among the 
great American Jewry.. . 20
Kook came to the United States shortly before Jabotinsky died
in 1940. Kook agreed with Netanyahu’s assessment that Jabotinsky
was a broken man because he had failed to mobilize American Jewry.
However, Kook did not mention the successes that Netanyahu and the
NZO had achieved with Jabotinsky during the campaign that spring
and summer. To the contrary, Kook contends that Jabotinsky “took
over a delegation of about five members of what they call the
presidency of the NZO with him . . .  to move to the United States
and mobilize American Jewry. And they failed miserably.”21
Kook claims that there was some joint activity between the two
groups to raise funds; “It was the only sort of joint activity that was
organized by the Irgun and the Revisionists. It was an open
delegation . . .  It was headed by Colonel John Henry Patterson . .  .
and Robert Briscoe.”22
For various reasons the two organizations drifted apart. The
Irgun delegation was criticized for establishing an open organization
when it was supposed to be working strictly underground.
There was a big fight going on between these guys and the 
Revisionists. They said, “You have no right to have an
“Kook interview with Kaufman, Ibid, p. 13.
21 Ibid, p. 14.
22 Ibid.
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organization. You are Irgun people. Irgun is an underground 
(organization). You cannot be a open organization. It was the 
first time that the Irgun was in control of an open 
organization.23
While Benzion Netanyahu stated that he joined the Kook group 
briefly after Jabotinsky’s death, Hillel Kook stated the same thing in 
reverse.
In New York, under the shock of his death and the shock of 
the war, and the very desperate situation all around, and 
being cut off from the Irgun, we as a group agreed that I 
should become a member of the ‘nesiut’ (executive) of the 
Revisionist Party. So, when I say that I was never a 
Revisionist it is not true. I was a Revisionist and I was a 
member of the ‘nisiut’ sometime between September and 
November of 1940. After about three or four meetings I saw 
that we had no common language whatsoever.24
Benzion Netanyahu agreed that he had found little common language 
with the Irgun delegation when he was a member of the Committee 
for a Jewish Army.25
Another point of misunderstanding was the relationship
between the Irgun in Palestine and the Irgun Delegation. While
Menachem Begin was angry that the Delegation wasn’t sending funds
to the Irgun, Kook felt that the Irgun was non-operative since it had
decided not to attack the British during the war.
To the best of my recollection I don’t think we sent a single 
penny to the Irgun here between the time I arrived there,
“ Ibid, p. 17.
“ Ibid, p. 20.
25 Conversation with Benzion Netanyahu, November 1993.
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which was July 1940, and until we sent Ben-Eliezer (1 9 4 6 )..
. As far as we were concerned the Irgun existed only in 
name. What did the Irgun do? We were the only Irgun that 
was doing something.26
Confusion over terminology is evident in many sources. The
majority of sources writing on the subject have used the terms Irgun
and Revisionists interchangeably and therefore incorrectly. This
analysis was even apparent in intelligence circles. For example, in a
1943 report from the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) such an error
is made. Here the New Zionist Organization is confused with the Irgun
Delegation to the United States.
. . .  the New Zionist Organization has. . .  been vociferous out 
of all proportion to its actual strength. Its activities in this 
country are being directed by a delegation of Palestinians, 
headed by Peter Bergson and including Eri Jabotinsky, son 
of Vladimir, and Alexander Hadani.. .  The Committee for a 
Jewish Army . . . the Emergency Committee to Save the 
Jewish People of Europe, the American Resettlement 
Committee for Uprooted Jewry, and a newest venture, the 
American Legion for a Free Palestine . . .a ll of these 
groups, through interlocking leadership, are Revisionist 
sponsored and are connected with the New Zionist 
Organization.. ,27
It was not well known in those days that the Kook group was directly 
affiliated with the Irgun in Palestine, since it promoted itself as an 
American organization which was not specifically Jewish.
29 Kook interview with Kaufman, p. 28.
27 CIA file, Office of Strategic Services, Foreign Nationality Branch, report 
No. 160, November 20, 1943, “Aftermath of the American Jewish Conference,” 
p.8-9.
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There is some ambiguity here. The Irgun Delegation
organizations did in fact operate to rally a diverse following. This
non-sectarian appeal made it appear to be different from Jewish
mainstream groups because it brought the problems and the
campaigns out of a strictly Jewish milieu and integrated them into
American society.
We were not a Jewish organization. The Committee for a 
Jewish Army was an American organization. The first 
chairman was Pierre Van Passen the writer, who was not a 
Jew. He was a Zionist but not a Jew. He was very active.28
The Committee for a Jewish Army was only one of the Irgun
Delegations organizations which sought non-sectarianism.
. . . this little  committee that we had called American 
Friends of Jewish Palestine which, by the way, was non­
sectarian. It was not a Jewish organization, it was an 
American organization whose chairman was a non-Jew by 
design, not by accident. Not that we thought there was 
anything wrong with Jews organizing it, but already in ' 39 
we instinctively didn’t see ourselves as a body functioning 
within the American Jewish community on a Jewish basis.
The decision was that this had to be an effort to mobilize 
the sympathy not only of the American Jews but also of the 
American people for our Zionist aspirations.29
Such sympathy was, by these efforts, forthcoming from a 
variety of groups, not only in America but in distant regions of the 
world. The Irgun Delegation was able to secure the support of “Bible
“ Kook interviewed by Kaufman, p. 36.
28 Kook interview with Kaufman, p. 20.
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people,” Ideological sympathizers, and supporters of national
liberation movements like the Irish.
There were people of Irish descent who hated the British 
and who liked the idea of another nation wanting to free 
itself. We were a national liberation movement. We were the 
first unequivocal formulation of a national liberation 
movement that followed after war.30
Various other groups also supported Kook’s movement.
Actually we collaborated with, we organized, we helped the 
Indians because we had more support. Later on, when we 
had quite a bit of support, we helped the Koreans. Syngman 
Rhee was on our payroll We used to pay him $50 a month..
. The Indians (Ghandi’s) we helped a great deal.. .  We also 
had the support of the American Indians. . . The main 
supporter in the House of Representatives was Congressman 
W ill Rogers, who was part Indian, son of the famous W ill 
Rogers.31
This outreach to all ethnic peoples of varying religions helped
to alleviate interracial tensions in a time when the general
assumption was that antisemitism dominated the American scene.
During the 1940’s, the general feeling of Americans turned to
sympathy for the Jewish plight.
There was tremendous sympathy in America for Zionism in 
those days. There was some antisemitism in America but I 
would say the vast majority of the American people, if you 
could reach them, would sympathize. We had the Bible 
people, who were very strong, from the Bible belt in the 
Middle West. From there we mostly got our Senators and 
Congressmen, and we could hold on to them because they
30 Ibid, p. 22.
31 Ibid.
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didn’t yield.32
The effort by the Irgun Delegation to present itself as an 
American, rather than a strictly Jewish, organization was paralleled 
by the efforts of the New Zionist Organization of America. Rather 
than trying to appear to be an American organization, they presented 
the Jewish and Palestine problems in a global scenario. This effort 
was one of the most successful aspects of their campaign. While 
administration officials and congressmen were, at first, hesitant to 
support the Jewish cause, the executive director of the NZO, Benzion 
Netanyahu, a brilliant and eloquent speaker, was able to present the 
situation as having far reaching global effects which could alter the 
post war world. The basis of his thesis was that only a democratic 
Jewish State in Palestine would be strong and determined enough to 
stave off the coming surge of Soviet influence which Netanyahu was 
sure would sweep the region after the war ended. The force with 
which Professor Netanyahu conveyed this assumption resulted in 
changing the Palestine problem from a regional problem to a global 
concern.
While both the Irgun Delegation and the N.Z.O. appealed to 
Americans on a non-sectarian basis, both were intensely committed 
to Palestine. It eventually became known that Kook’s organizations
“ Ibid, p. 21.
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represented the Irgun in America. The O.S.S. recognized this
relationship in a 1944 report.
Relationship between the Hebrew Committee of National 
Liberation and the Irgun in Palestine has not been admitted, 
but there is sufficient circumstantial evidence to justify the 
charges that have been made.33
The Office of Strategic Services also acknowledged the 
differences between the Revisionist Party and the Irgun in 1944. 
However, they were still unsure whether or not the two 
organizations were working together secretly while maintaining that 
they were divided for tactical purposes.
Their report stated that although there were indications of 
connections between the Hebrew Committee of National Liberation 
and the Irgun in Palestine, the Committee denied that it was a 
Revisionist organization. The Zionist Revisionist Party had recently 
disassociated itself publicly from the activities of the Bergson 
committee. The views put forth by the Hebrew Committee of 
National Liberation represented a departure from certain aspects of 
the Revisionist program, particularly their view that Transjordan 
should be considered an inseparable part of a Jewish state in 
Palestine. While this was the opinion reported in the O.S.S. file, 
Transjordan was really not a major issue at the time. The main issue
33 CIA file, Office of Strategic Services, Foreign Nationality Branch, report 
No. 191, June 6,1944, “The Hebrew Committee of National Liberation and Its 
Background,” p. 5.
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was the policy toward the British.34 The report further remarked that
their m ilitant and nationalistic attitude, particularly with 
respect to the Arabs, has often led them to be called “Jewish 
Fascists” and their m ilitary organization, the Irgun Z’vai 
Leumi, has committed acts of violence in Palestine. 
According to some observers the avowed organizational and 
ideological separation between the Revisionists and this 
Committee of National Liberation is designed primarily for 
tactical purposes, although there may be personality 
differences involved.35
The supposition that the New Zionist Organization was working
secretly with the Hebrew Committee proved to be unfounded; and
the characterization of the Revisionists as Fascists was an extreme
inaccuracy. The label, Fascists, had been attached to the Revisionists
by leftist opponents.36 By June 1944 the OSS was better able to
differentiate between the New Zionist Organization leadership and
that of the Irgun Delegation.
In the United States an American branch of the Revisionist 
Party was formed in 1926. It has always been a small group 
with approximately 500 members. Present president is 
Colonel Morris Mendelsohn, Executive director and editor of 
the organization’s bimonthly English - language magazine, 
Zionews. is B. Netanyahu.37 Like its parent in Palestine, this 
American branch of the New Zionist Organization has in the 
past refused to cooperate with the general Zionist 
organizations . . . Recently, since the program of the 
American Zionists now places its greatest emphasis on the
34 Conversation with Benzion Netanyahu, January 23, 1995, from New York.
35 CIA file, Office of Strategic Services, Foreign Nationality Branch, report 
No. 191, June 6 ,1944, “The Hebrew Committee of National Liberation and Its 
Background,”Ibid, p. 6-7.
30 Conversation with Benzion Netanyahu, January 23, 1995, from New York.
37 Netanyahu was actually head of political activity.
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establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine and closely 
approximates that of the Revisionists. The NZO has at times 
sought to collaborate.38
Perhaps the major point of contention and division between the
New Zionist Organization and the Irgun Delegation to the United
States resulted over a point of ideology. While the two groups did not
work together they did not attack one another until a policy of Hillel
Kook was published which distinguished between “Jews*' and
“Hebrews.” While Kook held this view, it was not accepted by all
members of the Irgun delegation. Dr. Alex Raphaeli and Yitshak Ben
Ami opposed the idea.39 This distinction was pointed out in an F.B.I.
report in 1945. It reported Kook’s demand for a democratic Hebrew
nation in Palestine.
The Bergson group makes a distinction between Hebrews 
and Jews. By Hebrews it means those who wish to be 
Hebrews by nationality, as a part of a renascent nation in 
Palestine, rather than Hebrews by religion. Jews are 
properly so called only when referring to their religion, they 
assert.40
By Kook’s definition Jews living in Europe as of 1945, together 
with the Jews of Palestine, constituted the Hebrew nation, and owed 
allegiance only to that nation. Palestine was the Hebrew nation by
38 Ibid, p. 7.
39 Telephone conversation with Dr. Raphaeli from Jerusalem, by Joanna 
Saidel, February 1994.
40 FBI Confidential Internal Security Report, “Hebrew Committee of 
National Liberation,” January 1, 1945, p. 5-6.
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God’s will. Palestine was to be “a free state in which the Arabs (who 
outnumber the Jews in Palestine 3 to 1) and other non-Hebrew 
residents will share full equality and privileges of citizenship.” This 
ideology distinguished between American Jews and all other Jews. 
“American Jews are American of Hebrew descent. They are an 
integral part of the American nation.”41
The O.S.S. likewise reported on Kook’s plan for a democratic 
state in Palestine, reiterating that the terminology used by the 
Hebrew Committee of National Liberation presented a differentiation 
between European and Palestinian Jews wishing to live in Palestine 
and “Jews living in other countries who therefore do not belong to 
the Hebrew nation. The Committee’s ideology divorces the concept of 
“Jew” and “Hebrew,” arguing that the former is a term pertaining to 
religion, the latter to nationality.” 42 The O.S.S. report compared this 
ideology to that of the anti-Zionist American Council for Judaism, 
which maintained that the basis of unity among Jews had to be 
religion and that Jews should consider themselves nationals of the 
countries in which they resided. The American Council for Judaism 
differed, however, in its opposition to the establishment of a Jewish 
state in Palestine.43
41 Ibid.
42 CIA file, Office of Strategic Services, Foreign Nationality Branch, report 
No. 191, June 6,1944, “The Hebrew Committee of National Liberation and Its 
Background,” p. 5.
43 Ibid.
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The Zionists maintain that. . . it has never been intended 
that Jews should owe political allegiance to any country 
other than to the land of which they are citizens. The 
relation of the American Jew to the Jewish National Home, 
according to the Zionists, w ill not differ from that of any 
other American toward the land of his ancestors.44
This policy was opposed by Kook’s foes (and some of his 
friends) because of its ominous implications for Jews of Europe who 
wished to remain in their countries of origin, and for American and 
other Jews who wanted equal rights of return to a Jewish National 
Home.
Bergson’s foes say this distinction has grave implications, 
because it infers that the Jews of Europe have no claim to 
citizenship in the countries where they live. Although the 
Zionists fight for the right of such Jews as wish to go to 
Palestine to do so, it also believes in and w ill fight for the 
right of full and equal citizenship for Jews in any country 
where they may liv e .. .  Furthermore, they point out that if 
anyone, Jew or non-Jew, wishes to contribute to the 
establishment of a Jewish Commonwealth in Palestine he has 
full opportunity to do so.. . 45
This issue became the focus of a full fledged attack on the 
Irgun Delegation by New Zionist Organization leader, Benzion 
Netanyahu. In the July 1944 issue of his newspaper, Zionews. he 
wrote an article titled, “The Fiasco of the Hebrew Committee.” In this 
article Netanyahu contended that the Irgun Delegation to the United 
States had no mandate or authority to represent the Jewish people.
44 Ibid.
45 FBI Confidential file No. 100-61870, New York, 1945, p. 5-6.
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They may be able, energetic, and determined. The very fact, 
however, that a few individuals, relatively unknown in 
Jewish life, without any authority or mandate from the 
people, could come and declare themselves the masters of 
the Hebrew nation, testifies to a mania of grandeur or to 
some sort of messianic complex that they must have 
developed during the period of unlimited control which they 
exerted over the Committees of their creation46
Benzion Netanyahu claimed that Kook’s call for a democratic 
state was based on a “fundamentally false, historically groundless 
differentiation between Hebrews and Jews.” Where, he asked, does 
one draw the line between Hebrew and Jew? He believed that certain 
conclusions may be derived from the assumptions of Kook’s Hebrew 
nation policy.
Either we agree that Palestine is not yet a Jewish State, and 
in consequence no Jews owe allegiance to it, and hence there 
is no Hebrew Nation; or we agree that Palestine is already 
the Jewish State, and then even the Jews who were born in 
Palestine, but are citizens of other countries, must be 
excluded from the Hebrew Nation. On the other hand, “Arabs 
and other non-Hebrew residents of the land” - to whom the 
Hebrew Committee promises “full equality and privileges of 
citizenship and government” - must be considered members 
of the Hebrew nation, and I cannot understand why they are 
called “Arabs and non-Hebrews.”47
Netanyahu believed that the contentions of Hillel Kook were 
self contradictory and inconsistent. Such a policy accepted the theory 
of assimilationists which stated that while their religion is Jewish,
48 Zionews. Central Zionist Archives, Jerusalem, July 1944, p. 12.
47 Ibid, p. 13.
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their nationality is that of the country in which they live.
I believe, however, that what constituted the main reason 
for this endorsement of assimilationism by the Hebrew 
Committee people, came not out of audacity but cowardice, 
not out of stupidity but “super-smartness.” In short - it was 
out of opportunism.4®
Netanyahu stated that just as the Committee was opportunistic
with regard to the assimilationists, so it is with regard to the British
policy in Palestine. He particularly pointed to the Hebrew Committee
policy which stated “that the Hebrew Nation postpones the
settlement of the political and boundary problems of Palestine until
after victory. Until that time we shall cooperate with and assist Great
Britain as the Mandatory for Palestine.”49 Netanyahu believed that
the Hebrew Committee disregarded the possibility that the political
fate of Palestine could be decided before the war was over, as most
political problems would be.50
An anti-Zionist body, like the American Jewish Committee, 
found it necessary to demand, in the midst of the war, that 
Britain relinquish the mandate - the same demand that had 
been raised by the New Zionist Organization of America. But 
the members of the Hebrew Committee would not dare do 
such a thing. They would not embarrass the mandatory 
power. They would not fight the White Paper or the Land 
restrictions, or the other instruments of British policy which 
are employed for the liquidation of Zionism. They will 
“cooperate with and assist Great Britain as the mandatory
48 Ibid, p. 14.
48 Ibid, p. 15-16.
50 Ibid.
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for Palestine.”51
The New Zionist leader believed that recognition of the Jewish
people in the United Nations was imperative for effecting a solution
to the “Jewish problem.” He said, “We, the New Zionists, have raised
this demand long before the Committee decided to “adopt” it.” This
policy was adopted because the New Zionists believed that such a
solution would benefit the world, not only the Jews of Europe. They
based it on legal and political facts concerning the recognition of
Jewish national minorities, and on the granting of Palestine to the
whole Jewish people. They vehemently contested the assertion that
the Hebrew nation differed from the Jewish nation. They maintained
that the League of Nations had granted national minority rights “to
Jews, and not to Hebrews; and the Mandate speaks of the Jewish,
and not the Hebrew people.”
As far as we are concerned, the names Hebrews and Jews 
are synonymous terms. Both are dear to us and we are 
proud of both. But if a differentiation between the two is 
attempted, such as that of the Hebrew Committee, which can 
only strengthen the position of assimilationism, then we 
shall adhere more adamantly to the name Jews - a name 
denoting the greatness, the heroism and the suffering of our 
nation, a name which accompanied us through the darkest 
corridors of history, a name which our enemies have tried so 
hard to besmirch, and which as Herzl said, we must turn into 
a symbol of honor in our future Jewish State.52
61 Ibid, p. 16.
52 Ibid.
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These arguments represent the fundamental differences
between the New Zionist Organization of America and the Irgun
Delegation to the United States. There remains however one other
question which has been raised by a former Irgun leader, Shmuel
Katz. He, with some ambiguity, questioned whether or not the Kook
group was actually sent to the United States by the Irgun at all.
I myself have never found any evidence that they were 
actually sent there, but according to letters that Raziel, who 
was, in 1940, the head of the Irgun, wrote to Kook, and 
these have been published now, and he said, What on earth 
are you doing, we sent you to get money. So that I take as 
evidence that he was sent there.53
Mr. Katz explained that Hillel Kook had been in London until
June 1940 and he was in a committee representing the Irgun in
which Katz was a member. Katz was suspicious of Kook’s intentions.
I wasn’t sure, but I suspected that he was not representing 
the Irgun. I knew something about the Irgun, I’d been 
attached to the Irgun before the war. and I thought he was 
just putting it on. I don’t, I still don’t know.S4
Katz speculated that perhaps Kook was originally asked by Raziel to
go to America and that he went from Poland to England instead. He
went on to America in June.
My impression is that he had no real business in London, 
but that his intention was to get to America in the first 
place and Raziel’s letter rather confirms that. What was he 
doing in America if he wasn’t collecting money? So I, there’s
53 Interview with Shmuel Katz by Joanna Saidel, November 1993, Tel Aviv.
M Ibid.
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no evidence. You see if you talk to these people, they don’t 
admit anything so you can’t get to the bottom of it .. .  how is 
it that they started an organization there before Jabotinsky 
came which had nothing to do with the Irgun? And he 
didn’t worked for the Irgun. The Irgun had no benefit from 
it at that time.55
Irgun Delegation member, Dr. Alex Raphaeli has rebutted Mr. 
Katz’s contentions that there were no documents to support the belief 
that the Irgun High Command sent the Kook group to America as 
their emissaries. Raphaeli feels that Mr. Katz’s charges are a bit 
naive. Raphaeli claimed that, in 1939, when the Irgun delegation 
came to the United States, the Irgun was an underground 
organization which didn’t write such documents. He said that if a 
command were given it would be in code and that not many open 
letters of the type that Mr. Katz required would ever have been 
written, as the British were hunting them everywhere. Dr. Raphaeli 
explained that while he admired Mr. Katz’s intellectual abilities (Mr.. 
Katz recently produced a monumental biography of Ze’ev Jabotinsky) 
he felt that Mr. Katz was incorrect in stating that Kook’s group may 
not have been sent by the Irgun. Dr. Raphaeli believes that Shmuel 
Katz’s controversy with the Irgun delegation is the result of Mr. 
Katz’s Revisionist leanings. Raphaeli stated that Katz believed the 
Irgun should be under the control of the party and resented and 
objected to their independence. These objections, Raphaeli argues,
65 Interview with Shmuel Katz by Joanna Saidel, November 1993, Tel Aviv.
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have led to Katz’s frequent questions, “Where are the documents?” 
and “Who sent you?” Raphaeli believes that Katz was a political 
animal, not a military man.
In further defense of his position, Dr. Raphaeli spoke with two 
members of the Irgun High Command, Aharon Heichmann, Vice- 
chairman of the Irgun Veterans, and Mr. Benjamin Zeroni, Irgun 
commander who also participated in Lechi activities.56 Dr. Raphaeli 
told them of Mr. Katz’s charges. Raphaeli was told by them that they 
would testily to the fact that the Irgun did indeed send a delegation 
(i.e. Kook’s group) to America and that they would provide a joint 
declaration to such effect to this writer.57
These documents were forthcoming and confirmed that the
Irgun had indeed sent the delegation to the United States. Mr.
Heichman and Mr. Zeroni wrote the following.
We would like to take reference to you letter dated 
November 29, 1993 to Dr. Alex Raphaeli regarding the 
question whether the Irgun Delegation, which was active in 
the USA from August 1939 until the end of WWII was 
indeed dispatched by the command of the IZL and whether 
there are any documents confirming this decision.
The implication would be that otherwise the delegation also 
called the “Committee,” the “Bergson Group,” was a self 
appointed body not representing the Jewish underground.
As two surviving members of the High Command of the
“ Zeroni’s activities in Lechi are recounted in Eliav’s book, Thp Wanted.
57 Conversation with Dr. Raphaeli from Jerusalem, by Joanna Saidel,, 
December 12,1993.
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Irgun of that period, we gladly confirm to you that our 
fighters headed by Mr. Hillel Kook, including Sam Merlin, Y. 
Ben Ami, A. Ben -Eliezer, and Alex Raphaeli (Nahshon, 
Hadani) indeed were appointed by the Irgun to be sent to 
the USA from the different bases of their work in Europe in 
order to conduct activities leading to the establishment of a 
Jewish Army, on the way to the creation of a Jewish State, to 
do the rescue work, saving as many as possible Jewish 
people from the terror of the Germans and bringing them to 
Israel.
Though during the World War II the contact between the 
USA and Palestine was very difficult, the delegation carried 
out, to the best of their ability, with a lot of initiative and 
courage this assignment
Irgun was an underground organization under the law of 
conspiracy especially in view of the British efforts to arrest 
and destroy our organization.
Obviously, there was neither protocols nor w ritten  
instructions, only in special cases contacting members 
abroad were coded messages used.
Every member of the Irgun who was supposed to be 
informed knew exactly about the decision of the High 
Command and who the members of the delegation were.
When the delegation started setting up the national 
committee for action in America public leaders, especially in 
the Jewish community, knew exactly the status of this 
delegation.
Mr. Jabotinsky, the President of NZO, while in the last 
months of his life, often addressed the delegation in writing 
and the title addressed was always “The delegation of the 
IZL”
These letters have been published and appear in the
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published archives of the IZL in 1990, Volume 1, #53-#54, 
p. 111-114.
There is a possibility that some persons involved in political 
work, for reasons of their own, might try to delegitimize the 
delegation, however, the publication of the work of the 
delegation is in numerous books covering recent Jewish 
history, research work at the universities, have this point 
absolutely clear in the spirit of the decision of the High 
Command
We wish you success in your important work,
Very sincerely yours,
Aharon Heichman (and) Benjamin Zeroni58
While both the New Zionist Organization and the Irgun 
Delegation stemmed from Jabotinsky’s Revisionist movement and, 
therefore, had Revisionist origins, the path of these two groups 
separated. The New Zionist Organization retained the political 
characteristics of the Revisionist Party. The Irgun Delegation 
deviated from Jabotinsky’s leadership, though continuing to respect 
and consult with him, and became an independent military organ 
which cut its ties to the Party altogether. The antagonism which 
existed between the New Zionist Organization and the Irgun 
Delegation was never totally resolved. The Irgun Delegation’s 
decision to act independently, as a m ilitary rather than political
68 Letter written to Joanna M. Saidel from Mr. Zeroni and Mr. Heichmann.
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entity, and, particularly, to establish a democratic, rather than a 
Jewish, state in Palestine, were the determining factors in Benzion 
Netanyahu’s decision to launch an all out attack on the Irgun 
Delegation. The term “Revisionist” and its application remain highly 
controversial within these groups to this day. It should stand that, 
while originating from the same Revisionist source, the members of 
the more militant Irgun Delegation to the United States were not 
Revisionists (i.e. were not participants in the Revisionist political 
party), in contrast to the members of the New Zionist Organization of 
America.
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CONCLUSIONS
The Irgun Delegation to the United States and the New Zionist 
Organization of America had both failures and successes in their 
efforts to influence American public opinion. Despite their tireless 
work, they failed to change the circumstances which affected the 
Jews of Europe.1 Nevertheless, the Irgun Delegation succeeded in 
procuring ships and arms for some rescue missions, providing 
intelligence to the United States government through their contact in 
Europe, Reuben Hecht, appealing to the public as non-sectarian 
(rather than as a uniquely Jewish organization), creating the 
foundations of the Jewish lobby in America, increasing awareness 
by stirring and challenging the American public, and possibly 
forestalling an outright pro-Arab foreign policy.
The New Zionist Organization was particularly effective in 
publicly confronting and challenging the anti-Zionist British policy in 
Palestine, in exposing the intentions of the British, and in changing 
the perception of the Palestine problem w ithin American 
government circles from a regional problem to a global concern.
The achievements of the N.Z.O. and the Irgun Delegation were 
primarily educational and political. They affected not only the Jewish 
community in the United States but the entire nation, broadening the
1 Raphaeli, p. 112.
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understanding of the plight of European Jewry and revealing the
results of the silence and isolation which surrounded it.
The bitter truth was that the Allies, after great sacrifices, won 
the war against Nazi Germany, whereas for the Jewish people the 
doors of Palestine remained closed, the Jews were isolated, and 
millions perished.2
The Kook and Netanyahu groups can be credited with creating 
a successful campaign for public support in the United States. Their 
contributions have been consistently overlooked in American Zionist 
historiography which generally credits the mainstream Zionist 
organizations with any successes achieved in the States. It is now 
evident however, that the work of the Irgun Delegation and the N.Z.O. 
was actually the precursor of effective mainstream Zionist activity in 
America in the 1940’s. Support for this analysis can be found in the 
writings of David Wyman, Monty Penkower, Walter Laqueur, Joseph 
Schectmann, and in the Hecht Archive. Walter Laqueur wrote that 
the Irgun Delegation, particularly Bergson and Ben Hecht, “organized 
a public relations campaign. . . which all but overshadowed the 
activities of the official Zionist movement.”3 Editors of the Hecht 
archive state that “scholarly literature on the subject has been 
dominated by a tendency to emphasize the rescue efforts undertaken 
by the “establishment” Jewish and Zionist groups.. .  and not those of
2 ibid.
3 Laqueur, p. 551.
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their rivals, the “dissident organizations.”4 David Wyman praised the
Irgun Delegation for their outstanding accomplishments.
As for Jewish groups in this country, the group that was 
most effective, I don’t think there is any question about it if 
you look at it objectively, was the Bergson group. Which is 
not to say that other Jewish groups weren’t active in trying 
to publicize and to build political pressure and to get action 
taken.. .  But, among the groups involved in that, it seems to 
me that the group that was most effective and the group 
that was most finely focussed on the issue was the Bergson 
group.s
For their time, both the Irgun Delegation and the New Zionist 
Organization operated in a highly innovative manner. Launching a 
nation wide advertisement campaign was considered new and 
daring.
It was a new dimension. It revolutionized American Jewry.
The criticism was: “How dare you write about Jewish things 
so big?” And we said, “Because they are big issues!” Who 
says the Jews are a small issue, or the Jews are a small 
people? We are not pygmies. We are people. It was an 
innovation also in American terms, by the way. No American 
organization had ever run a full page ad asking for money. 
Today now this is everybody’s style. Everybody runs ads.6
Another extremely important success for the Irgun Delegation 
and for the New Zionist Organization was the fact that these groups 
laid the foundations for the creation of the Jewish lobby in America.
4 Hecht Archive, p. ix.
5 Interview with David Wyman by Joanna Saidel, Canterbury, New 
Hampshire, August 20,1993.
“Kook interview with Kaufman, p. 36.
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This accomplishment had long term benefits to Israel which exist to 
this day. The congressional support garnered by these groups was 
the start of this activity to lobby Washington. Hillel Kook said, “We 
had close to 200 Congressmen and close to 40 Senators out of a total 
of 96. It is a lot of power. We were the real originators of the so- 
called “Jewish Lobby,” the pro-Israel lobby. And that kept us alive.7 
There was a great deal of congressional support for both groups, as 
well as high level administrative support, for the New Zionist 
Organization.8
When asked whether the Irgun Delegation founded the Jewish 
lobby in America, the former Prime Minister of Israel, Yitshak 
Shamir, stated that the Irgun Delegation was extremely important to 
the creation of the Jewish lobby in America. He stated that, during 
and after the war, emissaries of the Zionist movement and Jewish 
world organizations, such as Weizmann and Abba Eban, came to 
America and to the United Nations and contributed to the creation of 
the Jewish lobby, but that the Irgun Delegation pioneered the idea.9 
. . .  they (Weizmann, Eban, etc.) have started also a kind of
7 Ibid, p. 72.
‘ This question represents a major point of controversy between the Irgun 
Delegation and the New Zionist Organization. Both groups claim that they had 
the majority of Senatorial and Congressional support and that the other group 
had little or no such support. It  appears, in fact, that at one time or another 
each group had relatively strong support. As time passed some of the initial 
support gained by the Irgun was lost to the Revisionists simply by mistakes 
like the premature Bermuda Conference ad.
8 Interview with Yitzak Shamir by Joanna Saidel, the Knessett, Jerusalem,
Octoer 25,1993.
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Jewish lobby, but I think that Hillel was the pioneer of this 
idea. The pioneer, the first to create a Jewish lobby. . . he 
convinced some congressmen for the first time. Some not 
Jewish congressmen, to help him, to support h im .. .  this, I 
think, it was an achievement of the group of Hillel Kook.10
One of the most remarkable successes of both the Irgun 
Delegation and the New Zionist Organization was how much they 
were able to achieve with an almost insignificant number of 
organization members. The activist role of both the Irgun Delegation 
and the N.Z.O. forced mainstream Zionist agencies, which had isolated 
themselves, to reexamine their position, and, eventually, to end their 
silence. By 1943 the New Zionist Organization and the Irgun 
Delegation shamed the majority of American Jews into action. 
“Bergson and his followers remained an annoying, but perhaps 
healthy, stimulant for American Zionist leaders..
Irgun delegation member, Dr. Alex Raphaeli, stated, “At the 
very least, it would be fair to say that we helped to place the Jewish 
problem on the American agenda, thereby making it a matter of 
international concern.”12 This seems to be a very modest self- 
assessment.
While the war was going on, the Irgun Delegation focussed on 
the issue of rescue rather than focussing, as some Zionist groups had,
10 Ibid.
11 Aaron Berman, Nazism: The Tews and American Zionism. Ch. 5, “The 
American Zionist Lobby 1943-1945,” p. 131.
12 Raphaeli, Dream and Action, p. 97.
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primarily upon the issue of statehood. The lobbying efforts of the 
Irgun Delegation in this area were effective in drawing public 
attention to the atrocities being committed in Europe.
The Bergson group did, for the most part, move their 
focuses away from the statehood issue, which they also had 
been working on until we learn about mass annihilation in 
late 1942. They transferred most of their energies to rescue 
and, given the limited size and the limited resources they 
had, they achieved, I think, quite a good deal both in terms 
of publicizing the issue . . . which was a big problem 
because the press didn’t do it, and then also in terms of 
lobbying and getting support in Washington . . . 13
These rescue efforts during the war also accomplished positive 
results in Europe. There Reuben Hecht helped to relay intelligence 
to the White House through the American Council General and 
Zionist sympathizer, Samuel Edison Woods, to free captured U.S. 
airmen, to effect actual rescue missions, and to inform the United 
States government about Axis war plans.
The Irgun Delegation applied enough public and political 
pressure, particularly after the failed Bermuda Conference, to 
demand the creation of the War Refugee Board. The Irgun Delegation 
was one of the main forces that brought the War Refugee Board into 
existence.
This has been questioned by some historians and I would 
have to say they’re coming at it from a bias point of view.. .  
the conflict between the Bergson group back then and the
"Interview with David Wyman by Joanna Saidel, August 20, 1993,
Cantebury, New Hampshire.
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main Zionist groups, the Stephen Wise group and the Chaim 
Weizmann mainline Zionists, that conflict continues on to 
this day in certain Jewish circles.14
Hillel Kook commented about the creation of the War Refugee Board 
by saying, “The War Refugee Board was our biggest achievement and 
also our biggest failure. Hitler wasn’t killing refugees.”15
Menachem Begin commended the work of Hillel Kook. Begin 
stated, “His ingenuity in keeping a fierce light of publicity upon the 
Irgun’s struggle was an important factor in the success of the 
revolt”16
The tragedy of the activities of the Irgun Delegation and the
New Zionist Organization is that American mainstream Zionism
feared, resented, and, in fact, were jealous of the independent
activities of these fiercely independent groups. Had they been able to
work together in a concentrated lobbying effort, their power would
have been increased dramatically. A united Jewish effort could have
drastically altered the outcome of the fate of millions of Jews.
It is my opinion.. .  that if the American Jewish leadership, 
especially the Zionist leadership. .  .would not have hindered 
our activities, let alone joined with us or let us join with 
them - which we offered and nearly achieved - then 
probably as many as half the Jews of Europe would have 
been saved by governmental action.. .17
14 ibid.
16 Kaufman interview with Hillel Kook, October 27, 1981, p. 49.
18 Begin. The Revolt, p. 63. note.
17 Kook interview with Kaufman, October 27, 1981, p. 48-49.
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Perhaps the greatest achievement of the Irgun Delegation to 
the United States and of the New Zionist Organization of America was 
not the outright success of individual campaigns to raise a Jewish 
Army, to rescue the Jews of Europe, to establish a democratic Hebrew 
nation in Palestine, to combat the Mandate through anti-British 
propaganda, lobbying and boycotting. None of these missions was 
completely successful. Rather the greatest contribution which these 
organizations made was their constant struggle to place these issues 
on the American public agenda and, ultimately, onto the global 
agenda.
Our public relations campaign was very successful, and our 
movement included . . .  a cross-section of America. It was 
not a Jewish movement. In fact, the Jews were a minority 
and people from all sections and all walks of life were 
represented.. .18
This resulted in a far greater success than could have been 
achieved by pursuing individual targets, that is, the establishment of 
the only democracy in the region, the State of Israel. Had the N.Z.O. 
and Irgun Delegation not been so aggressive, statehood might have 
failed to come about. Palestine may have remained in British hands 
or become an Arab entity. A combination of events which includes 
the outbreak of the war, the extermination of a huge segment of the 
Jewish population of Europe, and the outcry which ensued from the
18 Raphaeli, p. 112.
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publicity efforts of the Irgun Delegation to the United States and the 
New Zionist Organization of America, culminated in the long sought 
dream, a Jewish National Home.
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APPENDIX A
PARTIAL LIST OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST, EXPULSIONS AND 
MURDER OF, THE JEWS -720 B.C. to 1969 AD.
720 B.C. Sargon makes Samaria an Assyrian province - Mass 
deportation of Israelites 
586 B.C. Destruction of Jerusalem - Mass deportation to Babylon 
411 B.C. Destruction of the temple of the Jewish community at 
Elephantine
348 B.C. Artaxerxes III deports a number of Jews to Hyrcania 
167 B.C. Antiochus IV outlaws the practice of Judaism and profanes 
66 B.C. Massacre of the Jews at Alexandria 
70 C.E. Destruction of Qumran community; Seige o f Jerusalem, 
destruction of temple; Fall of Masada 
325 C.E Christian Church formulates its policy toward the Jews: the 
Jews must continue to exist for the sake of Christianity in 
seclusion and humiliatian 
339 C.E. Constantius II prohibits marriage between Jews and 
Christians and possession of Christian slaves by Jews 
438 C.E. Thoedosius II Novellae against the Jews and heretics 
455 C.E Jews of Babylonia forbidden to keep the Sabbath 
470 C.E. Persecutions by Babylonian authorities 
525 C.E. End of Jewish kingdom in southern Arabia 
612 C.E. Severe legal measures against the Jews of Spain 
628 C.E. Dagobert I expels Jews from Frankish Kingdom
632 C.E. Heraclius decrees forced baptism
633 C.E. Severe legal measures against the Jews of Spain 
638 C.E. Jerusalem conquered by the Arabs
638 C.E. Severe legal measures against the Jews o f Spain
694-711 C.E Jewish religion outlawed in Spain
1012 C.E Expulsion from Mainz
1078 C.E. Jerusalem conquered by Seljuks
1096 -1099 C.E First Crusade
1096 C.E Crusaders massacre Jews of Rhineland
1099 C.E Jerusalem conquered by crusaders
1144 C.E. Blood Libel at Norwich, England
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1147-1149 C.E Second Crusade 
1171 C.E Destruction of the Blois community, France 
1182- 1198 C.E Expulsion of Jews from France 
1187 C.E Jerusalem captured by Saladin 
1190 C.E. Anti-Jewish riots in England; massacre at York 
1195-1196 C.E Anti-Jewish excesses at Speyer and Boppard 
(Germany/Austria)
1215 C.E. Fourth Lateran Council, Italy, introduces the Jewish Badge 
1222 C.E Council of Oxford, England, introduces discriminatory 
measures against Jews
1235 C.E. Blood Libel at Fulda (Germany/Austria)
1236 C.E. Persecutions against Jews in W. France 
1242 C.E. Burning of Talmud at Paris
1244 C.E. Jerusalem captured by the Khwarizims
1249 C.E. Innocent IV issues bull against blood libel, Italy
1255 C.E. Blood Libel at Lincoln, England
1263-1264 C.E. Jews of London sacked
1275 C.E. Statu turn dejudaismo, England
1285 C.E. Destruction of Jewish community of Munich, Germany
1288 C.E. Jews burned at Troyes, France
1290 C.E. Expulsion of Jews from England
1298-1299 C.E. Rindfleich persecutions (Germany/Austria)
1306 -1315 C.E. Expulsion of Jews from France 
1322-1359 C.E. Expulsion of Jews from the Kingdom of France 
1348 C.E. Black Death Massacres, Spain 
1348-1349 C.E. Black Death Massacres, France 
1348-1350 C.E. Black Death Massacres, Germany & Austria 
1356 C.E. Charles IV grants the Electors the privilege of taxing the 
Jews
1389 C.E. Massacre of Jewish community at Prague 
1391 C.E. Massacres and conversions, Spain 
1399 C.E. Blood libel at Poznan (Poland-Lithuania)
1415 C.E Benedict XIII (Italy) orders censorship of Talmud 
1420 C.E Expulsion of Jews from Lyons 
1424 C.E Expulsion of Jews from Cologne
1427 C.E. Papal edict prohibits transportation of Jews to Eretz Israel 
in ships of Venice and Ancona 
1435 C.E. Massacre and conversion of Jews of Majorca 
1439 C.E. Expulsion of Jews from Augsburg
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1452-1453 C.E John of Capistrano incited persecutions and 
expulsions of Jews from Germany & Austria 
1454 C.E. Privileges revoked; riots against Jews in Cracow 
1473 C.E. Expulsion of Jews from Mainz
1473 C.E. Marranos of Valladolid and Cordoba massacred
1474 C.E. Marranos of Segovia massacred
1475 C.E. Blood libel of Trent
1480 C.E. Inquisition established in Spain
1483 C.E. Expulsion of Jews from Warsaw
1492 C.E. Expulsion of Jews from Sicily
1492 C.E Expulsion of Jews from Castile and Aragon
1495-1503 C.E. Expulsion of Jews from Lithuania
1496-1497 C.E Expulsion of Jews from Portugal; mass forced 
conversion
1499 C.E. Expulsion of Jews from Nurenberg
1506 C.E. Massacre of Marranos in Lisbon
1510 C.E. Expulsion of Jews from Brandenburg
1516 C.E. Eretz Israel conquered by the Turks
1519 C.E. Expulsion of Jews from Regensburg
1531 C.E. Inquisition established in Portugal
1541 C.E Expulsion of Jews from Naples
1541 C.E. Expulsion of Jews from Prague and crown cities
1544 C.E. Luther attacks the Jews
1550 C.E Expulsion of Jews from Genoa
1551 C.E. Expulsion of Jews from Bavaria
1553 C.E. Burning of Talmud, Italy
1554 C.E. Censorship of Hebrew books introduced in Italy
1555 C.E. Paul IV orders that Jews be confined to ghettos
1556 C.E. Burning of Marranos in Ancona, Italy
1567 C.E Expulsion of Jews from the Republic of Genoa 
1569 C.E Expulsion of Jews from the Papal States 
1584 C.E. Gregory XIII orders compulsory sermons to Jews 
1593 C.E Expulsion of Jews from Papal States 
1597 C.E Expulsion of Jews from Milan
1614 C.E Fettmilch’s attack upon the Jews of Frankfort
1615 C.E. Expulsion of Jews from Worms 
1624 C.E Ghetto established at Ferrara, Italy 
1648-1649 C.E. Chmielnicki massacres (Poland-Lithuania) 
1649 C.E. Expulsion of Jews from Hamburg
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1655-1656 C.E. Massacres during wars of Poland against Sweden and 
Russia
1670 C.E. Blood libel in Metz, France
1670 C.E Expulsion of Jews from Vienna
1687 C.E Jews of Paznan attacked (Poland-Lithuania)
1712 C.E Jews of Sandomierz expelled after blood libel
1734-1736 C.E. Attacks by the Haidamacks (Poland-Lithuania)
1745-1748 C.E Expulsion of Jews from Prague
1750 C.E. Severe legislation against the Jews in Prussia
1775 C.E. Anti-Jewish edict of Pius VI, Italy
1793 C.E Attack on the ghetto in Rome
1819 C.E “ Hep! Hep!” riots
1824 C.E. Expulsion of Jews from the villages of Russia 
1826-1835 C.E Velizh blood libel
1839 C.E. Entire community of Meshed (Persia) forced to convert to 
Islam
1840 C.E Damascus blood libel; restoration of Turkish rule in Eretz Q_ 
Israel
1847 C.E. Anti-Jewish riots in Prussia
1848 C.E. Anti -Jewish riots in Austria-Hungary 
1871-1872 C.E. Attacls on Jews of Rumania 
1879 C.E Kutais blood libel
1881-1882 C.E. Pogroms sweep southern Russia; beginning of mass 
emigration of Jews 
1882 C.E. Tiszaeszlar blood libel 
1885 CE Expulsion of Russian refugees 
1891 C.E. Expulsion of Jews from Moscow 
1891 C.E Xanten blood libel
1894 C.E. Dreyfus trial
1895 C.E Anti-semitic league organized in Rumania 
1900 C.E Konitz blood libel, Germany
1903 C.E. Pogrom in Kishinev (Russia-Poland)
1905 C.E. Pogroms; mass emigration (Russia-Poland)
1906 C.E Pogroms in Russia 
1909-1910 C.E. Polish boycott against Jews 
1910 C.E. Expulsion of Jews from Kiev 
1917 C.E. The British capture Jerusalem 
1919 C.E. Pogroms in Hungary
1919 C.E. Pogroms in Ukraine and Poland
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1919 C.E. Abolishment of community organization and 
Jewish institutions in Russia
1924 C.E Economic restrictions on Jews in Poland; attempt to settle 
Jews in Crimea
1929 C.E. Massacres in Hebron and Safed (Arab riots in Jerusalem)
1933 C.E anti-Jewish economic boycott in Germany
1935 C.E. Nuremberg Laws deprived all German Jews (i.e. anyone 
who was one-quarter Jewish blood or more) of rights of 
citizenship or intermarriage
1936 C.E Pogrom in Przytyk (Poland)
1937 C.E Discrimination against Jews in Polish universities
1937 C.E. Anti-Semitic legislation in Rumania
1938 C.E. Anti-Jewish economic legislation in Hungary
1938 C.E. Pogroms in Vienna; anti-Jewish legislation; Deportations 
from Austria begin
1938 C.E Kristallnacht; economic ruin of German Jews
1938 C.E. Racial legislation in Italy
1938 C.E Many Hungarian Jews lose citizenship
1939 C.E. Pogroms in Poland (after Nazi invasion)
1939 C.E. Anti-Jewish laws in the Protectorate (Czechoslovakia)
1940 C.E Formation of ghettos in Poland
1940 C.E. Discrimination laws of the Vichy regime
1940-1945 C.E. A total of 139,000 Jewish victims from the 
Netherlands, Belgium. Italy, Scandinavia, Switzerland
1941 C.E. Pogroms against Jews in Kaunas and Lvov, massacres by 
Einsatzgruppen in occupied Russia; expulsions of Jews from the 
Reich to Poland; first death camp established in Poland at 
Chelmno
1941 C.E Pogrom in Jassy (Rumania)
1941 C.E. Anti-Jewish laws in Slovakia
1941 C.E. Jewish emigration from Germany prohibited
1941 C.E Opening of concentration camp at Drancy ( France)
1941-1944 C.E 83,000 Jews of France deported from and murdered
1942 C.E. Massacres in occupied Russia continue, death camps at 
Auschwitz, Maidanek and Treblinka begin to function at full 
capacity; transports from the ghettos to death camps
1942-1944 C.E. Mass transports of Jews to Auswitz from Belgium and 
Holland
1943 C.E. Transports from all over Europe bring Jews to death camps
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in Poland; Warsaw ghetto revolt; Annihilation of most of the 
ghettos of Poland and Russia
1943-1944 C.E 7,500 Italian Jews murdered
1944 C.E. Extermination of Hungarian Jews began
1944-1945 C.E A total of 557,000 Jewish victims from Rumania, 
Hungary, Greece, and Yugoslavia
1945 C.E A total of 125,000 Jews of Germany murdered
1945 C.E A total of 342,000 Jewish of Austria and Czechoslovakia 
murdered
1945 C.E A total of 4,565,000 Jews of Poland murdered
1946 C.E Pogroms at Kielce and other places of mass emigration 
1948 C.E Jewish culture in U.S.S.R. repressed and intellectuals shot 
1956 C.E. Jews of Egypt expelled
1969 C.E. Jews executed in Iraq
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APPENDIX B
The following is the complete text from the Congressional Record of 
Senator Mead’s speech favoring the creation of a Jewish Army.
Congressional Record
Proceedings and debates of the 77th Congress, Second Session
A Jewish Armv 
Extension of Remarks of 
HON. JAMES E. MURRAY 
of Montana 
In the Senate of the United States 
Wednesday, May 6, 1942 (Legislative day April 30, 1942)
Mr. Murray. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have 
printed in the Appendix of the Record a very able address delivered 
by the distinguished Senator from New York [Mr. Mead] at a dinner 
given in New York at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel on May 3, 1942, 
discussing the proposal for the creation of a Jewish Army.
There being no objection, the address was ordered to be 
printed in the Record, follows:
Pierre Van Paassen belongs to that small group of men to 
whom America and world democracy will forever be indebted. For 
Mr. Van Paassen is one of the most distinguished members of that 
fellowship of journalists who have been trying to arouse us to what 
has been happening in the world. With sustained eloquence, 
crusading fervor, desperate urgency, he has been hammering away 
at us, “that it was later than any of us thought.” If we have finally 
awakened, Mr. Van Paassen has played an important role in that 
awakening.
But Van Paassen has done much more than to provide us with 
mere recital o f events. He has helped us to understand the real 
meaning of those events. He recognized long ago that the vast 
struggle in which we of the United Nations are now engaged, is much 
more than a battle for spoils. It is more than a clash of empires. Its
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roots lie deeper than the megalomania of a Hitler, a Mussolini, or a 
Japanese war clique. This war, Van Paassen has been telling us for 
years, is a total war. It is a total war not simply because it covers the 
earth and the seas and the heavens; it is a total war because it is a 
death struggle between civilizations; between diametrically opposed 
conceptions of life, between those who would preserve for all the 
opportunity to go forward to greater freedom and greater progress, 
and those who would impose a system of slavery on all mankind. 
And because it is that kind of total war, the faiths and the hopes and 
the ideals of men, are weapons no less important than the arms they 
wield. We need total mobilization of all our spiritual and moral 
weapons.
It has taken us a long time to develop that conception of total 
war. Indeed, the fact that we must meet as late as May 1942 to 
demand the formation of a Jewish army is distressing proof that we 
have not even yet fully understood that conception. If  we did, there 
would today be in the Middle East, in Palestine, around Suez, a 
Jewish army fighting proudly and equally with all other peoples in 
the cause of liberty and freedom.
We have passed through several stages in our thinking about 
the war. There was a period that will go down in history as the 
Munich period, when we thought we could safeguard democracy by 
bargaining with its enemies, by making a deal with tyranny. 
September 3, 1939, shattered that illusion. On that day the lesson 
was written in letters of blood for all to see; in a world that had been 
shrunk to a fraction of its former size by the achievements of science, 
democracy and Naziism could not live side by side.
But even after that date we persisted in illusions. There were 
many of us in this country who thought we could defeat the forces of 
darkness by helping our friends with materials, by providing them 
with arms with which to smash the common foe. That, indeed, saved 
democracy from defeat But it could not give us victory. The Japanese 
shattered that illusion for us. On December 7, 1941, we finally 
learned that we could not save ourselves from slavery merely by 
building the arms for others to use. We, ourselves, had to take up 
those arms. We, ourselves, had to man the planes and the ships and 
the tanks we were building. We had to take our place in the fighting 
ranks of humanity, shoulder to shoulder with all the brave and 
gallant peoples who had been facing the fury of the Axis attack
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But even at this late hour, our conception of total war is still 
inadequate. We are still far from complete mobilization of our 
material resources. We are even further from total mobilization of 
our moral strength. And by that, I mean simply this: There are 
throughout the world, in the ranks of the United Nations, on the side 
of democracy - yes: and among the conquered peoples of Europe- 
great reservoirs of strength which we are failing to use. There are 
sources of manpower and materials we are not enlisting in our battle 
for freedom. There are powerful ideals and values and aspirations, 
which we are failing fully to utilize. And those faiths and ideals, as I 
have already suggested, are no less important to us in this war of 
“faiths and ideals” than the weapons our factories are producing.
For years we made the mistake of trying to compromise with 
our sworn enemies. We are paying in blood, sweat and tears for that 
mistake. Today we are committing another grave error. We are 
failing to use to the full, the energies and loyalties and abilities of all 
our friends.
For years, we made the mistake of trying to compromise with 
our democratic ideals. Today we are repeating that mistake. We are 
not fully mobilizing our moral resources. We are failing to make 
imaginative and aggressive use of the dynamic power of freedom 
and equality. We are failing to give to the peoples of the world a 
ringing and inspiring affirmation, not merely of the things we are 
fighting against but of the things we are fighting for.
The need for, the very existence of your committee for an army 
of stateless and Palestinian Jews - a cause to which I am proud to 
give my fullest support - is eloquent proof of our failure to 
understand the meaning of total war. I am no military strategist. I 
have no access to the plans of the Axis general staffs. I don’t pretend 
to understand Hitler’s intuitions. But I do know a few plain and 
simple facts. Hitler is on the edge of the Caucasus attempting a drive 
to the east. The Japanese are in Burma driving west. Rommel is in 
Libya heading for Suez. That to me means clearly one thing: That the 
Axis forces are making a gigantic attempt to converge on the Middle 
East; that Hitler wants to grasp with his mailed fist that has crushed 
so many brave peoples the treacherous hand of the Japanese, 
dripping with the blood of the heroes of Baatan and Singapore, and 
Java. And I know one other thing: Suez is virtually the last bastion 
we command between Malta and Australia. Its loss would be a
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catastrophe.
Iraq and Iran are among the last remaining sources of oil - the 
most vital of all commodities in this war of machines. That oil is no 
less vital for our victory than it would be for Axis fortunes. My 
business is not prophesy, at least not prophesying the result of 
military campaigns. But you don’t have to be a prophet to realize that 
the next major theatre of conflict is bound to be the Near and Middle 
East.
Again let me repeat, I am no m ilitary strategist. But it is 
absolutely obvious that if we were really lighting a total war, we 
should be mobilizing every single person in that area, every bit of 
material that is available there. We should be attempting to inspire 
democracy’s friends in the Near East with the unflinching 
determination, with the unbreakable resolve, to throw back the 
assault the Axis is preparing to unleash.
Are we doing that? Are we really applying to the Near East the 
lessons we learned in Singapore, in Crete, in Hong Kong? The 
existence of your committee for a Jewish Army is the reply to that 
question. And it is a negative reply.
For the plain facts are that at this vary moment there stands in 
the Near East, 75 miles from Suez, the modem Jewish community of 
Palestine. A half million strong. A community pulsating with creative 
energy; possessed of an amazing degree of special skills and abilities; 
passionately dedicated to the cause of democracy and freedom; 
aware to a man that its alternatives are the victory of world 
democracy or death; desperately anxious to fight back against the 
oppressor who began his ruthless attack on civilization by attacking 
the Jewish people. Already, Jewish Palestine has made a magnificent 
contribution to the cause of the United Nations. It has given of itself, 
of its men and materials far beyond its numbers and size. The 
heroism of those Jews who fought and died so bravely in Crete, in 
Greece, in Libya, on the Mediterranean, will ennoble the annals not 
only of Jewish history, but the pages of world history.
But there are still many tens of thousands of able-bodied Jews 
in Palestine who clamour for the opportunity to fight in this common 
battle for civilization. There are tens of thousands of stateless Jews 
throughout the world who have been given no place in the ranks of 
the United Nations. Joined together in the ranks of a Jewish army, 
these people would constitute a m ilitary force that would
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immeasurably strengthen the position of the United Nations in the 
Near East. Fighting under the inspiration of their own symbols, they 
would be raised to a pitch of enthusiasm that would make them a 
fighting force second to none. Granting the Jews of Palestine equality 
among the United Nations in this struggle, would inspire oppressed 
people everywhere. We would be offering living proof of our 
determination to restore the freedom of which they have been so 
cruelly robbed.
I do not want to attempt any analysis of the reasons why we 
have failed to organize the Jews of Palestine into a Jewish army. 
Surely we should have realized by this time that in total war nothing 
less than total mobilization of all our men and materials and energies 
everywhere w ill suffice to give us victory. Surely we should 
recognize that to discriminate against the Jews, living in their 
national homeland, by refusing them the status and dignity we have 
granted to all other free peoples, is to set aside the sacred principles 
for which we are fighting.
Our refusal, I fear very much, is a hangover of an earlier period 
in our thinking and politics. It is a hangover of the attempt to win 
doubtful friends and to influence wavering people. Today, we can 
have no patience with such efforts. Less appeasement and more 
vision, less fear and more courage- these are the urgent needs of the 
moment. And there, in Palestine, is one vital instance where we can 
demonstrate such statesmanship and vision and courage.
If, we of the United Nations were to say tonight: “Jews of 
Palestine. You, who know so well the meaning of persecution and 
slavery, and who therefore so profoundly appreciate the meaning of 
freedom and human dignity. You who are so desperately anxious to 
join in crushing the common enemy of all mankind. We want you to 
join with us in that struggle. We want you to join, not as you already 
so magnificently have done, as an anonymous entity, as a people 
whose name the communiques dare not mention. We want you with 
us as a full partner in battle and, therefore, as a full partner in 
freedom. And we want you to unfurl in the society of nations, the 
Jewish banner, that inspiring symbol which through your glorious 
work in Palestine, you have made synonymous with courage, with 
heroism, with unbreakable resolve. We will use every man you can 
muster. We want every resource you can command. We need every 
atom of energy you possess.”
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My friends, if we were to say that to the Jews of Palestine 
tonight, do you think Adolf Hitler would be very happy? I hardly 
think so-and for a very simple reason. Such a declaration would 
mean that we of the United Nations are finally determined never 
again to repeat the tragedy of “too little and too late.” It would mean 
that we are acting in time to safeguard one of the most valuable 
bastions in our possession by mobilizing every available man, every 
available resource for its defense. It would mean that we have 
finally learned that to win this war, we must mobilize democracy’s 
friends everywhere. It would mean that we have determined to use 
to the fullest the tremendous dynamic of the democratic ideal. It 
would mean that we have begun to implement our promises to the 
oppressed and conquered peoples of the world by granting dignity 
and equality to all people who are fighting with us in freedom’s 
battle.
That a Jewish army will be organized in the Near East, I have 
little doubt. I know that military necessity, elementary justice, and 
simple common sense w ill ultimately triumph. But will we act in 
time?
That, in Palestine no less than elsewhere, w ill determine 
whether we are doomed to years of devastating and costly conflict or 
whether we shall go forward, speedily, resolutely, efficiently, to that 
certain victory on which the future of civilization depends.
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APPENDIX C
Extension of Remarks 
of
Hon. James M. Mead 
of New York 
In the Senate of the United States 
Thursday, May 7, 1942
Mr. Mead. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have inserted 
in the Appendix of the Record a notable address delivered by my 
distinguished colleague, the junior Senator from Montana [Mr. 
Murray], at the testimonial dinner for Pierre Van Paassen, sponsored 
by the Committee for an Army of Palestinian and Stateless Jews, on 
Sunday evening, May 3, 1942, at the Waldorf - Astoria Hotel, New 
York City.
There being no objection, the address was ordered to be 
printed in the Record, as follows:
Mr. Toastmaster, our honored and distinguished guest, Pierre 
Van, Paassen of the Committee for an Army of Palestinian and 
Stateless Jews, ladies and gentlemen, I am happy to be here tonight 
and to have the privilege of taking part in this program. Like all true 
Americans, I am proud of the fact that I live in a country which 
possesses the highest measure of freedom and liberty in the world - 
a country where it is possible for men and women of all races or 
creeds to freely assemble, as we do here tonight, and express 
ourselves openly and fearlessly on any subject relating to human 
liberty and justice.
Today, the eyes and thoughts of all humanity are focused on 
that cruel and deadly struggle now taking place on the battlefields of 
Europe and other far- flung areas of the world - a struggle which will 
determine the future of civilization and of freedom for centuries to 
come. In this great sanguinary battle which will decide the shape of 
things for the future there must be no irremediable mistakes; there 
must be no failure to mobilize to the fullest degree all the ideological 
foes of Hitler’s totalitarian philosophy, wherever they may be found. 
All the vital forces of the world, wherever they exist, opposed to the 
pagan doctrines of Hitler, must be mobilized in this fight for human 
liberty and justice.
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When I first heard through the press of the activities of your 
committee for a Jewish army, I was frankly skeptical of the proposal. 
To me it seemed improper to suggest an armed force made up of 
members of a particular race or religion. It did not appear to me to 
be in harmony with American principles of common citizenship in 
this free country of ours-a country where our Jewish fellow citizens 
have always carried their full share of responsibility as Americans, 
and where they are today carrying out in the fullest measure their 
share of the war burden. It had seemed to me at first that there 
should not be any talk of any special Jewish army. But since I have 
come to study and understand the plan, I can see that a Jewish army 
composed solely and entirely of Palestinian and stateless Jews can be 
made a most effective force for the defeat of Hitler’s campaign in the 
Middle East. It is, of course, not contemplated that this army is to be 
organized in this country. It will mobilize a substantial force of free 
men, not now organized, in an area where they are needed, men 
whose intense feelings have been aroused and who will constitute a 
fighting force to reckon with our enemies.
In this plan I see no intention whatsoever of differentiating, 
directly or indirectly, between Americans of Jewish and other stocks 
in their proper participation in the war effort. The plan is to organize 
those fighting men of Palestine who are now unorganized and who 
can, under this proposal, be made a very effective factor in the 
defeat of Hitler. With this understanding of the proposal, I have no 
hesitation in saying that I am an enthusiastic advocate of such an 
army.
The United Nations cannot afford to overlook the offer of a 
middle eastern Jewish army. They cannot ignore a proposal designed 
to strengthen physically and morally the democratic forces of the 
world by the creation of a new army of a couple hundred thousand 
fighting men who have been uncompromising foes of Hitler ever 
since his ascension to power.
It is easy to see that on purely moral and Christian grounds an 
indisputable case can be established for the formation of an army 
made up of Palestinian and stateless Jews. We all know that 
followers of the Christian faith for years before the outbreak of the 
war have stood aghast at the barbarous persecution of Jews by the 
Nazi regime in Germany. Yet, because of the principles of 
international law and diplomatic relations between countries, they
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were unable to do much about i t  But now we are engaged in a life- 
and-death struggle for the preservation of democracy and of 
Christianity itself, and to insure victory we must mobilize every 
available force in the world.
These stateless Jews feel bound by the dictates of honor and 
the preservation of their ideals, to offer themselves in this struggle, 
It seems clear to me that we in this country should do everything in 
our power to remove any technical obstacles to the accomplishment 
of their purpose and the vindication of their honor. This is the least 
we can do to atone for the years of inaction and idleness during 
which we permitted Hitler to expand his military power and cany on 
his inhuman efforts to annihilate both Jewry and Christendom in 
Germany and mass his forces for a supreme attack against world 
civilization.
On moral grounds the case for a Jewish army, as I see it, is a 
case so logical and unanswerable that there can be no basis for 
questioning it. I will not undertake to pursue this point further.
But wholly aside from a moral basis for the establishment of a 
Jewish army, as proposed by your committee, there is a selfish 
reason for such a plan. That selfish reason is that the United Nations 
needs a Jewish army in the Middle East as part and parcel of a total 
pattern of world strategy essential to destroy Hitler. It is not 
necessary to be a m ilitary expert to realize that the Jewish army 
which is here proposed would be a very substantial reinforcement to 
the armies opposing Hitler in the Middle East In that theatre of the 
war there is an absolute need for all the possible manpower that can 
be mustered to block the advance of the Nazi forces.
In connection with this matter I am thinking always of the 
main fact that this war must be won and Hitler must be destroyed. It 
requires only common sense to understand that the m ilitary 
situation today is such that if we are to win, we must put into the 
field armed forces in the greatest possible number and at the most 
strategic points. Right where this army will be assembled is one of 
the most strategic areas of the war. If, therefore, there is such 
manpower available-manpower that can be depended upon to fight 
to the last breath of life rather than surrender - why should there be 
the slightest hesitation to make use of it? This is especially obvious 
since these armed forces you are proposing to organize are located 
substantially right in the area involved, and w ill, therefore, not
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require the use of our extremely lim ited shipping facilities for 
transportation.
Thus, for selfish reasons alone, we in this country should have 
undertaken to encourage this idea of a Jewish army if it had not 
already been proposed.
As the eleventh hour of this desperate global conflict 
approaches, no time remains for futile discussion. This proposal is a 
practical one. The Jewish army is not a theory; it is not a vague idea; 
it is a fact which can be realized if our ally, Great Britain, wills it so. I 
feel certain that the British people and their military leaders desire 
this army, and that their recognized political leaders, Churchill and 
Cripps, will surely approve it.
We in this country find it difficult to understand why there 
should be any hesitation by the British Government in giving 
wholehearted approval to the plan of a Jewish army. If it were a 
matter to be decided by the American people, I know what the 
decision would be. A plan which proposes that tens of thousands of 
intrepid young Jews of Palestine and the Middle East should be given 
an opportunity to oppose Hitler’s bloody march toward India and the 
subjugation of the world would be instantly accepted. If there were 
a matter to be decided here, this proposed Jewish army would be 
mobilized without a moment’s delay.
My friends, it is my belief that the establishment of this Jewish 
army, if carried out, w ill prove to be of great value - yes, a very vital 
step in the conduct of our total war against the Axis Powers. I wish 
your committee Godspeed in your efforts, and I give you my full 
assurance of unqualified support.




The Tewish Armv 
Extension of Remarks 
of
Hon. James A  Shanley 
of Connecticut 
In the House of Representatives 
Tuesday, May 12,1942
Mr. Shanley. Mr. Speaker, under leave to extend my remarks in the 
Record, I include the address of Alfred A. Strelsin, chairman of the 
executive board, Committee for a Jewish army, delivered at the 
Waldorf - Astoria on May 3,1942.
It gives a vivid story of the movement which all of us who are 
fighting the Axis ought to know. It speaks for itself:
Honored guests, ladies, and gentlemen, this dinner is a 
testimonial to Pierre Van Paassen, well-known author, war 
correspondent and lecturer: A great humanitarian, a fighter for 
freedoms and the dignity of man. To Pierre Van Paassen, the 
chairman for the committee for an army of stateless and Palestinian 
Jews.
This committee is composed of hundreds of leading American 
men and women of all walk of life, including Congressmen, Senators, 
and men of high places in the Army and the Navy, who, with their 
now millions of followers, are urging England to permit the creation 
of an army of stateless and Palestinian Jews to fight under allied 
command.
You might ask “why should we in America be concerned with 
an army in the Near East?” The answer is very simple. The Near East 
means one of the largest and richest oil areas in the world - Iraq and 
Iran. The Near East means the pathway to the world’s greatest pincer 
movement - the Near East means the back door to Russia - and the 
gateway to the Suez Canal; the life line for supplies that keep all our 
Allies fighting. The Near East means Palestine, the land of religions 
and the cradle of civilization; the land that now has become one of
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the most strategic center points of the war because of its proximity to 
the Suez Canal - only 75 miles away - the Palestine that Jewish 
people, with superhuman zeal, sweat, and blood, have in one 
generation, transformed from an empty desert into a land rich with 
fine farms, golden orange groves and swiftly growing modern cities.
These Palestinian Jews, who have conquered the soil, the rocks, 
and all the natural obstacles, who know the terrain and understand 
guerrilla warfare, together with their stateless and disinherited 
brethren scattered through the Near East, 200,000 strong, are 
offering themselves to be organized into an army to protect the Suez 
Canal. Ordinarily, 200,000 men would not appear to be very 
important, but today there are only 350,000 Allied soldiers in the 
entire Near East, an area larger than the United States; and because 
of the difficulty of transportation, an additional 200,000 men on the 
scene may be the deciding factor in the most significant battle of the 
world’s greatest struggle. Only today copies arrived in this country 
of the London Daily M irror that contain a statement of General 
Wavell to the effect that the reason they lost the Far East was due to 
their use of practically untrained soldiers as they dared not further 
deplete their already inadequate forces of the Near and Middle East 
by the transfer of a few much - needed divisions from there.
The now stateless Jews were the first to feel the persecutions 
and sadistic oppression of the brutal Nazis. It is these men who have 
seen their homes destroyed, their families murdered, their women 
mutilated, who want to fight these fiendish Huns; men who would 
fight with a fanaticism that only the experience of such horrors 
makes possible, and who, knowing their fate if captured, would fight 
to the death. These people constitute the only manpower available on 
the spot and with thousands of them army trained, having escaped 
from the defeated armies of Czechoslovakia, Greece, Yugoslavia, and 
other unhappy nations, become the men of the hour. With a 
background, the results of which may decide this war, America must 
be and is concerned. With our Allies calling upon us for men and 
materials for the Near East, some 12,000 miles away, and with a 
recognized shortage of transports and convoys, it becomes important 
to America that all existing manpower in any section of the world, 
who are imbued with the spirit of democracy and world freedom, 
should be utilized.
Yes, we plead with England to permit the creation of this army
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
329
so that they, too, may fight for the universal cause of democracy and 
for the extermination of the verminous Nazi - Fascist menace, in 
concert with all other people who are fighting for the emancipation of 
the world. One doesn’t have to be devout to feel that there is some 
sort of religious destiny in the fact that these 200,000 stateless and 
Palestinian Jews are now available to prevent Hirohito from shaking 
bloody hands with Hitler. Perhaps the moral law of retribution is 
about to come into its own.
This dinner marks the closing of the first chapter of our 
campaign, known as the formative stage. The second chapter will be 
devoted to making this army idea a reality. Through the use of the 
press, the radio, and the speakers’ platforms, we hope to impress 
Great Britain with the American public desire to give concrete 
expression to Churchill’s recent statement that this is not a war for 
territorial controls, nor subordination of people, but for the freedom 
of the world, the dignity of man, and equality of all races, colors, and 
creeds - which utterances were so deservedly lauded by the well - 
known commentator, Upton Close, last Sunday.
We know that the thinking Americans w ill help us find the 
financial means with which to do this, and we fervently hope that 
before long we shall have another dinner - that one to be held in 
celebration of the accomplished fact
And now, I have the privilege of introducing the next speaker 
of the evening, one of the most distinguished citizens of the State of 
New York, with a defense record that marks him one of America’s 
leading statesmen, whose constant fighting for humanity has 
indelibly inscribed him in our heart - the Honorable James M. Mead, 
United States Senator from the great State of New York.




On the Jewish Army
Extension of Remarks of 
Hon. Andrew L. Somers of New York 
In the House of Representatives 
Thursday, May 7, 1942
Mr. Somers of New York. Mr. Speaker, under leave to extend 
my remarks in the Record, I include an address delivered by Peter 
Bergson, national director of the Committee for a Jewish Army, at a 
dinner given at the Waldorf - Astoria Hotel on May 3,1942:
The President of the United States, in his striving for 
truth and righteousness, is looking for a name to baptize this war. 
The need and difficulty in naming the present war stems from the 
fact that the question, “When did this war start?” remains 
unanswered.
Pierre Van Paassen, like any prophet and fighter for 
justice, does not recognize strictly official data and chronology. Before 
September 1939 there were bloody rehearsals on many theatres of 
war on the globe - in China, Abyssinia, Spain, and Palestine. Van 
Paassen watched and understood the meaning of these rehearsals. 
Through his books, articles, and lectures, he became a herald and 
prophet of the fight against fascism and Naziism.
We Palestinian Jews have had the arduous task of 
meeting the spearhead of the fascist and Nazi tyrants in the Middle 
East long before 1939. We took up weapons in our hands in order to 
fight a sub - war, provoked and led by Axis agitators and officers and 
Arab-Nazis like the ex-Mufti of Jerusalem. For three years there 
raged in Palestine a ruthless campaign which murdered not only 
Jewish men, women, and children but also British officials and 
soldiers. We were forced to meet the enemy with rifles and bombs. 
We who met these Axis vanguards on the hills of Judea and Galilee, 
in the slums of Jerusalem and Haifa, on the roads of Tel Aviv and 
Yafa; we who were forced to answer with force the Nazi provocations 
against the Jews and the British from 1936; we representatives of
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this Palestinian youth are here in full dress at a banquet and 
conference begging the right to continue this fight against Naziism 
and fascism we started long ago-now, when the whole of humanity is 
struggling for survival.
This was the era of the Chamberlains and Daladiers, of 
Munich and Berchesgaden. Appeasement was at its height not only in 
London and Paris, but also in Cairo and Jerusalem. And then the time 
came when the world began to awake and recognize its mortal 
enemies - a world war was on and millions of people died for 
blunders of their misguided leaders. The weakened democracies are 
straining every ounce of energy to stem the tide, and yet, the people 
standing the brunt of the enemy’s attack for years before, single - 
and empty-handed, without friends or support from the big free 
world around them, are still denied equal opportunity to fulfill their 
duty in the crusade for the destruction of the now common foe.
And yet the Jews of Palestine today are submitted to the 
shameful status of “Schutz-Juden” - protected Jews. Use your 
imagination, free Americans, and try to understand what 100,000 
sturdy Palestinian Jews feel, when submitted to forced passivity - 
have their parents, wives, and children and their country defended 
by Americans, Englishmen, Poles, Czechs, and Frenchmen - protected 
Jews, second-grade citizens of God’s earth.
So, my colleagues and I came here with a message, a message 
to a great people , who have been destined to save the world. “Give 
the Jews of Palestine and those disinherited Jews of the world guns, 
airplanes, and tanks. Give them a flag-create a Jewish army.”
Nothing can express more concisely the differences between 
the evil of Nazidom and the justice of the United Nations, than the 
Jewish army on our side of the front.
One of the greatest battles of history was won with the 
command “England expects every man to do his duty.” Every man did 
his duty, and England became the mightiest sea power in the world. I 
know of no more concise a form to express the message we brought 
to this country than those historic words of Nelson. We Said, “We 
want to do our duty.” Two hundred thousand men want to fulfill 
their duty in the world that was plunged into a frightful, chaotic, and 
bloody mess, just because so many people failed to fulfill their duties. 
It is only because this same world has not freed itself of an unjust 
and futile discrimination that these 200,000 jews are being
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prevented from fulfilling their duty for their people and dignity and 
human civilization.
In these United States, the land of human liberties and genius, 
the reception to our cause was as complete as we had dared hope. 
First, came a symbol of America’s greatness, a giant of letters, a 
brave soldier, and a prophet of his generation - Pierre Van Paassen, 
Dutch by birth, Canadian on the field of battle, and yet, so completely 
and cherished an American.
W ith prophetic clarity he foresaw the trend of future 
developments. “The Axis’ march around the oceans, the conquest by 
land of Malaya and Singapore, and the pending climatic battle of the 
Middle East. Then came other great Americans, admirals, generals, 
statesmen, presidents of universities, and thousands of everyday 
stout-hearted Americans, who gave us their blessings and support. If 
I were to return today to my country, and speak to our men there 
who are eagerly awaiting the call to arms, it would be a message of 
great cheer and hope that I could bring them from the Committee for 
a Jewish army, and the many thousands of its active supporters and 
millions of followers.
Of course our task is not achieved yet, and the Jewish army 
has not as yet raised its banner on the field of battle. But no task of 
great historic magnitude, has ever been easily achieved. We have, 
however, succeeded in putting the Jewish army question on the map, 
together with the other problems the United Nations will have to face 
and solve before victory is achieved.
Bringing you here tonight the feelings and sentiments of 
100,000 brave and fearless Palestinian Jews, I would like to assure 
you, Pierre Van Paassen, and all of your colleagues in the fight for a 
Jewish army, that the army’s formation is a foregone conclusion. No 
power on earth can now prevent the formation of a Jewish army, as 
no power on earth succeeded to defeat the army of the Yugoslav 
Chetniks. But it is up to the democratic powers to determine whether 
the Jewish army will be a strong, well-equipped and trained army, 
comprising at least 200,000 Jews, who are Hitler’s arch enemies and 
who have no other or better way to fight him, or that this be a 
guerrilla army that w ill do its best behind the lines of the Axis 
hordes.
The youth of Palestine will fight with determination of people 
who know that: “Dying on one’s feet is better than living on one’s
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knees.” We will fight because out there has grown a generation that 
has again learned something that Jews have long forgotten, and that 
is to kill. For generations we have learned to die a multitude of 
deaths, the fighting Jews of Palestine have learned to kill a ruthless 
enemy.
Assuring and pledging the readiness of his gallant people to 
fight to the last, a great leader has appealed to these United States 
for tools to do the job. America answered the call - 333tools were 
given. As a small man of a great and ancient people, I appeal to these 
United States, and to the same Mr. Churchill to give us the tools, and 
we will do our job.
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APPENDIX F
Committee for a Jewish Army List 
(Membership list as it appears on their official stationery)
Hon. Chairmen
Dr. Samuel Harden Church
Col. John Henry Patterson D. S. 0.
Pierre Van Paassen -Chairman 
Louis Fitch, K.C.-Vice Chairman
Alfred A. Strelsin-Chairman-Executive Board and Trustee 
Meir Grossman- Vice Chairman-Executive Board 
Peter Bergson-National Director 
Gabriel A. Wechsler-S’ecreta/y
Committee
Very Rev. H.P. Almon Abbott-Bishop o f Lexington, Ky.
Hallet Abend -Foreign Correspondent 
Rabbi Aaron Ashinsky, Pittsburg Pa.
Repr. William B. Barry (N.Y.)
Dr. Carl Beck-Surgeon , Chicago 
Y. Ben Ami, Palestine 
Repr. George H. Bender, (Ohio)
A. Ben-Eliezer, Palestine
Rabbi Bernard Bergman, New York, N.Y.
Rabbi Joshua Bloch, New Hyde Park, N. Y.
Rabbi Philip D. Bookstaber, Harrisburg, Pa.
Rabbi Jacob Bosniak, Brooklyn, N.Y.
Repr. Fred Bradley, (Mich.)
Repr. Michael J. Bradley (Pa.)
Joseph Brainin-Publicist
Rabbi William G. Braude, Providence, R.I.
Hon. Miller M. Brister, Chairman, New York City Fusion Party
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Louis Bromfield-Au thor 
Senator Prentiss M. Brown (Mich.)
Rev. Duncan H. Browne, St. James Church, Chicago 
Repr. Charles A. Buckley (N. Y.)
Struthers Burt -Author
Bishop James Cannon, Jr., Richmond, Va.
Eddie Cantor- Actor 
Repr. Louis J. Capozzoli, (N.Y.)
Rabbi D.A. Jessurun Cardozo, New York, N. Y.
Dr. O. C. Carmichael, Chancellor, Vanderbilt University
Russell Gordon Carter-Author
Carrie Chapman Catt, Civic Leader
Dr. Emmanuel Chapman, Fordham University
Rabbi Jechiel M. Charlop, Bronx, N.J.
Rabbi B. L Chayet, Roxbury, Mass.
Dr. Rufus E. Clement-Pres., Atlanta University 
Rabbi Rudolph I. Coffee, San Francisco, Cal.
Rabbi Armond E. Cohen, Cleveland, Ohio 
Rabbi Herman M. Cohen, St. Paul, Minn.
George Hamilton Combs, Jr.-Radio Commentator 
Jerome Count, Attorney, N. Y.
Thomas T. Craven - Rear-Admiral, U. S. Navy (Retired) 
Assemblyman Robert J. Crews, Brooklyn, N.Y.
Repr. Thomas H. Cullen, (N.Y.)
Prof. Elliott C. Cutler, Harvard University 
Repr. Thomas D’Alesandro, Jr. (Md.)
Morecai Danzis-Joumalist
Prof. Taraknath Das, College of the City of N. Y.
Senator James J. Davis, (Pa.)
G. B. Dealey- Chairman, Dallas Morning News
Dr. Clarence R. Decker-Pres., University of Kansas City
Repr. Charles S. Dewey, (111.)
Repr. Samuel Dickstein, (N. Y.)
Repr. John D. Dingell, (Mich.)
Melvyn Douglas-Acfor 
Repr. Le Roy D. Downs, (Conn.)
Dr. Stephen Duggan-Dir., Inst, of International Educ. 
Repr. Herman P. Eberharter (Pa.)
Rabbi Nachman H. Ebin, Brooklyn, N.Y.
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Oscar W. Ehrhom-ftes., Nat Fed. of Church Clubsof U. S. 
(Episcopalian)
Rabbi Hebert Fedder, Laurelton, LI.
Rabbi Louis Feinberg, Cincinnati, Ohio 
Repr. Ivor D. Fenton, (Pa.)
Lion Feuchtwanger-Author
B. P. Fineman-Mofcron picture Producer
Rabbi Jesse J. Finkle, Newport News, Va.
Prof. H. H. Fisher-Stanford University 
Repr. James M. Fitzpatrick, (N.Y.)
Rt. Rev. Msgr. E. J. Flanagan, Boys Town, Nebraska 
Repr. Thomas F. Ford, (Calif.)
Bruno Trarik-Author 
Waldo Frank-Author 
Rabbi Benjamin Friedman, Syracuse, N.Y.
K. Bertram Friedman-Attorney, New York 
Repr. Fred C. Gartner, (Pa.)
Dr. Christian Gauss-Dean, PrincetonUniversity 
Oscar Gavrilovitch-Royal Yugoslav Consul 
Otto Gavrilovitch- Yugoslav Statesman 
Repr. Bertrand W. Gearhart (Calif.)
Rabbi David L Genuth, Cleveland, Ohio 
Manfred George-Editor, Aufbau 
Senator Guy M. Gillette (Iowa)
Rabbi Roland B. Gittelsohn, Lynbrook, L.I.
Rabbi Isaac Goldfarb. Brooklyn, N.Y.
Rabbi David A. Goldstein, Omaha, Nebraska 
Rabbi Abraham V. Goodman, Davenport, Iowa 
Dr. H.L Gordon, Past National Commander, World War Vetrans 
American Palestine Jewish Legion 
Repr. George Grant, (Ala.)
William Green-Pres. American Federation of Labor 
Rabbi Wm. P. Greensfeld-Waterbury, Conn.
Hon. Dwight Griswold-Govemor of Nebraska
Mrs. John Gunther-Author and Lecturer
Rev. Ernest Graham Guthrie, Chicago Congregation Union
Dr. Alexander B. Hadani, Palestine
Morris W. Haft-/ndustrialist
Rabbi Naftali H. Halpem, Newark, N.J.
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Rabbi Israel Harburg, Lynn, Mass.
Sir Cedric Hardwicke-Actor 
Repr. Vincent Harrington (Iowa)
Dr. Franklin S. Harris-Pres., Brigham Young University 
Hon. George J. Harter-Mayor of Akron, Ohio 
Rabbi Gustav N. Hausmann, New York, N. Y.
Mark Hawley-Radio Commentator 
Miriam Hayman, Palestine
Ira A. Hayes, Brigadier General, U. S. Army (Retired)
Ben Hecht-Aufhor
Captain Jeremiah Helpem-Director, Jewish Marine League 
Burnet Hershey-Padio Commentator 
Dr. Ernest 0. Holland, Pres., State College of Washington 
Dr. J Shelton Horsley, St Elizabeth’s Hospital, Va.
Bronislaw Huberman- Violinist
Hon. Robert A. Hurley- Governor of Connecticut
Harry P. Huse, Vice-Admiral, U. S. Navy (Retired)
Wallace Irwin-Author 
Eri Jabotinsky, Palestine
Hon.Howard W. Jackson, Mayor of Baltimore, Md.
Hon. R. M. Jefferies, Governor of South Carolina 
Rt. Rev. Thomas Jenkins-Bishop o f Nevada 
Rev. Albert S. Johnson, Memphis, Tenn.
Senator Edwin C. Johnson, (Colo.)
Dr. A. S. Kagan, New York, N. Y.
Rabbi Charles Kahane, Brooklyn, N.Y.
Prof. Eric Kahler
Rabbi Jacob H. Kaplan, Miami, Fla.
Rabbi M. A. Kaplan, Brooklyn, N. Y.
Rabbi Dr. Jacob Katz, Bronx, N. Y.
Samuel L. Katz, New York, N.Y.
Rabbi Reuben Kaufman, Paterson, N.J.
Rabbi C. Hillel Kauvar, Denver, Colo.
Rabbi Julius Kerman, Lorain, Ohio
Hans Kindler-Conductor, Natl. Synphony Orchestra
Repr. Arthur G. Klein, (N. Y.)
Rabbi Isaac Klein, Springfield, Mass.
Dr. R. B. Kleinsmid- President, University of S. Calif.
Rabbi Nathan Kollin, Richmond, Va.
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Repr. Charles Kramer, (Calif.)
Rabbi Bernard Lander-Civil Engineer, U. S. Navy
Dr. Emil Lengyl-Aufhor
Prof. Max Lemer, Williams College
Kenneth Leslie-Editor, Protestant Digest
Theodore Levin -Attorney, Chicago
Rabbi Dr. George Lieberman, Wheeling, W. Virginia
Haim Lieberman-Journalist
Harry W. Lielnors-JExec. Secretary, Baltic American Society 
Prof. Julius E. Lips
Clarence C. Uttle-Director, Jackson Memorial Laboratory 
Rt. Rev. Harry S, Longley, D.D .-Bishop o f Iowa 
Ludwig hore-Columnist 
Prof. Willem J. Luyten, University of Minnesota 
Repr. Walter A. Lynch, (N.Y.)
Repr. Lucien Maciora, (Conn.)
Rabbi Mairim Magnes, Brooklyn, N.Y.
Rabbi Jacob R. Marcus, Cincinnati, Ohio
Morris Margulies, Past National Secretary of the Zionist Organization 
of America 
Rabbi Dr. Bernard D. Marton, Brooklyn, N.Y.
Alfred J. McCosker, Pres., Mutual Broadcasting System 
Hon. John McDonough, Mayor of St. Paul, Minnesota 
Edward P. McGlachlin, Jr.-Major General, U. S. Army (Retired)
Repr. Raymond S. McKeough (111.)
Prof. Nelson P. Mead, College of the City of New York 
Eric Mendelsohn-Archifecf
Col. Morris J. Mendelsohn-President, New Zionist Organization of
America. Past National Commander Jewish War Veterans 
Rabbi S. Felix Mendelsohn, Chicago, 111.
Rabbi J . 0. Mereminsky, Mt. Vernon, N.Y.
Samuel A. Merlin-Journalist 
Rabbi Max Meyer, Flushing, N.Y.
Karin Michaelis-Author
Hon. E.D. Millikin, Mayor of Seattle, Washington
Moishe Nadir-Author
Dr. Reuben S. Nathan-Journalist
B. 'Netanyahu-Author
Alfred Neumann- W riter
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Prof. Reinhold Niebuhr-Union Theological Seminary 
Hon. Herbert R. O’Conner, Governor of Maryland 
Rabbi Ahron Opher, New York, N.Y.
Prof. H. A. Overstreet-Educator and Author 
Prof. Constantine Panunzio, University of California 
Angeio Patrl-Educator and Author 
Repr. Nat Patton, (Texas)
Brock Pemberton-Producer 
Dr. Svetislav S. Petrovitch-Yogoslav Statesman 
Dr. D.B. Phemister, University of Chicago 
Harold M. Phillips-Atroraey, New York 
Rabbi Herman Pollack, Bloomington, Ind.
Channing Pollock-Author
Michael Potter-A ttorney, New York
Rabbi Baruch E. Rabinowitz, Baltimor, Md.
Joseph Raffaeli, Palestine 
Rabbi Max Raisin, Patterson, N.J.
A. Philip Randolph, International President, Brotherhood of Sleeping 
Car Porters 
Victor Ratner-Advertising Executive 
Prof. O.LReid-Educator 
Curt Bless-Foreign Correspondent and Author 
Rabbi N. H. Riff, Camden, N.J.
Col. Raymond Robins-Social Economist 
Rabbi Moses Rokeach, Brooklyn, N. Y.
Rabbi Morris M. Rose, Brooklyn, N. Y.
Samuel Rosen -Journalist
Rabbi Abraham I. Rosenberg, Baltimore, Md.
Rabbi Samuel Rosenblatt, Baltimore, Md.
Rabbi Rudolph Rosenthal, Cleveland, Ohio 
Rabbi Jacob Philip Rudin, Great Neck, L I., N.Y.
Repr. Adolph J. Sabath (111.), Dean, House of Representatives 
Dr. Abram Leon Sachar-A& tional Director, B’nai B’rith Hillel 
Foundation 
Prof. Curt Sachs, New York University 
Repr. Leon Sacks, (Pa.)
Rabbi Maxwell L. Sacks, Brooklyn, N. Y.
Rabbi Abraham S. Samuels, Bronx, N.Y.
Rabbi Edward T. Sandrow, Cedarhurst, L. I., N. Y.
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Israel Schapiro, Library of Congress 
Rabbi Abraham Scheinberg, Brooklyn, N. Y.
William Jay Schieffelin-Civic Leader 
Arnold Schoenberg -Composer 
Rabbi Henry A. Schorr, Bronx, N.Y.
Leopold Schwartzchield-Journalist 
Milton Shapiro-Attorney, Chicago 
Dr. David Shecket-Military Engineer 
Dr. Irving Shendell, New York, N. Y.
Repr. John Edward Sheridan, (Pa.)
Herman Shumlin-Prod ucer 
Rabbi Julius Silberfeld, Newark, N. J.
Hans Simons, New School of Social Research 
Rabbi M . K. Skinder, New York, N. Y.
Senator William H. Smathers, (N. J.)
Reps. Andrew L Somers, (N. Y.)
Rabbi Samuel D. Soskin, Ft. Worth, Texas 
Marcus M. Sperber, K. C., Montreal, Canada 
Willard G. Stanton, New York, N. Y.
Harry Stsnrr-Attorney, New York
Dr. Alfred E Steams, Massachusetts
Rabbi HarryJ. Stem-Montreal, Canada
Prof. Kurt G. Stem, Yale University
William Stern-Pres., Dakota National Bank
Rt. Rev. W. Bertrand Stevens-Bishop o f Los Angeles, Calif.
Rex Stout-Author 
Arthur Szyk-A rtis t 
Dr. Horace D. Taft, Connecticut 
Irving Taitel-Industrialist 
Senator Elbert D. Thomas, (Utah)
Lowell Thomas-Radio Commentator 
Repr. Harve Tibbott, (Pa.)
Prof. Paul Tillich, Union Theological Seminary 
Senator Millard E Tydings (Md.)
Clifton M. Utley-Director, Chicago Council on Foreign Relations 
Z. H. Wachsman-Jouraaiisr
Hon. Murray D. Van Wagoner, Governor of Michigan 
Maurice Walk-A ttorney, Chicago 
Repr. Samuel A. Weiss, (Pa.)
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M. R. Werner-Author
William Allen White-Editor, Emporia Gazette 
Dr. Henry N. Wieman, University of Chicago 
Ray Lyman Wilbur-President, Stanford University 
Alexander Wilf, W ilf Bros., Phila.
Dr. Maurice William, New York, N. Y.
Dr. Joseph B. Wollfe, Wollfe Clinic, Phila. Lieutenant Commander, U.S.
Naval Reserve 
Mary E Wooley-Educator 
Rabbi Samuel Yalow, Syracuse, N. Y.
H. E. Yamell-Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy (Retired)
Rabbi Ephraim E. Yolles, Philadelphia, Pa.
Leon Zimmerman-/ndustrialist 
William Zorach-Sculptor
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APPENDIX G
List of names attached to the ad “The Bermuda Conference was a
Mockery”
Major Gen. Charles J. Bailey
Rear-Admiral Charles S. Butler
Rear-Admiral Richard E. Byrd
Major-Gen. Fox Conner
Mafor Gen. William Crozler
Major-Gen. Robert C. Davis
Rear-Admiral Ralph Davison
Major-Gen. George B. Duncan
Major-Gen. Charles S. Farnsworth
Brig.-Gen. Robert C.FoyBrig.-Gen. Ira A. Haynes
Admiral A. J. Hepburn
Major-Gen. Roy A. Hoffman
Major-Gen. C.E. Kilboume
Rear-Admiral C. P. Kindleberger
Rear-Admiral H. E. Lackey
Gen. Edward W. Lewis
Brig,-Gen. Marshall Magruder
Major-Gen. Edw. M. McLachlin, jr.
Brig.-Gen. George W. Melver 
Brig.-Gen. James J. Meade 
Admiral 0. G. Murfin 
Brig.-Gen. J. Watt Page 
Brig.-Gen. John F. Preston 
Major-Gen. Charles R. Reynolds 
Vice-Admiral S. M. Robinson 
Rear-Admiral George H. Rock 
Major Homer A. Stebbins 
Admiral Joseph Strauss 
Brig.-Gen. George Vidmer 
Vice-Admiral R. R. Waesche 
Rear-Admiral Harry Ervin Yarnell 
Sen. John H. Bankhead (Ala.)
Sen. Warren Barbour (N. J.)
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Sen. Theodore G. Bilbo (Miss.) 
Sen. Arthur Capper (Kansas)
Sen. Albert B. Chandler (Ky.) 
Sen. James J. Davis (Pa.)
Sen. Sheridan Downey (Cal.)
Sen. Guy M. Gillette (la.)
Sen. Carter Glass (Va.)
Sen. Joseph F. Guffey (Pa.)
Sen. Edwin C. Johnson (Colo.) 
Sen. Harley M. Kilgore (W. Va.) 
Sen. William Langer (N. Dak.) 
Sen. Francis Maloney (Conn.) 
Sen. Burnet R. Maybank (S.C.) 
Sen. Kenneth McKellar (Tenn.) 
Sen. EH. Moore (Okla.)
Sen. James E. Murray (Mont.) 
Sen. Claude Pepper (Florida)
Sen. George L Radcliffe 
Sen. Robert A. Taft (Ohio)
Sen. Elbert D. Thomas (Utah)
Sen. Charles W. Tobey (N. H.) 
Sen. Harry S. Truman (Mo.)
Sen. James M. Tunnell (Del.)
Sen. Millard E. Tydings (Md.)
Sen. Charles L McNary (Ore.) 
Sen. James M. Mead (N. Y.)
Sen. Frederick Van Nuys (Ind.) 
Sen. Robert F. Wagner (N. Y.)
Sen. David I. Walsh (Mass.)
Sen. Kenneth S. Wherry (Nebr.) 
Sen. Alexander Wiley (Wis.)
Hon. Claude G. Bowers 
U.S. Ambassador to Chile 
Hon. Joseph F. Davies 
Former Ambassador to Russia 
Hon. Prentiss M. Brown 
Administrator, OPA 
Hon. Marriner S. Eccles 
Chairman, Federal Reserve Bank




Hon. Wm. M. Leiserson
Nat. Labor Relations Board
Hon. Dave H. Morris
Former U. S. Ambassador to Belgium
Hon. Donald Nelson
Chairman War Production Board
Hon. Robert R. Nathan
Chief o f Planning Division, W. P. B.
Hon. Charles Poletti 
Sp. Asst, to Sec. o f War 
Hon. Hariod D. Smith 
Director, Bureau o f Budget 
Hon. Homer M. Adkins
Governor o f Arkansas 
Hon. Robert O. Blood 
Governor o f N.H.
Hon. Dwight Griswold 
Governor o f Nebraska 
Hon. Herbert B. Maw 
Governor o f Utah 
Hon. Howard McGrath 
Governor o f Rhode Island 
Hon. Robert R. O’Conner 
Governor o f Maryland 
Hon. Henry F. Schricker 
Governor o f Indiana 
Hon. Harold E. Stassen 
Governor o f Minnesota 
William Green 
Pres. Amer. Fed. o f Labor 
Phillip Murray
President, Congress o f Industrial Organizations 
Sidney Hillman








And 3,381 other distinguished American leaders from a ll walks o f 
life  and
from a ll sections o f the country.
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APPENDIX H
“Jerusalem Bomb Kills 41 in Attack on British Offices.” 
“Zionist Terror Raiders Accused of Blast in King David Hotel.”
The New York Times. July 23,1946, p. 1.
Jerusalem, July 22 - An entire six story corner and basement at the 
southwestern wing of the King David Hotel were destroyed and at 
least forty - one British, Jewish and Arab Government officials were 
killed and fifty-three were injured soon after midday when 
terrorists , believed to belong to either Irgun Z’vai Leumi or the Stern 
Gang, blew up a large part of the offices of the chief secretary of the 
Palestine Government.
Prominent Britons, including British Jews, are among the 
casualties. The dead include eight unidentified bodies, according to 
the latest semi-official figures, and fifty-two missing persons are 
buried under a huge pile of debris. They include twelve senior 
British civil servants and four senior Palestinian civil servants.
I was on the scene, outside the fashionable hotel - a Jerusalem 
landmark overlooking the Old City - just after the heavy explosions 
shattered the southwestern corner. Rescue operations had already 
been begun by British troops and police sweating under the hot July 
sun. They were bringing out bodies on stretchers, leaving a trail of 
blood over the rubble.
People standing outside or just entering or leaving the building 
were among the casualties. Postmaster General Gerald Donald 
Kennedy was killed outside the southern wing. The Superintendent 
of Police, Kenneth Page Hadingham, was badly injured. Richard 
Mower, correspondent of The New York Post, suffered a leg fracture.
The corner was destroyed by a heavy charge of gelignite 
planted in the basement by four or five armed gunmen. The six 
floors included a well known basement cafe called La Regence and 
consisted of thirty or thirty-five rooms, mostly occupied by the chief 
secretary’s offices. British Army headquarters has the entire top 
floor of the hotel and only a small section is situated at the 
southwestern corner. This explains the comparatively small 
casualties among the British military.
The first detonation occurred at about 12:10 P.M. when a small
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
347
smoke bomb exploded near a parked automobile on Julian’s Way 
about fifty yards south of the hotel. It was intended to hold up all 
cars. Then came several shots from automatic guns.
The second explosion came almost immediately as a man 
dressed in Arab clothing alighted from a blue limousine and threw a 
small grenade along a lane on the northern end of the hotel. A 
military sentry fired at him and the man threw away a submachine 
gun and limped to the car, which sped off toward the Jaffa Gate - one 
of the main gates of the walled Old City. The car was found 
abandoned later at the foot of the Tower of David, not far from the 
district police headquarters.
Five minutes later came a third, shattering explosion. It was 
preceded by a mysterious telephone warning to the hotel’s 
switchboard operator by a woman caller who said: “Tell everyone to 
leave the hotel. It is going to blow up in a few minutes.”
A few minutes before the third detonation a truck drove down 
the sunken driveway at the northern end of the hotel and four or 
five men jumped out at the service entrance to the kitchen. They 
assembled all the hotel staff-cooks, waiters and kitchen boys - below 
the stairs at gunpoint as one man laid several milk cans full of 
explosives with fuses, wires and detonators. Then the men dashed off 
and the hotel staff fought to get out at all the exits.
An eyewitness, Maj. Eric Merrill, army public-relations officer 
who was in the building opposite the hotel, told me: “First there was 
a great explosion. Then the southwestern corner of the hotel seemed 
to bulge. It collapsed with a great roar and a huge column of brown- 
gray smoke billowed up.”
A number of Government officials, typists and women clerks 
who had been standing at their office windows peered out to seek 
the causes of the first two explosions were trapped and hurtled out 
as the third went off. E.W. Keys, assistant secretary, was hurled clear 
across the road into the wall of the W.M.C.A. gymnasium. He was 
killed.
Men and women staggered from the hotel, dazed from shock, 
their faces covered with white dust and many streaked with blood 
from head wounds. Others unable to walk were being helped. 
Government employees, British military men, messenger boys and 
hotel guests came out in a long stream. A passing bus was blown off 
course and every passenger was injured.
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The Deputy High Commissioner, Sir John Valentine Shaw, was 
sitting in his office at the southeastern corner of the hotel when the 
explosion occurred. He was uninjured, Immediately he assumed 
charge of the rescue work, directing troops, police officers and 
plainclothes men. A few minutes later the inspector general of the 
police, Col. W. N. Gray, and other high-military officers joined him.
Executives of the Jewish Agency and the National Council of 
Palestine Jews issued a statement expressing horror “at the dastardly 
crime perpetrated by the gang of desperadoes.” After expressing 
sympathy to the victims’ families, the statement added: “Jews in 
Palestine are called upon to rise up against these abominable 
outrages.” This may herald active efforts by responsible Jewish 
institutions to combat and liquidate reckless terrorist groups.
A detachment of Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders arrived 
with picks, shovels, acetylene blow-torches, portable cranes and 
first-aid kits exactly fifteen minutes after the explosion. They began 
clearing the wreckage. At one crevice beneath a twenty-foot pile of 
wreckage, there was moaning. One man was brought out, followed by 
two others.
Police worked unceasingly to seek the culprits. I heard orders 
crackling and snapping over the short-wave police radio. Commands 
were issued and patrol trucks and armored cars dashed to the scene. 
Anti-terrorist sirens wailed and halted all traffic. Police cars with 
loudspeakers went around announcing complete curfew in the whole 
municipal area of Jerusalem from 12:45 P.M. until further notice. 
The curfew was later restricted to the central Jewish area only and 
this will be removed at 5 A.M. tomorrow.
One report said that an automobile abandoned near the Jaffa 
Gate had two sticks of gelignite, one revolver and one Arab cloak 
inside. But the small group of gunmen who held up the hotel staff 
and planted the explosives in the basement got clear away. A taxi 
containing a quantity of arms believed used by some of the escaping 
terrorists was found abandoned on Jaffa Road.
Army headquarters declared that the men who entered the 
hotel basement unloaded several milk cans and trundled them along 
the corridor to the far end, directly below the secretariat and outside 
the restaurant. A British Signal Corps officer, hearing the noise, came 
out to investigate and was shot in the stomach twice and severely 
wounded by a man dressed as an Arab.
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The Palestine radio reported that bodies of five Britons and 
twenty-three Palestinians had so far been taken from the wreckage 
of the hotel. Four are still below the wreckage. Hospital reports, 
however, said that thirty-one bodies had been brought in by 7 P.M.
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APPENDIX I
NATIONAL REVIVAL PRINCIPLES 
(Ideological Principles of Lechi)
1. THE NATION
The Jewish people is a covenanted people, originator of 
monotheism, formulator of the prophetic teachings, standard- 
bearer of human culture, guardian of a glorious patrimony. The 
Jewish people is schooled in self sacrifice and suffering; its 
vision, survivability and faith in redemption are indestructible.
2. THE HOMELAND
The homeland is the Land of Israel w ithin the borders 
delineated in the Bible. (To your descendants I shall give this 
land, from the River of Egypt to the great Euphrates River. 
Genesis 15:18). This is the land of the living where the entire 
nation shall live in safety.
3. THE NATION AND ITS LAND
Israel conquered the land with the sword. There it became a 
nation and only there it will be reborn. Hence Israel alone has a 
right to that land. This is an absolute right. It has never 
expired and never will.
4. THE GOALS
1. Redemption of the land.
2. Establishment of sovereignty.
3. Revival of the nation. There is no sovereignty of the land, 
and there is no national revival without sovereignty.
These are the tasks of the organization during the period of war 
and conquest:
5. EDUCATION
Educate the nation to love freedom and zealously guard Israel’s 
eternal patrimony. Inculcate the idea that the nation is master 
to its own fate. Revive the doctrine that “The sword and the 
book came bound together from heaven” (Midrash Vayikra




The unification of the entire nation around the banner of the 
Hebrew freedom movement. The use of the genius, status and 
resources of individuals and the channeling of the energy, 
devotion and revolutionary fervor of the masses for the war of 
liberation.
7. PACTS
Make pacts with all those who are wiling to help the struggle of 
the organization and provide direct support
8. FORCE
Consolidate and increase the fighting force in the homeland and 
in the diaspora, in the underground and in the barracks, to 
become the Hebrew army of liberation with its flag, arms and 
commanders.
9. WAR
Constant war against those who stand in the way of fulfilling 
the goals.
10. CONQUEST
The conquest of the homeland from foreign rule and its eternal 
possession.
These are the tasks of the movement during the period of 
sovereignty and redemption.
11. SOVEREIGNTY
Renewal of Hebrew sovereignty over the redeemed land.
12. RULE OF JUSTICE
The establishment of a social order in the spirit of Jewish 
morality and prophetic justice. Under such an order no one will 
go hungry or unemployed. All w ill live in harmony, mutual 
respect and friendship as an example to the world.
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13. REVIVING THE WILDERNESS
Build the ruins and revive the wilderness for mass immigration 
and population increase.
14. ALIENS
Solve the problem of alien population by exchange of 
population.
15. INGATHERING OF EXILES
Total ingathering of the exiles to their sovereign state.
16. POWER
The Hebrew nation shall become a first-rate m ilitary, political, 
cultural and economical entity in the Middle East and around 
the Mediterranean Sea.
17. REVIVAL
The revival of the Hebrew language as a language spoken by 
the entire nation, the revival of the historical and spiritual 
might of Israel. The purification of the national character in the 
fire of revival.
18. THE TEMPLE
The building of the Third Temple as a symbol of the new era of 
total redemption.1
1 Yaacov Eliav. Wanted. ( New York: Shengold Publishers, Inc. , 1984), p. 
136-138.
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APPENDIX J
lis t of Voyages1
Name of 
ship





1. Kosta 3-37 16 (Vienna) Athens- 
Beach near Haifa
Revisionists Sailboat with auxiliary 
motor. Wading ashore.
No landing organization yet.
2. Artemisia 1 8-37 68 (Vienna) Athens 
Tantura Beach
Revisionists First time aid of landing 
organization. Artemisia net 
tonnage: 115
3. Artemisia il 12-37 120 (Vienna) Korinthos- 
Tantura
Revisionists
A. Artemisia III 6-38 386 (Vienna) Inlet near 
Athens-Tantura Revisionists
5. Draga 1 9-38 246 Susak-Tantura Revisionists Mordechai Katz’s group 
plus those who had es­
caped to Fiume and Susak 
landed on Yom Kippur. 
Draga net tonnage: 277
6. Draga II 11-38 544 (Vienna) Galatz- 
Netanyah
Revisionists Draga II and Ely carried the 
survivors of Amoldstein 
transport plus additional 
immigrants
7. Ely 11-38 620 (Vienna) Galatz- 
Netanyah) Revisionists Ely took Draga II 
passengers aboard 
prior to landing pro­
cedures.
8. Gepo 1 12-5-38 734 (Vienna) Tulcea- 
Netanyah
Revisionists Smooth sailing and 
easy blockade break­
ing. Arrived, landed, 
December 18.
9. Katina 1-18-39 775 (Vienna) Balchik-
This chart is from The Four Front War: From the Holocaust to Hie riOiiilScu Laii.il, 
by William R. Perl, Crown publishers, Inc., New York, 1979, pp. 367-371.
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N. of Netanyah Revisionists
10. Gepoll 2-20-39 750 (Vienna) Balchik- 
N. of Netanyah
Revisionists Gepo II sinks in Mediter­
ranean. Katina rescues 
all on board and lands 
them near Netanyah.
11. Astir 3-6-39 720 (Danzig) Vfeima-AI 
Jura, Palestine
Revisionists Transferred to & de­
barked by S.S. Marsis




Captured off Palestine 
coast on 3-23
Private Ship captured by British 
Left Palestine 3-26. Ar­
rived Constanta with all 
aboard 4-2-39.
14. Assimi 3-20-39 260 Constanta-Palestine Members of Captured by the British 
Mizrachi & Ha (4-1). Turned back. Re- 
Noar Ha Zioni. turned Palestine and 




Late March 39 750 Constanta-Palestine Private (Mr. 
Flesch)
Fired at by British patrol. 
One passenger killed. 
Immigrants landed any­
way on 4-39.
16 .Atratoil Late March 39 400 Susak-Palestine Mossad Immigrants first embark­




Late March 39 600 Marseille, Fiume- 
near Rehoboth 
(Palestine)
Revisionists 420+ evaded arrest, 
173 arrested “near Is- 
dud," of whom 44 es­




Late March 39 80 Korynth-Palestine Revisionists Jews from Austria & 
Germany who were 
stranded in Greece 









ped to S.S. Nichola. 
Landed by Nichola 
5-19. Arrested & later 
released: 308.
20. Atrato III 4-39 400 Susak-Palestine Mossad Passengers first em­
barked on SS Colorado.
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Then transferred to At- 
rato. Short voyage, 
last, successful landing.
21. Lieset 5-17-39 906 Tulcea-Palestine Maccabi-
Revisionists
Captured by British 6-2; 
Master of Liesel: 9 mo. 
prison; crew acquitted; 
passengers released in 
Palestine 6-4.
22. Atrato IV 5-20-39 430 Constanta-Palestine Mossad Captured 5-28-39 by 
H.M.S. Sutton. Passen­
gers released in Pales­
tine after short detain­
ment.
23. Colorado 1 5-19-39 266 Constanta-Palestine Mossad Was observed by British 
intelligence passing Is­





Late May ‘39 26 Vtigoslavia-Palestine Private Landed 6-7, near Akko
25. Beriitsa 
Maria
5-27-39 350 Burgos-Palestine Revisionists
(Confino)
Landed 6-8.
26. Frossoula 5-29-39 658 Czechoslovakia-
Sulina-Palestine
Private Long Odyssey. Epi­
demic on board. Ship 
fumigated in Beyrouth. 
From there stranded 
passengers taken a- 




6-39 693 Vama-Palestine Private Landed 7-3-39 by trans­
fer to landing ship 
Nicola.
28. Rim 6-26-39 801 Constanta-Rhodes. 
See remarks.
Revisionists Ship caught fire July 4 
off Rhodes. All aboard 
saved. Passengers 
taken aboard & landed 
by Aghios Nikolaos IV  
near Netanyah, 8-20-39
29. Las Perlas Late June 370 Palestine Private
30. Dora 7-39 500 Holland-Palestine Mossad Mainly German Jews 
who had escaped to 
Holland and were evac­
uated before German
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invasion of Holland.
31. Parita 7-8-39 800 (Poland) 
Galatz-Tel Aviv
Revisionists Ran straight through 
the blockade, up the 
beach of Tel Aviv. 
Beached there 
(8-23-39).
32. Colorado II 7-14-39 266 Vama-
Constanta-
Palestine
Mossad Captured on July 28.
33. Rudnichar 8-1-39 305 Vama-Palestine Revisionists Passengers landed 
8-10








After loading immigrants 
at Constanta, ship pick­
up the shipwrecked 
from Rim in Rhodes. 
Landed all 796 by land­
ing ships Tassos and 
Rosetta.




Mossad Included in the 1,417 
when landxing were 
passengers of the 
Frossoula (see Fros- 
soula No. 26). While 
breaking the blockade, 
the Tiger Hill was, on 
9-1-39, fired at and two 
of the immigrants were 
killed* Repeated the 
Parita feat. Beached 
in Tel Aviv.
36. Krotova 8-20-39 650 Fiume-Palestine Revisionists Relatively smooth sail­
ing.
37. Syros 8-22-39 593 Fiume-Palestine Revisionists Last transport sailing 
from Italy before out­
break of war.
They were the first persons to be killed by British bullets after the outbreak of World War II.
38. Noemi 8-29-39 1,136 Constanta- Revisionists September 1 9 ,‘39 ship
Julia Palestine sailed openly into Haifa
and demanded admis­
sion for those on board.
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With war on, in wake of 
furor over British killing 
of Tiger Hill refugees, 




8-30-39 368 Vama-Constanta- 
Burgos-Palestine 
(near Herzliya)
Revisionists All aboard landed by 
landing boat S.V. 




10-27-39 457 Sulina-Palestine 
(Sydne Ali, near 
Tel Aviv)
Revisionists Passengers transship­
ped for landing to 
schooner Kooperator 
and small boats.
41. Hilda 12-9-39 729 Balchik-Sulina- 
Palestine (Haifa)
Mossad Ship captured 1-24-40 
by Royal Navy. Brought 
to Haifa. Passengers 
first detained, then re­
leased.
42. Delpa 12-24-39 224 Constanta-Vfema-
Palestine
Revisionists A youth transport, al­
most all from Betarim 
from Hungary, Poland, 
Rumania, Bulgaria.
43. Sakarya 2-1-40 2,175 Sulina-Palestine
(Haifa)
Revisionists Captured by H.M.S. 
Fiona and escorted to 
Haifa 2-13-40. Largest 
ship, largest load, fast­
est trip of all. Ship seiz­
ed but later released to 
owners due to legal 
quirk. Passengers to 
detention camps. Re­
leased 8-12. Eri Jabotin- 
sky, the Sakarya's C.O., 
brought to Akko fortress 
& imprisoned there until 
death of his father,
Ze’ev Jabotinsky, 
8-6-40.
44. Pentscho 9-21-40 514 Sulina-Mytilene 
(Greek island, 
Stampalia, Rhodes)
Revisionists Ship faltered near Kamili 
Island (actually unin­
habited rock). After al­
most perishing of hun­
ger, picked up by Italian 
warship and taken to 
Rhodes, then Italy. In­
terned but miraculously
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survived the war and re­
turned to Palestine.
45. Libertad 5-40 390 Burgos-Palestine 
(Zikhron Ya’acov)
Revisionists Bulgarians, mostly, with 
some Yugoslavs, Ruma­
nians.
46. Atlantic 10-7-40 1,771 Tulcea-Sulina-
Cyprus-Haifa
Mossad Those arriving in Pales­
tine on the Pacific plus 
80 from Atlantic were 
transferred by the Brit­
47. Pacific 10-11-40 1,000 Sulina-Haifa Mossad ish to their S.S. Patna. 
The Patria blew up and 
rapidly sank in Haifa Har­
48. Milo 10-19-40 880 Tulcea-Haifa Mossad bor. 254 perished in this 
catastrophe. 1,584 sur­
vivors, most from Atlan­
tic and Milo, were de­
ported to fever-stricken 
island Mauritius. Survi­
vors of this climate and 
epidemics received per­
mission to enter Pales­
tine five years later.
49. Salvador 12-40 (327) Burgos-lstanbul 
sinks in Sea of 
Marmara
Private 204 die as Salvador 
sank. Survivors reached 
Istanbul. From there on 
3-19-41 the Dalian , 
another refugee ship, 
picked them up and 
landed them in Pales­
tine.
50.Struma 12-11-41 (767) Constanta-lstanbul 
Turks towed the 
unseaworthy ship 
out into the Black Sea 
on 2-23-42 where she 
sank 2-24.
One sole survivor. All 
others drowned.
Militant Irgun Zvai Leumi 
declared this sinking to 
have been “murder" 
and initiated violent 
action against the colo­
nial power.
51. Darien II 2-19-41 878 Constanta-Vama-
Palestine
Mossad Ship sailed from Con­
stanta with 380. In Varna 
370 more boarded. In 
Instabul 128 survivors 
of Salvador boarded.
52. Vitorul 9-42 120 Constanta Private The 60 ton unsea­
worthy ship is not
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known to have arrived.
53. Euxenia 4-42 12 Sulina-Casne
(Turkey)
Private Sailboat with auxiliary 
motor. Foundered in 
Aegean Sea. All 12 
saved; land in Turkey.
54. Milka 1 3-44 410 Constanta-lstanbul. 





Due to new  policy, 
those who on their own 
craft reached neutral 
Turkey could from there 
legally enter Palestine 
by land.





See remarks re; travel 
from Turkey, above.
56. Maritsa II 5-44 266 n  «i •c
57. Milka II 5-44 433 W II u «
58. Morina 7-44 308 a  u K u
59. Maritsa III 7-44 318 m a U u
60. Bulbul 8-44 410 Constanta-lstanbul-
Palestine
u See remarks re: travel 
from Turkey, above.
61 . Salah-A- 
Din
8-44 547 Constanta u
62. Mefkurie 8-44 (350) Constanta
(torpedoed)
u Ship torpedoed, survi­
vors machine-gunned 
in water. 345 perished.
Total number of those tabulated who reached Palestine*
* Tabulation of Aliya Bet shipping constitutes a most intricate task, as reports about ships, dates, number 
of passsengers vary widely. When in doubt we accept the lower figure. Besides, contemporary news 
reports and intelligence dispatches mention more names of ships carrying ‘ illegal" refugees than are 
tabulated above. Careful scrutiny reveals, however, that a good number of these communications erred. 
The blockade breaking ships often had their names changed. Thus a dispatch might name a ship as 
loading refugees in some port. Another ship with refugees crammed on board, flying a different flag and 
showing a different name might be reported passing the Bosporus. Again another ship was related as 
hiding in one of the numerous inlets of a Greek island. Still another ship was written up as unloading 
visaless immigrants in Palestine. Yet it was always one and the same vessel.
On the other hand, as the Jew hunt in Europe increased in intensity, a growing number of individually 
organized small vessels, mainly sailboats, set out for the only possible point of escape. Those who made it
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to Palestine had landing organizations waiting for them. Their arrival was not recorded and they mixed as 
fast as they could with the population there. The total number of visaless Jews reaching the country 
during the Nazi reign therefore exceeds the number tabulated above.
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APPENDIX K
List of twelve points made by David Wyman regarding President 
Roosevelt's treatment of the Holocaust.
1. The War Refugee Board should have been set up in 1942. It 
should have been better funded and received broader powers.
2.The U.S. government should have made bolder efforts to 
press the Germans to release Jews.
3. Constant pressure and threat of punishment could have been 
applied to Axis satellites to release their Jews.
4. Neutral countries should have been pressured to absorb 
Jews, to by-pass immigration procedures, and to erect reception 
camps near borders. The U.S. could have funded, encouraged and 
supplied absorption, food distribution, etc
5. In the United States immigration quotas were almost 
untouched. Had the U.S. made a concerted effort to take in displaced 
Jews other countries might have followed suit. However, in 1942, 
when Wendell Wilkie urged British leaders to admit Jews “the British 
high commissioner replied that since the United States was not 
taking Jews in even up to the quota limits, Americans were hardly in 
a position to criticize.”
6. The excuse that shipping was needed to transfer Jews and 
that such shipping would interfere with the war effort was 
unfounded. In fact, some ships returning from Europe actually 
needed ballast. Jewish refugees could easily have acted as weight in 
these ships’ holds.
7. A campaign (through radio, leaflet dropping, underground 
communication, falsifying documentation, bribing lower level 
officials) to stimulate and assist escapes would have greatly 
increased the number of Jews able to escape.
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8. Larger sums of money could have been sent to Europe to 
facilitate escapes, hide Jews, supply food and essentials, strengthen 
the Jewish underground and gain non-Jewish assistance.
9. Much more effort should have gone into sending food and 
medical supplies.
10. The U.S. government could have applied additional pressure 
on neutral governments, on the Vatican, and on the International Red 
Cross to push them to take earlier and greater action.
11. The U.S. could have taken military action. The Air Force 
could have bombed the Auschwitz killing installations and some 
deportation railroads.
12. “Much more publicity about the extermination of the Jews 
should have been disseminated through Europe. Allied radio could 
have beamed the information for weeks at a time, on all possible 
wavelengths, as the Germans did regarding the alleged Russian 
massacre of Polish officers at the Katyn forest. This might have 
influenced three groups: the Christian populations, the Nazis, and the 
Jews. Western leaders and, especially, the Pope could have appealed 
to Christians not to cooperate in any way with the anti-Jewish 
programs, and to hide and to aid Jews whenever possible.”1
1 David Wyman, p. 331-334.
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Appendix L
To 5,000,000 Jews in the Nazi Death-Trap Bermuda Was a
“Cruel Mockery”
“When Will The United Nations Establish An Agency To Deal With 
The Problem of Hitler’s Extermination of a Whole People?”
Somehow, through invisible, underground channels, one 
ray of shining hope might have penetrated the ghettos of Europe. A 
rumor might have spread and grown into a whisper among the 
agonized Jews of Hitler’s hell. A whisper telling of deliverance from 
torture, death, starvation and agony in slaughter-houses. This ray of 
hope and this whisper were expressed in one word: Bermuda !
The rumor told of representatives of the United States and 
Great Britain, the leading champions of the United Nations, the 
protagonists of the Four Freedoms, assembling to save the hunted 
and tortured Jews of Europe. On the deliberations of this small 
convention on an Island in the Atlantic were focused all the hopes of 
the doomed Jews of Europe: those, too, of the free well-meaning 
people the world over. Men and women of good will everywhere at 
last believed that the United Nations had decided to do something 
about the unprecedented disaster of a people put to death.
Wretched, doomed victims of Hitler’s tyranny ! Poor men and 
women of good faith the world over! You have cherished an illusion. 
Your hopes have been in vain. Bermuda was not the dawn of a new 
era, of an era of humanity and compassion, of translating pity into 
deed. Bermuda was a mockery, and a cruel jest.
THIS is not our definition. It is the definition of the London Sunday 
“Observer”- one of the most influential and important newspapers in 
Great Britain.
Not only were ways and means to save the remaining four 
million Jews in Europe not devised, but their problem was not even 
touched upon, put on the agenda, or discussed. More than that-the 
name “Jews” was banished from the vocabulary of this convention, as 
PM’s foreign editor, Alexander Uhl, reports: “It was regraded as 
almost improper to mention even the word “Jew.”
But not only the attention of the victims of Nazi atrocities and
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of their friends the world over was concentrated on the meeting at 
Bermuda: Hitler, too, was concerned with the United Nations’ reply to 
this challenge to the extermination of the Jewish population in 
Europe. Alas! To him Bermuda was again convincing proof that the 
United Nations were neither ready nor willing to answer his threat 
with action. They were continuing to give him “carte blanche” in his 
extermination process, exactly as in the pre-war days they permitted 
him to deal with Jews in Germany, with Austria and Czechoslovakia, 
thus paving the way for aggression, invasion, and war.
Can it be possible that the United Nations do not understand 
that should Hitler succeed in exterminating the Jews as a people, 
they by their silence w ill pave the way to the extermination of the 
Czechoslovak, Polish, Greek or even the French people?
Now we are witnessing a variety of attempts to justify the 
Bermuda failure, to wrap it in secret formulae, such as “no dealing 
with Hitler,” or “not to interfere with the prosecution of the war,” or 
“not to undertake anything which would prolong the war,” etc. All 
this is just throwing sand into the eyes of public opinion. All this has 
nothing to do with the real facts and the harrowing truth.
The facts, plain and simple, are the following: (a) This is a 
specific problem of Jewish disaster. Hitler did not (as yet) decree the 
extermination of all the peoples of Europe, he decreed the 
extermination of the Jewish people in Europe and this process of 
extermination is unabated and steady. Two million or more have 
been put to death already! (b) Five million Jews in Europe still live. 
The government of Roumania, Hungry and Bulgaria, all satellites of 
Germany, are willing to release their Jews any time the United 
Nations are willing to take part in the deliverance. By doing do, they 
hope to find grace and pardon in the eyes of the United Nations 
whom they consider as the inevitable victors in this world struggle, 
(c) The United Nations have taken no advantage of these offers. They 
have not done so for one reason: the British government has 
prevented them, fearing that public opinion will demand that these 
refugees be admitted into Palestine - a practical place of salvation 
only a few days away from the Axis countries by short water route, 
train or even bus, where the new Hebrew Nation awaits them with 
open arms.
The Jewish Problem Is Not a Refugee Problem
With the Bermuda Conference a thing of the past, not having
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even discussed the problem of the extermination of the Jewish 
people in Europe, now, more than ever, it is clear that we are dealing 
not only with a refugee problem, but with the Jewish problem  
of Europe. These two problems should not be confused. They are 
entirely distinct. Democracy cannot connive with the slaughter of 
millions of innocent civilian people - the Jews in Europe. There are 
ways and means to stop Hitler’s wholesale murder and to evacuate 
those who can be evacuated. But no one has been assigned to 
deal with this tremendous problem. What is necessaiy is that 
the machinery for action be created. The United Nations, which have 
uttered so many words of pity must now do something if these 
words of pity are to be more than empty lies. They must create a 
United Nations Agency composed of military and diplomatic experts, 
which should have full authority to define and effectuate a realistic 
and stem policy of action, to save the remaining millions of Jewish 
people. This Agency or Commission will deal, not with 
refugees outside Hitler’s reach, but with the Jewish people 
under his yoke today.
A Program of Action ( . . . Not Pity !)
There are two broad areas in which this Agency can begin to 
operate without delay or procrastination.
1. Immediate utilization of all existing possibilities of transfer 
of Jews from Hitler - dominated countries to Palestine or to any 
temporary refuge and the initiation of all further possibilities in this 
program.
2. The immediate creation of a Jewish army of stateless and 
Palestinian Jews, including “suicide” Commando squads, and Air 
Squadrons for retaliatory bombing, which w ill raid deep into 
Germany, thus participating as an entity in the war and bringing 
their message of hope to Hitler’s victims.
Join the Crusade for Democracy
The crime of Europe calls for the mobilization of every shred of 
righteousness and spiritual power left in the world. On the field 
o f battle soldiers die. On the field o f massacre civilization 
dies. The thunder of civilization against the swamp-like antics of the 
German government is alone capable of stopping the German crime 
against life. Such a thunder unleashed by our own representatives 
and by all the nations that serve the cause of God would strike terror
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into the souls of the German people.
Therefore we dedicate ourselves to this fight and we call upon 
every American to join hands with us in this crusade for humanity 
and decency.
Every citizen is part of the collective conscience of America; 
this conscience has never been found wanting. Demand action from 
your government against the German massacre of the Jews.
COMMITTEE FOR A JEWISH ARMY OF STATELESS AND 
PALESTINIAN JEWS1
1 The New York Times. Tuesday, May 4,1943, p. 17.
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APPENDIX M
TEXT OF NEW YORK TIMES LETTER, DEC. 4,1948 
TO THE EDITOR OF THE NEW YORK TIMES:
Among the most disturbing political phenomena of our time is 
the emergence in the newly created state of Israel of the “Freedom 
Party” (Tenuat Haherut), a political party closely akin in its 
organization, methods, political philosophy and social appeal to the 
Nazi and Fascist parties. It was formed out of the membership and 
following of the former Irgun Zvai Leumi, a terrorist, right-wing, 
chauvinist organization in Palestine.
The current visit of Menachem Begin, leader of this party, to 
the United States is obviously calculated to give the impression of 
American support for his party in the coming Israeli elections, and to 
cement political ties with conservative Zionist elements in the 
United States. Several Americans of national repute have lent their 
names to welcome his visit It is Inconceivable that those who oppose 
fascism throughout the world, if  correctly informed as to Mr. Begin’s 
political record and perspectives, could add their names and support 
to the movement he represents.
Before irreparable damage is done by way of financial 
contributions, public manifestations in Begin’s behalf, and the 
creation in Palestine of the Impression that a large segment of 
America supports Fascist elements in Israel, the American public 
must be informed as to the record and objectives of Mr. Begin and 
his movement.
The public avowals of Begin’s party are no guide whatever to 
its actual character. Today they speak of freedom, democracy and 
anti-imperialism, whereas until recently they openly preached the 
doctrine of the Fascist state. It is in its actions that the terrorist 
party betrays its real character; from its past actions we judge what 
it may be expected to do in the future.
A shocking example was their behavior in the Arab village of 
Deir Yassin. This village, off the main roads and surrounded by 
Jewish lands, had taken no part in the war, and had even fought 
off the Arab bands who wanted to use the village as their base. On
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April 9 (The New York Times), terrorist bands attacked this peaceful 
village, which was not a m ilitary objective in the fighting, killed 
most of its inhabitants - 240 men, women and children - and kept a 
few of them alive to parade as captives through the streets of 
Jerusalem. Most of the Jewish community was horrified at the deed, 
and the Jewish Agency sent a telegram of apology to King Abdullah 
of Trans -Jordan.
But the terrorists, far from being ashamed of their act, were 
proud of this massacre, publicized it, widely, and invited all the 
foreign correspondents present in the country to view the heaped 
corpses and the general havoc at Deir Yassin.
The Deir Yassin incident exemplifies the character and actions 
of the Freedom Party. W ithin the Jewish community they have 
preached an admixture of ultra-nationalism, religious mysticism, and 
racial superiority. Like other Fascist parties they have been used to 
break strikes, and have themselves pressed for the destruction of 
free trade unions. In their stead they have proposed corporate 
unions on the Italian Fascist model. During the last years of sporadic 
anti-British violence, the IZL and Stern groups inaugurated a reign 
of terror in the Palestine Jewish community. Teachers were beaten 
up for speaking against them. By gangster methods, beatings, 
window-smashing, and wide-spread robberies, the terrorists 
intimidated the population and exacted heavy tribute.
The people of the Freedom Party have had no part in the 
constructive achievements in Palestine. They have reclaimed no 
land, built no settlements, and only detracted from the Jewish 
defense activity. Their much publicized immigration endeavors 
were minute, and devoted mainly to bringing in Fascist compatriots.
The discrepancies between the bold claims now being made by 
Begin and his party, and their record of past performance in 
Palestine bear the imprint of no ordinary political party. This is the 
unmistakable stamp of a Fascist party for whom terrorism (against 
Jews, Arabs, and British alike) and misrepresentation are means, and 
a “Leader State” is the goal.
In the light of the foregoing considerations, it is imperative that 
the truth about Mr. Begin and his movement be made known in this 
country. It is all the more tragic that the top leadership of American 
Zionism has refused to campaign against Begin’s efforts, or even to 
expose to its own constituents the dangers to Israel from support to
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Begin.
The undersigned therefore take this means of publicly 
presenting a few salient facts concerning Begin and his party; and of 
urging all concerned not to support this latest manifestation of 
fascism.
Isidore Abramowitz, Hannah Arendt, Abraham 
Brick, Rabbi Jesurun Cardozo, Albert Einstein, 
Herman Eisen, M. D., Hayim Fineman, M. Galleri,
D., H. H. Harris, Zelig S. Harris, Sidney Hook, Fred 
Kabush, BruriaKaufman, Irma L. Lindheim,
Nachman Majsel, Seymour Malman, Myer D. 
Mendelson, M. D., Harry M. Orlinsky, Samuel Pitlick, 
Fritz Rohrlich, Louis P. Rocker, Ruth Sager, Itzak 
Sankowsky, L J. Schoenberg, Samuel Shuman,
M. Unger, Irma Wolpe, Stepan Wolfe.
New York, Dec. 2 ,19481
11bid, p. 588-590.
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GLOSSARY
(Note: The purpose of this glossary is to briefly supply a definition as 
it relates to the dissertation. It is not meant to completely define a 
term or list the achievements of any group or individual)
ALIYAH (Hebrew, ascent) the coming of the Jews to settle in Eretz 
Israel. This term does not only denote immigration, but expresses the 
essence of Zionism, the return of the Jew to his homeland. The First 
Aliyah (1882-1903) brought 25,000; the Second Aliyah (1904-1914) 
brought approximately 40,000 Eastern European Jews; the Third 
Aliyah brought about 35,000; the Fourth Aliyah (1924-1928) 
brought 67,000; the Fifth Aliyah (1929-1939) brought some 250,000 
Jews, most of which were refugees from Nazi Europe.
ALTALENA - Pseudonym of Vladimir Jabotinsky for his column in 
the Russian newspaper, Odessa News, during the early 1900’s.
ALTALENA - Ship purchased by the Irgun which sailed from France 
with fighting forces, ammunition and weapons for Israel but was 
destroyed by the Haganah before it was unloaded.
AMERICAN LEAGUE FOR A FREE PALESTINE - Established in 1944 to 
support a Jewish national independence movement in Palestine to 
defeat the British Mandatory Government there; directed by Yltshak 
Ben Ami from 1946 to 1948; co-chaired by Senator Guy Gillette and 
American author Ben Hecht. The organization was closely affiliated 
with the Hebrew Committee of National Liberation. Jewish 
establishment organizations opposed these groups. In 1946 the 
League produced the Broadway play, “A Flag is Born.” The proceeds 
benefited the Irgun. The League was dissolved in November 1948.
ARLOSOROFF, Chaim - Labor leader whose assassination was
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ARLOSOROFF, Chaim - Labor leader whose assassination was 
allegedly blamed on the Revisionists in order to discredit their 
growing movement
BALFOUR DECLARATION - on November 2, 1917, Lord Balfour, in 
correspondence to Lord Rothschild, promised British support for a 
Jewish State in Palestine.
BERGSON, Peter - alias for Hillel Kook while working for the Irgun in 
the United States.
BETAR - Acronym for B’rith Trumpeldor; Zionist youth organization 
founded by Vladimir Jabotinsky in 1924, dedicated to the formation 
of a Jewish State in Palestine, and affiliated with the Zionist 
Revisionist Movement
BRITISH MANDATE FOR PALESTINE - One of four Mandates 
established by the League of Nations after World War I; Iraq and 
Palestine came under British Mandatory Power, Lebanon and Syria 
under French Mandatory Power. The Mandate for Palestine stated 
that the Mandatory would be responsible for securing the 
establishment of a Jewish National Home there.
COMMITTEE FOR A JEWISH ARMY - organized in 1941 by the Irgun 
Delegation to the United, the Committee aimed to create a Jewish 
Army based in Palestine to fight under Allied Command. It was 
opposed by the Jewish establishment but succeeded in heightening 
public awareness of the plight of the Jews in Europe. It ceased to 
function in 1944 after the creation of the Jewish Brigade and was 
succeeded by the American League for a Free Palestine.
Diaspora - the Jewish communities dispersed outside Eretz Israel.
Die Tat- daily newspaper of the Irgun (1938-1939), published in 
Yiddish in Warsaw, Poland.
EBAN, Abba - Israeli representative to the United Nations. Supporter 
of the Labor party, opponent of the underground movements (Irgun 
and Lechi).
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ELDAD, Dr. Israel - chief theoretician for the underground movement, 
Lechi.
ERETZ ISRAEL - Land of Israel.
HADANI - Alias for Dr. Alex Raphaeli while working for the Irgun 
Delegation to the United States.
HAGANAH- Underground self-defense m ilitia of Jews in Palestine 
created in 1920 by Jabotinsky for the defense of Jewish settlements 
against Arab attacks. In 1931 arguments over the effectiveness of 
the organization led to the split which resulted in the formation of 
the Irgun Z’vai Leumi.
HEBREW COMMITTEE FOR NATIONAL LIBERATION - founded in 1944 
by the Irgun Delegation to the United States under the leadership of 
Hillel Kook. The group sought to establish a Jewish state in Eretz 
Israel.
HECHT, Ben - author, journalist, important contributor to the ad 
campaign of the Irgun Delegation to the United States, writing 
scathingly critical ads opposing the U.S. policy toward the Jews of 
Europe during the Holocaust
HECHT, Reuben - European contact for the Irgun who assisted in the 
American war effort by helping to free American airmen and by 
gathering intelligence.
HERUT - Irgun underground newspaper (1942-1948), later the 
political party of Menachem Begin.
HERZL, Theodore - The father of political Zionism; author, journalist
IRGUN Z’VAI LEUMI (IRGUN - IZL) - underground Jewish military 
organization founded in Palestine in 1931 and headed by Ze’ev 
Jabotinsky from 1937 until he died in 1940; later headed by 
Menachem Begin. From 1931 to 1939 the Irgun protected Jews from 
Arab attacks, and retaliated. The British White Paper, issued in May
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1939, initiated a new stage of Irgun activities which included attacks 
and sabotage against the British. The Irgun ceased activities against 
the British during World War II to join the Allies in the fight against 
Germany. Under the leadership of Menachem Begin the Irgun 
resumed its anti-British efforts in 1944. In 1948 the Irgun was 
incorporated into the Israel Defense Forces.
JABOTINSKY, Vladimir (Ze’ev) - founder of the Revisionist Party; 
leader and founder of the New Zionist Organization and head of the 
Irgun.
JEWISH BRIGADE - a World War II British m ilitary unit which fought 
under a Jewish flag.
JEWISH LEGION - a World War I British m ilitary unit which fought 
under a Jewish flag.
KATZ, Shmuel - Foreign Affairs advisor to Prime Minister Menachem 
Begin, member of Irgun High Command, Knessett member, author, 
writer for the lerusalem Post.
KOOK, Hillel - (Peter Bergson) leader of the Irgun Delegation to the 
United States (also called the Bergson Group), nephew of the chief 
Rabbi of Jerusalem.
LECHI - (Lohamei Herut Israel, Hebrew for Freedom Fighters of 
Israel), also known as the Stern Gang, the Jewish underground in 
Palestine which fought the British from 1940 - 1948, organized and 
led by Avraham Stern. This group split from the Irgun following the 
Irgun’s decision to refrain from fighting the British during World 
War II. Lechi also differed from the Irgun in its method of attack, 
Lechi choosing personal assassinations of British officials rather than 
military targets.
MERLIN, Shmuel - one of the original group of five delegates sent to 
America by the Irgun.
NETANYAHU, Benzion - leader of the Revisionist Zionist movement 
in America, Executive Director of the New Zionist Organization,
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Professor, author, editor of Zionews.
NEW ZIONIST ORGANIZATION OF AMERICA - the Revisionist political 
party in America, headed by Ben Zion Netanyahu.
PALMACH - The striking units of the Haganah; dominated by 
socialists
RAPHAELI, Dr. Alexe - one of the original group of five delegates sent 
to America by the Irgun. Founder of Jerusalem Pencils, Director of 
Israel Aircraft Industries, Jerusalem Economic Corp., Zim Israel 
Navigation Company, Ltd., Dagon Ltd., Haifa.
REVISIONIST PARTY - See Union of Zionist Revisionists.
“SEASON”- (“The Hunting Season”) A campaign (Nov. 1944 - Oct. 
1945) organized by Haganah, under Ben-Gurion’s leadership, to 
inform on, kidnap and interrogate Irgun and Lechi members in an 
attempt to stop them from attacking the British. Most of those 
captured were turned over to the British and were imprisoned in 
Palestine or exiled to prisons in Africa.
SHAMIR, Yltshak- Former Prime Minister of Israel; leader of Lechi 
following the assassination of Avraham Stem.
UNION OF ZIONIST REVISIONISTS - Zionist political movement 
founded by by Vladim ir Jabotinsky in 1925 with the goal o f 
establishing a Jewish State in Palestine on both sides of the Jordan. 
In 1935 the Revisionists left the World Zionist Organization and 
established the New Zionist Organization.
UNITED RESISTANCE MOVEMENT (UMR) - coordinated anti-British 
military actions of the Haganah, Irgun and Lechi which lasted from 
November 1945 to August 1946.
WHITE PAPER OF 1939 - official British rejection of the partition 
plan; a proposal for a Palestinian state having an Arab majority. 
Under the plan Jewish immigration and rights to purchase land 
would terminate within five years.
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WYMAN, David - author of The Abandonment of the lews, which 
criticized the actions of the United States government during the 
Holocaust with regard to the lack of effort to save the Jews of Europe.
ZIONISM - the political movement which called for the return of the 
Jewish people to Eretz Israel.
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